Lucky13
Forum Mascot
.....and Japan attacked the Soviet Union instead for US and Pearl Harbor....now what?
7th of December, 1941....
- Thread starter Lucky13
- Start date
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Looks a good question for me, Jan.
There was no remarkable reason for Japan yet to attack Soviet Union as it only needed immediate oil to go on the war in China to wipe out communists but, if Japan had done it, there would have been no Pearl Harbor on the date.
There was no remarkable reason for Japan yet to attack Soviet Union as it only needed immediate oil to go on the war in China to wipe out communists but, if Japan had done it, there would have been no Pearl Harbor on the date.
This would have been a much better strategic option for Japan, but the realization of this is helped by a healthy dose of hindsight. I believe it's a much more difficult argument to make operating from the perspective of the Japanese at the time.
The Japanese had a dim view of the U.S. as a potential adversary. This perspective wasn't completely unfounded - even the British had to be convinced of the U.S. ability to equip and field competent armed forces overseas. Churchill in particular had doubts until he observed U.S. troop exercises stateside in early '42. Of course, both the Japanese and British were completely wrong on this point, but both at least had a justifiable basis at the time for holding that view. It's not as much that the Japanese underestimated the industrial potential of the U.S. (which they did), but rather they believed that the U.S. populace was soft and would not have the "fighting spirit" to stomach a prolonged conflict - thus negating any long-term industrial superiority.
Since the Japanese evaluated the U.S. incorrectly, they believed they could contain a war with the U.S. A negotiated peace following a short, intense war was the only way for Japan to win against the U.S. Although considered a victory at the time, Pearl Harbor obliterated any hope of this; afterwards, the Japanese were going to lose, it was just a matter of when. The attack was also a huge gift to the Allies because it eliminated just about any dissent in the U.S. populace about intervening/going to war. Hitler put the "bow tie" on it when he made the declaration of war, which spared Roosevelt justifying supporting the U.K. in Europe when it was the Japanese who attacked.
By attacking the Soviet Union, the Japanese would have robbed the U.S. of its rallying cry while at the same time attacking the resolve of the Soviet Union. Not to disparage the people of the Soviet Union - they proved their mettle and then some. But you have to understand that Stalin was so successful in consolidating power that in a very real sense he *was* the Soviet Union (insert "I am the Senate" meme here). He had already suffered one breakdown/withdrawal after the initial German invasion; although the Germans had not accomplished everything they wanted (i.e. capturing Moscow before winter), the initiative was squarely with the Germans at the time. Perhaps a two-front war delivered right at the time the Germans seemed unstoppable would have been enough to topple Stalin's house of cards.
On a more practical note, the move would have more closely aligned the strategies of the Axis while making it more difficult for the Allies to cooperate to the degree which they did historically. The Japanese could have picked up some oil fields on Sakhalin Island, securing a decent oil source close to home. They already had a nice reserve of oil and their fleet doctrine could have been kept as a "fleet in being", acting as a deterrent by simply existing and not needing to sail around much. The Japanese would have had a hard fight on their hands, and they probably would have made little progress on the Asian mainland against the excellent forces the Soviets kept in the Far East. The Japanese probably wouldn't have much to show for such a war, and justifying its continuance would be difficult. Yet, at the very least they would deprive Stalin of the luxury of later transferring the bulk of those forces to participate in the counterattacks following Stalingrad - when the Soviets seized the initiative.
As it turned out historically, the Axis demonstrated next to no competency in cooperation. They did very little pre-planning together and mostly just reacted to one another. On the other hand, the U.S. and British Combined Chiefs of Staff, while imperfect, did much to prioritize and coordinate the Allied war efforts. December 1941 became the month the "reach" of the Axis exceeded its "grasp", and almost any hope of Axis total victory was lost.
The Japanese had a dim view of the U.S. as a potential adversary. This perspective wasn't completely unfounded - even the British had to be convinced of the U.S. ability to equip and field competent armed forces overseas. Churchill in particular had doubts until he observed U.S. troop exercises stateside in early '42. Of course, both the Japanese and British were completely wrong on this point, but both at least had a justifiable basis at the time for holding that view. It's not as much that the Japanese underestimated the industrial potential of the U.S. (which they did), but rather they believed that the U.S. populace was soft and would not have the "fighting spirit" to stomach a prolonged conflict - thus negating any long-term industrial superiority.
