American purchase programs, alternatives and reality, 1937-43 (2 Viewers)

[tomo pauk]

Okay, what to do with the people that can make everything and had no fear of 'land aggression'

Alternative source for the torpedo design and production? Should put some fire under the Rhode Island facility, too.

 

[Shortround6]

Build factories sooner?
SO the US could actually build weapons instead of cars, refrigerators.
1937 Pontiac, over 230,000 built

Pontiac was not among the top 3.

The US had major/minor recession in 1937-38. Minor compared to 1929 but Industrial production fell 32% between May 1937 and May 1938.
It was major compared to some other US recessions (like 2008-9?).
Car production for 1938 was around 1/2 of what is was in 1937.

U.S. Auto Production - 1930-1939 - ClassicCarWeekly.net

ClassicCarWeekly.net. The most interesting classic cars for auction and for sale - worldwide.

www.classiccarweekly.net

Tooling up fighter production in 1937 might get you more P-36s and thus P-40s but since they built 11,000 P-40s by the end of 1943 I don't think P-40 production was much of a problem (P-40 engine is a different story). More P-35s might get you more P-43s? A larger building and more employees for 1942 for the P-47?

The US managed to avoid building some real crap in large numbers in a number of categories (they did build crap in small numbers so be careful of expansion plans) due to small budgets. More M2 light tanks were not an advantage. just over 300 built before they stuck the 37mm gun in.

Some congressmen and senators were not any smarter than some of the ones we have now.
They would demand protection for their state against hypothetical invasions from either the Japanese on the west or the Germans on the East coast.
Sinking the enemy when they were still at sea didn't often enter into it.

 

[Elan Vital]

Tooling up fighter production in 1937 might get you more P-36s and thus P-40s but since they built 11,000 P-40s by the end of 1943 I don't think P-40 production was much of a problem (P-40 engine is a different story). More P-35s might get you more P-43s? A larger building and more employees for 1942 for the P-47?

I'd argue that an earlier and faster buildup of P-36/40 and otehr aircraft production prewar would at least allow greater deliveries to the French and other European customers, for what it's worth.

 

[tomo pauk]

I'd argue that an earlier and faster buildup of P-36/40 and otehr aircraft production prewar would at least allow greater deliveries to the French and other European customers, for what it's worth.

Tooling up fighter production in 1937 might get you more P-36s and thus P-40s but since they built 11,000 P-40s by the end of 1943 I don't think P-40 production was much of a problem (P-40 engine is a different story). More P-35s might get you more P-43s? A larger building and more employees for 1942 for the P-47?

More P-40s means that anti-Axis AFs are less required to put their pilots in the Hurricanes, Buffaloes and I-16s - while the production of P-40s in 1943 was not some great thing that mattered, making much more of them in 1941 is. More P-36s means less of a need to put the pilots in the Gladiators.
So I'd suggest tooling up the St. Louis Curtis-Wright facility, that historically made the CW-21 fighter, as well as some light aircraft. Installing the better R-1830s on the P-36s should also be done.

Not having the second source for the P-38s was a major mistake. Have Bell make the P-38.
(although I'd break the wedding lock that was the V-1710 in the late 1930s, and have Lockheed make a fighter shape, size and weight close to the P-47, and have it powered by the turboed 2600)

Jump on the (X)P-51 bandwagon the minute it exists.

More on the engines later.

 

[Frog]

More P-40s means that anti-Axis AFs are less required to put their pilots in the Hurricanes, Buffaloes and I-16s - while the production of P-40s in 1943 was not some great thing that mattered, making much more of them in 1941 is. More P-36s means less of a need to put the pilots in the Gladiators.
So I'd suggest tooling up the St. Louis Curtis-Wright facility, that historically made the CW-21 fighter, as well as some light aircraft. Installing the better R-1830s on the P-36s should also be done.

