Allied AFs in 1943: realistic options for long range fighters? (1 Viewer)

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You do have several problems with 1943 use of the P-47, one is the change of propeller that came later, the Paddle blade allowed/provided better climb and take-off performance. Pre Paddle blade climb performance can be described ( charitably) as a "bit lacking". You may have to lighten armament to compensate for extra fuel.

Another problem is field performance. a 14,000lb P-47C needed 3200ft to clear the trees (50ft obstacle) from a sod runway on a 0 degree day, this went to 3680ft on a 15 degree Celsius day and 4160ft on a 30 degree Celsius day. Headwinds help, paved runway helps. New airfields and extended areas were being worked on at a frantic pace at this time. The Paddle blades ( and occasional use of WEP for take-off) also helped with field performance with the bigger drop tanks.

More could have been done in 1943 than was done but providing more/bigger drop tanks in 1943 does not turn the the 1943 P-47 into a 1944 P-47.

Maybe P-51 racks could have been used and maybe they couldn't, rack use is dependent on the carried store not hitting the aircraft when jettisoned. Some tanks could only be jettisoned at certain speeds and in certain flight attitudes. Somewhere there is a strip of photos of a Spitfire jettisoning a tank. The tank turns 90 degrees to the aircraft while still only a few feet below it. Every aircraft had to be trialed with every different bomb or tank to be used in order to prevent accidents, like jettisoned tank hitting flaps or ailerons.
 
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You do have several problems with 1943 use of the P-47, one is the change of propeller that came later, the Paddle blade allowed/provided better climb and take-off performance. Pre Paddle blade climb performance can be described ( charitably) as a "bit lacking". You may have to lighten armament to compensate for extra fuel.

The P-47, without paddle blade prop, need to do his thing - climb at 25-30000 ft, and use the speed altitude to it's advantage. In other words, usual boom'n'zoom game. I've already stated that 2 HMGs + their ammo can be deleted.

Another problem is field performance. a 14,000lb P-47C needed 3200ft to clear the trees (50ft obstacle) from a sod runway on a 0 degree day, this went to 3680ft on a 15 degree Celsius day and 4160ft on a 30 degree Celsius day. Headwinds help, paved runway helps. New airfields and extended areas were being worked on at a frantic pace at this time. The Paddle blades ( and occasional use of WEP for take-off) also helped with field performance with the bigger drop tanks.

Fair points.

More could have been done in 1943 than was done but providing more/bigger drop tanks in 1943 does not turn the the 1943 P-47 into a 1944 P-47.

Agreed. The internal fuel tank must grow to 370 USG, dive flaps, paddle blade prop, water injection, wing strengthening to carry the 2 x 150 gal tanks, bubble canopy...
Out of that, the ability to carry 2 x 75 wing drop tanks seem to be easiest to pull off (along with existing 108 USG belly tank). A 450+ miles, almost bug-free (in second half of 1943) fighter would've meant something for the Allied war effort.

Maybe P-51 racks could have been used and maybe they couldn't, rack use is dependent on the carried store not hitting the aircraft when jettisoned. Some tanks could only be jettisoned at certain speeds and in certain flight attitudes. Somewhere there is a strip of photos of a Spitfire jettisoning a tank. The tank turns 90 degrees to the aircraft while still only a few feet below it. Every aircraft had to be trialed with every different bomb or tank to be used in order to prevent accidents, like jettisoned tank hitting flaps or ailerons.

Of course, things need to be tested.
One detail from Spitfire: it had hook (hooks?) to force the slipper tank to turn down and away from the low hull. One of the rare planes that suffered almost no speed loss when become able to carry a drop tank?
 
Before of november (?) 1943 the P-47 is a good fighter only at 25k and over... the P-51A is a good fighter until 18k...
so send the P-51A to free jagd and attack the enemy fighters before they get the intercept altitude, and use the P-47 for zoom and climb over the 21/22k maybe fine....
 
