American Expeditionary Force - 1939/1940

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I am still wondering what Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg did to get counter attacked?

In any case the Curtiss Hawk 75 is claimed to be the 2nd most numerical fighter in French service at the beginning of May, 1940 Which basically means the French had no surplus of fighters to equip any American expeditionary force with.
The French had managed to assemble up to 64 Douglas DB-7s in North Africa before the Capitulation and 2-3 squadrons (or more?) had flown to mainland France to help with the defense. How many were still in crates is debatable. Perhaps 80-90 sorties were flown by DB-7s against the Germans?
223 Martin Marylands had arrived in Casablanca by the time of the Surrender but only about 180 had been fully assembled. Marylands operating in France had flown just over 400 sorties.

While not large numbers in the overall scheme of things it also shows that the French had no great numbers of up to date bombers of their own to equip an American force with in 1939/40.

for instance the DB-7s were replacing Bloch 210s in several squadrons.
preview_bloch-mb-210_src_1.jpg

A plane that could barely reach 200mph.
The more modern French bombers were desperately needed by the French to replace out-dated bombers in all too many units.

The Germans also had outdated bombers. I give you the Do 11,13 and 23. They weren't secretly developing an air force disguised as airliners, they used airliners and mail planes because their bombers failed. The Ju 86 was a little better. I give you the Do 23 which was an improvement on the Do 11,13
do23_1.jpg



Why did France fail to gets its aircraft production in order. It had 7 months of phoney war. German bombers were actually worse but they rapidly improved up to a point. The reason may just have to do with the organizational ability and skill of that German Government of the time.


Norway was attacked because:
1 it couldn't or rather the particular Government of Norway wouldn't defend its neutrality. Although playing neutral the Norwegian cabinet had decided secretly to join Britain in secret if Britain landed. Unfortunately there were no secrets from German intelligence which functioned well in Norway.
2 Britain under the pretext of helping Finland decided to land an invasion force near Narvick Norway, this was a disguised plan to cut of the critical Iron Ore Swedish Iron ore supplies (from Kiruna Swedden 1.5 hours by rail from Narvick) which were shipped by the port of Narvick. I'm not being sarcastic, Britain wasn't helping Finland. Vidkun Quisling had desperatly tried to form a Scandinvian front. Germany was dependent on this Swedish iron that passed through Norway. Hitler had warned that any attempt at this would be met by a ferocious response. It wasn't a secret. Germany pretty much lost WW1 because of Iron ore shortages. That's why there was no German tank mass production despite some excellent designs and why their helmets sheet stampings thinned out. In a masterpiece of propaganda the British operation was called "Wilfred' to trivialize its nefarious nature. The British invasion fleet left on 5 May, Royal Navy mining operations in support began in 8th May but the German preemptive invasion began on the 9th May a few hours before the British invasion was scheduled. US meddling in the Gulf over oil and its 'interests' has no less justification.

German paratroops and naval forces cut of British forces, they were hampered by the short range of the Ju 52 many of which were abandoned on the lakes near Kiruna (where Bomber command latter mustered to attack the Tirpitz)

As far as Holland goes. It was an unpopular invasion with Germans as Holland had been neutral and benign with Germans in WW1. The German ambassador was in tears over the injustice of it towards a friendly people. However Holland's ruling elite had their own ideas. RAF aircraft were overflying Holland and being let fly with a token response while similar Luftwaffe incursions were met with force. Despite haughty British propaganda it seemed likely they would have another "Wilfred" on Holland and Holland would be a beachhead for Britain. Churchill was openly calling on Holland to side against Germany, which didn't help neutrality any.

As far as Poland goes you are aware of the large losses of territory and German population from ancient homelands they had lived in 3 times longer than the USA has existed. You should be aware of the ethnic cleansing of Germans (about 4000 murdered, appropriation of land, discrimination in education and public service) that occurred against German minorities (who weren't minorities where they lived). Although exaggerated by Goebell's (claimed about 50,000) the discrimination, land seizures are well documented by the League of Nations. 200-400 racially motivated murders year do tend to get noticed. Check Maurice de Zayas "A Terrible Revenge" if you want credible proof.

The Polish dictator, Beck, was a pretty lascivious character. Your rather have tee totaling and prudent Hitler as a guest in your house. I'll let you research him. Beck declined an offer of peace, with an anti Soviet allegiance in return for a mere rail corridor to the German city of Danzig (now Gdansk) which had been isolated by the treaty of Versailles but remained ethnically German and was close to the heart of Germans. The city would be killed by this. Hence rejected, seeing the great city fall on hard times and feeling threatened Hitler and Stalin made an Pact with the USSR before Poland and the USSR could make one with each other. Thanks to Britain's badly and foolish communicated 'guarantee' Beck was rash, uncompromising, imprudent, impractical. Russia had significant territorial and ethnic strife with Poland and Both German and Russia, both due to boycotts against them, had trade synergies with each other.

