Aircraft Economics the forgotten consideration

[gruad]

The British 17pdr seemed to able to take out the King Tiger even from the front, the problem was getting the ADPS to actually hit at greater than suicidal range. Which stopped the US from using APDS for much of the 50s. APCR worked at short range but didn't work at long range. The British persevered with APDS. The French spent a lot of time/money on better shaped charge projectiles.

They took out Wittman with this ending the Nazi super tank myth...

 

[z42]

An example of that was the Ronson Sherman problem that got resolved very quickly as it was a real problem.

Here's a recent discussion with Nick Moran debunking the 'Ronson Sherman' myth:


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=leWp4GNWqpI

tl;dr: There is a grain of truth, in that the Sherman was the first medium tank the Western Allies deployed in large numbers equipped with a large calibre gun. With such large shells needing a lot of propellant, and with the then contemporary way of storing ammunition all around the tank, it was likely a penetrating hit would cause fragments to ignite the propellant in a shell leading to a catastrophic chain reaction. In contrast previous generation tanks equipped with 2-pdr and similar guns had such small shells that such a catastrophic chain reaction was much less likely. But this wasn't a deficiency that was somehow unique to the Sherman, but rather shared by practically all tanks equipped with large caliber guns (of course, heavy tanks were much less likely to receive such penetrating hits in the first place).

And yes, later Sherman variants with the wet storage drastically reduced the chance of such chain reactions. Not sure if any WWII tanks had anything similar to the systems common on contemporary Western tanks with an armored door to the magazine and a blowoff panel to direct a conflagration of the magazine to the outside of the tank?

 

[marathag]

And yes, later Sherman variants with the wet storage drastically reduced the chance of such chain reactions.

In Korea, the M4A3 wet tanks were drained to reduce weight, and just the empty bins proved enough to reduce ammo ignition nearly as well as when filled.
So no more wet stowage after that in later US Armor designs

 

[BiffF15]

Fair point! In context it was meant to say that the Tiger was rubbish economically in that while it met a need economically early on, by the time of the Tiger 2 There was no real need for a breakthrough tank that gobbled gas and transmissions.

The Allies didn't have to destroy these things. They just had to wait for them to run out of gas or breakdown.

Hitler wasted his money on vanity projects. The allied planners were very precise in allocating resources to where they were needed.

An example of that was the Ronson Sherman problem that got resolved very quickly as it was a real problem.

The Sherman "Ronson" Myth -

When one has spent any time in tank circles, particularly those online, it's almost inevitable that when discussing World War Two Allied armor somebody

tankhistoria.com

An interesting counter point to the "Ronson" branding. I'm not well learned on tank history but am willing to dig some.

 

[WARSPITER]

The "Ronson" designation certainly isn't noted in contemporary writings from the war. It's a bit like the P-38 being
called the Fork Tailed Devil.

As to burning, most tanks will go up when rounds get in. Panthers carried rounds in the side of the sloped hull
which were vulnerable to hits. Add the sealed engine bay with fuel vapours and they burned easily too. The
problem with engine cooling/air flow was bad with the Panther A/G having what looks like two extra pipes on the
left rear exhaust. These were actually air inlet pipes to try to stop the left exhaust manifold from getting so hot.
Even with that the Panther could still catch fire in the engine bay without being hit.

The other problem for the Sherman reputation as the posted article notes was indeed Belton Coopers book about
the Sherman. He actually mostly did see only broken machines which would have contributed greatly to his opinion
of the tank.

The Sherman was also the most numerous tank for the Western allies from D-day on. This automatically meant that
being on the attack it was always going to have the most losses.