Aerial Bombing Question

[Shortround6]

"I thought accuracy was basically how close you hit to where you actually intended to hit?"

Accuracy is a much abused or overworked word and needs to taken in context.

How close you come to where you actually intend to hit might be called practical accuracy. It is dependent on the mechanical accuracy of the weapon/weapon system as in rifle bullet and rifle or the consistent fall of a an aircraft bomb. However you then need figure in the accuracy (or limits) of the sighting system plus the effects of environment as in differences due to temperature or cross winds/headwinds or visibility. For moving platforms (aircraft/ships/tanks etc) the steadiness of the platform comes into consideration and then you finally get to the human error or human differences.

If somebody quotes test range "accuracy" what they may be measuring is the mechanical accuracy of the weapon or system with the fewest variables. It gives the best numbers but will probably never be equaled in the field. Measuring results in the field throws everything together and while useful from a planning standpoint has so many variables that trying to isolate any one factor to work on it for improvement is very difficult.

For instance if you are getting a result of a CEP error of xxx when bombing from 20,000ft on city YYY do you need a better bomb sight?, or better weather forecasting (wind direction/speed at different altitudes)?. a steadier bomber ( less yawing/oscillating)? or maybe you need more quality control on the tail fins on the bombs (better uniformity/fewer dents/dings) so the bombs actually fall closer to each other.
Or maybe you need to put a better head rest on the bomb sight so the bomb aimers in different planes have a more consistent eye position when looking through the sight if individual bombing?

For proper analysis you need a combination of the two. WHY isn't performance in the field coming close to test results?

Unless you are sure that various sources are comparing the same thing and doing it the same way (same conditions) things can get very confusing very quickly.

 

[stona]

I have already described the 'table cloth' produced for a British raid. It gave a timeline for the raid and information on when and where every aircraft bombed.

The point made about the pattern actually created by a formation in practice, as opposed to a theoretical model, is that it made the probability studies on which the number of bombs and bombers required to destroy a target had been calculated irrelevant. Bombs simply didn't fall in the neat theoretical rows and columns used as a basis for the studies.

Cheers

Steve

 

[pbehn]

I understand that, so there's no confusion here...

Obviously there is some confusion because you said this:-

So, in some cases they aren't even compatible? Certain laser-guided ordinance being an example?

CEP was introduced because using Gaussian distribution was not satisfactory

I thought accuracy was basically how close you hit to where you actually intended to hit?

Read this and other links posted
Circular error probable - Wikipedia

If all bombs fall in a 20m radius 2 miles from the aim point that is a great CEP number and a hopeless bias number.
CEP is a radius centered on the mean of all results not on the aim point. This allows the people running the tests to draw conclusions referred to by Stona. The equivilant for aa gun would be a snipers rifle with the sight misaligned, all rounds in a small space but not on the centre of the target

 

[Reluctant Poster]

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MHz3DBwYVyo


This is loading bombs into a B-29.

Generally similar to the B-17, I believe.

What we have been calling the shackle is attached to the bomb before it is hoisted into position, and that then connects to the rack.

The hoisting starts at around 3:00 or 3:30, the connecting of the shackle to the rack happens around 4:45.

For the Silverplate B-29s the normal racks were removed and a new type of rack installed.

An interesting film showing a very dangerous occupation. The telling quote is " We've lost too many men..." My uncle was an amourer in WWII. He had a few stories to tell about fatal accidents involving bombs or machine guns.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

To add to the excellent points above, the Americans used group pattern analysis precisely because they couldn't distinguish individual bomb strikes, but could more often (but by no means always) discern group patterns. The US analysts used 'vertical' photographs taken by PR aircraft accompanying the missions, 'vertical' photographs taken by some of the bombers and, for blind bombing, 'scope' photographs taken of the H2X display (one every sixteen seconds on the bomb run up to bomb release, others less frequently).
The Americans analysed each group's bomb fall, from all its aircraft, as if it was the result of a single aiming operation.

The British, by night, didn't even attempt to to see individual bomb strikes, they were estimated by a rather complicated extrapolation from the bombing photograph which all the bombers took.

Both air forces undertook BDA by photographic reconnaissance, but this too was fraught with difficulties, some mentioned above. The best data came very late in the war, when the men of the various allied ORS were able to examine recently bombed areas as they fell into allied hands. This is why some of the data for tactical operations, and for the strategic bombers in a tactical role, in direct support of ground operations, is so good.