Belgium was exploited as France's buffer state, France hid behind Belgium.
 
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It is highly contentious and debateable to claim the german actions in Norway were the result of british machinations.

In fact both sides were more or less routinely flouting Norwegian neutrality from very early in the war.

A more complete account of what was happening may be found here;

This Day in the War in Europe: The Beginning

There is a fair bit of reading to wade through, and yes I contributed to that thread, but I don't think there is a better online version of the day to day events of the war available online
 
according to Axis history Forum, the forces available in the west as of 26 august through to 10 September were as follows:

"Western borders were far from be undefended after the Mobilmächung on August 26th 1939 : there were 42 infantry divisions, including an half from 1. and 2. Wellen (active and first reserve units, the best ones of the German army), and several independent units from Grenzschutztruppen or Allgemeine SS. From north to south :

Heeresgruppe C :

- 5. Armee (borders with Netherlands and northern Belgium) :

--- V. Armeekorps :
----- 22. Infanterie Division (1. Welle).
----- 225. Infanterie Division (3. Welle).

--- VI. Armeekorps :
----- Grenz-Infanterie Regiment 16 (Grenzschutztruppen).

--- XXVII. Armeekorps :
----- 16. Infanterie Division (1. Welle).
----- 69. Infanterie Division (2. Welle).
----- 211. Infanterie Division (3. Welle).
----- 216. Infanterie Division (3. Welle).

--- XXX. Armeekorps :
----- Grenz-Abschnittskommando 9 (Grenzschutztruppen).

--- Generalkommando der Grenztruppen "Eifel" :
----- 26. Infanterie Division (1. Welle).
----- 86. Infanterie Division (2. Welle).
----- 227. Infanterie Division (3. Welle).
----- Grenzkommandanturen "Aachen" and "Trier" (Grenzschutztruppen).

--- Reserves/Under army direct command :
----- 58. Infanterie Division (2. Welle).
----- 87. Infanterie Division (2. Welle).

- 1. Armee (Saarland, borders with Southern Belgium and France) :

--- IX. Armeekorps :
----- 25. Infanterie Division (1. Welle).
----- 33. Infanterie Division (1. Welle).
----- 71. Infanterie Division (2. Welle).

--- XII. Armeekorps :
----- 15. Infanterie Division (1. Welle).
----- 34. Infanterie Division (1. Welle).
----- 52. Infanterie Division (2. Welle).
----- 79. Infanterie Division (2. Welle).

--- Generalkommando der Grenztruppen "Saarpfalz" :
----- 6. Infanterie Division (1. Welle).
----- 9. Infanterie Division (1. Welle).
----- 36. Infanterie Division (1. Welle).
----- Grenz-Infanterie Regimenter 125, 127, 129, 132, 142 and 152 (Grenzschutztruppen).
----- Maschinengewehr Bataillone 10, 13 and 14.

--- Reserves/Under army direct command :
----- 75. Infanterie Division (2. Welle).
----- 209. Infanterie Division (3. Welle).
----- 214. Infanterie Division (3. Welle).
----- 223. Infanterie Division (3. Welle).
----- 231. Infanterie Division (3. Welle).
----- 246. Infanterie Division (3. Welle).

- 7. Armee (along the Rhine) :

--- Generalkommando der Grenztruppen "Oberrhein" :
----- 5. Infanterie Division (1. Welle).
----- 35. Infanterie Division (1. Welle).
----- 14. Landwehr Division (3. Welle).
----- SS-Standarte "Der Führer" (Allgemeine SS).
----- Maschinengewehr Bataillone 4, 5 and 11.

--- Reserves/Under army direct command :
----- 78. Infanterie Division (2. Welle).
----- 212. Infanterie Division (3. Welle).
----- 215. Infanterie Division (3. Welle).

- Heeresgruppe C reserves/Under army group direct command :
----- 76. Infanterie Division (2. Welle).
----- 251. Infanterie Division (4. Welle).
----- 253. Infanterie Division (4. Welle).
----- 254. Infanterie Division (4. Welle).
----- 255. Infanterie Division (4. Welle).
----- 256. Infanterie Division (4. Welle).
----- 260. Infanterie Division (4. Welle).
----- 262. Infanterie Division (4. Welle).
----- 263. Infanterie Division (4. Welle).

Total : 42 infantry divisions, including 12 active divisions (1. Welle), 10 first reserve divisions (2. Welle), 12 second reserve divisions (3. Welle, Landwehr, poor quality and equipment) and 8 complement divisions (4. Welle, not combat ready at this time).

This total is particularly important on the important sectors, those of the 1. Armee and right wing of the 7. Armee (borders with France), where there were 9 active divisions and 5 first reserve divisions
".

