Am I the only person in the world who's a fan of the Ki-43
- Thread starter Johnny .45
- Start date
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
The Basket
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,712
- Jun 27, 2007
I see no issue liking a particular airplane.
Nothing wrong with that.
However....The Hayabusa is not that great and shows the weakness of Japanese design, resources and planning.
The Boulton Paul Defiant is a good case or the Brewster Buffalo. The foibles of these 2 machines are not deal breakers as the Defiant was not a fighter in 1945 so you can be a fan without the fact that it was unsuccessful but you can enjoy the engineering. If the Hayabusa is still a front line fighter in the mid 1940s then that's not because the design is that good but because the Japanese war industry is that bad.
Nothing wrong with that.
However....The Hayabusa is not that great and shows the weakness of Japanese design, resources and planning.
The Boulton Paul Defiant is a good case or the Brewster Buffalo. The foibles of these 2 machines are not deal breakers as the Defiant was not a fighter in 1945 so you can be a fan without the fact that it was unsuccessful but you can enjoy the engineering. If the Hayabusa is still a front line fighter in the mid 1940s then that's not because the design is that good but because the Japanese war industry is that bad.
parsifal
Colonel
Japanese failures can be traced to their pre-war thinking and assumptions and this was borne out in the weakneses they accepted in their aircraft designs. The Japanese gave unrealistic assessments prewar as to their own strengths, and assumed the western democracies were weak kneed and would not fight beyond a few months into the campaign. They placed considerable weight on the assumption the Germans would force the Russians out of the war in 1941, and that the Germans would swing back west to the west, leaving the Allies with little choice but to negotiate a settlement with Japan.
For their war strategy to have any hope of success, the Japanese had to deliver a killer blow from the start, and complete the conquests at breakneck speed. Upon achievement of the (assumed) defeat of the western allies and Russia in other TOs, the Japanese believed they would have time to consolidate, fortify and build up their positions with years of time up their sleeves. If, or more likely when, the allies returned to the field of battle, it was assumed they would suffer heavy attrition as they attempted to advance onto the vital Japanese interests.
Clearly the Japanese were wildly over optimistic and unrealistic in their thinking. The allies recover, the Soviets did not surrender and within 15 months the axis on all fronts were on the retreat.
Whilst the Americans did modify their Plan Orange strategies to take advantage of their new fast carriers, these were hardly the war winning weapons of war the Americans so often like to claim. By the end of 1942, both sides had fought their carrier fleets to utter exhaustion. In the case of the USN they were reduced to just a single operational CV in the PTO (which even then was damaged), the IJNs had 3 smaller fleet carriers but had suffered near fatal losses in air crew. What crushed the Japanese were the powers of recovery possessed by the Allies and their ability to simply overwhelm the Japanese defences. They did this with a multi pronged series of attacks, the most important being their submarine campaign. Next in importance was the unrelenting allied air sea and land campaigns fought in the SW pacific, the south Pacific, NW Australia and the CBI, which prevented the Japanese from replacing losses and building reserves, whilst the Allies were able to do just that.
US carriers did play a pivotal role in the final campaigns, but they were noticeably absent for most of 1943, as were the IJN carriers. They were a factor, but not a critical one. Mac had worked out strategies by early 1943 which did not require carriers (the socalled "island hopping strategies" and "wither on the vine"). By June 1944, the Japanese were facing defeat, and they knew it. Their entire efforts from that date until warsd end was about securing an honourable surrender not about any form of victory. In that last year the USN fast carrier forces were at last decisive as they moved at will in enemy controlled waters blasting anything that opposed them out of existence.
The Japanese retained their two principal fighter types, the Zeke and the Oscar in more or less original form because they had no choice. The pressure from the allies was relentless there was no time to significantly alter the design as had always been intended so the Japanese struggled on with aircraft design for offensive purposes when they really needed fighters for defensive purposes, fighters in which range and manouverability were second to speed, firepower and protection. For those of us with Japanese symathies, it is a sad account of history. For the rest of humanity including the Japanese themselves, it was a merciful omission that allowed the war to end quickly
For their war strategy to have any hope of success, the Japanese had to deliver a killer blow from the start, and complete the conquests at breakneck speed. Upon achievement of the (assumed) defeat of the western allies and Russia in other TOs, the Japanese believed they would have time to consolidate, fortify and build up their positions with years of time up their sleeves. If, or more likely when, the allies returned to the field of battle, it was assumed they would suffer heavy attrition as they attempted to advance onto the vital Japanese interests.
