A more effective Dec 1941 preemptive attack on the USA

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1. Having a third strike target the fuel farm would prove more hazardous to the Japanese than to the Hawaiian defenders. The heavy marine bunker fuel contained in the farm isn't readily ignited unless preheated. The normal mix of incendiary ammo for aircraft cannon and machineguns wouldn't be effective. Even if special incendiary bombs managed to set a few tanks alight, tank segregation and containment berms would prevent fires from spreading to engulf the entire tank farm. By the time of the second attack wave, AA defences were fully alert and did a much better job of shooting down the attackers. It would only be worse for a third wave. Also, as others have mentioned, a third wave significantly raises the risk of the Japanese fleet being located and targeted and adds to the problem of running out of fuel before returning safely home or finding a safe place to refuel at sea.

5. Strikes targeting the Canal locks would be ineffective given the lack of resources available for this far flung adventure on top of those employed at PH. The Japanese just couldn't do enough damage to justify the expenses/losses. Setting a sub ambush outside the Canal for any USN forces sent to reinforce the Pac Fleet would be an excellent idea.

6. Any Japanese Atlantic adventure is pure fantasy.

The idea of shore bombardment contributing anything meaningful to the Pearl Harbor attack is also fantasy, given the extensive Hawaiian coastal defenses that were untouched by the aerial attacks. There also were a few U.S. ground-based aircraft remaining after the initial attacks, plus those of the 2 returning CVs making their way back after their ferry missions to Wake and Midway.
 
How effective were the shore batteries and were they even manned Sunday morning?

We've already seen the results of of Navy/Army being unprepared.

As for the few remaining aircraft on Oahu, yes, they were up and looking for the Japanese fleet - but in what numbers and if they found the fleet, what then?
 
The shore batteries would be fully manned and ready to mete out vengeance by the time a third wave hit. Any overconfident BB, CA or CL venturing to within 20km likely wouldn't make it back to Japan undamaged. In fact, neither BB was a "real" BB, but were reconstructed battlecruisers.

Pearl Harbor defenses: The Harbor Defenses of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii - Coast Defense Study Group
FORT BARRETTE / Kapolei /1934- / city / county park / KKK
Hatch / 2/-16″/ BCLRN / 1934-1948 / casemated-WWII

FORT WEAVER / Puuloa / 1899 (1922) / Navy Housing / K
Williston / 2-16″/ BCLRA / 1924-1948/ ARF
Weaver / 4-155 mm / PM

FORT KAMEHAMEHA / Queen Emma Point / 1908-1949 / Hickam AFB / MD?, MC / KKK
Hasbrouck / 8-12″/ M/ 1914-1943
Closson / 2-12″/ BCLR / 1924-1948/ casemated 1942
Selfridge/ 2-12″/ DC/ 1913-1945
Jackson/ 2-6″/ DC/ 1913-1943
Chandler/ 2-3″/ P-CM/ 1915-1942/ Bishop Pt.
Hawkins/ 2-3″/ P/ 1914-1943
Other locations- Pearl Harbor
Brown's Camp/ 4-8″/ RY/ 1937-1944/ Browns Camp, Kahe Point
Keaau HomesteadsNanakuli / 2-5″ / NP / 1941-1943 / plus 1 – 3″ NP
unnamed/ 2-240 mm/ H 1931-1941/ Laie
unnamed/ 1-240 mm/ H 1927-1941/ Pupukea
unnamed/ 3-240 mm/ H 1930-1941/ Makua
Barber's Point/ 4-155 mm/ PM/ 1937-1942/ Barber's Point
X-Ray/ 4-155 mm/ PM 1942-1944/ Oneula Beach

Plus:
Ft. DeRussy (Waikiki) 2-14" and 2-6"
Ft. Ruger (Diamond Head) 12-12" Mortars, 4-8" and 8-155mm
Ft. Armstrong 2-3"
Battery Ashley 2-155mm

If the Japanese fleet was located, whatever aircraft able to would have at least shadowed and vectored in attacks by the Enterprise and Lexington. Any Japanese surface ship loitering close to Oahu would have been subject to attack by surviving CAs, CLs, DDs and subs. The Japanese weren't ever going to hang around after the initial air strikes.
 
I would first ask a guy who works at a major naval base and see how a naval base works and which targets are the most vulnerable. So dry docks or oil tanks or floating dry docks or repair facilities are key.

Problem is there is no follow up or invasion so you could do a lot of destruction but damage can always be replaced and repaired so may take time but it will be repaired and back to the start you go.

