American Expeditionary Force - 1939/1940

[Greyman]

The United States declares war along with everyone else in September. What aircraft would they send for their air component if they had to have something there for the spring?

Douglas B-18 bombers?
Douglas O-46 army-coop?
Northrop A-17 attack planes?
Seversky P-35 fighters?

 

[tomo pauk]

When they start sending out the aircraft (I presume all of them via ships in the UK), and what is the deadline?

 

[Shortround6]

The United States declares war along with everyone else in September. What aircraft would they send for their air component if they had to have something there for the spring?

Douglas B-18 bombers?
Douglas O-46 army-coop?
Northrop A-17 attack planes?
Seversky P-35 fighters?

Pretty much covers it as there isn't much of anything else.
of course there aren't many of them either so actual contribution on the front lines is going to be minimal.
US anti-sub activities will be restricted even more than historically and and US training of pilots and crews drops in the toilet.

From Joe Baugher's website.
B-18
"177 B-18As were ordered on June 10, 1937, with 78 more being added to the contract on June 30, 1938. The B-18A flew for the first time on April 15, 1938. The first B-18A was delivered to the Army in April of 1938, with the last example being delivered in January of 1940. Only 217 out of the 255 ordered were actually delivered as B-18As, the last 38 examples being built as B-23s"
"The maiden flight of the B-23 took place from Clover Field at Santa Monica on July 27, 1939. After being evaluated by the Materiel Division at Wright Field in Ohio, the B-23 entered service with the 89th Reconnaissance Squadron based at March Field in California. The remaining 37 B-23s were delivered between February and September of 1940,"

The Northrop A-17?
Only about 129 of the retractable landing gear version were built for the US and it was out of production in 1938. About 93 were declared surplus and sold to the French. They were refurbished at the Douglas Factory but France fell before they could be delivered. Putting them back in production might delay delivery of A-20s.

for the P-35 the initial order was for 77 aircraft. the 77th was delivered as the XP-41. Production was completed in 1938. Sweden ordered three batches of essentially the same plane (but with better engines) starting in the summer of 1939 these totaled about 120 aircraft. Sweden took delivery of 60 aircraft but the last 60 were embargoed by the US and later taken into service. This was not until the last half of 1940 so they are unavailable in 1939/early 1940.

P-36 had been ordered to the tune of 210 aircraft in the first order and this would have been the standard US fighter in late 1939/ early 1940.

Please remember that 524 P-40s had been ordered in the spring of 1939 so continued/increased production of the P-36 would be at the expense of introducing the P-40.

The Douglas O-46 was judged obsolete in 1939 and in any case only 90 had been built and production had ended in 1937. North American was delivering some of the last of 239 O-47s in 1939. Curtiss had the O-52 on the drawing board in 1939 (wouldn't fly until 1940).

None of the Aircraft mentioned (or even a few of the replacements) would be considered suitable for combat by June/July of 1940, lacking armor, bullet proof windscreens and self sealing fuel tanks.

 

[Greyman]

Seems like the most likely course of action (in the early stages) would be to send trained pilots/personnel over to use French/British aircraft.

 

[Shortround6]

French couldn't even supply their own air force. Hundreds of airframes waiting for propellers, guns, gunsights and other equipment when the Germans attacked. A few symbolic squadrons might have been formed but actual results would have been minimal as you would have that many fewer French squadrons.

 

[Greyman]

The Poles and Czech pilots played a reasonable part in the battle, I imagine something similar would be possible with pilots from the US.

 

[parsifal]

I would say no aircraft would be available, moreover it would probably take more than a year, and probably two years for the Americans to get their aero industry on a true war footing. Since 1935, with the passing of the neutrality act, US military aircraft development had languished at the bottom With UK and French cash and carry money the US was able to more rapidly ramp up their production and readiness rates because of that money that was made available by foreign investment.

Moreover, many of the individual programs were funded by british money where the funding was outside the parameters of cash and carry.

