90th anniversary of Jutland.
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renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
delcyros seems to have a lot of data on naval matters which makes his posts always interesting. The British BCs gunnery seemed to have been deficient compared to their battleships. Another factor about the effectiveness of the British gunfire that has been pointed out is that their bursting charges in the AP shells was lyddite which proved to be unstable and caused the charge to explode prematurely. The German shells used another explosive I believe called trotyl which was more stable and more effective.
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
I believe it was Beatty who was supposed to have said to Lion's captain after he thought(mistakenly) that Princess Royal had blown up " something seems to be the matter with our bloody ships today, steer two points closer to the enemy" probably a myth but this was before the third BC the Invincible had blown up.
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
The reason given for the charmed life of New Zealand during the battle(I believe she received not a single hit) was that her captain was wearing a Maori skirt which had been given him by those tribesmen and the skirt bestowed it's luck on the ship. To me the decisions, conduct and actions of Hipper and his battle cruisers deserve all of the praise possible for meritorious and effective behavior during the battle. I can only compare their fortitude and bravery to the actions of the small boys and jeep carriers at Leyte Gulf.
Very true about Del's postings. A treasure trove of facts and information. Very good to read.
Heard the same thing about the New Zealand. Of the 6 BCs in that line, she was the only one to get away without any casualties.
Think Hipper's BC squadron was thrown away. Scheer could've done a better job of handling them. The "Death Ride" was a panic move. Probably could've gotten them home (for the most part) in one piece. And the turn back towards the Brits the second time, what was he thinking? Read plenty of it but still have no clue.
On the other hand, Jellicoe made sound decisions throughout the battle. Ended up getting the short end of the stick from the Admiralty while the guy who screwed up most of his decisions (Beatty) ended up being promoted.
Go figure. Probably a lesson in making sure you make friends in high places when getting promoted.
Henk
Master Sergeant
German Navy could have won taht they if they just cept on fighting. No one actualy won the battle, but if you take losses the Germans won the battle that they lost the least men. The German Navy were never used again in a major Naval battle again. I wish I could see some of those German and British Battleships. Oh, and were the Baden class there it would have been great.
trackend
Chief Master Sergeant
Good Post Del
In my opinion the German Fleet would of lost had they not withdrawn.
My take is that although the German fleet inflicted heavier casualties they failed to acheive the original objectives in fact all it proved was that they could not take on the British and hope to take command of the sea
It was the German fleet that withdrew to port so I say they lost as they no longer commanded the ground.
In my opinion the German Fleet would of lost had they not withdrawn.
My take is that although the German fleet inflicted heavier casualties they failed to acheive the original objectives in fact all it proved was that they could not take on the British and hope to take command of the sea
It was the German fleet that withdrew to port so I say they lost as they no longer commanded the ground.
Agree with Trackend on this one. The High Seas fleet was only under the guns of the Grand Fleet for a relatively short time. In terms of numbers, that is where they were most vulnerable. The British Battleships could and did stand the shelling very well. An example of this is the damage done to the Warspite. She survived in spite of being targeted by almost every gun on the German Battleline (for a short time). The Brits had a larger number of larger guns. Brits built their battleships to shoot then survive. The Germans built theirs battleships to survive then shoot.
I think the Germans did ok, as did the British. True, it was not a total victory for either side. But, if I had to make a decision on it, I would give it to the Brits on Points. The Germans did come out of port again later in the war, but they did not have any great affect as a fleet. They were not a threat to British trade.
The German High Seas Fleet was a failed weapon (IMHO). Tirpitz idea of being a threat but not being able to destroy the opposition was a failed strategy. The results of his theory was the creation of a fleet that made an enemy of the British (who were not one before). The fleet never paid for itself strategically and, in fact, was one of the causes of the eventual German defeat.
I think the Germans did ok, as did the British. True, it was not a total victory for either side. But, if I had to make a decision on it, I would give it to the Brits on Points. The Germans did come out of port again later in the war, but they did not have any great affect as a fleet. They were not a threat to British trade.
