Aircraft Economics the forgotten consideration

gruad said:

I am a big fan of the p47 don't get me wrong. Ironically, if there was no mustang then the p47 could have been tweaked to perform the role that the mustang did with drop tanks.

But for the role the mustang was cheaper and therefore it got the role. And the p47 was switched to ground attack where it's ruggedness must have been an absolute blessing.

However, I want some videos of the p47 in action performing strafing and that must have been far more dangerous than actually going on mission escorts at that point of the war.

So really thank God we had such a choice of fantastic planes

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part of the problem of using the retrospectroscope is that we tend to forget what the Planners of the time had to deal with.
In Jan 1942 the Farmingdale plant had over 1580 P-47 B, C, Ds on order, the Evansville Indiana plant had 1050 P-47Ds on order ( and they didn't start construction of the plant until March) and Curtiss had 354 P-47Gs on order.
First P-47B came off the line the previous month but needed changes.

Now during this time period the US had around 2000 P-60s on order (canceled) and had ordered 4000 P-76s (P-39Es) in Feb 1942 (new factory in Georgia) but canceled the whole order in May 1942 and used the factory to build B-29s.

The US did somethings wrong and it did a lot right.

Geoffrey Sinclair said:

1,530 Merlin 22
3,830 Hercules 100
1,480 Merlin 25
1,840 Merlin 76
1,900 Merlin 114
2,300 Griffon
5,550 Sabre II
3,180 Hercules XVII
1,596 Pegasus XVIII

My but Rolls Royce were cost effective.

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Does show the disproportionate cost of the Sleeve valve engines.

Cost was a consideration but not a major one until the dog days of the war. The P-47 may have cost twice as much as a P-51 but the USA needed both in 1944 and in fact gave a lot of both to the British. The Lancaster may have been better than the Halifax but switching production from Halifax to Lancaster would just mean much fewer "four engined bombers" and there were many tasks that the Halifax could do just as well as a Lancaster. Ther were things the B-24 was better at than the B-17 so they were used in complimentary ways. There were more Wellingtons made than either Lancaster or Halifax and a use was found for them bcaus there were all sorts of ways that planes got used apart from what they were originally designed for or what is now considered their main task. The first use of the B-24 in British hands was to ferry pilots to and from the UK, carry high value freight and people like Churchill along with its maritime recon role.

pbehn said:

The P-47 may have cost twice as much as a P-51 but the USA needed both in 1944 and in fact gave a lot of both to the British.

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Well put.

For over 1/2 of 1944 they were building over 600 P-47s a month and it wasn't until Aug 1944 that P-51 production exceeded P-47 Production. P-47 Production did taper off a bit after that while P-51 production increased. P-39 and P-40 production stopped in 1944 (P-63 production continued) but changing over a factory could take a number of months. Using the retrospectroscope we can see when the US could have changed over sooner but at the time with both the Europe and the Pacific in question (result was not in question, just how many months or years) loosing hundreds or perhaps 1000 fighters while changing over to a 'cheaper' alterative was not a gamble that they wanted to make.

In each production 'scheme' there were hundreds if not thousands of subcontractors, everything from elevators/alerions/door covers to screws. You can't fit P-47 brakes into P-51 wheels

Shortround6 said:

Well put.

For over 1/2 of 1944 they were building over 600 P-47s a month and it wasn't until Aug 1944 that P-51 production exceeded P-47 Production. P-47 Production did taper off a bit after that while P-51 production increased. P-39 and P-40 production stopped in 1944 (P-63 production continued) but changing over a factory could take a number of months. Using the retrospectroscope we can see when the US could have changed over sooner but at the time with both the Europe and the Pacific in question (result was not in question, just how many months or years) loosing hundreds or perhaps 1000 fighters while changing over to a 'cheaper' alterative was not a gamble that they wanted to make.

In each production 'scheme' there were hundreds if not thousands of subcontractors, everything from elevators/alerions/door covers to screws. You can't fit P-47 brakes into P-51 wheels

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That is only one way of looking at costs, what was the cost of lost shipping in 1942 and 43? As compared to the cost of some B-24s to close the gap. What is th cost of all the Spitfires and Hurricanes and the Chain home system compared to not being able to defend any UK port from daylight air attack? What is the cost of all allied fighters used in Europe compared to a failure of the D-Day landings? Then we have the costs of the B-29 and Manhattan projects which only needed two missions on two days to justify their massive expenditure. I cant remember a discussion saying that the expense of a B-29 wasnt worth the effort compared to a B-17 or B-24.

gruad said:

It would be interesting to know how many German tanks were lost as a result of mechanical failure rather than them actually being destroyed.

