A more effective Dec 1941 preemptive attack on the USA

[muskeg13]

Cutting off Australia by naval blockade was feasible in 1942. Less so in 1943. Had the full might of Japanese naval power been at Coral Sea or Guadalcanal instead of been sunk at Midway then different story.

Fully concur and agree that the PH raid wasn't really necessary to achieve what the Japanese needed to survive as an Empire, but they had to take and hold the Dutch East Indies and Malaya , and to do this they had to take Singapore, Hong Kong and the Philippines. If they had restricted their expansion efforts to this, they'd have the power to blockade Australia and NZ and then possibly defeat the aged USN counterattacking fleet in the one Armageddon naval battle the Japanese Navy dreamed of.

 

[GrauGeist]

Of course not, and not considering so much going after the 6 carriers, but there's no way that 2 BBs and 2 heavy cruisers are going to be allowed to come into gunnery range (within sight of the observation posts on Diamond Head) and start lobbing shells into Pearl Harbor and Honolulu. Every Coast Artillery gun that can range the targets will engage and every aircraft remaining that can fly, shoot or drop any ordnance will be sent out, even if its known it may be their last mission. Ditto for the many surviving mission capable cruisers, destroyers, PT boats and subs. Maybe the USN would discover, much earlier and without doubt, that their MK 13 and 14 torpedoes were faulty, and it wouldn't take until 1943 to fix that.

The proposal of the thread is what could the IJN have done better.

So let's run some numbers, then.
The USAAC had 83 serviceable aircraft after the first two waves.
The IJN had over 300.

No USN Capitol ships were in a position to steam out of Pearl within the time needed, leaving lighter tonnage to act.
The IJN had aside from two battleships and two heavy cruisers: one light cruiser, nine destroyers and twenty three fleet submarines.

Yes, there were shore batteries. How many were manned?
How many had access to ammunition?
How many were directed by experienced directors?
Was the range of the batteries comparable to the main armament of the two IJN battleships and/or heavy cruisers?
Would the USN ships be able to clear the narrow harbor entrance in spite of the IJN long-lance torpedoes or attacking destroyers?
Would the IJN's 300+ aircraft perhaps play a supporting role in neutralizing shore batteries and any shipping trying to clear the harbor?

 

[The Basket]

One aspect of warfare is controlling the field of battle after the Battle.

The IJN did a bombing and then ran like beehatches at Pearl Harbour.

If you going to do something you either do it or don't do it.

The Japanese didn't have a military strategy goal at Pearl Harbour as they quickly left the field of battle as fast as they could. The military equivalent of a two pump chump.

Go hard or go home and the carriers went home. So that's a F in my book.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The Opana Point radar which tracked the Japanese attack incoming could have been used to track the aircraft back out,

I've read that it was tracking the IJN aircraft back out, but that no one up the chain asked to see the data.

It seems that every offensive ops by the Kido Butai always racks up significant losses. Even at the few short days of the 1942 Indian Ocean Raid where the ill-prepared opposition was Fulmars, Hurricanes, Blenheims, Swordfish and Catalinas, the IJN managed to lose more than twenty aircraft. I don't think the FAA ever suffered such losses from CV launched sorties.

 

[Shortround6]

The Japanese could have undertaken a 3rd wave. It has it's own benefits and it's own downsides.

The Japanese surface strike (the two battleships + extras) has a number of downsides. It is rather variable in timing?
If it arrives during either of the 2 waves it may achieve surprise, it may also reveal the Japanese forces before the 1st air wave is getting into position. There were 9 civilian aircraft in the air when the 1st wave came in. There may have been fishing boats or commercial ships that may have reveled the Japanese task force.
If the surface strike is later in timing (between 2 and 3rd wave?) the shore gunners will be much better prepared and the Japanese effort could change from a great success to a colossal failure of the Japanese surface ships. If the Japanese are NOT covering the shore batteries with suppressive air strikes the two Kongos and two cruiser could be turned into little more than target practice for the shore batteries. The Americans had four 16in 1919 model guns and two 14 in guns and a number of 12in howitzers. There were a number of old 8in guns.
Some of the guns had been on site for many years and the late 30s or 1940/41 a number of 155mm guns (WW I guns) had been located on Panama mountings. Max range was about 21,000yds (Land)
The coast defense batteries had range finders, predictor equipment and communications.
The Japanese cruisers were vulnerable to 6 in guns, at least for mission kill.
The Japanese battleships and cruisers do not have the ammo capacity to get into long range gun duels with the shore batteries. the More time/ammo spent duking it out with shore batteries the less time/ammo the 4 Japanese ships have to try to hit the the things the short batteries are protecting.


The more complicated the Japanese arrangements the more things that can go wrong.

Should a 3rd wave have concentrated on the objectives or should a a large percentage of it have been been diverted to trying to suppress the shore batteries with the hope that the 4 surface ships can do the damage the reduced air component cannot?