Not having the second source for the P-38s was a major mistake. Have Bell make the P-38.
(although I'd break the wedding lock that was the V-1710 in the late 1930s, and have Lockheed make a fighter shape, size and weight close to the P-47, and have it powered by the turboed 2600)

Jump on the (X)P-51 bandwagon the minute it exists.

More on the engines later.

You would have less P-39s...

 

[tomo pauk]

You would have less P-39s...

No P-39.

 

[TM06]

No P-39.

To give a completely fair shake to Bell, the P-39 and P-63 were some of the most important fighter aircraft the Soviets received via Lend-Lease, and also helped them improve some of the soft factors in their indigenous aircraft like sighting.
But as for the AAF, they definitely do need to ditch them completely as front-line fighters, since redesigning them might take too much resources away from other important projects.

 

[tomo pauk]

To give a completely fair shake to Bell, the P-39 and P-63 were some of the most important fighter aircraft the Soviets received via Lend-Lease, and also helped them improve some of the soft factors in their indigenous aircraft like sighting.

In a more-P-40s and no-P-39 scenario, Soviets will be getting the extra P-40s instead.
I'd disagree that P-63 was among the most important Soviet fighters, LL or otherwise.

Engines:
- Allison really needs to up their supercharger game, and AAF needs to make a point there, but also to fund the V-1710 program ASAP. Kill the V-3420 to help out, as well as the different extension shafts designs - get the basic V-1710 up to the speed. V-1710 would've been probably improved with introduction of the direct fuel injection.
- R-2600, R-2800 - also in need for the improved S/C. The 11in impeller on such big engines is too small, get to 13 in ASAP, and make the more refined intakes and impeller blades.
- Merlin licence production - if it can be done earlier, great. The 2nd prototype of P-51 needs to have a Merlin in the nose; even the equivalent of the Merlin XX/V-1650-1 will do.
- The turbo-compound idea might be a major boon for low- and medium altitudes.
- Ford was musing with air cooled blades for the turbocompressors IIRC as early as 1941 (if not in 1940?) - application of that allows for a more compact turbo installation, and might be worth pursuing.
- Send the invitation to Mr. Whittle.

 

[Howard Gibson]

Okay, what to do with the people that can make everything and had no fear of 'land aggression'

Alternative source for the torpedo design and production? Should put some fire under the Rhode Island facility, too.

When do we start doing all this? American planning in the 1930s was to stop a British invasion from the Bahamas. This is what B-17s were supposed to prevent, at least until the US Navy banned them from flying over water.

There was lots of time to put bad ideas into production, such as the Bell YFM-1 Airacuda. Look at all the Boulton Paul Defiants the British managed to build. Aggressive production starting in 1938 would have made for lots and lots of P-35s and P-36s. These production lines would have had to be shut down to permit manufacture of the newer P-47s. The P-47s were heavily influenced by combat experience in Europe.

 

[tomo pauk]

When do we start doing all this?

1937, as it is stated in the title.

 

[SaparotRob]

No P-39.

 

[Shortround6]

I'd argue that an earlier and faster buildup of P-36/40 and otehr aircraft production prewar would at least allow greater deliveries to the French and other European customers, for what it's worth.

More P-40s means that anti-Axis AFs are less required to put their pilots in the Hurricanes, Buffaloes and I-16s - while the production of P-40s in 1943 was not some great thing that mattered, making much more of them in 1941 is. More P-36s means less of a need to put the pilots in the Gladiators.
So I'd suggest tooling up the St. Louis Curtis-Wright facility, that historically made the CW-21 fighter, as well as some light aircraft. Installing the better R-1830s on the P-36s should also be done.

I don't have the production numbers for Curtiss in 1939. In 1940 they were.