What was truly needed was a total gods eye view of the naval base with a forward air controller calling each and every bombing run. No wasting torpedoes and bombs on the same target or on Utah or Shaw. Targeting was haphazard and so you need a way to control this.

A third strike creates its own problems such as the IJN being discovered. The war is not going to be won in a morning.

What the Japanese needed to do was land a huge force on the American west coast. Fight their way to Washington DC and then sign the American surrender at gunpoint on the White House lawn. It's that simple. Why Yamamoto didn't think of that!
 
Just playing Devil's advocate, so working all points, here.

*if* the shore batteries were fully manned by the time Heie and Kurishima approached the coast. Adding to the IJN's batteries, werw their two new Heavy Cruisers, which I think we're more dangerous than the two older battleships.

In regards to USN assets getting out to engage, they'd have to work their way out through the narrows, presumably under fire - a theoretical killing zone.

This would also most likely take place with air support and support from the scores of IJN fleet subs that were present. Scouting aircraft from the Tone or the battleships would be able to call the shotfall in the Harbor.

I understand that Pearl was on high alert before the third planned wave was aborted, but the USN and USAAC did not have a cohesive plan for such an occasion and here was chaos, no command or communication structure at the time. A great deal of manpower was tied up with rescue operations, many of the ship's were boxed in by damaged ships alongside, many ships had cold boilers and would take a while to build up enough power just to get maneuvering speed, let alone speed need for battle.

Most of the Army's fighters had been destroyed, save for the P-36s up at Haleweia or the trainers and reserve types (like P-26s) at Hickam.
Some of the Navy's F2As had been spared and most of VSB-6 and VB-6 were lost or damaged.

The list goes on, but the point being that if the Japanese were aggressive, took advantage of their seasoned and experienced crews and kept pressing the attack, it could have been much worse.
 
It's a lot like the Battle of Britain. If Germany or Japan had been prepared to take higher losses the outcome would have been
different.

In Japan's case the doctrine was to keep the fighting force intact so a third strike was not invoked. Yamamoto although he saw the sense
in the arguments at the time later admitted it was a huge mistake not to take the risk.

From the US perspective destruction of port facilities and oil storage would have set them back by a year. As it was out of 33 ships hit
30 ended up back in service. Of the three sunk two were unfortunately in service battleships but the third, Utah, was a target ship.
 
The damaged/sunk battleships (Arizona, Oklahoma and Utah excluded) were repaired at Pearl Harbor's drydock facilities as well as the other ships that were sunk/damaged during the attack.

Focusing on the harbor's infrastructure would have been a huge boost to the bigger success of the attack.
 
I find your contrarian nature disturbing. It's easy to summarize why something could not, should not or would not have occurred. But now that's done, how would you make the preemptive attack on the US more effective?
 
No comprendo.

How could the Japanese be more effective? Is what they did not effective enough?

Look at their achievement with the forces they had.

My question would be how they were able to achieve what they did with what they had.
 
Admiral Beez said:
I find your contrarian nature disturbing. It's easy to summarize why something could not, should not or would not have occurred. But now that's done, how would you make the preemptive attack on the US more effective?
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Ok, what seems contrarian to one is being a realist to another. Have their sub fleet stationed off west coast ports and the Panama Canal to engage naval targets according to a preset time to initiate hostilities, a Japanese version of Operation Drumbeat. This could have more effect if they included merchant shipping, particularly tankers to be set alight and sunk within sight of densly populated civilian port cities. They also could have shelled more coastal cities at night, earlier than they did, to enhance civil hysteria.

Otherwise, the basic attack plans historically executed against the US in the Philippines, Guam, Wake and Hawaii were about as perfect as the Japanese could manage without sacrificing the forces engaged. The only thing that could have turned out better would have been if the 2 carriers had also been caught unprepared in port, but the basic PH plan and its execution were nearly as flawless as was humanly possible.

Well...maybe not Wake. The Japanese severely underestimated the resistance a 1/2 strength and poorly outfitted Marine Defense Battalion exhibited. They tried to quickly take Wake "on the cheap" and paid the price for insufficient prep and poor amphibious doctrine. To be more effective at Wake, prior to attempting a close-in shore bombardment and ad hoc landing, they needed to bomb a bit more, especially when the Wake defenders air defences no longer were able to resist. If Japan had planned pre-war to make amphibious landings, they should have developed methods of getting large numbers of troops ashore quickly without having to resort to running converted destroyers and transports aground. Unlike Pearl Harbor, the idea of using several BBs and heavy cruisers to prep Wake (instead of light cruisers and destroyers) would have made sense and the landing there much easier. There's a big difference between sending in heavy warships to conduct shore bombardment when the defenders only have a few 3" and 5" guns with inadequate fire control (Wake) and sending any warship short of the Yamato against the extensive Pearl Harbor shore defenses.
 