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A lot of T-34's were. So much so that the early ones sometimes went into combat with a spare transmission strapped to the rear deck. The Germans had units equipped entirely with captured T-34's, and I think those were all tanks that had broken down rather than been knocked out.

Interesting item is the Germans were using captured French tanks in Normandy and that the US Army was fixing captured German tanks in France and issuing them to French Resistance units to use against isolated pockets of German troops, which must have annoyed the German troops quite a lot. And in fact the French put some captured Ju88 back into action against those German holdouts as well.

pbehn said:

That is only one way of looking at costs, what was the cost of lost shipping in 1942 and 43?

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Which was the idea behind the CAM Hurricanes. Lose one older model fighter to prevent the loss of multiple ships.

MIflyer said:

Which was the idea behind the CAM Hurricanes. Lose one older model fighter to prevent the loss of multiple ships.

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The Cam launches were hugely successful, 8 launches 8 planes destroyed 1 damaged and three chased off for the loss of 8 Hurricanes and one pilot. FO. JB Kendal.

I wonder if anyone has ever figured out how many airplanes were built that did not have to be. The A-31 was used by the RAF in Burma but overall could not have been worth the effort. A good portion of the P-40 production had to be unneeded. The A-24 was hardly a star in the USAAF but I guess they did get some limited use out of the A-27's in the PI, training rookie pilots before wrecking them. The B-32 was not needed as a heavy bomber; they even planned to use them as low altitude gunships in the invasion of Japan. You have to wonder what the O-47 was good for, other than a target tug. The C-76 was a complete waste of time, money, and lives, but they did get to switch the factory over to building Higgens boats.

pbehn said:

The Cam launches were hugely successful, 8 launches 8 planes destroyed 1 damaged and three chased off for the loss of 8 Hurricanes and one pilot. FO. JB Kendal.

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You wonder that if they had not built the baby flat tops if maybe an expendable CAM fighter might have been developed, maybe like that Martin Baker cheap fighter that was proposed during the BoB. Given that you pretty much were not fighting other fighters, the performance could have been lower to favor more ammo and more fuel to increase the on-station time.

pbehn said:

That is only one way of looking at costs, what was the cost of lost shipping in 1942 and 43? As compared to the cost of some B-24s to close the gap. What is th cost of all the Spitfires and Hurricanes and the Chain home system compared to not being able to defend any UK port from daylight air attack? What is the cost of all allied fighters used in Europe compared to a failure of the D-Day landings? Then we have the costs of the B-29 and Manhattan projects which only needed two missions on two days to justify their massive expenditure. I cant remember a discussion saying that the expense of a B-29 wasnt worth the effort compared to a B-17 or B-24.

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Agree once your existence is at stake cost goes out the window and you spend whatever it takes.

50% of GDP means everyone in the UK is devoting half the effort to the war and is 50% poorer as a result of it.

tomo pauk said:

Many times, a much more expensive piece of hardware was actually less capable than the less expensive counterpart. Like the Ki 45 when compared with Zero (yes, Zero was IJN's piece of kit, but still). Bf 110 was probably more expensive than the Fw 187, but the 110 was preferred, even if the 187 was a much better performer.

British saw that once the Hurricane and Spitfire can be outfitted with cannons, they can do without Whirlwind; however, they were still paying for Beaufighter (granted, it offered both great firepower and long range, while Whirlwind was a short range fighter). They were also willing to pay for Tempest and Typhoon, as well as actually pay for Lightning. They didn't have the luxury of hindsight like we have today.



Ease of manufacturing of the 109 had to do with much more things than just with the layout of U/C, even if we forget the BMW 801 being more expensive engine to make and use than the DB 601/605.

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Did you mean Ki-43?

gruad said:

File:Ourworldindata uk-defence-spending-as-a-percentage-of-gdp.png - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Agree once your existence is at stake cost goes out the window and you spend whatever it takes.

50% of GDP means everyone in the UK is devoting half the effort to the war and is 50% poorer as a result of it.

