A more effective Dec 1941 preemptive attack on the USA

[Howard Gibson]

That speaks to Japan's second miscalculation, that unfounded belief that the US lacked the will to fight. Where on God's Earth did that assumption come from? 1781, after a grinding five year uprising, the US defeats the British, the greatest superpower the world had yet known, handing the Empire it's worst ever defeat (Singapore saw more captured, by Britain was back in three years). They again beat Britain to a standstill in 1812-14. Then in 1898, less than forty years after the Civil War the US defeats Spain, another major power. Then in 1907 the US sends its battlefleet around the world to remind everyone of US power. Did the US ever demonstrate a lack of Warrior spirit? Where was Japan looking?

Great Britain was not a superpower in 1781. They had the world's biggest and best navy. It could keep damn foreigners out of Great Britain, as long as they did nothing stupid, like re-deploying everything to the Americas. The British experienced a military coup in 1648, and they learned to keep their army small, and under the command of politically reliable people. An army capable of keeping Americans in line may decide to come home and keep King and Country in line.

A lot of glorious British victories during that period were not glorious British victories. They were glorious allied victories. Of 56,000 troops at Blenheim, only about 16,000 were British, and the Duke of Marlborough shared command with Prince Eugene of Savoy. The Duke of Wellington's Peninsular army was half Portuguese, and there were Spanish troops all over the place. Of his 65,000 troops at Waterloo, only about 24,000 were British. I think about 30,000 were from the Netherlands. This count excludes the Prussians coming to his rescue under General Blucher.

The Spanish were a major power up into the seventeenth century. By 1898, they were decrepit.

 

[Howard Gibson]

Did the Japanese have the fuel to maintain an aggressive naval presence off the west coast of the Americas?

I don't think logistics matter here. The Japanese plan was for the Americans to surrender after Pearl Harbour. If the Japanese bomb the fuel tanks at Pearl Harbour and they win the Battle of Midway, the Americans take longer to annihilate them.

The Japanese needed to employ psychological tactics that would discredit the Roosevelt administration, but not piss off the isolationists. Maybe confining their attack to the Philippines would have done it. Maybe?

The Japanese attack on the Dutch East Indies was not optional, unless American isolationists took power and agreed to sell the Japanese oil.

 

[don4331]

The Japanese were hoping for a Vietnam 25 years earlier - take a bunch of meaningless Islands in Pacific, have US start at far end and slowly work their way to Japan. As the body bags keep coming home from places people have never heard of American's start questioning why they are fighting and negotiate a settlement. (With Japan keeping China - or at least Manchuria and DEI).

The problem is MacArthur didn't play by Japanese rule book. He started in middle, bypassing and isolating large garrisons.

 

[SaparotRob]

Island hopping may have also been part of one of the "Plan Oranges".

 

[Admiral Beez]

Interesting story here Japanese Fighter Pilot Who, after Pearl Harbor, Crash-Landed on Hawaiian Island & Terrorized the Residents

 

[GrauGeist]

Interesting story here Japanese Fighter Pilot Who, after Pearl Harbor, Crash-Landed on Hawaiian Island & Terrorized the Residents

The Niihau incident was one of the reasons given, when the decision was made to relocate Japanese and Japanese-americans away from the west coast.

As far as Pearl Harbor was concerned, the public wasn't outraged by the attack so much as they were outraged that there was no declaration of war. So it was seen as a "dastardly", "unwarranted", "un-provoked" "sneak attack".

Yes, the Japanese intended to deliver the declaration just before the attack, but it was delayed.
This was a huge mistake on their behalf and a golden opportunity for the press.

It would be interesting to see how the press and public would have reacted, had the declaration been delivered as intended.

 

[Admiral Beez]

As far as Pearl Harbor was concerned, the public wasn't outraged by the attack so much as they were outraged that there was no declaration of war.

Did Germany give a DoW before invading the USSR? This seems like a rare thing.

 

[GrauGeist]

Did Germany give a DoW before invading the USSR? This seems like a rare thing.

No, but Germany wasn't neutral at the time and it's public wasn't pro isiolationism, either.

 

[Admiral Beez]

No, but Germany wasn't neutral at the time and it's public wasn't pro isiolationism, either.

My point was expecting Japan to have issued a DoW before commencing hostilities is unrealistic. Has any aggressor country ever done so? I don't think the US expected Japan to do so, especially after their surprise attack on Russia a mere 37 years earlier.

 

[GrauGeist]

They intended to declare war before the attack.

They knew the US was for the most part, isolationist and gambled on the American public not having a stomach for war.

The problem is, that the Declaration was delayed, so the attack backfired on Imperial Japan and galvanized the public.

The Japanese war planners effed up on many levels. Had they declared war even an hour beforw the attack, chances are, Pearl would have still been lethargic in it's moving from peacetime to war footing. As it was, the Air Corps and Navy was under funded, under staffed and would still have suffered an ass-kicking that morning.

The difference would have been the public's reaction.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Great Britain was not a superpower in 1781.

I suppose if your only metric for national power is the size of a standing army, this might be correct. But I think that's only one of many metrics that factor into national power -- and the RN alone meant the UK was indeed a superpower insofar as it could deny trade routes to its enemies even as it secured the nation's own trade.