The benefit of the proposal is to keep the LW fighter busy. Once they expand the fuel and/or ammo, they must retreat into the safety of the bases to refuel rearm. Supossing the attacker outnumbers the defender, that can make the fleeing defender a target. Further, the defender has less-than-ideal time opportunity to go after the designated prey, namely the bombers that would be incoming shortly. That also makes the job easier for close escort. IIRC that was very much how the things turned out when Doolitle replaced Eaker?
The shortcoming is that P-51As doo ned top cover, in order not to be badly hit from above. Vincenzo addressed that above. The lower altitude of the P-51As makes them also easier targets for the heavy AAA.

BTW,
V-1710-81 FTH is 14,600 maybe too much 20,000

The different charts tables give the FTH, military power, between 14300 ft up to 15500.

http://www.raafwarbirds.org.au/targetvraaf/p40_archive/pdfs/1710-81.pdf
 
The primary problem with P-51A is that the contract was converted in favor of the P-51B starting in December 1942. There would be new P-51A after September 1943 - or else the P-51B would have been delayed.

The secondary problem is that for the P-51A to be efffective, the 8th AF BC needed to strike at 15-18000 feet for the P-51A to meet the 109 and 190 on reasonably even terms at escort altitudes.

The P-47C didn't have ability to past German border until late fall/early winter 1943. Only the 51A would go to Brunswick, Kassel Leipzig and Friederichshafen - but not quite to Munich. Schweinfurt questionable unless the 51A flies directly to Schweinfurt area with others to perform penetration and withdrawal support. There would never be enough P-51As to offset the re-deployment of the P-38 and temporarily replace with P-51A. The P-38H had the same limitations per range but much better altitude performance..
 
The problem with LR fighter in '43 was mental, not mechanical. Had the desperate need for a LR fighter been identified in 1942, many of the comments on providing the capability could have been provided, more fuel for the P-47, more fixed problems in the P-38, earlier inclusion of the Merlin in the P-51, optimizing the F4U-1, and even more fuel in the Spitfire. However, I don't get the feeling that providing a LR fighter became desperate until mid 1943, so no priority was set for developing one. By 1943, the natural fit of the P-51B trumped all the other efforts.
 
The problem with LR fighter in '43 was mental, not mechanical. Had the desperate need for a LR fighter been identified in 1942, many of the comments on providing the capability could have been provided, more fuel for the P-47, more fixed problems in the P-38, earlier inclusion of the Merlin in the P-51, optimizing the F4U-1, and even more fuel in the Spitfire. However, I don't get the feeling that providing a LR fighter became desperate until mid 1943, so no priority was set for developing one. By 1943, the natural fit of the P-51B trumped all the other efforts.

My thoughts exactly Davparlr.
Tradition is the worst enemy of progress they say and the pre-war USAAF is not exception. It arrived to the war with a stiff traditional view on how a strategic bombing campaign should be conducted and it took a fair amount of time -and losses- to realize that a change of strategy was desperately needed in the face of defeat.
 
Don't think the USAAF was heavily in the grip of tradition. There was no tradition possible, since the whole air combat was a new thing in warfare. It was the doctrine, that stated the priorities. IIRC,:
-bombers to hit enemy assets far away from USA, or far away from front line
-interceptors to bring down enemy bombers threatening the USA it's 'dominions' (Panama, Philliphines, etc); the P-38/-39/-47 were conceived as interceptors.
-attack aircraft, to aid the Army units in the front line
The bombers have top priority, than the interceptors, than the attack planes.

The category/task for 'escort fighters' was not there. The bombers will penetrate enemy air space, deliver the bombs and got away (rather Douhetist, or Trenchardist approach). They need to combine speed, altitude, sophisticated sights and defensive armament to help them do the task. It took (here we agree) bloody noses to make them re-think about the doctrine.

BTW, there was only a slim chance to actually see a Merlin Mustang, in numbers, in 1943. Packard's deliveries of the two stage V-1650s were lagging behind the NAA production of the airframes.
 