For anyone with more than a passing interst in the heer, the divisions listed include some formations that went on to acquire some of the best reputations in the german army. they definitely were not also rans.

This source further states that the westwall defences had a further 9 reserve divisions added to them by 10 September.

it is a blatant lie that the French were at any stage in a position to launch any sort of major attack likely to succeed in the west in 1939.
 
The Germans also had outdated bombers. I give you the Do 11,13 and 23. They weren't secretly developing an air force disguised as airliners, they used airliners and mail planes because their bombers failed. The Ju 86 was a little better. I give you the Do 23 which was an improvement on the Do 11,13
do23_1.jpg
The Do 11, 13 and 23 were NOT in front line service in 1940 with makes them rather irrelevant to this discussion.
 
Curtiss P-37?
Instead of P-36s?
There were 13 YP-37s and there were rather troublesome. the airframe with the highest number of hours was 212 when retired.
Armament was one. 50 and one .30, no armor, no BP glass, no self sealing tanks.
There is a reason the US ordered 524 P-40s in the spring of 1939. They were the best fighter the US was going to get, in numbers, in 1940/41. However, like most planes, they took a bit over a year to start showing up. Which is too late for this proposal. The P-40s were too late for the BoB.
 
The Germans also had outdated bombers. I give you the Do 11,13 and 23. They weren't secretly developing an air force disguised as airliners, they used airliners and mail planes because their bombers failed. The Ju 86 was a little better. I give you the Do 23 which was an improvement on the Do 11,13
do23_1.jpg



Why did France fail to gets its aircraft production in order. It had 7 months of phoney war. German bombers were actually worse but they rapidly improved up to a point. The reason may just have to do with the organizational ability and skill of that German Government of the time.


Norway was attacked because:
1 it couldn't or rather the particular Government of Norway wouldn't defend its neutrality. Although playing neutral the Norwegian cabinet had decided secretly to join Britain in secret. Unfortunately there were no secrets from German intelligence which functioned well in Norway.
2 Britain under the pretext of helping Finland decided to land an invasion force near Narvick Norway, this was a disguised plan to cut of the critical Iron Ore Swedish Iron ore supplies (from Kiruna Swedden 1.5 hours by rail from Narvick) which were shipped by the port of Narvick. I'm not being sarcastic, Britain wasn't helping Finland. Germany was dependent on this iron. Hitler had warned that any attempt at this would be met by a ferocious response. It wasn't a secret. Germany pretty much lost WW1 because of Iron ore shortages. That's why there was no German tank mass production despite some excellent designs and why their hemets sheet stampings thinned out. In a masterpiece of propaganda the British operation was called "Wilfred' to trivialize its nefarious nature. The British invasion fleet left on 5 May, minining operations in support began in 8th May but the German invasion began on the 9th May. US meddling in the Gulf over oil and its 'interests' has no less justification.

German paratroops and naval forces cut of British forces, they were hampered by the short range of the Ju 52 many of which were abandoned on the lakes near Kiruna (where Bomber command latter mustered to attack the Tirpitz)

As far as Holland goes. It was an unpopular invasion with Germans as Holland had been neutral and benign with Germans in WW1. The German ambassador was in tears over the injustice of it towards a friendly people. RAF aircraft were overflying Holland and being let fly with a token response while similar Luftwaffe incursions were met with force. Despite haughty British propaganda it seemed likely they would have another "Wilfred" on Holland and Holland would be a beachhead for Britain. Churchill was openly calling on Holland to side against Germany, which didn't help neutrality any.

As far as Poland goes you are aware of the large losses of territory and German population from ancient homelands they had lived in 3 times longer than the USA has existed. You should be aware of the ethnic cleansing of Germans (about 4000 murdered, appropriation of land, discrimination in education and public service) that occurred against German minorities (who weren't minorities where they lived). Although exaggerated by Goebell's (claimed about 50,000) the discrimination, land seizures are well documented by the League of Nations. 200-400 racially motivated murders year do tend to get noticed. Check Maurice de Zayas "A Terrible Revenge" if you want credible proof.

The Polish dictator, Beck, was a pretty lascivious character. Your rather have tee totaling and prudent Hitler as a guest in your house. I'll let you research him. Beck declined an offer of peace, with an anti Soviet allegiance in return for a mere rail corridor to the German city of Danzig (now Gdansk) which had been isolated by the treaty of Versailles but remained ethnically German and was close to the heart. The city would be killed by this due. Hence rejected, seeing the great city fall on hard times and feeling threatened Hitler and Stalin made an Pact with the USSR before Poland and the USSR could make one with each other. Thanks to Britain's badly and foolish communicated 'guarantee' Beck was rash, uncompromising, imprudent. Russia had significant territorial and ethnic strife with Poland and Both German and Russia, sue to boycotts, had trade synergies.