The German High Seas Fleet was a failed weapon (IMHO). Tirpitz idea of being a threat but not being able to destroy the opposition was a failed strategy. The results of his theory was the creation of a fleet that made an enemy of the British (who were not one before). The fleet never paid for itself strategically and, in fact, was one of the causes of the eventual German defeat.
delcyros
Tech Sergeant
As to whom won, Jutland was inconlusive, something unexpected by the admirality of both navies. The concept of battlefield possession as pointed out above by trackend, was uncommon in naval theories and put forward exclusively by historians. Altough it must be said that the battlefield possession of the GF directly lead to the scuttling of the CL´s ROSTOCK ELBING in the next morning and to a lesser degree may have played a role in the scuttling of SMS LÜTZOW (Not wanting to say that she could make port otherwise but without having the GF that near, Lützow wouldn´t have driven to unadvisable high speed as she did historically. The main reason why the weakened principal transverse bulkhead (forward) gave way at about midnight).
Jutland was a minor tactical victory for the HSF but not the decisive they were seeking for. In the meantime, it was a bad lesson for the GF but without suffering real substantial losses, so that they could keep up the tight blockade over Germany. True, the GF seeked for a second Trafalgar and the way things developed were not favourable but in the end, the GF chased the HSF, and that´s what counts.
I think that both, Scheer Jellicoe did a hell of a job out there with the limits in communication in mind.
Regarding the ability of the QE´s to survive in the battleline, WARSPITE might not be the proper example. The events of her steering gear jam made a spectacular story but this is not reflected by the damage inflicted. She was withdrawn because her buoyancy and stability was compromised (caused by some flooding aft), along with a significant limitation in speed. Her combat factors were not that much imited. Other QE´s suffered more in the brief engagement with the van: Placed as the last ship of the line, MALAYA did not waited until WARSPITE finished her turn and turned together with her out of sight from the german van. MALAYA received seven major calibre hits in this event, suffering 63 dead and 68 wounded (much more than WARSPITE), with her whole secondary starboard 6" artillery out of action following two contemporary hits. She was lucky to survive the turn as smoldering fragments defeated the main armour deck via ammunition hoists and landed on cordite bags of the shell handling rooms. The prompt action of PO Day and L/S Watson prevented the disaster, they removed the debris. If these cartridges had ignited, there is little doubt that the forward 6" magazine (located above the shell rooms and in open condition with it) would have exploded and as this magazine was adjacent to the forward 15" magazine, as pointed out by Campbell, the loss of the ship must have followed. A diving shell also caused some flooding so that MALAYA technically was in a far worser state than was WARSPITE, developing 4 degrees list. Even BARHAM suffered from more losses (28 dead, 46 wounded) by only 4 major calibre hits than did WARSPITE.
Jutland was a minor tactical victory for the HSF but not the decisive they were seeking for. In the meantime, it was a bad lesson for the GF but without suffering real substantial losses, so that they could keep up the tight blockade over Germany. True, the GF seeked for a second Trafalgar and the way things developed were not favourable but in the end, the GF chased the HSF, and that´s what counts.
I think that both, Scheer Jellicoe did a hell of a job out there with the limits in communication in mind.
Regarding the ability of the QE´s to survive in the battleline, WARSPITE might not be the proper example. The events of her steering gear jam made a spectacular story but this is not reflected by the damage inflicted. She was withdrawn because her buoyancy and stability was compromised (caused by some flooding aft), along with a significant limitation in speed. Her combat factors were not that much imited. Other QE´s suffered more in the brief engagement with the van: Placed as the last ship of the line, MALAYA did not waited until WARSPITE finished her turn and turned together with her out of sight from the german van. MALAYA received seven major calibre hits in this event, suffering 63 dead and 68 wounded (much more than WARSPITE), with her whole secondary starboard 6" artillery out of action following two contemporary hits. She was lucky to survive the turn as smoldering fragments defeated the main armour deck via ammunition hoists and landed on cordite bags of the shell handling rooms. The prompt action of PO Day and L/S Watson prevented the disaster, they removed the debris. If these cartridges had ignited, there is little doubt that the forward 6" magazine (located above the shell rooms and in open condition with it) would have exploded and as this magazine was adjacent to the forward 15" magazine, as pointed out by Campbell, the loss of the ship must have followed. A diving shell also caused some flooding so that MALAYA technically was in a far worser state than was WARSPITE, developing 4 degrees list. Even BARHAM suffered from more losses (28 dead, 46 wounded) by only 4 major calibre hits than did WARSPITE.