In the 1930s there were dramatic strides in civil and commercial aviation, and by the eve of the war the United States was the world leader in civil aviation….in terms of the theory, but not in terms of practice.. Army aviation lagged sadly behind. Its aircraft were not capable of meeting the demands of the war to come, and production was quite limited in comparison with the industry's potential. In 1938 only 1,800 military aircraft were built, and 2,195 in the following year. This was less than Italy's production at the time.


In June 1941 the United States Army Air Corps became the Army Air Force and was commanded by Major-General "Hap" Arnold. At that time its strength was only a small force of 9,078 officers and 143,563 enlisted men. Within six months its strength had risen to 22,524 officers (including cadets) and 274,579 men. The numbers of aircraft had risen from 6,102 to 10,329 in the same period. This made it larger than the Luftwaffe, and about the same size as the RAF, but more than 605 of this impressive total was needed in the training and replacement role. Only a very small proportion of the AAC could be shipped to the ETO, the first fighter unitsd arriving in either may or september, measured in double digits only for months to come

If a/c supply was critical, manpower was even worse. Like the army, there was plenty of untrained manpower, but hardly any trained manpower to spare.

If they really applied themselves, the USAAC might have had an expeditionary force ready for shipment by about June 1940, if theyr were lucky.

 

[wuzak]

Would they still have had P-26 squadrons in service?

 

[Shortround6]

The US was going to a war footing sooner than many people realize. The trouble is it takes a long time to go from where the US was in 1938/39 to where it was in 1943.
It is true that the US aircraft industry got a big boost from both French (often under appreciated in these discussions) and British orders in 1938 and 1939 but President Roosevelt gave speech calling for a 50,000 plane air force in May of 1940.

" During the past year American production capacity for war planes, including engines, has risen from approximately 6,000 planes a year to more than double that number, due in greater part to the placing of foreign orders here.

Our immediate problem is to superimpose on this production capacity a greatly increased additional production capacity. I should like to see this nation geared up to the ability to turn out at least 50,000 planes a year. Furthermore, I believe that this nation should plan at this time a program that would provide us with 50,000 military and naval planes."

He had to get congress to vote the funds and start work but lets remember that talks with Ford and Packard about the Merlin were happening within 2-3 months and within 4 months Ford was breaking ground on the factory to produce R-2800s under licence.

Initial contracts or at least letters of intent had been issued for a variety of aircraft. However in 1938-39-40 they had to build the factories that would build the engines and aircraft (and other war materials). Contracts were placed with Studebaker, Buick and Chevrolet to build/manage aircraft engine factories before the end of 1940. Yes, this 2-4 years behind some of the British shadow factory schemes.

The trouble with a US expeditionary force in the spring/summer of 1940 is that there just aren't very many planes suitable for combat available or even in production. However most of the airplanes that the US fought WW II with either on paper or flying in prototype form.

Trying to speed up the historical timeline to any great extent by having the US go to war earlier might very well mean the US concentrating
on building nearly obsolescent aircraft and engines for too long. As in buying or producing Martin Marylanders or Baltimores in greater numbers while delaying the B-26 Marauder. Having Republic build P-43s and P-44s and delaying the P-47. Delaying second source R-2800 factories while additional R-1830 or R-2600 factories are built.

 

[Capt. Vick]

What about the P-39? Wouldn't that have been available in small quantities?

 

[tomo pauk]

What about the P-39? Wouldn't that have been available in small quantities?

1st no-prototype P-39, the P-39C, was delivered in January 1941.

 

[Shortround6]

Vanishingly small
There were 13 P-39s built in 1940 and 10 of those were in December.
These were YP-39s and as Tomo has stated the P-39Cs didn/t start being completed until Jan 1941, Major difference was that the "C"s got an 1150hp -35 engine (comparable to the -30 in the P-40D/E?) while the YP-39s had a 1090hp -37 engine.

No self-sealing tanks until after the first 60 "C"s and amount of armor varried considerably from later versions.

All the YP-39s were used for testing of one sort or another an no service squadron was issued a YP-39.

 

[vikingBerserker]

The early B-17s (though there were not many) and the Curtiss P-36 I think could be added into the mix.

 

[Shortround6]

The Poles and Czech pilots played a reasonable part in the battle, I imagine something similar would be possible with pilots from the US.

The Poles in the Battle of France got the Caudron 714. Basically because the French didn't want them.