Cheers

Steve

Anyone interested in the allied efforts at bomb damage assessment should read this book:Amazon product ASIN 0700616829View: https://www.amazon.com/Targeting-Third-Reich-Intelligence-Campaigns/dp/0700616829
Another interesting read is:Amazon product ASIN 0802096298View: https://www.amazon.com/Science-Bombing-Operational-Research-Command/dp/0802096298/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1495372785&sr=8-1&keywords=the+science+of+bombing+operational+research+in+raf+bomber+command

 

[Old Wizard]

 

[stona]

Whilst looking through some 'Bomber Command stuff' for information relating to Lancaster armour (still haven't found it!) I did find, in Henry Probert's biography of Harris, the text of a letter written to Trenchard on 14th April 1943 which explains Harris' views on 'panacea targets' in his own words. Trenchard had earlier written to Harris, asking how he might counter those asking why the German rubber industry in Hannover was not being targeted.

"What your critics say about the rubber industry in Hannover applies with equal force to the rubber industry all over Germany, upon which we have already wreaked considerable incidental damage while carrying out operations of a more general description. I do not believe in 'panacea' targets, eg oil, rubber, ball bearings. Specialising on one such means that the enemy concentrates all his defences, and nothing else in Germany, including morale and housing is likely to suffer. If the 'panacea' fails all is lost. Finally I distrust experts and specialists on 'panacea' commodities...for example a fortnight after we were told Germany was nearly on the rocks for oil she staged the biggest campaign in history [Russia] using billions of gallons. Not even the 'oily boys' attempted to laugh that off. They just hid their heads for a spell and now raise the same song again."

Overy has summed up Harris' hostility to panaceas. He wrote that his hostility arose

"because he [Harris] realised that an enemy economy and social structure could not be dislocated by an attack on just one of its many elements with the prospect of forcing a decision."

A strange contradiction on the issue of morale is that in 1947 Harris himself would concede:

"The idea that the main object of bombing German industrial cities was to break the enemy's morale proved to be totally unsound; when we had destroyed almost all the large industrial cities in Germany the civil population remained apathetic, while the Gestapo saw to it that they were docile, and in so far as there was work for them to do, industrious."

And yet various German historians have since disagreed. Horst Boog (whatever you make of him) wrote.

"If the morale of the civilian population is defined as their will to continue to work for the war effort, then German morale was not broken. But it was certainly weakened, as recent studies have revealed, especially in cities suffering heavy attacks. People continued to do their duty in a fatalistic and apathetic mood, and this did not increase their devotion to the political cause and to productivity."

Gotz Bergander, who has written extensively about Dresden and interviewed many people who suffered under the bombing, something Harris could never have done, goes even further.

"In reality, the air raids on cities shook the foundations of the war morale of the German people. They permanently shattered their nerves, undermined their health and shook their belief in victory, thus altering their consciousness. They spread fear, dismay and hopelessness. This was an important and intentional result of the strategic air war, of this warfare revolution."

History is almost by definition an ever evolving organism. We cannot draw an arbitrary line post war at, say, the publication of the USSBS and imagine that it gives the definitive account of the campaigns.

Cheers

Steve

 

[buffnut453]

Great post, Steve. We are talking about large system-of-systems activities where it's often hard to associate cause and effect. For example, the German oil production industry was one of many vital target categories but hitting that alone won't eradicate existing stockpiles, hence the tactical and operational impacts are unlikely to be felt for some considerable time.

Harris's use of the term "panacea" is, perhaps, not the best application of the English language. "Silver bullet" might be a more apposite aphorism relative to killing the monster that was Nazi autarky.

 

[stona]

Harris's use of the term "panacea" is, perhaps, not the best application of the English language. "Silver bullet" might be a more apposite aphorism relative to killing the monster that was Nazi autarky.

Yes. In every example I've seen Harris puts the word 'panacea' in inverted commas which is a slightly odd use even for the time. I think he knew that opponents had latched on to his use of the word and was in some way detaching himself from it, though not from his principles and objection to such targets.
Cheers
Steve

 

[buffnut453]

Perhaps. I suspect he was not objecting to the targets per se but, rather, to the focus on a single target type as being the one to hit in order to win the war. He had a clear view of the complexity of national economy and the need to engage a range of target types to achieve strategic victory. Facilities producing oil, rubber and ball bearings were all important targets but so were many others, including the entire logistics train from stockpiles to tactical distribution ("warehouse to warrior" if you will).