Clearly the Japanese were wildly over optimistic and unrealistic in their thinking. The allies recover, the Soviets did not surrender and within 15 months the axis on all fronts were on the retreat.
Whilst the Americans did modify their Plan Orange strategies to take advantage of their new fast carriers, these were hardly the war winning weapons of war the Americans so often like to claim. By the end of 1942, both sides had fought their carrier fleets to utter exhaustion. In the case of the USN they were reduced to just a single operational CV in the PTO (which even then was damaged), the IJNs had 3 smaller fleet carriers but had suffered near fatal losses in air crew. What crushed the Japanese were the powers of recovery possessed by the Allies and their ability to simply overwhelm the Japanese defences. They did this with a multi pronged series of attacks, the most important being their submarine campaign. Next in importance was the unrelenting allied air sea and land campaigns fought in the SW pacific, the south Pacific, NW Australia and the CBI, which prevented the Japanese from replacing losses and building reserves, whilst the Allies were able to do just that.
US carriers did play a pivotal role in the final campaigns, but they were noticeably absent for most of 1943, as were the IJN carriers. They were a factor, but not a critical one. Mac had worked out strategies by early 1943 which did not require carriers (the socalled "island hopping strategies" and "wither on the vine"). By June 1944, the Japanese were facing defeat, and they knew it. Their entire efforts from that date until warsd end was about securing an honourable surrender not about any form of victory. In that last year the USN fast carrier forces were at last decisive as they moved at will in enemy controlled waters blasting anything that opposed them out of existence.
The Japanese retained their two principal fighter types, the Zeke and the Oscar in more or less original form because they had no choice. The pressure from the allies was relentless there was no time to significantly alter the design as had always been intended so the Japanese struggled on with aircraft design for offensive purposes when they really needed fighters for defensive purposes, fighters in which range and manouverability were second to speed, firepower and protection. For those of us with Japanese symathies, it is a sad account of history. For the rest of humanity including the Japanese themselves, it was a merciful omission that allowed the war to end quickly
The Basket
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,712
- Jun 27, 2007
The Kawasaki Ki-61 was only par with say the Bf 109 Emil and so was 4 years behind the curve.
The idea of putting an aircraft with such a poor top speed such as the Hayabusa in service in 1941 is mind boggling.
The idea of putting an aircraft with such a poor top speed such as the Hayabusa in service in 1941 is mind boggling.
parsifal
Colonel
The IJA was an incredibly conservative outfit, in which the qualities of turn capability were paramount. they also knew that in order to "get at" their opponents they needed range and in 1941 this was only really possible with small engines that were relatively fuel efficient, coupled with super lightweight construction at least in the context of 1938-40 when the plane was being developed. Its development was held up by the IJAs desire to develop a "heavy fighter" that ended in failure. The desire for range and disdain that speed and climb and protection as elements of aircraft design were held more or less guaranteed the form of the IJA fighter development. The Ki-43 was slower than the me109 E3, but greatly superior in terms of range. I wonder if the Ki-43 could have done better in the BoB if available. Could probably outfly the Spitfire V as demonstrated in the engagements between the Zeke (a comparable aircraft) and the Darwin Wing in 1943. The Ki-43 was clearly superior to the hurricane over the CBI. It is a design that can be easily dismissed because of its apparent lack of performance, yet it is also a design that has achievements and capabilities to its credit that clearly mount a serious challenge to that comfortable thinking.