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
At the time of Hipper's Death Ride, Scheer had only 4 effective BCs and, I believe, only16 dreadnoughts, whereas Jellicoe had 24 dreadnoughts, 3 super dreadnoughts, and either 5 or 6 BCs at his disposal. The HSF was so heavily outnumbered I don't see how, short of some miracle, they could have prevailed. Jellicoe was truly the only man on either side who could lose the war in one day and his handling of the GF, all things considered, was quite good. I would give Jellicoe an A, Hipper an A plus, Beatty a B minus and Scheer a C. Scheer was fortunate to get back to the Jade with as few losses as he had. Another point is that the GF was ready for battle just a few days later whereas the HSF was not ready to answer bells for some months.
delcyros
Tech Sergeant
The numbers might support Your view. However, the real difference was the cordite issue. On the paper, Hipper faced 4 QE´s (for most of it) and 6 BC during the Run to the South solely with his five BC´s. He was outnumbered 2:1 but got the better end of it (agreed, with a lot of an visibility advantage), just only because of the cordite. Had the battle, specificly the night battle prolonged or turned into a melee, the GF would get slaughtered with very high probability due to the dangerousness of their propellant charges. There is some room for a decent debate on this but most factors favour the HSF in night engagements (ruggedness in design [higher metacentric stability= more flooding tolerances], stable main propellant charges, fully efficiant APC-rounds, coordination of searchlights with FC, starshells, proper night training, 600mm torpedoes[The LONG LANCE of WW1])
beside of armour (which at the expected close distances wouldn´t play / provide such a huge role / protection on either side).
Personally, I would give Scheer an A-, that´s only because I understand the second turn about maneuvre now (more on that later).
Ahh, couldn´t resist. My 1st drawing of Lützow, the mightiest ship to be sunk at Jutland on either side and the ship with the best gunnery record of that battle.
Attachments
Sweet drawing Del. One thing about both the Germans, they built them pretty. Stil think the Prince Eugen is one of the best looking cruisers I've ever seen.
As usual, I bow to your math on the matter. Question though if the QEs were really in the game until the latter part of the "Run to the South". Missed the signal (not really their mistake, Beatty got a little wound up by events-IMHO). Got in at the end of it but that was after two BCs were gone, LION was mauled (going off memory here so could be a gap). Appreciate your perspective on this.
Definitely want to here you're ideas on the second turn. Always mystified me. What was he thinking? Did he want to fight his way through? I, personally, would've run.
As usual, I bow to your math on the matter. Question though if the QEs were really in the game until the latter part of the "Run to the South". Missed the signal (not really their mistake, Beatty got a little wound up by events-IMHO). Got in at the end of it but that was after two BCs were gone, LION was mauled (going off memory here so could be a gap). Appreciate your perspective on this.
Definitely want to here you're ideas on the second turn. Always mystified me. What was he thinking? Did he want to fight his way through? I, personally, would've run.
delcyros
Tech Sergeant
The Run to the South:
Possibility A) Evan-Thomas starts in close order with Beatty.
Following the battle charts and ship logs, LÜTZOW opened fire at 15:48, followed by LION in the same minute. HMS BARHAM opened firing at 16:08, some 20 minutes later. The whole run to the South lasted 66 minutes till the turn of Beatty (and some more until Evan-Thomas turned). For the remaining 46 minutes (46 out of 66 means that the QE´s didn´t joined very late), the four QE´s recorded a total of six major calibre hits (four on MOLTKE and one each on SEYDLITZ and VON DER TANN). Note that by the time BARHAM opened firing, INDEFATIGABLE´s destruction was four minutes ago and QUEEN MARY was still intact (facing her demise 16 minutes later) as was LION for most (altough her "Q"-turret was already disabled by the hit at 16:00).