 

[GrauGeist]

If the battleships/Cruisers approached early on, chances are good that they would have been mistaken for USN ships, much like the approaching attack aircraft were mistaken for the inbound B-17s from the mainland.

The IJN also failed to exploit their superior numbers of subs.

 

[Shortround6]

This assumes the ships, which differed considerably in appearance from US ships would be mistaken like aircraft were.
The two Japanese heavy cruiser cruisers had four turrets forward of the Bridge, no turrets aft of the funnels, large catapults and one funnel, heavy raked.

A more unamerican cruiser would be very hard to find.

Assuming that the Americans would continue to make constant mistakes in identification, all in Japan's favor seems an unrealistic expectation.

 

[The Basket]

You must also know your line of retreat.

So have a plan when things go south.

Problem at Pearl is the Japanese had total surprise. But let's imagine 48 hour warning

It would have been very very dicey. And damaged ships ain't coming back home.

The invasion of the Philippines makes sense to me. Maybe this or that but I can dig it. Bombing of Pearl makes no sense. Midway makes no sense. What ever happened to worse case scenario and planning for that? Instead of planning for moonbeams and wishdreams.

Judas Priest, the IJN annoy me.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

One aspect of warfare is controlling the field of battle after the Battle.

The IJN did a bombing and then ran like beehatches at Pearl Harbour.

If you going to do something you either do it or don't do it.

I think it was Nietzsche who once wrote "Be careful poking into the beehive, because when you poke into the beehive, the beehive pokes into you."

 

[The Basket]

Here's a tip. Only fight things that are weaker than you.

You won't believe this but when you fight a much superior enemy, you get your ass kicked home to mamma.

Whouda funk it?

 

[southjn1982]

A long post but here we go.

Japan should have attacked USSR not USA. I would have gone for invading Siberia especially in 1941 after Barbarossa had kicked off.

This makes logical sense as the Soviets are next door and have long been a thorn and obstacle in expansion. So time to kick the door down while the Germans are marching on Moscow.

Attacking Pearl Harbour was a poor error. Midway was worse.

The Japanese have huge forces in China. So these forces have to be redistributed to newly conquered territories in the Pacific.

The massive gains Japan makes up to the borders of Australia are a disaster. Japan has simply conquered too much and has neither the resources, economy or manpower to defend every inch.

Japan is now fighting on the borders of India and China and Guadalcanal and it's just too much. Especially as most of the IJA are in China not doing a lot.

If I had to fight the Americans then I would invade the Philippines and then politely ask them try and take it back. Turn the islands into a giant fortress and wait for the inevitable invasion. And then try to stop it.

Cutting off Australia by naval blockade was feasible in 1942. Less so in 1943. Had the full might of Japanese naval power been at Coral Sea or Guadalcanal instead of been sunk at Midway then different story.

As soon as you fight USA, you are fighting a defensive war, not an offensive war. Japan were trying to go offensive and it doesn't work.

Considering the kicking the Japanese got from the Soviets at Khalkhin Gol it was not going to happen plus the region simply lacked the infrastructure for a prolonged campaign. It is very unlikely that the Japanese would have had any significant successes against the Soviet Union if they had attacked and in all liklihood any attack woudn't have been enough to swing the decison in the west with Germany it may have made it more difficult for the Soviets, but Germany never had a realistic chance of beating the Soviets and even if Moscow fell the Soviets would have kept fighting, It should also be noted that the Soviet campaign in 1945 against Japan is probably the closest to a perfect military campaign in History and is not studied anywhere near enough in the West. In 11 days the Soviets marched over 1000 miles and took 600,000 Japanese POWs
also destroying

• 861–925 aircraft
• 369–600 tanks
• 2,576–3,704 guns and mortars captured
• 2,129–2,300 other vehicles captured

for the loss of less than 10,000 men absolutely annihilating the veteran Kwantung Army a group that was the best equipped most experienced and largest army the Japanese had. The Japs were afraid of the Soviets and to be honest they had a point.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

If the battleships/Cruisers approached early on, chances are good that they would have been mistaken for USN ships, much like the approaching attack aircraft were mistaken for the inbound B-17s from the mainland.

Perhaps by civilian operators, but how dense was military aerial recon? And did the Japanese have any idea of that density? If not, detaching the BCs and cruisers might be viewed by the IJN as unnecessarily risking surprise without offering commensurate gains in striking power.

The IJN also failed to exploit their superior numbers of subs.

Definitely. Instead of a gadget play like the midget sub attack, cordoning off Oahu would have been more useful imho.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Here's a tip. Only fight things that are weaker than you.

You won't believe this but when you fight a much superior enemy, you get your ass kicked home to mamma.

Whouda funk it?

We don't always agree, but your jib has some serious cut, Baskie.

 

[The Basket]

Considering the kicking the Japanese got from the Soviets at Khalkhin Gol it was not going to happen plus the region simply lacked the infrastructure for a prolonged campaign. It is very unlikely that the Japanese would have had any significant successes against the Soviet Union,

So how it could get any worse?
Get nuked more?
The Germans are defeating the Soviets for you. Just stick the boot in as appropriate.