Month...............H75/P-36...............H81A/P-40
Jan........................------.........................----
Feb.......................29...............................----
March..................77...............................----
April.....................83...............................----
May......................76..............................11
June.....................95...............................25
July.......................91..............................56
Aug......................14............................104
Sept.....................----..........................114
Oct......................----...........................135
Nov....................----............................168
Dec.....................16..............................165
Total...................481............................778
Grand total....................1259

Please note that the US produced 1685 fighters in 1940 from ALL companies put together.
Also note that Curtiss built P-40s in the following numbers.
1941............................2248
1942............................3854
1943............................4258

Curtiss added sq/ft to the existing factory space and added many workers. At one point they had 7 parallel production lines going. Moving one or two lines to St. Lewis may not have solved anything. You do need the tooling and not just factory space.
Curtiss did not build thousands of aircraft in the original factory/s.
" In 1940 the National Defense Expansion Corporation bought 124 acres of land adjacent to the Buffalo Airport in Cheektowaga. Ground was broken on November 9, 1940 for the construction of a 1,500,000 square foot building to be known as Curtis Wright Aircraft Buffalo Plant #2. Amazingly production began at the plant on May 19, 1941, just 193 days after ground breaking, with the formal dedication on August 14, 1941."
This is well after the May 16th, 1940 FDR speech were he called for a massive increase in American aircraft production. A capability of 50,000 aircraft per year was the goal.
In 1937-38-39 the US did not have anywhere near the production capability it would have even in 1941.
If you want significantly higher production in 1939-40 you have to come up with very large sums of money in 1937-38.

A lot is forgotten about America's ability to build/equip large factories in a very short period of time. The Ford plant for the R-2800 was a bare plot of ground on Sept 16th 1940.
1st engine was accepted Oct 5th 1941. Plant was built in Michigan in Winter. They started putting in 65 miles worth of steel pilings on Oct 7th 1940. They built a huge box of 900,000sq ft of fiberboard and tar paper to enclose the construction site and heated it with charcoal burners (try that today's safety standards) and the plant was planned for 800 engines per month from a 899,717sq ft plant.
However by June 4th 1942 they had plans for 1800 engines a month from a 2,618,867 sq/ft plant, tripling the original floor space. This was a 2nd expansion on the original factory.
A 3rd expansion was OK'd Jan 15th 1943 for 3400 engines per month and 3,852,273 sq ft.
The US both converted existing factories and sometimes built brand new ones next to old ones to use exiting infrastructure (worker housing/electric power/transportation). Sometimes they just shuttered the existing factory and left the existing machinery inside and just transferred over the bulk of the workers.

 

[muskeg13]

My dream sheet includes:
1. Increased procurement and development of the B-17, fewer B-18s and no B-23s. This could open the door for earlier adoption of the B-17 E and F.
2. Increased procurement and development of the P-38. With such promising potential, build more than one prototype so the loss of the single XP-38 won't set the program back a year.
3. As a backstop to the P-38, put more effort into the P-50. While giving similar performance figures to the P-38, the P-50 utilized the Wright R-1820, reducing the demand for Allison 1710s. Further development could lead to experiments with P&W 1830s and possibly 2600s.

 

[Shortround6]

1. Increased procurement and development of the B-17, fewer B-18s and no B-23s. This could open the door for earlier adoption of the B-17 E and F.

I don't see how or why?
January 28, 1936 they ordered 82 B-18s, with the order being increased to 132 by June.
Fortunately, the Army also ordered 13 Boeing YB-17s. Lets remember that at this time the YB-17s did not have turbos. In fact The Y1B-17A (last YB-17) flew for the first time on April 29, 1938, with turbos.
177 B-18As were ordered on June 10, 1937, with 78 more being added to the contract on June 30, 1938. The B-18A flew for the first time on April 15, 1938.
The first B-17B, out of 39 ordered, flew for the first time at Seattle on June 27, 1939. The last was delivered March 30, 1940. which rather neatly overlaps the last B-18A delivery in Jan 1940. Now out of the 255 B-18As ordered only 217 were delivered, the last 38 planes were delivered as B-23s.
The first flight of the B-23 took place from Clover Field at Santa Monica on July 27, 1939. The rest of the 37 planes were delivered between Feb 1940 to Sept 1940.
Which again overlaps The B-17C with a first flight July 21st 1940 (retained for testing) and first delivery Nov 29, 1940.