If we assume that the gunnery would be around the same than was for the remainder of this phase of engagement, we cannot expect more than 2-3 additional major calibre hits on Hippers five BC´s. That´s insufficiant to make a difference. You might insist that the range was different (LION opened at around 17.000 yards while BARHAM opened at around 19.000 yards) but then it should be noted as well that BARHAM opened from a much more favourable position in terms of visibility than did Beatty (Hipper stayed quite well with the sun in his back against Beatty, which partly explains the low gunnery record of Beatty in this phase of engagement).
for explenation of the second turn about maneuvre, I will need to prepare some battle charts first.
regards,
delc
Possibility A) Evan-Thomas starts in close order with Beatty.
Following the battle charts and ship logs, LÜTZOW opened fire at 15:48, followed by LION in the same minute. HMS BARHAM opened firing at 16:08, some 20 minutes later. The whole run to the South lasted 66 minutes till the turn of Beatty (and some more until Evan-Thomas turned). For the remaining 46 minutes (46 out of 66 means that the QE´s didn´t joined very late), the four QE´s recorded a total of six major calibre hits (four on MOLTKE and one each on SEYDLITZ and VON DER TANN). Note that by the time BARHAM opened firing, INDEFATIGABLE´s destruction was four minutes ago and QUEEN MARY was still intact (facing her demise 16 minutes later) as was LION for most (altough her "Q"-turret was already disabled by the hit at 16:00).
If we assume that the gunnery would be around the same than was for the remainder of this phase of engagement, we cannot expect more than 2-3 additional major calibre hits on Hippers five BC´s. That´s insufficiant to make a difference. You might insist that the range was different (LION opened at around 17.000 yards while BARHAM opened at around 19.000 yards) but then it should be noted as well that BARHAM opened from a much more favourable position in terms of visibility than did Beatty (Hipper stayed quite well with the sun in his back against Beatty, which partly explains the low gunnery record of Beatty in this phase of engagement).
for explenation of the second turn about maneuvre, I will need to prepare some battle charts first.
regards,
delc
Good post, as always, Del.
Always thought the QEs started in much later. Thought the BCs were duking it out on their own for 2x the time posted on your response. Do you have a link to a description of the battle? Not questioning, just want to brush up on the details (and it's all in the details).
If I do my math right, the QEs were engaged for 46 minutes, firing an average of 10 rounds a minute (figuring a lower number for the after turrets not getting into it until 20 minutes after the fight started). 4 ships, 10 RPM, 40 rounds for the group. That would mean around 1600 15" rounds fired in the first 46 minutes with 5 hits. Comes out to well less than 1% hit rate.
Looking forward to your ideas on the second turn about.
My Math has to be off:
1 My RPM is too high.
2. Barnham opens fire 20 minutes into the fight but the ships further back do not start shooting until much later
3. Distance affected the accuracy.
4. Rumor I have heard- British FC was pretty poor, focusing more on rounds out than on rounds on target. Heard the Germans were more regulated and more accurate in their shooting.
I guess the way to answer the question would be to find out when the ships in the QE group started shooting and how many rounds were fired by each ship during the fight. Even with the Barnham firing for the full 46 minutes, the shooting is pretty bad. Assuming all hits were hers, assuming she was firing the whole time-full out, she comes in with an accuracy somewhere less than 1% for her gunnery.
Always thought the QEs started in much later. Thought the BCs were duking it out on their own for 2x the time posted on your response. Do you have a link to a description of the battle? Not questioning, just want to brush up on the details (and it's all in the details).
If I do my math right, the QEs were engaged for 46 minutes, firing an average of 10 rounds a minute (figuring a lower number for the after turrets not getting into it until 20 minutes after the fight started). 4 ships, 10 RPM, 40 rounds for the group. That would mean around 1600 15" rounds fired in the first 46 minutes with 5 hits. Comes out to well less than 1% hit rate.