Belgium was exploited as France's buffer state.

FB_IMG_1501008835989.jpg
 
They pretty much went out of service in 1936, except for training. A few were used by the Czech unit/s aiding the Luftwaffe in WW II.

The Do 11 first flew (as the Dornier F) on May 7th 1932. Which rather points out that the Luftwaffe was rearming before Hitler really came to power.
Calling these things mail planes or cargo planes was polite fiction at best. How many mail planes need front gunner's pulpits or lower rear gun positions? fighting off aerial mail thieves? Even with a different nose and faired over gun positions it didn't take a genius to figure out that they were more suited to the bombing role than cargo. Using a skinny fuselage without large doors/hatches points to a rather poor transport.
Trimotor_02.jpg

Ford tri motor of the late 20s. Large mail bins in the wings. Converted WWI aircraft had skinny fuselages but planes flying in 1932/33 should have had fuselages more in line with the intended purpose.

And performance of early Dorniers was hardly world class as mail planes. top speed was within a few MPH of this
r4c1_curtiss_condor.jpg


I don't think they fooled many people.
 
I still would push for the limited number of B-17s in service at the time, I would also suggest the Douglas DB-7 which had started production in 1939 I believe. The Martin B-10/B-12 & Martin 166 had already bested a number of bombers in fly-offs still being flown by the Axis (such as the Ju-86 & SM.79s) so I would throw those in as well for recon and night time bombing raids.

Lockheed Hudson's and Consolidated PBY's was being produced at the time as well. I would consider replacing the A-17 with the Navy's Vought SB2U Vindicator as it had a higher ceiling and was faster and leave the strafing to the fighters..

Would the non-navalized Brewster Buffalo be worth considering? Might not be the fastest and it was maneuverable.
 
trouble is that some of these aircraft are in rather short supply which makes numbers available to deploy so small as to make little or no difference to the French campaign.
Especially as any DB-7s or Hudsons taken by the US from the countries that paid for them simply means that those countries have fewer planes to equip their squadrons with so there is very little net gain.

The A-17s were being phased out. That was the whole idea behind the attack bomber competition that lead to the A-20. If the Army wanted twins they were unlikely to buy Vindicators.

And the Vindicator, as a land attack bomber, is pretty much a one trick pony. Very useful for attacking bridges, not so good for much of anything else.
Using fighters for strafing is rather wasteful at this point in time and without armor or self-sealing tanks the losses from ground fire are going to be high.

To get back to the basic idea, just when is this expedition supposed to leave America for France/Europe ( makes a difference as aircraft availability is changing by the month) and what are it's goals once it gets there? If it is just to show that Americans can die as gallantly as French or British pilots it is pretty pointless.

And what are the down sides. Loosing a number of experienced pilots, air crew and ground personnel in a french adventure means building the USAAC in late 1940 and 1941 is much harder. The loss of obsolescent or semi-obsolescent aircraft is of minor importance.

Going back to the B-17, the first B-17B flew on June 27th 1939. It was delivered to the USSAC on July 29th 1939 but the 39th (and last) B-17B was delivered March 30th of 1940.

SO when do send your contingent of B-17s and how many do you send? Please remember that the British found the B-17C unsuited for combat missions over Europe in the summer and fall of 1941.

Any DB-7s built in 1939 had been paid for cash by either the French or British. The US had ordered around 200 A-20s powered by R-2600s in May of 1939 but the first of these will not show up until the fall of 1940 and first service use by a Squadron won't be until the spring of 1941.

You can't grab a new type of aircraft right from the factory doors and throw them into service. Testing has to be done, Not flight testing as such but operational testing so manuals can be written and training courses established. Otherwise you are just going to write off planes and pilots in needless accidents as they become accustomed to the new aircraft. DB-7s and A-20s were routinely shipped overseas in either crates or tarpaulins with outer wings and propellers removed. You need mechanics and manuals/tools to re-assemble the aircraft at the destination.

The Americans were probably no better at bombing by night than the British or French were in 1939/40, that is to say a very successful mission found the right city. And unless you change the French position of using live bombs the use of Martin B-10s to drop leaflets is hardly going to change the course of the war.

Brewster Buffalo production was pretty much spoken for. Again for the US to swipe aircraft already paid for by it's allies isn't going to help co-operation and it isn't going to change the total number of aircraft available. Brewster was chronically late in delivering aircraft no matter who the customer was.
Please remember that the Buffaloes that went to Finland were actually ex US Navy aircraft in that the Navy relinquished their slots in the production queue to Finland. Belgium had ordered 40 Buffaloes on Dec 11th 1939 and one is produced in April 1940 and 6 in May. One made it to Belgium just in time to be captured.