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Drachinifel has a good three-part series on the recovery and salvage efforts resulting from the attack ... first episode is here, and just follow the crumb-trail from there. I knew it was a big effort but he goes into some detail on the efforts and anyone wanting to broaden their knowledge on the matter should give it a watch.
 
Admiral Beez said:
I find your contrarian nature disturbing. It's easy to summarize why something could not, should not or would not have occurred. But now that's done, how would you make the preemptive attack on the US more effective?
Click to expand...

More of a combined-arms approach of incorporating subs (not by inserting midgets into the harbor, but establishing a blockade around Oahu with fleet subs) to follow up on the attack so that American relief forces, replacement ships, and repair personnel and materials have a tougher run of it.
 
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muskeg13 said:
By the time of the second attack wave, AA defences were fully alert and did a much better job of shooting down the attackers. It would only be worse for a third wave.
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The first wave lost 9 of 177 aircraft dispatched (5.08%). The second wave lost 20 of 167 aircraft dispatched (11.98%).

Losses more than doubled in the second wave. A nearly 12% loss rate is substantial.

muskeg13 said:
Also, as others have mentioned, a third wave significantly raises the risk of the Japanese fleet being located and targeted and adds to the problem of running out of fuel before returning safely home or finding a safe place to refuel at sea.
Click to expand...

The Opana Point radar which tracked the Japanese attack incoming could have been used to track the aircraft back out, giving an indication of a bearing to the Japanese carriers. But no one thought of this at the time, given the relatively poor understanding of radar and integrating its information into air defense.
 
GrauGeist said:
As for the few remaining aircraft on Oahu, yes, they were up and looking for the Japanese fleet - but in what numbers and if they found the fleet, what then?
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U.S. Army Air Corps post-raid aircraft availability. From 7 December 1941, The Air Force Story, Arakaki and Kuborn. These numbers don't reflect any remaining USN or USMC aircraft or those available from the Enterprise or Lexington. Even an old B-12 could drop bombs on any warship foolish enough to lurk within gun range of Pearl Harbor.

 

24 longer-ranged bombers left after the attack doesn't seem like much of a sustainable strike capability. No doubt the Navy still had available PBYs to take part in the recon missions, but for direct attack (given their early-war difficulties attacking shipping) I'm unsure how useful the USAAC bombers would be on 8 Dec considering the attack profile involved, not to mention that just finding the Japanese fleet hightailing back East would exacerbate the issues.
 
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A long post but here we go.

Japan should have attacked USSR not USA. I would have gone for invading Siberia especially in 1941 after Barbarossa had kicked off.

This makes logical sense as the Soviets are next door and have long been a thorn and obstacle in expansion. So time to kick the door down while the Germans are marching on Moscow.

Attacking Pearl Harbour was a poor error. Midway was worse.

The Japanese have huge forces in China. So these forces have to be redistributed to newly conquered territories in the Pacific.

The massive gains Japan makes up to the borders of Australia are a disaster. Japan has simply conquered too much and has neither the resources, economy or manpower to defend every inch.

Japan is now fighting on the borders of India and China and Guadalcanal and it's just too much. Especially as most of the IJA are in China not doing a lot.

If I had to fight the Americans then I would invade the Philippines and then politely ask them try and take it back. Turn the islands into a giant fortress and wait for the inevitable invasion. And then try to stop it.

Cutting off Australia by naval blockade was feasible in 1942. Less so in 1943. Had the full might of Japanese naval power been at Coral Sea or Guadalcanal instead of been sunk at Midway then different story.

As soon as you fight USA, you are fighting a defensive war, not an offensive war. Japan were trying to go offensive and it doesn't work.
 
GrauGeist said:
Are we forgetting the six IJN carriers still in the area?
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Of course not, and not considering so much going after the 6 carriers, but there's no way that 2 BBs and 2 heavy cruisers are going to be allowed to come into gunnery range (within sight of the observation posts on Diamond Head) and start lobbing shells into Pearl Harbor and Honolulu. Every Coast Artillery gun that can range the targets will engage and every aircraft remaining that can fly, shoot or drop any ordnance will be sent out, even if its known it may be their last mission. Ditto for the many surviving mission capable cruisers, destroyers, PT boats and subs. Maybe the USN would discover, much earlier and without doubt, that their MK 13 and 14 torpedoes were faulty, and it wouldn't take until 1943 to fix that.
 
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