 

[southjn1982]

So how it could get any worse?
Get nuked more?
The Germans are defeating the Soviets for you. Just stick the boot in as appropriate.

While the Germans could do significant damage to the Soviets even with Japanese help it was never going to be enough they simply lacked the industry not only that I serieosly doubt the Japanese could have attacked the Soviets with any significant strength even if they wanted due to just how much of thier forces were tied down in China. Plus it would be a lot easier for Russia to support the Chinese than the Western Allies and with no attack on the Western Allies the Chinese are getting significantly more equipment as the Burma Road remains open. Plus without the opening of hostilities in the Pacific the Commonwealth is in a much better position in North Africa etc and can not only sent even more resources to the Soviets but can also build up in the west a lot quicker. It should be noted that German casualties were higher in Tunisia than at Stalingrad and that Goebells would refer to the campaign as "Tunisgrad". Also the strike north plan wouldn't have helped the Japanese as even though Siberia had large mineral reserves it lacks the resources that Japan actually needed Oil and Rubber as Oil production in the region was virtually non existent and it wasn't until 1961 that any significant Oil deposits were found and there were in Western Siberia i.e just behind the Ural mountains by Falman Salminov and thus they are completely out of reach and Siberia is not known for its rubber plantations.

 

[SaparotRob]

Considering the kicking the Japanese got from the Soviets at Khalkhin Gol it was not going to happen plus the region simply lacked the infrastructure for a prolonged campaign. It is very unlikely that the Japanese would have had any significant successes against the Soviet Union if they had attacked and in all liklihood any attack woudn't have been enough to swing the decison in the west with Germany it may have made it more difficult for the Soviets, but Germany never had a realistic chance of beating the Soviets and even if Moscow fell the Soviets would have kept fighting, It should also be noted that the Soviet campaign in 1945 against Japan is probably the closest to a perfect military campaign in History and is not studied anywhere near enough in the West. In 11 days the Soviets marched over 1000 miles and took 600,000 Japanese POWs
also destroying

• 861–925 aircraft
• 369–600 tanks
• 2,576–3,704 guns and mortars captured
• 2,129–2,300 other vehicles captured

for the loss of less than 10,000 men absolutely annihilating the veteran Kwantung Army a group that was the best equipped most experienced and largest army the Japanese had. The Japs were afraid of the Soviets and to be honest they had a point.

I've stopped being surprised by how little I know. This surprised me. I definitely didn't study this enough.

 

[muskeg13]

Assuming that the Americans would continue to make constant mistakes in identification, all in Japan's favor seems an unrealistic expectation.

Completely urealistic, especially if the funny looking ships are shooting at you and all of the USN ships are in harbor, save a few destroyers patrolling at the harbor entrance. The personnel manning those ASW destroyers and those in the Diamond Head and other Coast Artillery observation posts are VERY adept at ship identification.

 

[SaparotRob]

This assumes the ships, which differed considerably in appearance from US ships would be mistaken like aircraft were.
The two Japanese heavy cruiser cruisers had four turrets forward of the Bridge, no turrets aft of the funnels, large catapults and one funnel, heavy raked.
View attachment 652914

A more unamerican cruiser would be very hard to find.

Assuming that the Americans would continue to make constant mistakes in identification, all in Japan's favor seems an unrealistic expectation.

I dunno. We've all read the slips in aerial reconnaissance. Ships were being misidentified by all sides. This was after the fur started flying.
You did bring up a valid point. At the start, no-one knew how bad ship ID would be.
At any rate neither Adm. Nagumo, nor any other CO would rely on being mis-identified as a defensive tactic.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The Japanese didn't have a military strategy goal at Pearl Harbour as they quickly left the field of battle as fast as they could. The military equivalent of a two pump chump. Go hard or go home and the carriers went home. So that's a F in my book.

Indeed, it's akin to going to John Wick's house and smacking him around and killing his puppy. All you've accomplished is to make him very angry and determined.

Problem at Pearl is the Japanese had total surprise. But let's imagine 48 hour warning. It would have been very very dicey. And damaged ships ain't coming back home.

With 48 hours notice I would not sail the battlefleet out to meet it's destruction but the Kido Butai. Instead the USN battlefleet and carriers sail west to standby. At Pearl every fighter is fueled, armed and ready. The radar stations are ready. Picket submarines are ready along the presumed route.

 

[SaparotRob]

Indeed, it's akin to going to John Wick's house and smacking him around and killing his puppy. All you've accomplished is to make him very angry and determined.

With 48 hours notice I would not sail the battlefleet out to meet it's destruction but the Kido Butai. Instead the USN battlefleet and carriers sail west to standby. At Pearl every fighter is fueled, armed and ready. The radar stations are ready. Picket submarines are ready along the presumed route.

With that said, Germany doesn't formally declare war on the U.S.