Looking forward to your ideas on the second turn about.
My Math has to be off:
1 My RPM is too high.
2. Barnham opens fire 20 minutes into the fight but the ships further back do not start shooting until much later
3. Distance affected the accuracy.
4. Rumor I have heard- British FC was pretty poor, focusing more on rounds out than on rounds on target. Heard the Germans were more regulated and more accurate in their shooting.
I guess the way to answer the question would be to find out when the ships in the QE group started shooting and how many rounds were fired by each ship during the fight. Even with the Barnham firing for the full 46 minutes, the shooting is pretty bad. Assuming all hits were hers, assuming she was firing the whole time-full out, she comes in with an accuracy somewhere less than 1% for her gunnery.
Henk
Master Sergeant
Yes, the night battle were bad, but the Germans did quite well with the few they had and the Battle of Jutland still stays one of the best navel battles of all time. The Germans like it has been said could design them pretty, but the RN also had lovely ships. The German shell were also great. They were made to enter the hull or upper structure and then explode once inside the target. The RN shells exploded on impact. If you look at some of the damage on tyhe German ships after the batttle you would see the damage will show how the RN shells worked. The RN knew the German gunners were also great aimers and could shoot very well, but the RN showed that they also can hit there target.
Great drawing Del.
Great drawing Del.
delcyros
Tech Sergeant
Thanks.
My prime source for this is the comprehensive analysis made by Campbell: Jutland. An analysis of the Fighting (Neew York 1986), page 46.
"(...), he (Evan-Thomas) altered course to 133 deg at 16:05 and 3 minutes later [note: 16:08] to about 160 deg, when BARHAM opened fire on the VON DER TANN with 15in CPC at about 19.000 yards"
It´s difficult to find a netsource on that as every source seems to prefer a new timesetting. J. Campbell is the most agreed on but there is even room for a reduction of Evan-Thomas entry according to:
"At 4.03 the British 5th Battle Squadron opened fire, rapidly hitting von der Tann and Moltke".
Battle of Jutland, the battlecruiser battle
I ignored that information for our purposes altough otherwise the webpage turned out to be very accurate.
Campbell even has the round expandeture figures for the 5th BS:
1099 15" rounds have been fired. Altough this is for the whole battle and not seperated by times. I assume that until about 16:22 or so, not all guns of the 5th BS were put to bear on Hipper. It´s reasonable that no more than around 300 major calibre rounds were fired by the 5th BS during the first phase of engagement, and it is possible that the actual figure is as low as 240 rounds, equaling to a hit rate in between 2% and 2.5%. Those rate estimates would also perfectly agree with the average 5th BS hit rate, which was 2.64% for the entire engagement (bearing in mind that the visisbility was somehow better for the run to the north).
As You might notice, average rate of fire was much lower than the theoretical max. battery output. Cease fire times, drill errors, obstruction times and spotting+correction time reduced that significantly over a longer timeframe. For brief engagements, some ships put up a very high rapid fire rate (Kaiser and Derfflinger surpassed 3 rounds per minute in 44 and 48 seconds, respectively occassionally but not for a prolonged period). The ship with the highest ammunition expandeture figure was HMS NEW ZEELAND with 420 rounds on her own for some 3 major calibre hits in respond.
All together, these efforts were put forwards in order to overutilize the fleet in an event of war.
Agreed 100%, Henk. The QE´s and moreso the Splendid Cats were beauties on their own!
My prime source for this is the comprehensive analysis made by Campbell: Jutland. An analysis of the Fighting (Neew York 1986), page 46.
"(...), he (Evan-Thomas) altered course to 133 deg at 16:05 and 3 minutes later [note: 16:08] to about 160 deg, when BARHAM opened fire on the VON DER TANN with 15in CPC at about 19.000 yards"
It´s difficult to find a netsource on that as every source seems to prefer a new timesetting. J. Campbell is the most agreed on but there is even room for a reduction of Evan-Thomas entry according to:
"At 4.03 the British 5th Battle Squadron opened fire, rapidly hitting von der Tann and Moltke".