The Navy had about 11 F2A-1s and aside from the Planes that went to Finland that is about it for 1939 production. Most of the rest of the Buffaloes were produced in 1940 and 1941.
 
Its not creepy, just poorly informed
It's accurate. The basic facts are undeniable.

The British intended to and set off on May 5th 1940 to invade Norway, supposedly partially, like girls get partially pregnant. This was to cut of German Iron ore supplies. The Germans merely beat them to it. Fake pretexts for war are normal, one is advised by the success of some of HM Governments in this area to be a good liar when starting a war. Plausible deniability and moralizations are key.

Had the Norwegians not insisted on splitting from Sweden in 1905 non of this would have been possible.
 
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trouble is that some of these aircraft are in rather short supply which makes numbers available to deploy so small as to make little or no difference to the French campaign.
Especially as any DB-7s or Hudsons taken by the US from the countries that paid for them simply means that those countries have fewer planes to equip their squadrons with so there is very little net gain.

The A-17s were being phased out. That was the whole idea behind the attack bomber competition that lead to the A-20. If the Army wanted twins they were unlikely to buy Vindicators.

And the Vindicator, as a land attack bomber, is pretty much a one trick pony. Very useful for attacking bridges, not so good for much of anything else.
Using fighters for strafing is rather wasteful at this point in time and without armor or self-sealing tanks the losses from ground fire are going to be high.

To get back to the basic idea, just when is this expedition supposed to leave America for France/Europe ( makes a difference as aircraft availability is changing by the month) and what are it's goals once it gets there? If it is just to show that Americans can die as gallantly as French or British pilots it is pretty pointless.

And what are the down sides. Loosing a number of experienced pilots, air crew and ground personnel in a french adventure means building the USAAC in late 1940 and 1941 is much harder. The loss of obsolescent or semi-obsolescent aircraft is of minor importance.

Going back to the B-17, the first B-17B flew on June 27th 1939. It was delivered to the USSAC on July 29th 1939 but the 39th (and last) B-17B was delivered March 30th of 1940.

SO when do send your contingent of B-17s and how many do you send? Please remember that the British found the B-17C unsuited for combat missions over Europe in the summer and fall of 1941.

Any DB-7s built in 1939 had been paid for cash by either the French or British. The US had ordered around 200 A-20s powered by R-2600s in May of 1939 but the first of these will not show up until the fall of 1940 and first service use by a Squadron won't be until the spring of 1941.

You can't grab a new type of aircraft right from the factory doors and throw them into service. Testing has to be done, Not flight testing as such but operational testing so manuals can be written and training courses established. Otherwise you are just going to write off planes and pilots in needless accidents as they become accustomed to the new aircraft. DB-7s and A-20s were routinely shipped overseas in either crates or tarpaulins with outer wings and propellers removed. You need mechanics and manuals/tools to re-assemble the aircraft at the destination.

The Americans were probably no better at bombing by night than the British or French were in 1939/40, that is to say a very successful mission found the right city. And unless you change the French position of using live bombs the use of Martin B-10s to drop leaflets is hardly going to change the course of the war.

Brewster Buffalo production was pretty much spoken for. Again for the US to swipe aircraft already paid for by it's allies isn't going to help co-operation and it isn't going to change the total number of aircraft available. Brewster was chronically late in delivering aircraft no matter who the customer was. Please remember that the Buffaloes that went to Finland were actually ex US Navy aircraft in that the Navy relinquished their slots in the production queue to Finland. Belgium had ordered 40 Buffaloes on Dec 11th 1939 and one is produced in April 1940 and 6 in May. One made it to Belgium just in time to be captured.

The Navy had about 11 F2A-1s and aside from the Planes that went to Finland that is about it for 1939 production. Most of the rest of the Buffaloes were produced in 1940 and 1941.


"You can't grab a new type of aircraft right from the factory doors and throw them into service. Testing has to be done, Not flight testing as such but operational testing so manuals can be written and training courses established."

I've learned that's true of any engineering project. The production and engineering is always ahead of the manuals.

I don't know what those Finnish Brewster Buffalos were fighting. Likely not Yaks, LaGGS and MiG but I-16.
 
It's accurate. The basic facts are undeniable.

The British intended to and set off on May 5th 1940 to invade Norway, supposedly partially, like girls get partially pregnant. This was to cut of German Iron ore supplies. The Germans merely beat them to it. Fake pretexts for war are normal, one is advised by the success of some of HM Governments in this area to be a good liar when starting a war. Plausible deniability and moralizations are key.

Had the Norwegians not insisted on splitting from Sweden in 1905 non of this would have been possible.


Your basic facts are wrong in this sub-debate. The reasons that led to both sides taking direct action, or planning to take direct action against the Norwegians goes back to almost the very beginning of hostilities

Whilst I do not claim the following is a complete record of all incidents leading up the direct invasion, the following is a reasonable summary nevertheless.

