445th BG Sept 27, 1944 - worst US bomb group loss, ever. Why?

[drgondog]

Stewart missed the worst mission of the 445th, namely when it lost the highest number of bombers of any US Bomb Group - ever. I'm still researching the September 27, 1944 mission to Kassel when the 2nd BW departed at the IP andwent toward Gottingen. Two mysteries. 1. Was 2BW tasked to separate and meet at Rally Point NNE of Kassel past Gottingen? 2.) Why did 4th FG not fly escort as the 2nd Box (2BW) as their assignment?

I still need to find the 8th AF MPI target codes to make a final judgment.

FYI the 65FW escorted the 2nd BD that day, 56FG flew Penetration Support to the IP, sweeping out front before turning back about 20 mi west of Kassel.

The 355th covered Vinegrove 1 and 2 up front, the 4th escorted middle and 361st covering the last two boxes. My father flew that mission in lead squadron of 355th. His briefing map is attached. It shows that the 479th (with Olds as squadron CO of 434FS/479th FG) was tasked with meeting the bombers at the Rally Point slightly NE of Gottingen. Based on the follow up 2nd BD debriefing his squadron arrived, spotted the B-24s flying south and swept from trailing box to lead - but didn't see the 445th and 389th and 453rd near Gottingen. The lead and trail BW were near the waypoint (Eisenach) to turn SW for the eturn home. The 445th was perhaps 25 mi in trail south bound when hit by JG3 and JG4 Sturms. The 445th lost 25 B-24s and 22 crews near Eisnenach/Eswege in the span of perhaps 5 minutes.

Last but not least, I have not seen another Briefing Map showing the separate bomber tracks from Initial Point to Rally Point. Nor have I seen another BG mission map showing a Rally Point NE of Gottingen.

Thoughts?

 

[Maxrobot1]

The Kassel Mission Historical Society

Thirty-five 445th Bomb Group B-24 Liberators and 336 men who make up their crews, suffered the greatest single-day loss to a group from one airfield in aviation warfare history, all within six minutes. Only four B-24s of the original thirty-five return safely to base at Tibenham. 117 airmen of...

www.kasselmission.org

 

[drgondog]

The Kassel Mission Historical Society

Thirty-five 445th Bomb Group B-24 Liberators and 336 men who make up their crews, suffered the greatest single-day loss to a group from one airfield in aviation warfare history, all within six minutes. Only four B-24s of the original thirty-five return safely to base at Tibenham. 117 airmen of...

www.kasselmission.org

Hi Max - I have contributed much to answering the how and why. Linda Dewey and Mike Simpson an Christina Olds have added much to my understanding of the details.The final questions are threefold - a) Why did my father's 355th FG Briefing map show a clear and separate strike track from the IP due east, while the main force went SE to Kassel, and b.) why the 2nd BD Frag Order specify a separate set of MPIs for the Vinegrove 3 (445th w/453 flights),, different from Vinegrove 4 (389th with 453rd flights), and c.) why did the 445th track match the 355th Briefing map, yet be deemed an error in the post mission de-briefing?

The Frag Order that came from 2nd BD to 355th should have been the same that went to the 4th, 56th, 361st and 479th FGs, save the specific escort assignments. The Frag Order contained the same R/V points to locate the 2nd BD and pick up escort, as well as the IP and the RP -

 

[Timppa]

Excerpt from John Weal's book (Luftwaffe Sturmgruppen):

Whatever decisions, if any, were arrived at, 27 September would, for the first time, see all three Sturmgruppen operating together in a single Gefechtsverband.
The Eighth Air Force's objectives on that day included transportation networks and war plants in western Germany; and it was against the 2nd Bomb Division's B-24s, targeting the Henschel works in Kassel (producers of the much-feared Tiger tank), that the first massed Sturm assault would be directed.

IV.(Sturm)/JG3 scrambled from its temporary base at Alteno at 1000 hrs. After rendezvousing with the other Gruppen (including I./JG 300, whose Bf 109s were to fly cover), the entire formation set course for Kassel. Some 45 minutes later contact was made with part of the attacking force to the southwest of the target area. The Gefechtsverband had chanced upon the 'wandering' 445th BG, which, having become separated from the main bomber stream, had opted for Göttingen as a target of opportunity and was now heading back out over Eisenach.

The three Sturmgruppen hit the unescorted Liberators in turn. The first to attack was IV.(Sturm)/JG 3. Flying their customary broad arrowhead withHauptmann Moritz at the point, the pilots bored in close before splitting into Staffeln, their heavy 30 mm cannon cutting swathes through the hapless Liberator formation. In just three minutes they had claimed a staggering 17 B-24s destroyed, plus a further four Herausschusse. Their own casualties amounted to just five pilots wounded.

Next to go in was II.(Sturm)/JG 300. The Liberator gunners were fighting for their lives. The Gruppe's 21 claims (a third of them Herausschusse) cost it seven pilots killed, the sky now a tumult of burning and exploding aircraft. One surviving B-24 pilot recalled the scene. 'At one moment I saw four German fighters and five of our own bombers going down around me. It was indescribable'.

One of the assailants, 5.(Sturm)/JG 300's Unteroffizier Ernst Schroder, was more graphic in his description of the bloody clash high over Eisenach;
'As we approached in close formation we could see the results of the first wave's attack - some bombers on fire, others blowing up. My Staffelkapitan and I had a new type of experimental gyroscopic gun-sight fitted in our fighters. This enabled me to claim two B-24s within seconds of each other.
'When I hit the first it immediately flipped over onto its side and went down. Its neighbour was already damaged, the two left-hand engines pouring smoke. The new sight allowed me to line up on him almost instantly. Another short burst and he was enveloped in flames. I flew alongside him for a moment, staring at the long banner of fire streaming back beyond his tailplane. Then this great machine slowly turned over onto its back before it too plunged earthwards.'