Battle of Jutland, the battlecruiser battle
I ignored that information for our purposes altough otherwise the webpage turned out to be very accurate.
Campbell even has the round expandeture figures for the 5th BS:
1099 15" rounds have been fired. Altough this is for the whole battle and not seperated by times. I assume that until about 16:22 or so, not all guns of the 5th BS were put to bear on Hipper. It´s reasonable that no more than around 300 major calibre rounds were fired by the 5th BS during the first phase of engagement, and it is possible that the actual figure is as low as 240 rounds, equaling to a hit rate in between 2% and 2.5%. Those rate estimates would also perfectly agree with the average 5th BS hit rate, which was 2.64% for the entire engagement (bearing in mind that the visisbility was somehow better for the run to the north).
As You might notice, average rate of fire was much lower than the theoretical max. battery output. Cease fire times, drill errors, obstruction times and spotting+correction time reduced that significantly over a longer timeframe. For brief engagements, some ships put up a very high rapid fire rate (Kaiser and Derfflinger surpassed 3 rounds per minute in 44 and 48 seconds, respectively occassionally but not for a prolonged period). The ship with the highest ammunition expandeture figure was HMS NEW ZEELAND with 420 rounds on her own for some 3 major calibre hits in respond.
Technically, the RN FC procedures were more advanced than the HSF procedures due to the introduction of centralized fire controll (spotter high placed) and the plot table. On the other hand, the HSF crews were much more methodical in their shooting (introducing ripple firing for quicker range adjustion) and significantly better trained. Prior to ww1 and until late 1915, there even was an annual gunnery championship in the HSF. Every crew could participate on different approaches and distances of target. All in all a quite modern maneuvre. Crack crews like those of AC SCHARNHORST repeatedly won that prize in 1913/1914, stunning the BB contenders. Precision was a key factor, but so was rate of fire according to our ww1 records (it should be noted that all german naval major calibre rifles were quick firing guns in opposition to breech loaders in the RN, which explains the better rate of fire).
All together, these efforts were put forwards in order to overutilize the fleet in an event of war.
delcyros
Tech Sergeant
Now back to the turn about maneuvre of Scheer.
Much has been said about the communication, under which Jellicoe suffered during the whole battle. The same should be mentioned when judging Scheers maneuvre. Since most ships were retreating behind a smoke screen during the 1st turn about, little -except gunflashes- could be seen from the GF. The scouting was done by the 2nd SG CL Frankfurt. They were cruising in a loop some 4 miles further to the east and could spot the enemy van during the whole procedure of the fist about turn (compare attached battlechart 1). Frankfurt radioed the positions of the enemy battlefleet in a signal timed 18:57 to Scheer but the position given was nearly 2 miles to far south than historically. Scheer therefore must have gotten the impression that he could cut off the enemy van, crossing Jellicoe´s "T" with a second turn about at about 19:00 (compare attached battlechart 2). This effectively would bring the german line in between the damaged ships of the 5th BS (whiches position was uncertain for Scheer by then) and the rear of the british van. Since Frankfurt radioed correctly that the enemy van was started to get into columns (turning "together") and pushed south (the direction radioed was off by a minor error), this indeed could bring Scheer in a favourable proistion if the advance is concealed by the remaining smoke screens as far as possible. It seemed to be a situation of opportunity, and Scheer did not wanted to discard such a possibility. As it turned out and contradicting to his informations, the enemy fleet was far more into the northwest and retook line formation with a southeasterly course but then it was already to late.