The Poles and Czechs did get better aircraft from the British.

 

[parsifal]

The US was going to a war footing sooner than many people realize. The trouble is it takes a long time to go from where the US was in 1938/39 to where it was in 1943.

Agree completely, and it would have taken longer, a lot longer, if the the US had entered the war in 1939

It is true that the US aircraft industry got a big boost from both French (often under appreciated in these discussions) and British orders in 1938 and 1939 but President Roosevelt gave speech calling for a 50,000 plane air force in May of 1940.

More than 50% of US production in 1938-40 was bank rolled by the French and British 9and also bits and pieces from lesser nations). Moreover the massive expansion in factory space and production potential prior to the formal entry of the US can to a significant extent be attributed to the efforts of Allied purchasing commissions

Records of the British Air Commission and other supply missions to North America | The National Archives

" During the past year American production capacity for war planes, including engines, has risen from approximately 6,000 planes a year to more than double that number, due in greater part to the placing of foreign orders here.

Despite this essentially propaganda rhetoric, and the efforts of the allies to get the US onto a war footing, US production continued to languish. In 1940, aircraft production was ramped up from 2400 (in 1938….i don't have the figures for 1939), to just 3600 in 1940 (of which 1700 were trainers and of the remainder more than 50% went to the allies). In 1941 things did finally begin to improve as the factories bankrolled by the allies came into effect. In 1941, 18400 a/c were produced, 9300 were trainers, and 6000 9approximately0 were to fill foreign orders. In 1942 the US outputs began, finally, to nudge the 50000 planes per year called for by the president way back in May 1940, with 46000 aircraft produced

Our immediate problem is to superimpose on this production capacity a greatly increased additional production capacity.

I disagree that an early entry of the US into the war automatically translates to enhanced or more rapidly ramped up outputs. Overwhelmingly US production was ramped up in the critical prewar years 91938-41) vecause of the investments poured into it by the Allies. There was simply too much anti war and pacifist sentiment in the US 1939-40 to realistically expect vast investment in its war production, including aircraft.

US war potential was overwhelmingly bank rolled by foreign money and with the US already in the war, it is highly doubtful that the allies would pour nearly as much resources into the Us war economy. Something akin to the US experiences in WWI might be a more realistic expectation. Here US war production was still pivotal, but far less spectacular compared to the efforts in the late 30's and early 40's.

I should like to see this nation geared up to the ability to turn out at least 50,000 planes a year. Furthermore, I believe that this nation should plan at this time a program that would provide us with 50,000 military and naval planes."

Which took until 1943 to reach.

He had to get congress to vote the funds and start work but lets remember that talks with Ford and Packard about the Merlin were happening within 2-3 months and within 4 months Ford was breaking ground on the factory to produce R-2800s under licence.

The initiative to build the merlin in the US, along with a lot of financing came from the british. Initially the british govt poured morfe than US$130,000,000 into the scheme, a massive injection of funds by any measure. The negotiations and planning might have started all the way nack in September 1940 9actually negotiations were occurring from January 1940), but the first single stage merlin XXs were not being built until September 1941, and then only in minute numbers

Initial contracts or at least letters of intent had been issued for a variety of aircraft. However in 1938-39-40 they had to build the factories that would build the engines and aircraft (and other war materials). Contracts were placed with Studebaker, Buick and Chevrolet to build/manage aircraft engine factories before the end of 1940. Yes, this 2-4 years behind some of the British shadow factory schemes.

And could only get started because of the rapidly ramped up financing and orders from the allies.

The trouble with a US expeditionary force in the spring/summer of 1940 is that there just aren't very many planes suitable for combat available or even in production. However most of the airplanes that the US fought WW II with either on paper or flying in prototype form.

