"All of Vlad's forces and all of Vlad's men, are out to put Humpty together again." (3 Viewers)

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By some chance, could it have been convenient for NATO that Turkey kept the Black Sea closed, at least until now?
Why - for what reason? since the Montreux Convention gives Turkey all the rights (and which they had initially rightfully done) to deny access to Russian warships (e.g. those stationed in Syria or elsewhere) into the Black Sea.
 
Once again, here is the overview and analysis of what's going on with the Turkish Straights.

Many good points presented, too.

 
Once again, here is the overview and analysis of what's going on with the Turkish Straights.

Many good points presented, too.

And me saying since weeks exactly the same thing you answer:

*yawn*
You obviously beleive what you like, that's your choice.
That fact of the matter is, they aren't allowing any warships through.
I posted that fact (yes, fact) earlier, although that doesn't mean you'll read it, because, well, facts.
So, I suppose at this point: carry on.


As my favorite sentence in the movie Green berets: - you funny
 
And me saying since weeks exactly the same thing you answer:

*yawn*
You obviously beleive what you like, that's your choice.
That fact of the matter is, they aren't allowing any warships through.
I posted that fact (yes, fact) earlier, although that doesn't mean you'll read it, because, well, facts.
So, I suppose at this point: carry on.


As my favorite sentence in the movie Green berets: - you funny
Well, there's a huge difference here - I have provided a legal analysis that covers what Turkey is doing, how far they have pushed Artical 19 and what motive may be behind it.

You have provided your opinion.

If shaking one's head could be considered laughing, then I am laughing - slowly...
 
Interesting legal and strategic analysis of Turkey's actions (or lack of actions)


It's a long read, but here are the conclusions::

The upshot is that Turkey retains wide latitude to interpret current events unilaterally. The Montreux Convention is heavy on legal ambiguity but light on historical precedent. At bottom, Turkey's sole discretion in controlling a vital narrow sea likely yields an outsized strategic impact on allied nations during a period of hostility. For example, Turkey's tacit "invocation" of Article 21 has, to date, succeeded in halting all warship traffic—regardless of nationality—into the Black Sea. Moreover, as we are in a pseudo-Article 21 regime it is feasible—though legally questionable—that Turkey retains the authority to open the Straits to warships of specific nations as it deems appropriate, providing a strategic military advantage for designated States. To that end, we have seen Turkey avail itself of its singular position and exercise its discretion accordingly.​
Though the nation's actions are debatably positive insofar as they mitigate escalation, the implicit or tacit invocation of its authority to do so may well be at odds with the spirit of Montreux. To realign its actions and keep the global community apprised of its thinking, Turkey should publicly and explicitly clarify its position with regard to Montreux in the coming days and weeks. To start, Turkey should provide its justification, however scant, for stretching of Article 19 to prevent all warships from transiting the Straits.​
Given Turkey's opacity to date, it would behoove the United States and NATO allies to attain a clear line of communication with the Turkish government to garner their real-time intent with regard to the Convention and plan maritime strategy accordingly. Reliance on said communications with a historically mercurial ally carries its own strategic risk for which the United States and NATO allies must account.​
 
The way I see it, Turkey blocking access to all warships (native and non-native) is a smart move.

This prevents any provocation, political posturing and most importantly: "accidents".
Currently, there is an issue with free-floating mines creating a hazard in the region. If a NATO warship (other than Romania or Bulgaria) was in the area and a Russian Ship struck it, they could claim they were attacked, etc.

Russia wants to reinforce their Black Sea fleet and has a number of ships in the eastern Med, but Turkey is standing firm on their position.

At the moment, I really don't see any reason why a Warship from any outside nation needs to be in that sea.
 
The way I see it, Turkey blocking access to all warships (native and non-native) is a smart move.

This prevents any provocation, political posturing and most importantly: "accidents".
Currently, there is an issue with free-floating mines creating a hazard in the region. If a NATO warship (other than Romania or Bulgaria) was in the area and a Russian Ship struck it, they could claim they were attacked, etc.

Russia wants to reinforce their Black Sea fleet and has a number of ships in the eastern Med, but Turkey is standing firm on their position.

At the moment, I really don't see any reason why a Warship from any outside nation needs to be in that sea.
You always say it better than I do.
 
Why - for what reason? since the Montreux Convention gives Turkey all the rights (and which they had initially rightfully done) to deny access to Russian warships (e.g. those stationed in Syria or elsewhere) into the Black Sea.
I doubt this situation was gamed at the War College prior to 24 Feb.
So, Russia has a fleet in the Med. They're denied access to the Black Sea. NATO has the 6th Fleet in the Med. The RN probably hasn't forgotten about Malta so I'm guessing that Her Majesty is well represented too. NATO assets in the Med, however, might not be set up for current situation. NATO hasn't had a "need" to enter the Black Sea, yet. Turkey keeps a lid on things, for a while. Romania decides it needs some mines swept up. Israel might have a minesweeper :). Now, that a suitable amount of time for equipping has passed, NATO can bring up the Montreux Convention.
Hey, I called the MiG-29 thing.
 
There have been numerous studies done by the US and NATO relative to the Russian Black Sea Fleet.

The thing to remember about the situation in the Black Sea, is that unless the US and/or NATO wish to go to full scale war with Russia, they cannot attack (unprovoked) the Black Sea Fleet ships. There is no need to have any US or NATO ships in the Black Sea, at least not in a military sense, unless the US and/or NATO are planning on imminent attack.

Plus, if the US and/or NATO wanted to attack/neutralize/destroy the Black Sea Fleet, they would not have to use naval forces to do so. Aircraft flying from land bases using air-launched anti-ship weapons (ie ~Harpoon, Tomahawk, HARM), along with surface ship and submarine launched Tomahawk cruise missiles, would clear the Russian ships from the open sea in very short order. Their only hope of having surface ships surviving any length of time would be to retreat to their harbours under protection of Russian Air Force and land-based AA systems.

In studies during the height of the later Cold War period, the best the Soviet Navy ever achieved was to have a significant number of its submarines survive past the death of their surface fleet. The best the Soviet surface fleet ever managed was to have 10% of its surface combat ships survive past 2 weeks. This was assuming that the Soviet surface navy sortied to attack the US and/or NATO surface and submarine units, while also helping their submarine fleet deploy under a protective umbrella. This was also assuming that it was a conventional war, and that there was some warning and therefore time for both sides to prepare.

As an added bit of info, the US all by itself (with some lead time) currently has the ability to deliver ~180 (or more) Harpoon and/or Tomahawk anti-ship missiles on target anywhere in the world on the open seas or in coastal waters. All arriving on target within a couple of minutes if so desired.
 
re the logistics ship damaged yesterday near Snake Island

The Vsevolod Bobrov is a sea-going tug and ice breaker design, sometimes used as a multi-roll transport for small amounts of cargo and personnel.

Vsevolod Bobrov.jpg


"Elbrus Class (Project 23120) Logistics Support Vessels"
 
The upshot is that Turkey retains wide latitude to interpret current events unilaterally. The Montreux Convention is heavy on legal ambiguity but light on historical precedent. At bottom, Turkey's sole discretion in controlling a vital narrow sea likely yields an outsized strategic impact on allied nations during a period of hostility. For example, Turkey's tacit "invocation" of A rticle 21 has, to date, succeeded in halting all warship traffic—regardless of nationality—into the Black Sea.
I wonder if being a NATO member, and NATO being "threatened' by Putler would pass muster under the "imminent threat" provision of Article 21.
 

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