September-December 1939: In response to the RNs Northern Mine Barrage currently being laid, DKM begins its own mine barrage, beginning with the laying of the Minefield "Martha Ida" on the 5th September. These mine barrages are designed initially to close off the Baltic, but extend in part through Danish, Swedish and Norwegian territorial waters. These mine barrages are not laid with any permission from the nations waters where they are laid. The germans will eventually advise these nations of the minefields, but only after a number of fatal incidents (which draws sharp protests from the nations concerned). Eventually the KM decides to lay defensive minefields through and into the Norwegian leads to facilitate its blockade and raider operations by the illegal passage of combatants through Norwegian waters

6 September 1939. Blockade runner JOHANNES MOLKENBUR is detected within Norwegian territorial waters. She attemptsd to make a run for it, Norwegian authorities do nothing to restrain the vessel. She is 17 miles west of Stadlandet when intercepted by CL Southampton and DD Jervis. DD Fortune pursues a DKM U boat as it flees into Norwegian territorial waters near Munken Rock in the fjord leading to Stavanger. This is the first of many episodes of U-Boats using Norwegian waters to bypass the RN blockade….

7 September 1939: German Blockade runner ALBERT departed Bergen on the 5th. Although challenged by DD FEARLESS off Kristiansand on the 7th, she was able to escape by running into into Norwegian waters. No action was taken by Norwegian authorities, and FEARLESS did not exercise its rights of hot pursuit at that point 9as it was assumed the Norwegians would arrest the ship as required and arrived safely at Hamburg on the 11th.

Home Flt patrolled off the Norwegian coast, just outside territorial limits, searching for enemy shipping. Several ships are spotted, but they immediately run to Norwegian ports for shelter. Norwegian authorities refuse entry to the RN, which is observed on this occasion. Norwegian authorities allow the enemy shiiping to continue movement within their waters.

9 September 1939: MVs HELFRID BISSMARK and HELGA SCHRODER are sunk by DKM mines that have been illegally laid in Swedish waters, in the Sound between Sjaelland and Sweden and in the Baltic, both the victim of German mines.

These games of cat and mouse and tit for tat continued right through to the following April

The iron route

The Germans made great use of the Norwegian Corridor to avoid the attention of the vigilant Royal Navy and RAF. In the winter of 1939–1940 a steady stream of their specially-constructed iron ore vessels made the long trip south from Narvik, sometimes within the three mile curtilage of neutral Norwegian territorial waters.

From the beginning of the war, both sides advocated gaining control of the iron route by force. The chief advocates in these parallel discussions were Raeder and Winston Churchill.

Diplomatic exchanges and incidents were repeated and ongoing. Both Germany and britiain were becoming increasingly agitated with the behavior of the Norwegians. In contrast to the germans, who repeatedly failed to seek any permissions for minelaying or other belligerent acts within Norwegian waters, the British at least informed the Norwegians that the Skjaergaard was about to be mined in January 1940, but the plan was postponed following protests from both Norway and Sweden. Yet another diplomatic dispute over abuse of Norway's territorial waters broke out in February 1940 between the respective governments of Britain, Norway and Germany following the Altmark Incident. A German tanker, attempting to return home via the cover of the Norwegian Corridor carrying British prisoners of war was spotted by British aircraft and pursued by destroyers, eventually being forced onto rocks. Prisoners held on this ship were liberated, despite the Norwegians claiming they had found nothing when they searched the ship. The germans had suffered casualties when they resisted the boarding parties.

On the evening of 21 March 1940 the British submarine HMS Ursula, (which had damaged the German cruiser Leipzig in Heligoland Bight the previous December) intercepted the German iron ore ship HEDDERHEIM, en route from Narvik, and sank her eight miles off the coast of Denmark, although the crew were all saved. At the time it was seen as an early indication that Britain was at last taking steps to end the iron trade and over the next few days several other German ships were sunk at the entrance to the Baltic. Following reports that strong British destroyer and submarine forces were stationed in the Skagerrak, Berlin ordered all her ships along the iron ore route to port immediately.

By now it was clear to all concerned that the Phoney War was about to end. Antagonised by the German mining of their own waters with deadly new magnetic mines and a general concern that Germany was managing to overcome the worst effects of the blockade, the Supreme War Council met in London on 28 March 1940 to discuss an intensification of the economic warfare strategy. On the 3April authorisation was given to commence mining operations within the territorial limits of Norway.