Its worse than that. Assuming the pre-war cash and carry orders were honoured (a big assumption, I admit), combat aircraft availability in 1939-40 would amount to about 900-1500 aircraft, FOR THE ENTIRE YEAR. Training of aircrew was in an even worse state. With a logistic base that small, the US might be able to maintain a force structure of 2-300 a/c, provided losses were light. Historically, with no combat exposure and a net production of some 23000 a/c of all types, the Us was able to expand its air forces from 3000 to just over 10000. That means for every two aircraft built, the force structure can expand by one. In 1940, wirth a net availability of 900 aircraft, but under light combat conditions 9difficult to expect in the hothouse of 1940), one might expect a need for 3 aircraft for every aircraft added to the expeditionary force (to allow for some losses). 300 second line aircraft is not enough to make any difference to anything n 1940.

Trying to speed up the historical timeline to any great extent by having the US go to war earlier might very well mean the US concentrating
on building nearly obsolescent aircraft and engines for too long. As in buying or producing Martin Marylanders or Baltimores in greater numbers while delaying the B-26 Marauder. Having Republic build P-43s and P-44s and delaying the P-47. Delaying second source R-2800 factories while additional R-1830 or R-2600 factories are built.

I tend to agree

 

[Capt. Vick]

What about P-43's?

 

[Shortround6]

13 YP-43a were ordered on March 12th, 1939. first ones were delivered in Sept of 1940. Seversky was busy building P-35s (for which complete tooling already existed) for the Swedish government. Existing factories were small and either needed expansion of existing buildings or completely new buildings.
Some of the later P-43 orders were as much about expanding the Republic factory and training the rapidly growing work force for the P-47 as they were about getting 1st line fighter aircraft for the USAAC.

 

[Koopernic]

The

French couldn't even supply their own air force. Hundreds of airframes waiting for propellers, guns, gunsights and other equipment when the Germans attacked. A few symbolic squadrons might have been formed but actual results would have been minimal as you would have that many fewer French squadrons.

The Germans didn't attack France they counter attacked. It's important to understand this to correctly appreciate German decisions at the time such as the Fuhrer Command to focus all R+D on productionising weapons that could reach the front in less than 6 months (latter lifted)

A French offensive in the Rhine valley began on 7 September 1939, four days after France declared war on Germany. The Wehrmacht was engaged in a war with Poland and the French enjoyed a decisive numerical advantage. Eleven French divisions, part of the Second Army Group, advanced along a 32 km (20 mi) line near Saarbrücken, against weak German opposition. The French army advanced to a depth of eight kilometres (five miles) in some areas, and captured about 12 towns and villages unopposed: Gersheim, Medelsheim, Ihn, Niedergailbach, Bliesmengen, Ludweiler, Brenschelbach, Lauterbach, Niedaltdorf, Kleinblittersdorf, Auersmacher and Hitlersdorf (later Sitterswald). Four Renault R35 tanks were destroyed by mines north of Bliesbrücken.

The offensive was halted after French forces had occupied the seven square kilometre (3 sq. mi.) Warndt Forest, which had been heavily mined by the Germans. The French stopped short of the Siegfried line, although they came within a few kilometres south of it, immediately east of Saarbrucken.

On October 17 1939 the French withdrew having held German territory for 6 weeks without a single German soldier setting foot in France and having suffered 2000 casualties and without significant German defense or counter attack. (That would come on 10th May 1940, some 7 months latter)

French aircraft production appears to have been a shambles with production dispersed among different designs and factories for political reasons never achieving the focus required to achieve high production levels and a debugged design. The intransigence and militancy of French unions and left leaning ideologies is said to have sapped energy because of internal conflict. This is a whole new area of discussion where aviation crosses over into politics.

The ruthless culling of duplicate designs (ie He 112/He 100) seems to have worked for Luftwaffe procurement. It's difficult to overstate what a superb aircraft the Germans had in the Bf 109, matched only, just in time anywhere in the world, by the Spitfire. Had they have implemented the drop tank technology they had demonstrated on the He 51 during the Spanish civil war even the BoB and Battle of France might have ended differently for the RAF.

The Morane-Saulnier M.S.406 was a good design and the Swiss turned it and its HS12 engine into a 440mph fuel injected wonder machine but there weren't enough or rather they weren't used right (low mission rate due to use of backline airfields). The Dewoitine D.520 while good on paper was disliked by Luftwaffe pilots (both 109 and 190) who trained on captured examples because of its nasty stall.