By this time a group of P-51s that had been escorting a formation of 1st Division B-17s near Cologne, some 100 miles (180 km) away to the east, and had picked up the Liberators' calls for assistance when they first spotted the approaching mass of German fighters, were finally beginning to arrive on the scene - four minutes after IV.(Sturm)/JG 3's first unopposed pass.

Despite their belated appearance, the Mustangs may have been responsible for some of II.(Sturm)/JG 300's losses. They certainly inflicted heavy casualties on the reconstituted II.(Sturm)/JG 4, whose pilots were in the last of the three waves to go in. The Gruppe's subsequent claims for 25 B-24s destroyed, plus a further 14 Herausschusse, are patently wide of the mark (the bomber formation was never that large to start with, let alone after the first two attacks!), but the inexperience of many of the pilots in this, their baptism of fire, should perhaps be taken into account.

There are fewer uncertainties about the unit's casualties. At least 13 of its Sturmbocke were hit, and seven pilots were reported killed or missing, with another three wounded. Nor were the losses restricted to the ranks of the replacements, for among the missing was arguably one of the most experienced Sturmpiloten of all - the veteran Staffelkapitan of 7.(Sturm)/JG4, Oberleutnant Ottmar Zehart. His wingman that day was Obergefreiter Gerhard Kott, who recalled;
'After our first pass we wanted to re-form for a second attack. But hardly had the Gruppe got itself into some sort of formation before I saw Zehart's
machine rapidly losing height. He was later posted as missing.'

 

[drgondog]

Excerpt from John Weal's book (Luftwaffe Sturmgruppen):

Whatever decisions, if any, were arrived at, 27 September would, for the first time, see all three Sturmgruppen operating together in a single Gefechtsverband.
The Eighth Air Force's objectives on that day included transportation networks and war plants in western Germany; and it was against the 2nd Bomb Division's B-24s, targeting the Henschel works in Kassel (producers of the much-feared Tiger tank), that the first massed Sturm assault would be directed.

IV.(Sturm)/JG3 scrambled from its temporary base at Alteno at 1000 hrs. After rendezvousing with the other Gruppen (including I./JG 300, whose Bf 109s were to fly cover), the entire formation set course for Kassel. Some 45 minutes later contact was made with part of the attacking force to the southwest of the target area. The Gefechtsverband had chanced upon the 'wandering' 445th BG, which, having become separated from the main bomber stream, had opted for Göttingen as a target of opportunity and was now heading back out over Eisenach.

The 445th made a deliberate course change from approximately 120 degrees to 067 degrees. Te rest of 2BD took heading 090.
The Box of 2CBW that set course based on lead ship 'Mickey' radar was comprised of 445th and elements of 453rd BG. The lead 453rd BG CO called the 445th Mission CO to tell him he was on the wrong course and remained with the rest of the 2CW, but now in lead position to the box of 389th and the 453rd.

By this time a group of P-51s that had been escorting a formation of 1st Division B-17s near Cologne, some 100 miles (180 km) away to the east, and had picked up the Liberators' calls for assistance when they first spotted the approaching mass of German fighters, were finally beginning to arrive on the scene - four minutes after IV.(Sturm)/JG 3's first unopposed pass.he re

The first contact was by 355thFG 354FS/Yellow Flight led by Henry Brown. Brown reported many flashes about 20 mi to the rear and immediately flew back to attack 10 FW 190s which broke for the deck near Eschwege - perhaps from the 3rd wave of your narrative. The 355th was escorting Vinegrove 3-1 in the lead and to the SSW of Kassel at the time. The 361st and 4th FG joined shortly aftewards near Eisenach. Brown and Priest shot down 3 FW.
190s under the cloud cover.

The 1st BD escorts (352nd FG) scored near Frankfurt.

Despite their belated appearance, the Mustangs may have been responsible for some of II.(Sturm)/JG 300's losses. They certainly inflicted heavy casualties on the reconstituted II.(Sturm)/JG 4, whose pilots were in the last of the three waves to go in. The Gruppe's subsequent claims for 25 B-24s destroyed, plus a further 14 Herausschusse, are patently wide of the mark (the bomber formation was never that large to start with, let alone after the first two attacks!), but the inexperience of many of the pilots in this, their baptism of fire, should perhaps be taken into account.

Each 'Box' was approximately 50 B-24s. That said the lead box of 50 comprised of 445th and three flights of 453rd were reduced when the 453rd stayed on course. 35 445th BG B-24s bombed 4mi west of Gottingen, turned NE, then S about 20 miles+ behind 14BW in trail to rest of the Division. 22 went down immediately, 2 crashed in France and one crashed in UK.

There are fewer uncertainties about the unit's casualties. At least 13 of its Sturmbocke were hit, and seven pilots were reported killed or missing, with another three wounded. Nor were the losses restricted to the ranks of the replacements, for among the missing was arguably one of the most experienced Sturmpiloten of all - the veteran Staffelkapitan of 7.(Sturm)/JG4, Oberleutnant Ottmar Zehart. His wingman that day was Obergefreiter Gerhard Kott, who recalled;
'After our first pass we wanted to re-form for a second attack. But hardly had the Gruppe got itself into some sort of formation before I saw Zehart's
machine rapidly losing height. He was later posted as missing.'

Worst single loss for any US Bomb Group - ever.

 

[Erich]

interesting in Weals book which much was taken off of our Sturmgruppen web-site years ago. yes Sturm JG 3 shot down 18 B-24's the first to go in though it was reported JG 4 had a mix of Fw's with Sturm JG 3 as well. Definitely the worst US bg losses in a single op.