The Germans didn't attack France they counter attacked.
The French attack on the german defences in the Saar was in response to the german failure to respond to the allied ultimatum concerning the german attack on Poland. The Germans refused to withdraw their forces, and as a consequence the French were obliged to make attempts to come to the aid of their allies. The attack through the saar corridor was a (belated) response to that
It's important to understand this to correctly appreciate German decisions at the time such as the Fuhrer Command to focus all R+D on productionising weapons that could reach the front in less than 6 months (latter lifted)
Ah no. Hitlers decisions to divert all R&D into short term projects were made well before the attack into the Saar got underway. The attacks into the Saar were expected and handled rather well by 7A.
A French offensive in the Rhine valley began on 7 September 1939, four days after France declared war on Germany. The Wehrmacht was engaged in a war with Poland and the French enjoyed a decisive numerical advantage. Eleven French divisions, part of the Second Army Group, advanced along a 32 km (20 mi) line near Saarbrücken, against weak German opposition.
One of the great lies put out by the largely pro-british historical accounts was that the French army enjoyed a massive numerical advantage over the germans in September. That the French army could call on 40 divisions to attack the 22 weak and poorly equipped divisions manning the westwall defences. In fact nothing could be further from the truth.
The westwall defenders were fully mobilized like all heer formations in September 1939. The French army of 1939 was a conscript army, and had only commenced its mobilization processes the day before the commencement of Case White.
At the outbreak of hostilities, the French had immediately available some 900000 men, of which more than half were deployed overseas. The remainder were scattered across metropolitan France, with a smattering of border guards defending the the fortress zones of the Maginot line. Perhaps 3 divisional equivalents were available but these were not concentrated into combat formations. They were spread out over 40 divs of the standing army. So while it is true that the offensive drew on the forces of drawn from over 11 divs, none of these formations were anything like up to full establishment. What the French were doing were throwing into this limited offensive what they could from any unit they could. Fewer than 10000 soldiers were engaged in this "offensive", and since the forces lacked any form of mine detection gear, of combat engineers for that matter, losses were heavy.
This is a table showing the manpower situation overall. It is important to note, that whereas the germans had competed their mobilization, or nearly completed it, it would take the French until mid October to complete their mobilization. Of the 4200 artillery pieces touted as available, less than a quarter were actually out of storage, and of these more than half were overseas, and about half of the remainder concreted into fixed defences. The French army of 1939 within metropolitan france had available perhaps 250 artuillery pieces, but these were stpread allover the country, and many were needed for training.
On October 17 1939 the French withdrew having held German territory for 6 weeks without a single German soldier setting foot in France and having suffered 2000 casualties and without significant German defense or counter attack. (That would come on 10th May 1940, some 7 months latter
Wrong again. Initially the germans fell back, as per their pre-war plans to behind the westwall defences. However by September 29, 52 infantrie Division had completed its mobilisation as one of the war emergency divisions, and immediately began to counterattack. Initially the French held these attacks rather well, but as was to occur so many times in the coming months, the Allied supreme war council lost its nerve and ordered a withdrawal from October 6. This staged withdrawal was bitterly opposed by many French officers, particularly Henri Giraud.
Overall the offensive had cost the French 1560 casualties, to the wehrmachts 760. The offensive had proven an utter and expensive failure, in that not a single German soldier had been diverted from the polish offensive to the west as had been intended. Worse, it exposed the weak and ineffectual Allied leadership and demonstrated its complete unreadiness for war.
The ruthless culling of duplicate designs (ie He 112/He 100) seems to have worked for Luftwaffe procurement. It's difficult to overstate what a superb aircraft the Germans had in the Bf 109, matched only, just in time anywhere in the world, by the Spitfire. Had they have implemented the drop tank technology they had demonstrated on the He 51 during the Spanish civil war even the BoB and Battle of France might have ended differently for the RAF
The superb performance of the LW had little to do with the excellence of its designs, and it one of the great myths of german superiority of technology. German success arose in spite of its inferior technology, not because of any alleged superiority.
The great advantages of both the Luftwaffe and the heer up until the end of fighting in June 1940, is attributable overwhelmingly to sound planning, a thoroughly well trained force structure, with vital experience to help it along, good levels of motivation and doctrinal theories on warfare years ahead of any of the opposition.
The offensive in the west was supported by over 1000 Me 109s , fighting a dislocated and outnumbered defence. There were fewer than 290 MS 406s available to oppose them, and, disregarding the efforts of the Belgians and Dutch, as well as the poorly placed units of BC and FC in England as well as those fighters of the FAF held back to defend the interior areas, there were fewer than 400 fighters to oppose the LW in the critical NW departments, and a pathetic 290 bombers to oppose a force of well over 1000 LW machines.
Despite this obvious one sided force match up, the LW lost heavily to the FAF, proving the basic soundness of the French designs. The Me 109 did not enjoy tearaway success in the air. It should be stated up front that Galland was dismissive of the aircraft he shot down: "
In addition to obsolete Hurricanes the pilots flew French types:Morane, Bloch, and Potez.our ME109E was technically superior to them all" . By the time Dunkirk fell he believed "
The enemy air force was heavily damaged..the extensive losses it had sustained began to make itself felt.."
It is true that the French air force was virtually demolished and the RAF took terrible punishment, with over 900 aircraft lost, including 453 Hurricanes. What is very relevant is the manner in which those Hurricanes were lost. Terraines analysis shows that 378 of them "were either destroyed on the ground, or were aircraft under repair that had to be abandoned." Similar stories can be brought forward to support the French air force losses. For the BEF, that leaves a maximum of 75 Hurricanes lost in combat. In the same campaign the Luftwaffe lost 367 of its Me109s to achieve that (as well as the several hundred FAF fighters lost in air combat). That is NOT the mark of a vastly superior aircraft, when the numbers advantages, the pilot advantages, and all those other advantages unrelated to the technology are considered. It is the mark of an adequate aircraft, whilst the heavy losses suffered by the RAF and FAF are the mark of a thoroughly disjointed and confused command system.
This is not to suggest that 75 Hurricanes fell while knocking down 367 Messerschmitts; the air war was far more complex than that. But few historians of the assault on the West point out that it cost the Luftwaffe 1,389 aircraft of all types,and that 367 of them were "technically superior" fighters. Few histories point out also that the LW lost more aircraft than were deployed by the FAF into the fight, since large numbers of FAF aircraft remained outside the TO for the campaign.