Regarding a large standing army as the only or main metric for superpowers is unrealistically constricted, in my opinion. National power comes in many guises, most of which aren't military at all.

 

[Howard Gibson]

I suppose if your only metric for national power is the size of a standing army, this might be correct. But I think that's only one of many metrics that factor into national power -- and the RN alone meant the UK was indeed a superpower insofar as it could deny trade routes to its enemies even as it secured the nation's own trade.

Regarding a large standing army as the only or main metric for superpowers is unrealistically constricted, in my opinion. National power comes in many guises, most of which aren't military at all.

You are a superpower if you can project power on everybody else. A famous quote by Otto Von Bismark was that if the British landed troops on the continent, he would have them arrested by the police. There was some conflict between Canada and the USA circa 1870, and the British appreciated that they could face millions of trained battle hardened troops, tens of thousands of battle hardened, proven officers and hundreds of battle hardened, proven generals, even without recruiting Confederates. The French had the same problem in Mexico. The reason for this is obvious.

John Jervis, 1st Earl of St Vincent's famous (and possibly inaccurate) quote was "I do not say the French cannot come, I only say they cannot come by sea".

The British could blockade continental powers, and they could support distant colonies. If they landed in the wrong place, their options became limited.

 

[SaparotRob]

Great quote.

 

[The Basket]

Macarthur hindered the war effort.

Spain was nothing in 1898 which is why they were rolled up so easily.

Japan had 2 choices which was go hard or go home. So fair play for choosing the more colourful of the two.

Island hopping was indeed the plan but it was superceded by Sub warfare and strategic bombing but it was the basis of what they did. 1930s long range bombers and long range submarines didn't really exist so it couldn't be planned for.

I need to look further into the treacherous colonies breaking from their rightful masters but the French were instrumental in the victory.

Not really into the 1812 was but we were fighting Napoleon so hardly able to spare resources.

 

[nuuumannn]

The problem is MacArthur didn't play by Japanese rule book. He started in middle, bypassing and isolating large garrisons.

This was Nimitz, not MacArthur. This is what MacArthur had to say about Island Hopping:

"My strategic conception for the Pacific Theater, which I outlined after the Papuan Campaign and have since consistently advocated, contemplates massive strokes against only main strategic objectives, utilizing surprise and air-ground striking power supported and assisted by the fleet. This is the very opposite of what is termed "island hopping" which is the gradual pushing back of the enemy by direct frontal pressure with the consequent heavy casualties which will certainly be involved. Key points must of course be taken but a wise choice of such will obviate the need for storming the mass of islands now in enemy possession. "Island hopping" with extravagant losses and slow progress... is not my idea of how to end the war as soon and as cheaply as possible. New conditions require for solution and new weapons require for maximum application new and imaginative methods. Wars are never won in the past."

Douglas MacArthur - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[GrauGeist]

1930s long range bombers and long range submarines didn't really exist so it couldn't be planned for.

USN subs, starting with the Porpoise class (1937-ish) had a range of 11,000 miles.
The early Porpoise class was 6,000.

Pretty sure that's a workable range for what was needed in the PTO.

 

[The Basket]

Depends on Wikipedia v actual combat effectiveness.

American subs from the early to mid 1930s were a sorry mess.

So hardly a fighting force. It got better. Couldn't get worse.

Plan Orange pushed for better submarines which matched it's outcomes rather than the actual subs that were available.

 

[The Basket]

The Americans had a few options.

Fight the Japanese in China. The main bulk of the IJA was in China so that's a no. The hugeness of China was a no go plus logistics and the IJA numbers were too big.

China was USA biggest failure in WW2. They tried to get the Nationalists to fight and they didn't. So the Nationalists were too corrupt and inept and waited for the USN to defeat Japan and then the true war against the communists could begin.

Fighting in Burma and Indochina was another no. The USA was unwilling to support the French and British to recover colonial territory as they rightly summarized that is exactly what was going to happen. Oddly USA was unwilling to support colonial adventures of their allies.

Macarthur can be blamed for the Philippines as he held as a sacred duty to reconquer it rather than as a strategic necessity. The Japanese obliged him. The USA was against allied colonial adventures but full on when it came to their own.

 

[SaparotRob]

Wasn't Philippine independence already scheduled for the late 40's?

 

[MikeMeech]

That speaks to Japan's second miscalculation, that unfounded belief that the US lacked the will to fight. Where on God's Earth did that assumption come from? 1781, after a grinding five year uprising, the US defeats the British, the greatest superpower the world had yet known, handing the Empire it's worst ever defeat (Singapore saw more captured, by Britain was back in three years). They again beat Britain to a standstill in 1812-14. Then in 1898, less than forty years after the Civil War the US defeats Spain, another major power. Then in 1907 the US sends its battlefleet around the world to remind everyone of US power. Did the US ever demonstrate a lack of Warrior spirit? Where was Japan looking?

Hi
The West Point Military History Series book 'Early American Wars and Military Institutions' page 57 is rather less convinced of US 'victory' in the 1812 war:

In terms of US aims it appears it was a complete failure.

Mike