The KMs scheme to establish a secret Uboat base in the far north of Norway
According to the DKM war diary of the period, DKM were planning the establishment of a secret U-Boat base in the far north of Norway. Later the proposal was shifted to soviet territory in the Murmansk region. The plan came to nothing but its worth noting that the Norwegians knoew nothing about this scheme

DKM War Diary entries 26 March 1940
Conference between the Fuehrer and Commander in Chief, Navy
Points under Discussion ;

1. "Weseruebung" : Commander in Chief, Navy reports the state of readiness of the Navy, and states that, though at present and for the immediate future no British landing in Norway need be expected, the British will attempt to harass German trade in neutral waters and to' suppress it completely sooner or later. In Commander in Chief, Navy's opinion, Germany will sooner or later have to face the question of carrying out "Weseruebung". Commander in Chief, Navy therefore is in favor of its execution as soon as possible, possibly utilizing the next new-moon period.


The Fuehrer fully agrees with this viewpoint. He authorizes the commencement of military operations but reserves a final date selection for its execution.


If we are going to reduce this to 'who threw the first punch, guilt rests with the germans. There were already german troops hidden aboard merchant ships swinging at their anchor chains by the time the british had authorised "Wilfred". Moreover the conference of 26 March conclusively shows that the germans had already decided to take overt offensive action against the Norwegians well before any decision by the british to attack the Norwegians had even been made.

DKM War Diary entries 28 March 1940
According to a Reuter report, the question of Norwegian neutrality and the German violations of Norwegian territorial waters are to be the subject of proceedings at the next meeting of the Allied Governments.

The "Temps" reports from competent circles that because of systematic violation of Norwegian territorial waters by German ships the Allies now consider themselves justified in no longer respecting the neutrality of these waters. "Havas" says in another publication that the Allies are resolved to play the role of police themselves.

In other words, the germans were making deliberate attempts to provoke the situation

By this stage also the declarations of unrestricted warfare on any neutral or allied shipping whenever and wherever found had thoroughly alienated the Norwegians who were by this stage losing ships and lives to DKM aggression at sea.
 
Your basic facts are wrong in this sub-debate. The reasons that led to both sides taking direct action, or planning to take direct action against the Norwegians goes back to almost the very beginning of hostilities

Whilst I do not claim the following is a complete record of all incidents leading up the direct invasion, the following is a reasonable summary nevertheless.

September-December 1939: In response to the RNs Northern Mine Barrage currently being laid, DKM begins its own mine barrage, beginning with the laying of the Minefield "Martha Ida" on the 5th September. These mine barrages are designed initially to close off the Baltic, but extend in part through Danish, Swedish and Norwegian territorial waters. These mine barrages are not laid with any permission from the nations waters where they are laid. The germans will eventually advise these nations of the minefields, but only after a number of fatal incidents (which draws sharp protests from the nations concerned). Eventually the KM decides to lay defensive minefields through and into the Norwegian leads to facilitate its blockade and raider operations by the illegal passage of combatants through Norwegian waters

6 September 1939. Blockade runner JOHANNES MOLKENBUR is detected within Norwegian territorial waters. She attemptsd to make a run for it, Norwegian authorities do nothing to restrain the vessel. She is 17 miles west of Stadlandet when intercepted by CL Southampton and DD Jervis. DD Fortune pursues a DKM U boat as it flees into Norwegian territorial waters near Munken Rock in the fjord leading to Stavanger. This is the first of many episodes of U-Boats using Norwegian waters to bypass the RN blockade….

7 September 1939: German Blockade runner ALBERT departed Bergen on the 5th. Although challenged by DD FEARLESS off Kristiansand on the 7th, she was able to escape by running into into Norwegian waters. No action was taken by Norwegian authorities, and FEARLESS did not exercise its rights of hot pursuit at that point 9as it was assumed the Norwegians would arrest the ship as required and arrived safely at Hamburg on the 11th.

Home Flt patrolled off the Norwegian coast, just outside territorial limits, searching for enemy shipping. Several ships are spotted, but they immediately run to Norwegian ports for shelter. Norwegian authorities refuse entry to the RN, which is observed on this occasion. Norwegian authorities allow the enemy shiiping to continue movement within their waters.

9 September 1939: MVs HELFRID BISSMARK and HELGA SCHRODER are sunk by DKM mines that have been illegally laid in Swedish waters, in the Sound between Sjaelland and Sweden and in the Baltic, both the victim of German mines.

These games of cat and mouse and tit for tat continued right through to the following April

The iron route

The Germans made great use of the Norwegian Corridor to avoid the attention of the vigilant Royal Navy and RAF. In the winter of 1939–1940 a steady stream of their specially-constructed iron ore vessels made the long trip south from Narvik, sometimes within the three mile curtilage of neutral Norwegian territorial waters.

From the beginning of the war, both sides advocated gaining control of the iron route by force. The chief advocates in these parallel discussions were Raeder and Winston Churchill.