 

[Zipper730]

A strange contradiction on the issue of morale is that in 1947 Harris himself would concede:

"The idea that the main object of bombing German industrial cities was to break the enemy's morale proved to be totally unsound; when we had destroyed almost all the large industrial cities in Germany the civil population remained apathetic, while the Gestapo saw to it that they were docile, and in so far as there was work for them to do, industrious."

Ironic isn't it?

And yet various German historians have since disagreed. Horst Boog (whatever you make of him) wrote.

"If the morale of the civilian population is defined as their will to continue to work for the war effort, then German morale was not broken. But it was certainly weakened, as recent studies have revealed, especially in cities suffering heavy attacks. People continued to do their duty in a fatalistic and apathetic mood, and this did not increase their devotion to the political cause and to productivity."

Gotz Bergander, who has written extensively about Dresden and interviewed many people who suffered under the bombing, something Harris could never have done, goes even further.

"In reality, the air raids on cities shook the foundations of the war morale of the German people. They permanently shattered their nerves, undermined their health and shook their belief in victory, thus altering their consciousness. They spread fear, dismay and hopelessness. This was an important and intentional result of the strategic air war, of this warfare revolution."

Yeah, but it didn't stop them from continuing.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki almost failed if it wasn't for a final thousand plane raid that happened to interfere with a plot to overthrow the emperor and prevent a recorded message getting out. I suppose it trimmed a 2-6 weeks off the war

 

[tyrodtom]

The thousand plane raid number must be including escorts too. There were 400 B-29's over Japan on Aug 14 during the day, and 300 that night.
The blackout during the raid might have added some confusion to the plot to stop the Emperor's broadcast, but the real cause of it's failure was just inept planing.

 

[stona]

Yeah, but it didn't stop them from continuing.

No, but they didn't want to continue against the western powers, they were pushed into a corner on this one.

There will be endless debate about the achievements of the strategic bombing offensives, but, as I've said before, we must ask the correct questions.
The first question should not be to ask what the German economy achieved under the bombing, but what it might have achieved had there been no bombing campaigns.
The second question should be to establish the resources devoted by Germany to defending the campaign (from manpower to artillery, ammunition, aircraft, etc.)
The third should be to establish the resources devoted to mitigating it's effects (from dealing with the bombed out population and destroyed housing stock, building massive underground factories and other bomb proof structures like U-boat pens or V-2 launch sites). The answers to the second two questions are unclear, but they required a huge effort in manpower and materiel when Germany could least afford either.
The last question, for me, would be the effect on the morale of the population, despite this being a primary target at the time. Time has shown that the effect was much greater and more debilitating than the authors of the post war reports ('panacea merchants' to a man) were prepared to concede. I've waded through every page of everyone of them, and they are all written to some extent confirm a prejudice. This applies more to the BBSU report on which Zuckerman's baleful influence is obvious.

Cheers

Steve

 

[tyrodtom]

Anyone familiar with the work world knows there is a great deal of difference between the production you can get out of people that are well rested, not worried about what they're going to encounter when they get home, and people tired , wondering if they'll even have a place to sleep that night.

 

[stona]

Anyone familiar with the work world knows there is a great deal of difference between the production you can get out of people that are well rested, not worried about what they're going to encounter when they get home, and people tired , wondering if they'll even have a place to sleep that night.

The British and Germans knew it. One of the great successes of the Light Night Striking Force was not in the physical damage a few 500lb bombs or 'cookies' could do but in causing widespread air raid alarms all over the Reich. The problem with the effect of this kind of disruption is that it is not easily quantifiable, you can't measure what effect getting up in the middle of the night and going into shelter had on Herr or Frau Average's productivity, but it was certainly significant and the Germans acknowledged this. On longer nights many of the LNSF's Mosquitoes would make two raids, maximising the disruption throughout the night. Even if we can't measure the effect most can imagine being woken once or twice a night by air raid alarms, taking to shelter and awaiting the all clear. It is hardly an experience likely to increase one's productivity the next day. The aircraft don't have to drop bombs anywhere near you to cause the disruption, but the possibility that they might is in itself stressful.
Cheers
Steve

 

[stona]

Re: the moral or indirect effects of bombing.

Imagine you are a German soldier called Wilhelm T and you receive this letter from your wife Ingeborg.

"Dear Bill, At the moment it is once again unbearable; day and night ceaseless alarms. This tears so much at the nerves that are anyway already shattered, that I'm afraid I will go mad if the war with all its terrible consequences does not end soon. Yesterday and today the bombers were in Munster, at midday today in Hamm. When will it be Soest's turn? I dare not go out of the house, I don't dare settle down to sleep. I drift along in constant crisis and torment."