Don't think the USAAF was heavily in the grip of tradition. There was no tradition possible, since the whole air combat was a new thing in warfare. It was the doctrine, that stated the priorities. IIRC,:
-bombers to hit enemy assets far away from USA, or far away from front line
-interceptors to bring down enemy bombers threatening the USA it's 'dominions' (Panama, Philliphines, etc); the P-38/-39/-47 were conceived as interceptors.
-attack aircraft, to aid the Army units in the front line
The bombers have top priority, than the interceptors, than the attack planes.

The category/task for 'escort fighters' was not there. The bombers will penetrate enemy air space, deliver the bombs and got away (rather Douhetist, or Trenchardist approach). They need to combine speed, altitude, sophisticated sights and defensive armament to help them do the task. It took (here we agree) bloody noses to make them re-think about the doctrine.

Operational doctrine not old enough to be considered a tradition, I concede that point.
Stiff enough IMHO to a point that I would consider it to have traditional connotations.

The P-38/P-39/P-47/Spitfire conceived as interceptors were used to a limited degree as escort platforms as early as 1942 (earlier for the RAF) when the 8th BC began its modest operations 70 years ago being escorted by Spitfires and P-38s while other USAAF outfits used P-39s/P-40s for medium and heavy bombers protection in the South Pacific Area of Operations.

To my reasoning the idea of using escorts fighters to protect bombers was not 'unthinkable' prior to 1943 and the concept was there although it needed to be broadened and given much more emphasis into the mind of strategists as the only solution to accomplish the strategic goals at hand.
 
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Wait a minute...
So the US builds self-defensible bombers sans escort in the belief that enemy interceptors will be ineffective...
While simultaneously building interceptors to shoot down enemy bombers???
Something doesn't smell right.

Seems like a pre Catch-22 Catch-22.
 
Wait a minute...
So the US builds self-defensible bombers sans escort in the belief that enemy interceptors will be ineffective...
While simultaneously building interceptors to shoot down enemy bombers???
Something doesn't smell right.

Seems like a pre Catch-22 Catch-22.

baffles the mind doesnt it? what is evern more baffling it is made perfect sense to someone in charge...
 
BUT-BUT-BUT-BUT other countries did not have the .50 cal gun in power turrets, or turbo chargers or massive formations with mutually supporting gunfire or...............:)

American bombers had just enough differences to keep the semi-delusional thinking that they made ENOUGH difference.
 
I thought somewhere there was discussion regarding Spitfire ranges particulalry spitfire VIII

The first production Spitfire F VIII (JF.274) was delivered in November 1942. 145 Squadron went operational with Spitfire VIIIs in June 1943 while based on Malta. Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily, commenced on 10 July 1943. On this date there were 23 Spitfire fighter squadrons based on Malta flying a mix of Spitfire Vs, VIIIs and IXs which provided cover for the invasion. 244 Wing moved to Pachino, Sicily on 13 July. 244 Wing (1 SAAF, 92, 145, 417 and 601 squadrons) as well as the 308th FS 31st FG USAAF used the Spitfire VIII during the Sicily campaign. The battle for Sicily was over by mid August.
On 3 September 1943 British forces landed at Reggio, Italy, followed by the Allied landing at Salerno on the 9th. 324 Wing was the first unit to move to Italy, flying in to Paestum on 12 September. Spitfire VIIIs were used widely in Italy from September 1943 to war's end. Units known to have used the Spitfire VIII in Italy are:
244 Wing: 92, 145, 417, 601 squadrons. VIIIs predominately/exclusively.
324 Wing: 43, 72, 93, 111, squadrons. Mix of VIIIs and IXs
31st FG USAAF: 307th, 308th squadrons. 308th was equipped with VIIIs exclusively
1 SAAF, 32, 73, 87, 185, 253, 256 squadrons (Incomplete listing)
Spitfire units began moving to Corsica in December 1943. By July 1944 the following Spitfire units, operating a mix of Spitfire VIIIs and IXs, were engaged in operations over France culminating in August in Operation Dragoon, the invasion of southern France:
7 Wing SAAF: 1, 2, 4, 7 Squadrons
251 Wing: 237, 238, 451 RAAF Squadrons
322 Wing: 154, 232, 242, 243 Squadrons
324 Wing: 43, 72, 93, 111 Squadrons
332 Free French Wing: 326 (GC/II/7 'Nice'), 327 (GC/I/3 'Corse'), 328 (GC/I/7 'Provence') Squadrons

