"All of Vlad's forces and all of Vlad's men, are out to put Humpty together again." (30 Viewers)

[Escuadrilla Azul]

As they also fitted with a warhead designed to take
on aircraft there is little effect on protected targets as the S-300 is a wide area fragmentation device.

That was another thing I was thinking. The standard warhead must be pretty useless against most fixed targets.

There are alternative warheads for the S-300 more suited for ground attack or the damage is planed only by the kinetic energy of the missiles?

 

[WARSPITER]

That was another thing I was thinking. The standard warhead must be pretty useless against most fixed targets.

There are alternative warheads for the S-300 more suited for ground attack or the damage is planed only by the kinetic energy of the missiles?

As far as I'm aware there is only one type of warhead although it has 133kg or 143kg of explosive to allow a big spread.
The only advantage for the S-300's is the speed at which they would come in. It would be hard to hit them.

 

[J_P_C]

 

[fubar57]

https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ukraine-russian-invasion-war-day-233-1.6616293

 

[RogerdeLluria]

More weapons from the museum to the front.

 

[Greg Boeser]

Soon they will be stripping all the T-34s off their Great Patriotic War monuments.

 

[Admiral Beez]

More weapons from the museum to the front.

Okay, this just validating my hoarding relative's mantra of never throw anything away since you never know when you'll need it in the future. Thanks Russia, idiot.

 

[Denniss]

They are probably working 24/7 to get these tanks back into service or to cannibalize them for spare parts

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Putin may intend for mobilized personnel to plug gaps in Russia's frontlines long enough for the autumn conscripts to receive some training and form additional units to improve Russian combat power in 2023. Putin confirmed on October 14 that mobilized personnel are receiving little training before they are sent to the frontlines. Putin announced that of the 220,000 people who have been mobilized since his September 21 order, 35,000 are already in Russian military units and 16,000 are already in units "involved in combat missions."[3] Putin also outlined the training these mobilized forces allegedly receive: 5-10 days of "initial training," 5-15 days of training with combat units, "then the next stage is already directly in the troops taking part in hostilities." This statement corroborates dozens of anecdotal reports from Russian outlets, milbloggers, and mobilized personnel of untrained, unequipped, and utterly unprepared men being rushed to the frontlines, where some have already surrendered to Ukrainian forces and others have been killed.[4]

***************

Key Takeaways

• Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that his "partial" mobilization will end in "about two weeks"—likely to free up bureaucratic bandwidth for the normal autumn conscription cycle that will begin on November 1.
• Putin may intend for mobilized personnel to plug gaps in Russia's frontlines long enough for the autumn conscripts to receive some training and form additional units to improve Russian combat power in 2023.
• Ukrainian and Western officials continue to reiterate that they have observed no indicators of preparations for a Belarusian invasion of Ukraine, despite alarmist reports in the Belarusian information space that President Alexander Lukashenko has introduced a "counter-terrorist operation" regime.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on October 14 that there is currently no additional need for further massive strikes against Ukraine.
• Russian authorities are continuing to engage in "Russification" social programming schemes that target Ukrainian children.
• A prominent Russian milblogger accused unspecified senior officials within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) of preparing to censor Russian milbloggers on October 14, but there is no official confirmation of an investigation or prosecution of these milbloggers.
• Russian sources continued to claim that Ukrainian forces are conducting counteroffensive operations in northeast Kharkiv Oblast east of Kupyansk.
• Russian troops conducted limited ground attacks west of Kreminna in order to regain lost positions.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in northwestern Kherson Oblast in order to regain lost positions.
• Russian troops continued ground attacks around Bakhmut and Donetsk City.
• Russian authorities expressed increasing concern over Ukrainian strikes against Russian rear logistics lines in southern Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian occupation authorities are continuing to consolidate control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) through strengthened security measures amid negotiations to establish a nuclear safety and protective zone at the plant.
• Russian officials continued to brand their movement of populations out of Kherson Oblast as recreational "humanitarian trips" rather than evacuations.[/I]

Institute for the Study of War

This page collects ISW and CTP's updates on the conflict in Ukraine. In late February 2022, ISW began publishing daily synthetic products covering key events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine.

www.understandingwar.org

 

[Glider]

An interesting article was shown from Bloomberg showing how dependent Russia is on Western parts for its most sophisticated pieces of equipment.

Russia was and obviously still is aware of this dependency and the threat to the future strength of its military.

An extensive survey was undertaken in Russia and a summary was completed in April 2021.