Soest is a small town about 30 miles east of Dortmund, 35 miles south east of Munster.

The letter was sent in May 1944. This clearly demonstrates the crisis faced by Ingeborg, but it must have had an effect on her absent husband too. This is the effect so hard to quantify and hugely underestimated by the airmen and economists who prepared the post war reports.
A Berlin school teacher, Lilo G made the following diary entry in January 1944

"You rightly observe that the nerves are slowly destroyed. Every evening you wait for the alarm. In the night you wake with a start because you believe that the siren has sounded. Then if it sounds, you go weak at the knees, you hurry, put things on (shirts, three pairs of stockings etc., because whatever you have on is sure to be saved.)"

This is just two examples, but millions of Germans were living under the same stress and fear.

Cheers

Steve

 

[buffnut453]

The British and Germans knew it. One of the great successes of the Light Night Striking Force was not in the physical damage a few 500lb bombs or 'cookies' could do but in causing widespread air raid alarms all over the Reich. The problem with the effect of this kind of disruption is that it is not easily quantifiable, you can't measure what effect getting up in the middle of the night and going into shelter had on Herr or Frau Average's productivity, but it was certainly significant and the Germans acknowledged this. On longer nights many of the LNSF's Mosquitoes would make two raids, maximising the disruption throughout the night. Even if we can't measure the effect most can imagine being woken once or twice a night by air raid alarms, taking to shelter and awaiting the all clear. It is hardly an experience likely to increase one's productivity the next day. The aircraft don't have to drop bombs anywhere near you to cause the disruption, but the possibility that they might is in itself stressful.
Cheers
Steve

I have 3 sons. The first was...well, the first and hence will always be the experimental model. The second was great and was sleeping through the night at 2 months old. The youngest was the exact opposite. We didn't have a complete night's sleep until he was 2 years old. Thus I can tell you from personal experience that enduring disruption of sleep is absolutely EXHAUSTING and affects productivity, sense of humour and many other intangibles. And that was just a baby. Throw into the mix fears of actual bodily harm and I can only imagine the deleterious impact of the combined bombing campaign.

 

[pbehn]

Re: the moral or indirect effects of bombing.

Imagine you are a German soldier called Wilhelm T and you receive this letter from your wife Ingeborg.

"Dear Bill, At the moment it is once again unbearable; day and night ceaseless alarms. This tears so much at the nerves that are anyway already shattered, that I'm afraid I will go mad if the war with all its terrible consequences does not end soon. Yesterday and today the bombers were in Munster, at midday today in Hamm. When will it be Soest's turn? I dare not go out of the house, I don't dare settle down to sleep. I drift along in constant crisis and torment."

The problem was that the people doing the bombing were not the people Bill was fighting. Theories about bombing an enemy into submission never took into account an army bent on revenge as an ally.

 

[buffnut453]

The problem was that the people doing the bombing were not the people Bill was fighting.

Correct, but Wilhelm would be far more worried about his family than would his American counterpart on the other side. The additional worry and stress must have impacted the effectiveness of individual Axis soldiers. As Stona points out, though, quantification of those impacts is incredibly difficult.

Theories about bombing an enemy into submission never took into account an army bent on revenge as an ally.

The pre-war theory that a strategic air campaign could somehow induce an enemy to capitulate was massively overstated. Just compare the bomb loads of aircraft available in 1939, when the Wellington was considered a heavy bomber, with those of the Lancaster and B-29. Yet even the big, 4-engined heavies couldn't force the issue on their own. On the flip side, revisionist theories that claim the strategic air campaign had little or no impact on the Axis war effort massively understate the reality. Yes, German production increased throughout most of the war but the constant drain on resources of reconstituting factories, machinery and transportation, the requirement to equip, man, train and sustain air and ground defences, and the lost productivity due to workforce casualties MUST have had a considerable impact on Germany's overall war effort. Just because the Axis continued producing aircraft, tanks, bullets and bombs does not mean they were doing it as well as would have been the case had the strategic bombing campaign not happened.

 

[Greyman]

The pre-war theory that a strategic air campaign could somehow induce an enemy to capitulate was massively overstated.

Luckily the theory was never fully put to the test and everyone pulled their punches. Things might have taken a different turn if the Wellingtons and Heinkels added chemical weapons to the HE and incendiary combo.