Since the Japanese evaluated the U.S. incorrectly, they believed they could contain a war with the U.S. A negotiated peace following a short, intense war was the only way for Japan to win against the U.S. Although considered a victory at the time, Pearl Harbor obliterated any hope of this; afterwards, the Japanese were going to lose, it was just a matter of when. The attack was also a huge gift to the Allies because it eliminated just about any dissent in the U.S. populace about intervening/going to war. Hitler put the "bow tie" on it when he made the declaration of war, which spared Roosevelt justifying supporting the U.K. in Europe when it was the Japanese who attacked.
By attacking the Soviet Union, the Japanese would have robbed the U.S. of its rallying cry while at the same time attacking the resolve of the Soviet Union. Not to disparage the people of the Soviet Union - they proved their mettle and then some. But you have to understand that Stalin was so successful in consolidating power that in a very real sense he *was* the Soviet Union (insert "I am the Senate" meme here). He had already suffered one breakdown/withdrawal after the initial German invasion; although the Germans had not accomplished everything they wanted (i.e. capturing Moscow before winter), the initiative was squarely with the Germans at the time. Perhaps a two-front war delivered right at the time the Germans seemed unstoppable would have been enough to topple Stalin's house of cards.
On a more practical note, the move would have more closely aligned the strategies of the Axis while making it more difficult for the Allies to cooperate to the degree which they did historically. The Japanese could have picked up some oil fields on Sakhalin Island, securing a decent oil source close to home. They already had a nice reserve of oil and their fleet doctrine could have been kept as a "fleet in being", acting as a deterrent by simply existing and not needing to sail around much. The Japanese would have had a hard fight on their hands, and they probably would have made little progress on the Asian mainland against the excellent forces the Soviets kept in the Far East. The Japanese probably wouldn't have much to show for such a war, and justifying its continuance would be difficult. Yet, at the very least they would deprive Stalin of the luxury of later transferring the bulk of those forces to participate in the counterattacks following Stalingrad - when the Soviets seized the initiative.
As it turned out historically, the Axis demonstrated next to no competency in cooperation. They did very little pre-planning together and mostly just reacted to one another. On the other hand, the U.S. and British Combined Chiefs of Staff, while imperfect, did much to prioritize and coordinate the Allied war efforts. December 1941 became the month the "reach" of the Axis exceeded its "grasp", and almost any hope of Axis total victory was lost.
buffnut453
Captain
I'd like to clarify the question being asked. By "Japan attacked the Soviet Union instead for US and Pearl Harbor" do you mean the entire southern campaign was cancelled, to include the attacks on Thailand, Burma and Malaya (as stepping-stones to the oil-rich NEI)? Just asking because access to oil was the main focus for Japan's actions on/around 7 Dec 1941.
Last edited:
Yes, Japanese would have had to advance to Ukraine to secure the oil field.
The Basket
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,712
- Jun 27, 2007
Japan did have a little war with USSR in 1939 and didn't go well so they decided not to repeat in 1941.
Simply put Navy wanted Pacific war and Army wanted Soviet war but the Khalkhin Gol conflict meant even the hotheads in the army had to support the navy.
Much is made of the Pearl Harbour attack but the did far worse in the Philippines only a day later.
Simply put Navy wanted Pacific war and Army wanted Soviet war but the Khalkhin Gol conflict meant even the hotheads in the army had to support the navy.
Much is made of the Pearl Harbour attack but the did far worse in the Philippines only a day later.
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 4,022
- Jun 25, 2013
What did the US do so Japan didn't attack the US? Acquiesce to their rampage throughout China? Or does Stalin suddenly decide to avenge Port Arthur?
As an aside, Stalin was not particularly supportive of Mao, possibly as he viewed Chiang Kai-Shek to be more effective against the Japanese. See, for example, Radchenko (http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/rp/publications/no09/09_08_Radchenko.pdf); this is not a fringe position. My suspicion is that, first, Stalin felt Mao was not his to control, so he wasn't going to empower him, and, second, antipathy towards Japan was more important than abstract attraction towards the Chinese communists. Overall, I do not see all that many step changes in behavior towards neighbors from the czars to the commisars.