The US, to my mind, was still a passive country by nature that thought, at least at an idealist level, that minding your own business was the best policy at the time preoccupied by the financial disaster its own banking system had created (the Fed withdrew 35% of money from circulation precipitating the great depression) and many people were chastened by the propaganda that had been used to draw it into WW1 (Germans bayoneting Belgium babies by throwing them in the air) so its lack of preparation is understandable. Nevertheless B25,B-26,B-29, P-38,P-47 and even B-36 were on the drawing boards well before 1939 and the civil industry had given it a superlaative world leading understanding of light alloy aircraft structures. For some reason US might was already being mobilized by a deep state (not unopposed).

One effect of the War was to supercharge US military aircraft business as France and Britain placed orders with the US for P40 and of course 'of the plan' P51 etc.

 

[parsifal]

The Germans didn't attack France they counter attacked.

The French attack on the german defences in the Saar was in response to the german failure to respond to the allied ultimatum concerning the german attack on Poland. The Germans refused to withdraw their forces, and as a consequence the French were obliged to make attempts to come to the aid of their allies. The attack through the saar corridor was a (belated) response to that

It's important to understand this to correctly appreciate German decisions at the time such as the Fuhrer Command to focus all R+D on productionising weapons that could reach the front in less than 6 months (latter lifted)


Ah no. Hitlers decisions to divert all R&D into short term projects were made well before the attack into the Saar got underway. The attacks into the Saar were expected and handled rather well by 7A.

A French offensive in the Rhine valley began on 7 September 1939, four days after France declared war on Germany. The Wehrmacht was engaged in a war with Poland and the French enjoyed a decisive numerical advantage. Eleven French divisions, part of the Second Army Group, advanced along a 32 km (20 mi) line near Saarbrücken, against weak German opposition.

One of the great lies put out by the largely pro-british historical accounts was that the French army enjoyed a massive numerical advantage over the germans in September. That the French army could call on 40 divisions to attack the 22 weak and poorly equipped divisions manning the westwall defences. In fact nothing could be further from the truth.

The westwall defenders were fully mobilized like all heer formations in September 1939. The French army of 1939 was a conscript army, and had only commenced its mobilization processes the day before the commencement of Case White.

At the outbreak of hostilities, the French had immediately available some 900000 men, of which more than half were deployed overseas. The remainder were scattered across metropolitan France, with a smattering of border guards defending the the fortress zones of the Maginot line. Perhaps 3 divisional equivalents were available but these were not concentrated into combat formations. They were spread out over 40 divs of the standing army. So while it is true that the offensive drew on the forces of drawn from over 11 divs, none of these formations were anything like up to full establishment. What the French were doing were throwing into this limited offensive what they could from any unit they could. Fewer than 10000 soldiers were engaged in this "offensive", and since the forces lacked any form of mine detection gear, of combat engineers for that matter, losses were heavy.

This is a table showing the manpower situation overall. It is important to note, that whereas the germans had competed their mobilization, or nearly completed it, it would take the French until mid October to complete their mobilization. Of the 4200 artillery pieces touted as available, less than a quarter were actually out of storage, and of these more than half were overseas, and about half of the remainder concreted into fixed defences. The French army of 1939 within metropolitan france had available perhaps 250 artuillery pieces, but these were stpread allover the country, and many were needed for training.


On October 17 1939 the French withdrew having held German territory for 6 weeks without a single German soldier setting foot in France and having suffered 2000 casualties and without significant German defense or counter attack. (That would come on 10th May 1940, some 7 months latter

Wrong again. Initially the germans fell back, as per their pre-war plans to behind the westwall defences. However by September 29, 52 infantrie Division had completed its mobilisation as one of the war emergency divisions, and immediately began to counterattack. Initially the French held these attacks rather well, but as was to occur so many times in the coming months, the Allied supreme war council lost its nerve and ordered a withdrawal from October 6. This staged withdrawal was bitterly opposed by many French officers, particularly Henri Giraud.

Overall the offensive had cost the French 1560 casualties, to the wehrmachts 760. The offensive had proven an utter and expensive failure, in that not a single German soldier had been diverted from the polish offensive to the west as had been intended. Worse, it exposed the weak and ineffectual Allied leadership and demonstrated its complete unreadiness for war.