177,058 components used in 278 types of military equipment were dependent on the West or Ukraine.

In 2020 a target was set to resolve 18,047 substitutions (for western components) in 43 types of equipment, but they only managed 3,148 substitutions in five types of equipment. The effects are significant

a) Efforts to produce analogue electronic components from scratch didn't even get off the ground: Of the plan to develop 4,148 different analogues in 2020, Russia managed — none.
b) Cruise missiles, TU-22 bombers, submarines, the air defense system Nudol, and anti-aircraft radar are all dependent on western components
c) The anti-missile and ballistic missile defense system 14Ts033 Nudol, has 1,548 tasks to substitute components, but only 0.3%, including the supply of spare parts, had been achieved so far.
d) Early warning, long-range radar systems 1L119 Nebo-SVU and 55Zh6UM Nebo-UM. Work on replacing foreign components with domestic analogues had not started as of 2021, with targets to import spare parts met at 20% and 0.7%
e) GT-01 Murmansk-BN, a communications intelligence and jamming system that Russia claims has a range of 1,000km. At least 111 of its components were from EU and NATO nations and needed to be replaced, while the development of domestic equivalents had not started.
f) Yasen-class nuclear attack submarines, and older project 971M Akula-class submarines. TU-22M3 bombers and Su-34 fighter bombers, alongside multiple types of missiles including guided air defense missile 9M96. The IL-96 aircraft, Project 22350 class frigates, one of the more modern Russian vessels. The air defense missile system Buk-M3. Ka-52K attack helicopters. Forpost drones. These are all dependent on Western components. A good number of the contracts (approx 100) designed to fill these gaps have yet to be signed, let alone have started any development work
g) Developing a supply chain is also important. In 2020 Russia planned to find alternative supply chains for 484 projects, but only achieved made progress on 5 of these projects.

Time isn't on Russia's side. As time goes by their store of spares are going to be used up and equipment is going to become non operational whilst the Ukraine forces are going to get better more modern equipment.

Putin Tried for Years to Stop His Military From Using Western Parts — And Mostly Failed

 

[RogerdeLluria]

On a side note, it looks like t-62 are way more likely to be captured than the average Russian tank.
I wonder if its because: 1) they break more often and are abandoned, 2) crews feel more insecure and are more predisposed to abandon them, or 3) both of them.

 

[Frog]

These ones could be recycled too ; just a bit phosphorescent by night :

 

[RogerdeLluria]

The Russian military intends to reactivate and upgrade some 800 Soviet-era T-62 tanks in the next three years to balance its significant losses in the ongoing Ukraine war.
I wonder what happened with the T-14 Armata?

Biggest Upgrade In History? Russia To Reactivate 800 Cold War-Era T-62 Tanks Amid Depleting Arsenal

Russian military intends to upgrade some 800 Soviet-era T-62 tanks to balance its significant losses in the ongoing Ukraine war.

eurasiantimes.com

 

[Snautzer01]

The Russian military intends to reactivate and upgrade some 800 Soviet-era T-62 tanks in the next three years to balance its significant losses in the ongoing Ukraine war.
I wonder what happened with the T-14 Armata?

Biggest Upgrade In History? Russia To Reactivate 800 Cold War-Era T-62 Tanks Amid Depleting Arsenal

Russian military intends to upgrade some 800 Soviet-era T-62 tanks to balance its significant losses in the ongoing Ukraine war.

eurasiantimes.com

An explanation.

Why Russia’s New T-14 Tank Wouldn’t Be a Game Changer in Ukraine - Even if it Had More of Them

The T-14 Armata next generation battle tank has for years promised to revolutionise the armoured warfare capabilities of the Russian Army, and following its unveiling in

militarywatchmagazine.com

 

[Admiral Beez]

On a side note, it looks like t-62 are way more likely to be captured than the average Russian tank.
I wonder if its because: 1) they break more often and are abandoned, 2) crews feel more insecure and are more predisposed to abandon them, or 3) both of them.

If used properly with infantry support the AFU can use the captured T-62s well enough, despite their low penetrative ammunition and lack of modern ERA armour. Most AFU tank engagements would be against hardened infantry positions and IFVs, not other tanks. That's what MANPATS are for.

 

[SaparotRob]

The Russian military intends to reactivate and upgrade some 800 Soviet-era T-62 tanks in the next three years to balance its significant losses in the ongoing Ukraine war.
I wonder what happened with the T-14 Armata?