Much has been said about the communication, under which Jellicoe suffered during the whole battle. The same should be mentioned when judging Scheers maneuvre. Since most ships were retreating behind a smoke screen during the 1st turn about, little -except gunflashes- could be seen from the GF. The scouting was done by the 2nd SG CL Frankfurt. They were cruising in a loop some 4 miles further to the east and could spot the enemy van during the whole procedure of the fist about turn (compare attached battlechart 1). Frankfurt radioed the positions of the enemy battlefleet in a signal timed 18:57 to Scheer but the position given was nearly 2 miles to far south than historically. Scheer therefore must have gotten the impression that he could cut off the enemy van, crossing Jellicoe´s "T" with a second turn about at about 19:00 (compare attached battlechart 2). This effectively would bring the german line in between the damaged ships of the 5th BS (whiches position was uncertain for Scheer by then) and the rear of the british van. Since Frankfurt radioed correctly that the enemy van was started to get into columns (turning "together") and pushed south (the direction radioed was off by a minor error), this indeed could bring Scheer in a favourable proistion if the advance is concealed by the remaining smoke screens as far as possible. It seemed to be a situation of opportunity, and Scheer did not wanted to discard such a possibility. As it turned out and contradicting to his informations, the enemy fleet was far more into the northwest and retook line formation with a southeasterly course but then it was already to late.
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renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
Many thanks to you delcyros. I understand Scheer's actions much better now. Good picture of Lutzow, very purposeful looking. It really helped the naval architects when they decided they could superimpose all the turrets. I don't know whose idea the cage masts of the US Navy was but they made our BBs butt ugly. I have an original of the 1942 Jane's and also 1914 and 1945, both not original.
delcyros
Tech Sergeant
It´s a pleasure for me to discuss things properly.
The US SOUTH CAROLINA introducing the all centerline end layout with superimposed turrets represented a quantum leap forwards in naval architecture.
I must admit that Lützow probably wouldn´t have looked that elegant if she had survived Jutland. All german ships were refitted with heavy tripod masts for a high placed spotter. We might argue what is more ugly, a tripod or a cage mast, difficult question
. I personally like the clipper bows of late war US dreadnoughts.
The König´s were the first to introduce the tubular tower in 1917 but not even the Bayern´s received that.
As pointed out by Henk, the Royal Navy also had very elegant looking vessels.
The US SOUTH CAROLINA introducing the all centerline end layout with superimposed turrets represented a quantum leap forwards in naval architecture.
I must admit that Lützow probably wouldn´t have looked that elegant if she had survived Jutland. All german ships were refitted with heavy tripod masts for a high placed spotter. We might argue what is more ugly, a tripod or a cage mast, difficult question
. I personally like the clipper bows of late war US dreadnoughts.The König´s were the first to introduce the tubular tower in 1917 but not even the Bayern´s received that.
As pointed out by Henk, the Royal Navy also had very elegant looking vessels.
Great post Del. Going to have to stew on that one for a while. Gives the battle a whole new perpsective. Have to re-read and consider. I'll get back to you on it in about 6 months!
As for the looks of warships, I agree with the latter British BCs looking very nice. Less so the QEs. Kind of remind me of Japanese cars. All look the same. Think by the time the Hood came around they had run their course in terms of looks. Something about the Hood's turrets gave it an odd look.
Also like the triple turreted cruisers of both the US and Japanese navy during WW2. Great look to them. Serious, efficient. The Japanese definitely did a great job on their Cruisers. Less so their Battleships. Exempting the Yamato and Musashi, the Japanese Battleships looked old. Perhaps because they were.
The American Boises were pretty ships. Also the Des Moines. But the interwar cruisers were duds in terms of looks. IMHO.
As for the looks of warships, I agree with the latter British BCs looking very nice. Less so the QEs. Kind of remind me of Japanese cars. All look the same. Think by the time the Hood came around they had run their course in terms of looks. Something about the Hood's turrets gave it an odd look.
Also like the triple turreted cruisers of both the US and Japanese navy during WW2. Great look to them. Serious, efficient. The Japanese definitely did a great job on their Cruisers. Less so their Battleships. Exempting the Yamato and Musashi, the Japanese Battleships looked old. Perhaps because they were.
The American Boises were pretty ships. Also the Des Moines. But the interwar cruisers were duds in terms of looks. IMHO.
