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The Wellington BomberI once saw a reference to a 'bomb undershield' which I noted having no idea what it was or what purpose it served. Maybe this had something to do with forcing spring loaded doors?
Cheers
Steve
I was under the impression that the doors were opened early to allow for manual opening should they malfunction. I would hate to fly that far, through that much hell to not drop.
Cheers,
Biff
I suppose the logic in using a quick arming fuse is that's it's mechanically simple, the less there is to that could go wrong, the less that will go wrong. Also cheaper to make.
Most fuses are little mechanical marvels, when you using them by the millions, economics have to come into play.
Not just movement of the bomb could set the fuse off, but any movement of the fuse itself, like unscrewing it.
But the bomb would have to be armed for the anti-tampering devices to work , you'd think.
WWII Mentality / Post-War Mentalities on Area Bombing
Public Relations on USAAS Bomber Usage: Mitchell Era
The general focus was on the use of bombers as defensive, against attacking ships. Essentially, the idea was that large bombers would be able to accurately hit ships at altitude beyond effective range of defensive guns and sink them effectively.
Official Plan for USAAS Bomber Usage: Mitchell Era
Mitchell had been far more forthcoming with the USAAS than the public, and had officially stated during his time in uniform that the plans would be for the intended Air Force to consist of around 50% fighter aircraft, 50% bombers, with 50% of the bomber force aimed for strategic ends, and 50% for tactical goals.
It would appear that Mitchell didn't have a definite view of fighters early on, and even saw dive-bombers as useful for military ends as he saw them used in WWI.....
He was okay with it, but wasn't too open with expressing it at first except possibly to a few people in specific circumstances. Later on he became more open.I'm not 100% sure, but I believe that Mitchell was OK with bombing cities. Where he differed from Trenchard and Douhet is that he didn't think that the bomber would always get through, and that the number one priority for the air force was to destroy the enemy's air force.
So what circumstances were the manual mode used over the non manual auto-release?Essentially, yes.
The automatic system actually flies the aircraft to the release point where it triggers the bomb distributor. I wrote that for this final part of the bomb run, once the sight has been locked onto the aiming point, the sight acts as little more than a timer, but it was an infinitely more complicated instrument than that.
As soon as a bombardier hits a manual release button/switch it does indeed activate the bomb distributor.
Why not just use the Lotfe? Regardless, what advantages did SABS have over us?We should not ignore the German Lofte 7D sight either. Like the Norden and SABS this was a tachometric sight and like the Norden was connected to a system which effectively allowed the sight to fly the aircraft automatically to the target and release the bombs. the SABS did not do this (nor did the Mk XIV), as simpler system called the Bombing Direction Indicator displayed necessary course corrections to the pilot on later versions, earlier ones required the bomb aimer to call out corrections to the pilot as seen in many old war films. The British even considered using some captured Lofte sights, but this provoked a near mutiny at Farnborough where the boffins were developing the British sights!
So what circumstances were the manual mode used over the non manual auto-release?
Why not just use the Lotfe? Regardless, what advantages did SABS have over us?
The SABS was statistically the most accurate bomb sight of the war, its why No. 617 (and 9) Squadrons used it to drop extremely large bombs onto extremely precise targets, like viaducts, V-1/V-2 sites and battle cruisers. No. 617 Squadron achieved an average radial error of 125 yards from 20,000 feet in the period February to March 1945.
The bombing height was also a compromise between accuracy and the speed of the bomb, in theory the bomb should be supersonic or close to it for maximum penetration but the height needed for this affected accuracy.