The ruthless culling of duplicate designs (ie He 112/He 100) seems to have worked for Luftwaffe procurement. It's difficult to overstate what a superb aircraft the Germans had in the Bf 109, matched only, just in time anywhere in the world, by the Spitfire. Had they have implemented the drop tank technology they had demonstrated on the He 51 during the Spanish civil war even the BoB and Battle of France might have ended differently for the RAF

The superb performance of the LW had little to do with the excellence of its designs, and it one of the great myths of german superiority of technology. German success arose in spite of its inferior technology, not because of any alleged superiority.

The great advantages of both the Luftwaffe and the heer up until the end of fighting in June 1940, is attributable overwhelmingly to sound planning, a thoroughly well trained force structure, with vital experience to help it along, good levels of motivation and doctrinal theories on warfare years ahead of any of the opposition.

The offensive in the west was supported by over 1000 Me 109s , fighting a dislocated and outnumbered defence. There were fewer than 290 MS 406s available to oppose them, and, disregarding the efforts of the Belgians and Dutch, as well as the poorly placed units of BC and FC in England as well as those fighters of the FAF held back to defend the interior areas, there were fewer than 400 fighters to oppose the LW in the critical NW departments, and a pathetic 290 bombers to oppose a force of well over 1000 LW machines.

Despite this obvious one sided force match up, the LW lost heavily to the FAF, proving the basic soundness of the French designs. The Me 109 did not enjoy tearaway success in the air. It should be stated up front that Galland was dismissive of the aircraft he shot down: "In addition to obsolete Hurricanes the pilots flew French types:Morane, Bloch, and Potez.our ME109E was technically superior to them all" . By the time Dunkirk fell he believed "The enemy air force was heavily damaged..the extensive losses it had sustained began to make itself felt.."

It is true that the French air force was virtually demolished and the RAF took terrible punishment, with over 900 aircraft lost, including 453 Hurricanes. What is very relevant is the manner in which those Hurricanes were lost. Terraines analysis shows that 378 of them "were either destroyed on the ground, or were aircraft under repair that had to be abandoned." Similar stories can be brought forward to support the French air force losses. For the BEF, that leaves a maximum of 75 Hurricanes lost in combat. In the same campaign the Luftwaffe lost 367 of its Me109s to achieve that (as well as the several hundred FAF fighters lost in air combat). That is NOT the mark of a vastly superior aircraft, when the numbers advantages, the pilot advantages, and all those other advantages unrelated to the technology are considered. It is the mark of an adequate aircraft, whilst the heavy losses suffered by the RAF and FAF are the mark of a thoroughly disjointed and confused command system.

This is not to suggest that 75 Hurricanes fell while knocking down 367 Messerschmitts; the air war was far more complex than that. But few historians of the assault on the West point out that it cost the Luftwaffe 1,389 aircraft of all types,and that 367 of them were "technically superior" fighters. Few histories point out also that the LW lost more aircraft than were deployed by the FAF into the fight, since large numbers of FAF aircraft remained outside the TO for the campaign.

 

[Shortround6]

I am still wondering what Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg did to get counter attacked?

In any case the Curtiss Hawk 75 is claimed to be the 2nd most numerical fighter in French service at the beginning of May, 1940 Which basically means the French had no surplus of fighters to equip any American expeditionary force with.
The French had managed to assemble up to 64 Douglas DB-7s in North Africa before the Capitulation and 2-3 squadrons (or more?) had flown to mainland France to help with the defense. How many were still in crates is debatable. Perhaps 80-90 sorties were flown by DB-7s against the Germans?
223 Martin Marylands had arrived in Casablanca by the time of the Surrender but only about 180 had been fully assembled. Marylands operating in France had flown just over 400 sorties.

While not large numbers in the overall scheme of things it also shows that the French had no great numbers of up to date bombers of their own to equip an American force with in 1939/40.

for instance the DB-7s were replacing Bloch 210s in several squadrons.

A plane that could barely reach 200mph.
The more modern French bombers were desperately needed by the French to replace out-dated bombers in all too many units.