Operation Dragoon called for aircover to be provided by these wings and for offensive operations to be undertaken to a depth of about 50 miles. I am unsure of the precise location of the airbases but if centred around Ajaccio, the spitfire Wings were flying sustained operations of around 250 miles. Providing Naval Cover dictates long loiter times, so combat radii in excess of 400nm seems entirely likely.

The RAF Spitfire Wing in Australia, comprised of 54, 548 and 549 Squadrons, converted to Spitfire VIIIs in April 1944. They were tasked primarily with the defense of the Darwin area. The Australian spitfire squadrons, Nos 79, 452 and 457, also began to re-equip with the Spitfire VIII in April. The Australian Spitfire Wing deployed to Morotai where they provided escort to Beaufighters and engaged in strikes against Japanese positions in the Moluccas. It is more than 400 miles between Moratai and the Moluccan islands which again suggests a combat radius of around 400-450 miles for the Spitfire VIII
 
A problem with comparing European (northern Europe) and Pacific ranges is that in the Pacific (and to some extent the Mediterranean) a lot of the flying was done over water with little or no danger from flak and enemy airbases were well known and enemy patrols/flights away from those bases were rare. Cruising speeds over Continental Europe tended to be higher both going in and coming out which cut the range to some extent. Getting "bounced" by a Japanese fighter group 150 miles from the target would be a very rare event. Getting "bounced" 100-150 miles from the German border was an all too real possibility.
 
Not so (at least for the Med) . After the experiences in Dodecanese,, where the germans transferred large formations of aircraft from Southern Russia to deal with the British incursion, allied planning always assumed heavy opposition to any offensive moves. Such moves necessarily would have to factor in forced limits on range due to flak and or enemy interceptions. Moreover, cover CAP operations are the most fuel hungry operations for land based air units, not the other way around. moreover atmospheric conditions on long over water flights can be worse than over land....higher humidity, lack of navigational cues sometimes heavier winds all meant that higher margins of safety had to be built into the operations undertaken
 
Wait a minute...
So the US builds self-defensible bombers sans escort in the belief that enemy interceptors will be ineffective...
While simultaneously building interceptors to shoot down enemy bombers???
Something doesn't smell right.

Seems like a pre Catch-22 Catch-22.

That whole riddle might have a good explanation: :D
"Our bombers are so superior, they will overwhelm their interceptors while our interceptors are so deadly, their bombers will not stand a chance." :lol:
 
US planners figured fighter escorts would use about 300-310mph cruise speeds over enemy territory. You may very well want ( I know I would) a bigger "reserve" or safety margin built in for over water flights but the safety margin or reserve is usually figured at a cruise speed closer to 200mph if not below. Last 30 min or even 1 hour of flight "reserve" planned at minimum fuel consumption speed, not at a "combat" cruise which could burn fuel at 3 times the gallons per minute.

Tactics and techniques changed with both time and locations, all I am saying is just because a certain plane operated at a certain radius in the Pacific does not mean it could operate at that radius on a consistent basis over Europe escorting bombers. I am not picking on the Spitfire. American Naval fighters get a bit too much credit for range in many of these threads when the operating conditions were so different.
 
If someone could shed light on this excerpt from Wikipedia:

In May 1943, [Brig. Gen. Frank ]Hunter was relieved of his command for his failure to obey a directive issued by his superior, General Ira Eaker mandating use of wing tanks on P-47 fighters.[3

Namely, who wanted/ordered/forbid? the P-47s with wing tanks in early 1943?
 

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