Biggest Upgrade In History? Russia To Reactivate 800 Cold War-Era T-62 Tanks Amid Depleting Arsenal

Russian military intends to upgrade some 800 Soviet-era T-62 tanks to balance its significant losses in the ongoing Ukraine war.

eurasiantimes.com

Maybe they're trying to scrounge up a few 74LS221N chips or a DAC03CDX1 or two.

 

[GTX]

An explanation.

Why Russia’s New T-14 Tank Wouldn’t Be a Game Changer in Ukraine - Even if it Had More of Them

The T-14 Armata next generation battle tank has for years promised to revolutionise the armoured warfare capabilities of the Russian Army, and following its unveiling in

militarywatchmagazine.com

That article is a bit dated

 

[buffnut453]

The accuracy may not be that poor.

I can't speak specifically for the S300, since I do not know how it works in the SS mode. However, I can speak to how a generic command guided (CG) SAM might be used in an SS mode.

From open sources, including the Australian Airpower article I listed before, the original S300 missiles, the 5V55K and KD models, are described as CG. Later versions apparently added additional capability.

For those not familiar ( buffnut453, I assume you know this, I am describing it for others that might not), CG missiles are basically radio controlled missiles. The radar tracks the target of interest, and then it uplinks (sends) commands to the missile to guide the missile to the position in space that the radar believes the target to be at. The missile does not guide itself, the radar on the ground tells the missile how to correct its path, and the ground radar guides the missile all the way to the target. It is, by design, accurate enough against a flying jet to get the missile within the kill radius of the warhead of the missile. For some CG missiles this might require putting the missile within ~25 feet of the moving target in order to be lethal.

Because the ground radar guides the missile, and radar track error naturally get larger with range, the CG system has practical accuracy limitations based on range. You don't use this technique for very long range shots, because at very long range the missile miss distance (based on track errors), on a moving target, might exceed the kill radius of the warhead.

Now lets apply this technique to a non-moving ground target. The radar does not even have to see, or be able to track, the target, all you need is surveyed numbers from the radar to the target, i.e., the target is 100.2 degrees azimuth true, 0.4 degrees elevation, and 50.4 km away. If the missile is launched in an up and over trajectory, the radar will provide guidance as if it was tracking that unmoving target at those coordinates. It will continue to guide the missile as long as it can see the missile. In an up and over it (the radar) might be able to see the missile until the missile is within a few thousand feet of the target, and the last command would arrive with the missile pointed right at the unmoving ground target.

For an unmoving ground target the accuracy might be better than for a moving flying target, particularly at longer ranges.

T!

The problem with command guidance only is that the missile must be able to see the command signal, which typically means the receiver antennas on the missile point aft. This drives flatter missile trajectories for surface-to-surface operations because the last third of a ballistic profile means the command signal antennas can't see the command signal transmitter antenna any more.

That flatter trajectory results in a faster velocity over the ground in the final third of the engagement, which means the command signal must tell the missile exactly when to dive onto the target. The longer the distance from the launch site, the more time it takes for those command signals to reach the missile, which inherently reduces accuracy, even for a static target, because the message to tip into a dive may come too late (or even too early) for the missile to accurately hit the target.

Finally, the curvature of the earth means that the missile can't even see the command signal during the terminal phase. This further degrades accuracy as the missile simply becomes an unguided rocket during that part of the flight.

WARSPITER is also bang on the money regarding the warhead. A SAM warhead typically generates a lot of shrapnel to increase the probability of kill against an aircraft. Shrapnel is great for taking out squishy human beings but it's less good at more solid targets. In the surface-to-surface mode, I suspect the primary effect mechanism of the S-300 (and similar) SAMs is the size and weight of the missile body itself.

 

[buffnut453]

They are probably working 24/7 to get these tanks back into service or to cannibalize them for spare parts

Not if the scenes in this factory are representative of activity across the sector:

Interesting video of T-62 tanks being refurbished and upgraded in Russia.



Reports suggest some 800 T-62s are undergoing such work in preparation for operations in Ukraine. Does that imply, perhaps, that stocks of newer T-64s, T-72s and T-80s are dwindling, and newer T-90s can't be produced quickly enough?

There's also reporting that Russia has run out of 2S19 self-propelled artillery and drawing on old Soviet D-30s and 2A36 towed artillery, which are more vulnerable to counter-battery fire.

 

[Snautzer01]

That article is a bit dated

March-4th-2022

---