To the credit of the IJA they were working on replacement designs that would give greater credence on these other elements. A/C like the Ki-44 and somewhat later the Ki-61 were just beginning to enter service 1942/43 and would provide greater diving ability, level speed and firepower, somewhat at the expense of the more traditional qualities and significantly with more limited ranges. There were 12 experimental Shokis that participated in the opening campaigns but the limits on their range meant they could not do what the Hayabusas were doing. The Ki-43 was designed with offensive operations in mind, using technologies that dictated that certain compromises needed to be accepted if that role was to be successfully met
To the credit of the IJA they were working on replacement designs that would give greater credence on these other elements. A/C like the Ki-44 and somewhat later the Ki-61 were just beginning to enter service 1942/43 and would provide greater diving ability, level speed and firepower, somewhat at the expense of the more traditional qualities and significantly with more limited ranges. There were 12 experimental Shokis that participated in the opening campaigns but the limits on their range meant they could not do what the Hayabusas were doing. The Ki-43 was designed with offensive operations in mind, using technologies that dictated that certain compromises needed to be accepted if that role was to be successfully met
IMHO The Basket is quite right in regard to the speed of the Ki-43. However the plane was not only agile, but also had a rate of climb that was considerably superior to the P-40 for instance. Perhaps with the right tactics it did caused a lot of trouble to Allied pilots. Unfornately I don't know almost nothing about the history of this plane in combat.
The Basket
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,712
- Jun 27, 2007
I am also a reader on Japanese history and do indeed find it fascinating. I have even come to the conclusion that the Nambu type 94 pistol isn't that bad which is a clear sign of madness.
But military speaking the Hayabusa or even the Zero is junk in 1945 and this isnt good enough.
A good pilot in a good plane with the right tactics can do wonders. We say how good the Hurricane is or the P-40 or the F4F but in reality that's not true and they are par at best with the Hayabusa or Zero. Even the early mark Spitfires are not too far ahead. It's when the later stuff comes along like the Hellcat and P-38 and P-51 and that is that.
But military speaking the Hayabusa or even the Zero is junk in 1945 and this isnt good enough.
A good pilot in a good plane with the right tactics can do wonders. We say how good the Hurricane is or the P-40 or the F4F but in reality that's not true and they are par at best with the Hayabusa or Zero. Even the early mark Spitfires are not too far ahead. It's when the later stuff comes along like the Hellcat and P-38 and P-51 and that is that.
GregP
Major
The Zero was NEVER junk and still isn't. In the hands of any decent pilot it was dangerous right up to the end. The only real question was whether or not the decent Zero pilot had some decent friends with him and whether or not they encountered any Allied pilots who were versed in properly handling the Zero. Mostly, I think they were. So decent American pilots versus decent Japanese pilots should have brought about something of a stalemete, favoring the more numerous Americans, with the Zeros being able to elude the Hellcats most of the time, while getting in some licks of their own some of the time. That of course, depends upon the disparity in numbers. If there was an encounter of, say, 8 Zeros versus 40 Hellcats, then the Zeros were in BIG trouble. If it was more like 8 vs. 8, then it could have gotten interesting, assuming combat veterans on both side. There is no way that ALL the Japanese pilots were always "newbies." Even some of the bigger aces survived the war.
In the end, I think it boiled down to too few decent IJN pilots for the swarms of Hellcats and Corsairs showing up, along with the newly freed-up P-51s from the ETO making their appearances, too. We simply threw too many aircraft with decent pilots flying them at the IJN / IJA for them to have any hope of handling the situation. Constant bombing raids would tends to hamper anyone's operations, and these never let up near the end.
Couple that with the Naval situation, and Japan knew the war was over LONG before VJ day arrived. The rather stange (to us, anyway) politics and power interplays of the Japanese Imperial / military hieraqrchy simply didn't deal with reality soon enough to avert disaster. You can say EXACTLY the same about the Nazi leadership. Had Hitler been killed in the bombing attempt, it is entirely possible that a much better solution could have been swiftly arrived at. Had Hirohito come down with an imperial command to cease war sooner, I wonder if the same could have been true in that theater. It's an interesting "what if," but there is no simple answer because it didn't happen.
In the end, I think it boiled down to too few decent IJN pilots for the swarms of Hellcats and Corsairs showing up, along with the newly freed-up P-51s from the ETO making their appearances, too. We simply threw too many aircraft with decent pilots flying them at the IJN / IJA for them to have any hope of handling the situation. Constant bombing raids would tends to hamper anyone's operations, and these never let up near the end.