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The nation may have been poorer but the poorest in that nation were better off than they had ever been. Rationing actually improved the diet of the poorest in London. My grandmother got two evacuees from London into her house in the depths of rural Yorkshire, they were half starved when they arrived and had never eaten so well. Rationing provided a minimum but those in the country had their own access to food like eggs milk flour and bacon. My Gran and mother stayed in touch with them until they passed away.

The A-24 held the same potential as the SBD, but the Army did not use the A-24 as designed, instead using it as as shallow diving bomber.

*had* the Army trained it's crews following USN doctrine, the A-24's performance would have been completely different.

The following videos from the WW2TV channel on YouTube may be of interest, although they about the economics of war production more generally.

The War Economies of the major combatants during WW2 — this video discusses the importance of manpower and its allocation between the military and production.

Destructive Creation: American Business and the Winning of World War Two — this video discusses how there was much more U.S. government involvement in and control over military production than is generally thought.

Churchill's American Arsenal — this video explores early cooperation between the U.K. and U.S., and how production for Britain helped spur the American armaments industry.

GregP said:

Did you mean Ki-43?

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No, the Ki 45 by Kawasaki.

We know now because they tried back then, designs that used non strategic materials were handicapped, then again what would de Havilland do with an edict all combat types must be all metal. If you wanted numbers in a hurry it was existing designs or compress the development cycle upping the risks of obsolescence and design failure. When it comes to over production consider the number of new allied front line combat types in reserve in mid 1945, all of them were not needed, on top of the various designs history has decided were failures.

The Sopwith Camel took around 7 months from start of design to squadron service, the Hawker Tempest took around 36 months. First flight to squadron service time was around 5 months for the Camel and 16 months for the Tempest, the air forces knew the need for continual development including new designs, what they did not know was how much longer it took to come up with a new design and then build it in numbers. It is one thing to have a good design, another to have good design stretch and stretch was the alternative to new designs. The air fighting ranged from the arctic to the tropics, a type could be much better suited to one area than another. Also to an extent there is a contrast in missions, when air forces fight each other the altitudes tend to go up, and performance at altitude becomes a real issue, being able to bounce from above a real edge. However when armies and navies are concerned low altitude rules. The B-17 was judged the better bomber in Europe, the B-24 in the Pacific.

The production schedules were ever changing, if you look at them with an agenda you can be sure there will be evidence to support it. AFHRA Call 145.96-204 reel A1502 page 1089 on USAAF Production schedule as of August 1942, production plans August 1942 to end 1943

B-29 production 236 in 1943, accelerating
B-32 11 in the second half of 1943, accelerating
P-39 to peak March to June 1943, production ending in October 1943
P-40 production at peak, production to end in May 1943
P-47 production accelerating from 55 to 588 a month by end 1943
P-51 production pause November 1942 to March 1943 for the A-36, then 105 a month from May 1943 onwards.
P-63 production 1 in June 1943, accelerating to 519 in December.
Dive bombers from 30 A-24 a month in August 1942 to 121 A-24, 176 A-25 and 196 A-35 in December 1943 with A-25 production accelerating.

Curtiss held a contract for 500 P-60 as of January 1943 and for a lot more P-40 than the August 1942 schedule expected.

The A-24 in USAAF service saw combat early in the SWPA area taking what the USAAF considered unacceptable losses, add the airfield space and supplies required the dive bombers were considered less efficient than other bomber types. In Europe the widespread light AA made dive bomber attacks more dangerous and they would require plenty of escorts in contested airspace, fighter bombers were less accurate but more survivable and overall more efficient in delivering bombs.

gruad said:

However, I want some videos of the p47 in action performing strafing and that must have been far more dangerous than actually going on mission escorts at that point of the war.

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What exactly is "at that point of the war."?

The 9th AF noted a loss rate of 0.8% in 1944 and 0.65% in 1945 for P-47, The P-51 in 1943 1.94%, in 1944 1.38%, in 1945 0.55%, P-38 in 1944 1.31%, 1945 0.84% all causes loss on operations. For the war the average flying hours per credit sortie was P-38 2.51, P-47 2.41, P-51 2.96. Fighter Credit sorties totals, Bombing 179,571, Escort 55,404, Other 22,556, Total 257,531

P-47 production at Farmingdale peaked in December 1943, then settled into around mid 300 a month in 1944, the change over to the N model saw D (and M) production go from 341 in September to 243 in October then monthly 102, 286, 45, 1, Evansville was running at about 250 P-47D a month in 1944 but saw a ramp up in November and peaked at 318 P-47D in May 1945, changing to the N model in July.