SO the real questions are
1. How many B-17s could you get instead of the B-18s?
2.When are you going to get them?
3. What are you going to do with them?
4. How long does it take to get the better B-17s, the Ds and the desired (with hindsight) Es.

To look at 2 & 3.
As of early December of 1941, the 5th and 11th Bombardment Groups at Hickam Field, Hawaii had 33 B-18s on strength, the 28th Bombardment Squadron at Clark Field in the Philippnes had twelve. B-18/B-18As were stationed with the 6th Bombardment Group in the Canal Zone, with the 9th Bombardment Group stationed at airfields in Trinidad, St. Lucia, and Surinam. The Pacific B-18s were pretty much destroyed on the ground.

The Bolos remaining in the continental USA and in the Carribean were deployed in a defensive role in anticipation of attacks on the US mainland. In 1942, 122 B-18As were modified for the maritime reconnaissance bombing role to counter the U-boat menace. These modified aircraft were redesignated B-18B. An SCR-517-T-4 ASV (air to surface vessel) radar set was mounted under a radome in the nose, replacing the bombardier's shark-nose glazed area. A Mk IV Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD) set was installed in a long tubular boom that extended behind and below the the rudder.

B-18Bs are credited with two U-boat kills--U-654 on August 22, 1942 and U-512 on October 2, 1942.

As far as No 4 goes.
Forty-two more B-17Cs were ordered on April 17, 1940 and would up designated as B-17Ds. They were delivered from February 1941 to April 1941.
B-17E was first ordered on August 30, 1940, and the first prototype took to the air on its maiden flight on September 5, 1941.

All of this is from Joe Baugher's website.
Now perhaps you can trade some of the B-18s for an increase in B-17s but you are not going to get B-17Es or at least B-17Es with power turrets much earlier.
You also don't have enough planes to equippe the operational squadrons with the number of planes they had and/or the training squadrons.

Now if you can get a lot more money for bombers in 1937-38-39 perhaps things could have been different.

3. As a backstop to the P-38, put more effort into the P-50. While giving similar performance figures to the P-38, the P-50 utilized the Wright R-1820, reducing the demand for Allison 1710s. Further development could lead to experiments with P&W 1830s and possibly 2600s.

We are comparing projected/promised performance to actual performance. The estimated performance was never reached in the tests and the plane was destroyed in three months.
None of the common photos show any armament fitted. At least one shows a landing gear malfunction

Which may have delayed test flying for a while during the 3 months.
At the time the XP-50 was flying some of the 13 YP-38s were flying and they had a much better idea of what the YP-38s could or could not do.

 

[tomo pauk]

For my money, US bombers were between 'good' and 'best' categories. The only odd man out was the B-26, that was initially very impressive on paper, however the reality was not kind to it. Perhaps going with the fuselage sized for a 4-engined bomber was not the best idea, initiating the vicious circle that saw the aircraft getting porkier, without the gain in capability.

Where the US should've be doing much better is their fighter force in the stated era. Having top-notch fighters in good numbers not only serves as an better insurance against the possible enemy attacking US possessions, but also as an enabler for the US bombers to do their job.
One of the reasons why I've suggested that Lockheed makes a 1-engined fighter with a big radial in the nose and turbo behind (so sorta half-way between the P-43 and P-47, both in size and timing) is that these aircraft should be faster to debug and produce than the 2-engined types, let alone that twin-boom A/C.
Some other benefits should be also there: less blind spots, no 'tunnel' between the nacelles and pod/fuselage to mess up the air stream and Mach limit, no hefty powerplants away from datum line to effect negatively the rate of roll, one less engine, prop and turbo for the ground crew to maintain, less fuel needed (a factor when that fuel has to come half a world away), no two liquid cooling systems to make per A/C (a factor when thousands of aircraft are to be produced), and pilot is in a warm place almost by default. No need to additionally train the pilots in 2-engined flying, no instant recognition by the enemy.

Find the second production source and Bob is your uncle.