Diplomatic exchanges and incidents were repeated and ongoing. Both Germany and britiain were becoming increasingly agitated with the behavior of the Norwegians. In contrast to the germans, who repeatedly failed to seek any permissions for minelaying or other belligerent acts within Norwegian waters, the British at least informed the Norwegians that the Skjaergaard was about to be mined in January 1940, but the plan was postponed following protests from both Norway and Sweden. Yet another diplomatic dispute over abuse of Norway's territorial waters broke out in February 1940 between the respective governments of Britain, Norway and Germany following the Altmark Incident. A German tanker, attempting to return home via the cover of the Norwegian Corridor carrying British prisoners of war was spotted by British aircraft and pursued by destroyers, eventually being forced onto rocks. Prisoners held on this ship were liberated, despite the Norwegians claiming they had found nothing when they searched the ship. The germans had suffered casualties when they resisted the boarding parties.

On the evening of 21 March 1940 the British submarine HMS Ursula, (which had damaged the German cruiser Leipzig in Heligoland Bight the previous December) intercepted the German iron ore ship HEDDERHEIM, en route from Narvik, and sank her eight miles off the coast of Denmark, although the crew were all saved. At the time it was seen as an early indication that Britain was at last taking steps to end the iron trade and over the next few days several other German ships were sunk at the entrance to the Baltic. Following reports that strong British destroyer and submarine forces were stationed in the Skagerrak, Berlin ordered all her ships along the iron ore route to port immediately.

By now it was clear to all concerned that the Phoney War was about to end. Antagonised by the German mining of their own waters with deadly new magnetic mines and a general concern that Germany was managing to overcome the worst effects of the blockade, the Supreme War Council met in London on 28 March 1940 to discuss an intensification of the economic warfare strategy. On the 3April authorisation was given to commence mining operations within the territorial limits of Norway.

The KMs scheme to establish a secret Uboat base in the far north of Norway
According to the DKM war diary of the period, DKM were planning the establishment of a secret U-Boat base in the far north of Norway. Later the proposal was shifted to soviet territory in the Murmansk region. The plan came to nothing but its worth noting that the Norwegians knoew nothing about this scheme

DKM War Diary entries 26 March 1940
Conference between the Fuehrer and Commander in Chief, Navy
Points under Discussion ;

1. "Weseruebung" : Commander in Chief, Navy reports the state of readiness of the Navy, and states that, though at present and for the immediate future no British landing in Norway need be expected, the British will attempt to harass German trade in neutral waters and to' suppress it completely sooner or later. In Commander in Chief, Navy's opinion, Germany will sooner or later have to face the question of carrying out "Weseruebung". Commander in Chief, Navy therefore is in favor of its execution as soon as possible, possibly utilizing the next new-moon period.


The Fuehrer fully agrees with this viewpoint. He authorizes the commencement of military operations but reserves a final date selection for its execution.


If we are going to reduce this to 'who threw the first punch, guilt rests with the germans. There were already german troops hidden aboard merchant ships swinging at their anchor chains by the time the british had authorised "Wilfred". Moreover the conference of 26 March conclusively shows that the germans had already decided to take overt offensive action against the Norwegians well before any decision by the british to attack the Norwegians had even been made.

DKM War Diary entries 28 March 1940
According to a Reuter report, the question of Norwegian neutrality and the German violations of Norwegian territorial waters are to be the subject of proceedings at the next meeting of the Allied Governments.

The "Temps" reports from competent circles that because of systematic violation of Norwegian territorial waters by German ships the Allies now consider themselves justified in no longer respecting the neutrality of these waters. "Havas" says in another publication that the Allies are resolved to play the role of police themselves.

In other words, the germans were making deliberate attempts to provoke the situation

By this stage also the declarations of unrestricted warfare on any neutral or allied shipping whenever and wherever found had thoroughly alienated the Norwegians who were by this stage losing ships and lives to DKM aggression at sea.


Here are the facts, from your own long list.
1 The Royal Navy began mining operations, before the Germans.
2 On May 5th the British Launched an invasion, before the Germans.
You've taken the DKM (German Navy Diaries) out of context. The diaries contain intelligence analysis of a speculative nature as to British intentions. The Germans expected to see their coastal trade routes attacked by the British Navy and RAF. They considered but did not rate highly a British invasion of Norway. In the end it came. British launched an Invasion near the critical port of Narvik.

Without Narvik Germany looses the war and that's why Britain attacked there. British troops actually landed. The German counter Invasion of Norway, to secure Narvik and the Norwegian coast from the British, required the invasion of Denmark to prevent a British attack on German supply lines. The German air forces, Army and Navy were still fully occupied in France and wouldn't be able to respond.

It's worth noting that during WW1 German submarine warfare against merchant ships on the high seas began due to British mining of neutral waterways in the baltic. If you are a sailor you are dead irrespective of weather hit by a torpedo or mine.

The British started first.
 

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