Inglewood was running at 250 P-51 a month in January 1944 and around 500 a month by end of year, Dallas settled on around 250 a month in mid 1944 but did have a small ramp up in mid 1945, peaking at 295 in May, to help cover the short fall as Inglewood moved to the H model.

Tanks were engine (like aircraft) and suspension limited, top speed not that relevant compared with cross country and broken ground performance, a gun with good AP and HE rounds and reliability. The whole point of tracks was off road performance. You needed a certain level of power to weight to move the vehicle and climb, keeping vehicle weights to below 30 to 40 tons in WWII generally worked, going above that was pushing technology, the JS-III, Centurion and M-26 were beginning to solve the problems for over 40 tons. Add transporters, bringing equipment etc. to enable heavy tank mobility. What WWII guns had both good AP and HE? It meant the general arrangement was go for either AP or HE performance. Few battlefield targets were armoured. Fire control optics and better visibility from inside the tank made real differences.

There was the idea of heavy tank for infantry support and breakthrough, lighter tanks for exploitation, but even in a pursuit operation tanks generally moved twice the distance the front line moved. The Red Army tried to use the more reliable Sherman for pursuit but tanks were mechanically fragile, reliability mattered more than top speed, the German tank losses fighting at Kursk were much less than when the repair deports were overrun post Kursk, in the western desert possession of the field after the battle was a priority for the Germans, recovering damaged vehicles including enemy or destroying them.

WO 169/3861 (Eighth Army), a document from the G(AFV) Branch dated 'End Sept.' [1942] headed "Tank Overhaul Programme." It gives the overhaul mileage limit/annual mileage rate/time in workshops for overhaul (weeks) as:

Crusader 1200 / 3000 / 8
Valentine 2500 / 3000 / 8
Matilda 1000 / 3000 / 8
Stuart 3500 / 3000 / 4
Grant 1500 / 3000 / 8

Which firstly shows how few miles per year the tanks were expected to do, and the distance they could travel before they needed a major overhaul. You would expect the time between overhauls to be at least basically related to the great "reliability" tag. And indeed looking at the above the Stuart became the Honey, and the Valentine has a good reputation for reliability. In effect for the Matilda to be able to drive 3,000 miles in 52 weeks it needed to spend 24 of those weeks in the workshop, over and above any maintenance done by the combat units. Now clearly the size of the workshops could be increased to cut down the maintenance time but of course that has its costs as well.

Wartime rationing, along with full employment giving people purchasing power, increased the average nutrition levels in Britain, the post war rationing sent that backwards.

GrauGeist said:

*had* the Army trained it's crews following USN doctrine, the A-24's performance would have been completely different.

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Good point! Compare the A-24 experience with that of the A-36. Or for that matter, compare the USMC Vindicators at Midway with that of the USN SBD's. USMC tried glide bombing attacks. I guess the USMC SBDs at Midway did the same.

Somebody thought that putting torps on single engine fighters was a potentially good idea. I don't think the USN came up with anything similar until the AD Skyraider.

MIflyer said:

I wonder if anyone has ever figured out how many airplanes were built that did not have to be. The A-31 was used by the RAF in Burma but overall could not have been worth the effort. A good portion of the P-40 production had to be unneeded. The A-24 was hardly a star in the USAAF but I guess they did get some limited use out of the A-27's in the PI, training rookie pilots before wrecking them. The B-32 was not needed as a heavy bomber; they even planned to use them as low altitude gunships in the invasion of Japan. You have to wonder what the O-47 was good for, other than a target tug. The C-76 was a complete waste of time, money, and lives, but they did get to switch the factory over to building Higgens boats.

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Pretty decent, perhaps except for the O-47. They gave good service up and down the east coast and Caribbean looking for U-boats, and were pretty good at it. They started off as observation airplanes and wound up being used as observation / spotting type airplanes, so they at least did a job reasonably commensurate with what they were designed for, even if they did it over an ocean instead of over a forest.