Couple that with the Naval situation, and Japan knew the war was over LONG before VJ day arrived. The rather stange (to us, anyway) politics and power interplays of the Japanese Imperial / military hieraqrchy simply didn't deal with reality soon enough to avert disaster. You can say EXACTLY the same about the Nazi leadership. Had Hitler been killed in the bombing attempt, it is entirely possible that a much better solution could have been swiftly arrived at. Had Hirohito come down with an imperial command to cease war sooner, I wonder if the same could have been true in that theater. It's an interesting "what if," but there is no simple answer because it didn't happen.
Last edited:
parsifal
Colonel
You could say the same about the Ki-43 I think....
GregP
Major
I wouldn't. It was outclassed, but they fought on gamely with it, despite knowing they were disadvantaged.
I doubt it was very dangerous to anyone in 1944 - 1945 unless it had surprise on its side. Unfortunately, that is entirely possible in a lot of situations, so it maybe lloks better than it was in late-war. Without VERY good surveillance of the airspace, anyone can be snuck-up upon at almost any time.
Otherwise we a wouldn't have airborne nose and tail radar in EVERYTHING that is a fighter today.
I doubt it was very dangerous to anyone in 1944 - 1945 unless it had surprise on its side. Unfortunately, that is entirely possible in a lot of situations, so it maybe lloks better than it was in late-war. Without VERY good surveillance of the airspace, anyone can be snuck-up upon at almost any time.
Otherwise we a wouldn't have airborne nose and tail radar in EVERYTHING that is a fighter today.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
And yet the KI-61 produced a quantity of Aces and accounted for quite a few B-29s downed - it also led to the KI-100, which was also a formidable fighter which coincidentally, came into being because of the B-29 bombing raids.
The KI-43 may not have been a world-beater in regards to it's speed or armament, but it was nearly untouchable with it's maneuverability. Considering that it was designed in the late 1930's and produced until war's end (like the Bf109), it was an asset to the Japanese. It also has the notoriety of downing more Allied aircraft than any other Japanese type.
The Basket
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,712
- Jun 27, 2007
If your main adversary is either the Hurricane or P-40 or Wildcat then aircraft like the Zero or Hayabusa are in the game and could be very good.
By 1945 the main adversary are going to be P-47 or P-51 or P-38 or Corsair or late model Spitfires or Bearcats and the Zero is so far behind the Bearcat that it's not even the same sport. Send the greatest pilot ever born in a Zero against a Bearcat and you have one dead Zero.
This isn't about how good the Zero was or is but how good is it against a Bearcat. And that is very telling.
The Me 109 would have been excellent for Japan. The Ki-61 was well behind in 1943 the latest European fighters but again the Hien adversary are P-40 and Hurricanes. You can say the Ki-61 did well against B-29s but a late model Spitfire or Dora 9 or Me109G would have done much better.
The Ki-100 had very poor performance for a 1945 fighter.
Sentiment gets nowhere in warfare. You may love the Zero and it's engineering but by 1945 it's nowhere near a front line fighter.
The RAF and other air force's flew the Buffalo against Japan because they had such a poor opinion of it. Japanese airpower was derided and was a nasty shock.
By 1945 the main adversary are going to be P-47 or P-51 or P-38 or Corsair or late model Spitfires or Bearcats and the Zero is so far behind the Bearcat that it's not even the same sport. Send the greatest pilot ever born in a Zero against a Bearcat and you have one dead Zero.
This isn't about how good the Zero was or is but how good is it against a Bearcat. And that is very telling.
The Me 109 would have been excellent for Japan. The Ki-61 was well behind in 1943 the latest European fighters but again the Hien adversary are P-40 and Hurricanes. You can say the Ki-61 did well against B-29s but a late model Spitfire or Dora 9 or Me109G would have done much better.
The Ki-100 had very poor performance for a 1945 fighter.
Sentiment gets nowhere in warfare. You may love the Zero and it's engineering but by 1945 it's nowhere near a front line fighter.
The RAF and other air force's flew the Buffalo against Japan because they had such a poor opinion of it. Japanese airpower was derided and was a nasty shock.
Last edited:
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Well...first off, the Bearcat never saw action in WWII. Perhaps you were referring to the Hellcat.
Secondly, the KI-43 (and other older types) held it's own against the advanced Allied types, although it was becoming a minority towards the war's end.
My personal sentiments have nothing to do with fact. And the fact is, the KI-43 is the all-time Allied killer of the Imperial Japanese air arms. The KI-61 could have been a much better performer, but they water-cooled engine was plagued with problems and when they were forced to install a radial engine on the KI-61 airframe (becomeing the KI-100), a deadly combination was created. The KI-61 was well armed, having 2x20mm cannon and 2x12mm MGs and this arrangement carried over to the KI-100.
In the later portion of the war, Japan did field some exceptionally advanced types that were the better of the Allied types and I could go on about those, but this thread is about the KI-43, after all
Secondly, the KI-43 (and other older types) held it's own against the advanced Allied types, although it was becoming a minority towards the war's end.
My personal sentiments have nothing to do with fact. And the fact is, the KI-43 is the all-time Allied killer of the Imperial Japanese air arms. The KI-61 could have been a much better performer, but they water-cooled engine was plagued with problems and when they were forced to install a radial engine on the KI-61 airframe (becomeing the KI-100), a deadly combination was created. The KI-61 was well armed, having 2x20mm cannon and 2x12mm MGs and this arrangement carried over to the KI-100.
In the later portion of the war, Japan did field some exceptionally advanced types that were the better of the Allied types and I could go on about those, but this thread is about the KI-43, after all
The Basket
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,712
- Jun 27, 2007
The Bearcat didn't see service because the war ended too early. But it would have met the Zero and so would have slaughtered it. In late 1945 or 46. Or let's say the P-80.
It absolutely doesn't matter at all.
I am well aware of Japanese aircraft and did the Japanese have anything in mass production in 1945 which matches the P-51D? Answer is no.
Thier best aircraft was beset by reliability issues that the Hayabusa had to be widely used.
I honestly don't see this. If you were a top British or American air force figure and put forward a Hayabusa or Zero in 1945 then I don't know. The Hawker Sea Fury had a top speed of 460mph against a late model Zero 360mph?
It absolutely doesn't matter at all.
I am well aware of Japanese aircraft and did the Japanese have anything in mass production in 1945 which matches the P-51D? Answer is no.
Thier best aircraft was beset by reliability issues that the Hayabusa had to be widely used.
I honestly don't see this. If you were a top British or American air force figure and put forward a Hayabusa or Zero in 1945 then I don't know. The Hawker Sea Fury had a top speed of 460mph against a late model Zero 360mph?
IMHO the Hayabusa is the most beautiful plane of WW2, it is also interesting as it was super aerobatic and weakly armed when other countries were going for high speed and guns. At least the IJA give it seat armour and wrapped fuel tanks in mid-1943, the Zero didn't get seat armour until 1945........OUChhhhhh.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
With all due respect, Tomo, the KI-100 was meeting Allied fighters on equal terms in performance and in some cases, out-performing them.
The Basket
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,712
- Jun 27, 2007
Outperform a P51D....
I can see it out turning or out rolling but the the Ki-100 unless my data is way off still only had the performance of a late model Zero.
On a par with an Emil.
Basically a 1940 fighter.
I can see it out turning or out rolling but the the Ki-100 unless my data is way off still only had the performance of a late model Zero.
On a par with an Emil.
Basically a 1940 fighter.
The Ki-100 was with 50+ mph deficit vs. what Anglo-Americans were deploying as 1st line fighters in 1945, bar Hellcat. It basically brought performance and fighting capability of the Spitfire Vb or Bf 109E-7 in '45.
Ki-100 was 'Fw-190A-3 minus' - no offense to anyone, just what it was.
Ki-100 was 'Fw-190A-3 minus' - no offense to anyone, just what it was.
Users who are viewing this thread
Similar threads
