An Allison V-1710 with a two-speed supercharger in 1942 (4 Viewers)

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

The implication is that I do not appreciate that.

Thinking like that will quickly have everyone throwing insults around.

There would not be "lone pilots navigating themselves"

Actually there would, run into even moderate weather and watch formations fall apart. In 1940 the British assigned their most experienced aircrew to prove flying across the Atlantic was a viable option, in 1944 it was routinely new crews with their new aircraft. The P-39 losses on ferry flights from England to North Africa were considered too costly.

because it was pretty much a standard method to have fighters accompany bombers that have navigators on them when on long flights over water. This is how the Spitfires navigated from carriers in the Med. to Malta (the guide plane departing Gib. and rendezvousing over the carrier),

For the record that seems to have stopped in the operation USS Wasp participated in, by end 1942 a few Spitfire fighters with 170 gallon external tanks had flown from Gibraltar to Malta. PR Spitfires had been flying out from England since 1941. The cross Africa ferry flights from Takoradi generally had 1 aircraft with a dedicated navigator from the start in 1941. Some of the Hurricane shipments used RN carrier aircraft as navigators.

If you look at the USAAF exports it was doctrine for single engine types to go as cargo, apart from a few exceptions.

But combat range is also very important and my point was merely that it appeared that that capability, instead of being primary, equal to, or a close second to the first (ferry range), was apparently, for good reason or ill, sidetracked by Materials.

Sidetracked is not how I would describe it, more they solved the problem in front of them, more easily getting the fighters to the front line. Just how many long range bombers were around in 1942 to escort? The lingering of peace time worries about the safety of external fuel tanks can be seen in ideas about self sealing combat tanks.

Basically nothing was done for the P-39 or P-40 and the P-38's ferry tanks, which I believe came into being on the initiative of Lockheed even before February 1942, and the famous 200 gal. belly tank for the P-47.

The USAAF external rack was designed to handle external fuel or bombs. They were fitted to the P-39 and P-40, with minimal ground clearance Republic came up with a non standard fitting to enable a large external fuel load. The P-38 had a strong wing centre section to keep the engines on plus a tricycle undercarriage that gave plenty of room under the wing. Hanging weights off the wings has its engineering issues, consider when the P-38 put racks on its wings outboard of the engines.

Also the P-75 project was initiated, with optimistic ideas of when B-29 would be available in numbers a next generation fighter was urgently needed to have B-29 range, maybe using existing components could get the P-75 into production in numbers to match the B-29?

I do not believe any of the P-51s manufactured in 1942 came from the factory with bomb or drop tank racks,

I was actually referring to the A-36 (P-51 design) the upside of it was the P-51 wing was adapted to carry up to a 1,000 pound bomb, making carrying 100 gallons at 700 or so pounds quite viable when the rack continued to be fitted in the P-51A and later.

From what drgondog said in a previous post it sounds much more specific than that and if you read the document itself it does sound like Doolittle was basing his evaluation on more than "what everyone was saying".

Bill provided the full details, as he notes people like Doolittle were being informed about ideas on the P-51, that is "everyone" was being asked and so talking about it. Like everyone there is a limit to how much time and so detailed references in replies.

I am mostly talking about how the original P-51 could have played a very useful role in friendly convoy protection and also as escort for anti shipping strike forces as well as reconnaissance for both of those types of missions and also, possibly, in support of naval surface forces, including carriers.

Actually part of the proposal is the idea of inflicting noticeable losses on the Luftwaffe. Mostly in the Mediterranean.

The axis ran convoys from Italy and Greece to Tripoli and Benghazi, the more Malta was suppressed the easier it was to stay out of range of other allied airpower and the shorter the voyage time. Convoys were in the order of 2 or 3 ships partially loaded with a similar number of escorts, reflecting Benghazi harbour capacity in particular. The advantage of the Wellington torpedo bomber in 1942 was its range.

How do the land and sea based air forces work together to allow P-51 to intervene in carrier operations? How many examples of USAAF aircraft co-operating with USN carriers in 1942 in combat exist as a template for the P-51 being added?

Well, I have to say that generally speaking the "it may look like we are wasting our time, but we are gaining valuable experience that will pay off handsomely in the future" line is all too often trotted out to defend unsound operations that reflect poorly on someone's favorite leader, military branch or sub-branch (like FC, BC or 8th AF/15th AF) or piece of military hardware. Perhaps what you are referring to does not fall in that category, however.

Perhaps it would have been better to comment on how accurate the statement is and if "unsound operations" occurred in 1942 give examples, The USAAF in the Mediterranean worked out they needed to escort the heavy bomber, then came learning how to do it.

I am dealing with the 1942 time frame, which the fact I referred to Julius (Harpoon/Vigorous) and Pedestal (do you really think I didn't know it was in August?)

I suggest dropping things like the final phrase in brackets. In 1941 and 1942 the RAF had problems providing viable maritime strike aircraft and trained crews. So did the RN.

we are talking about the Beaufort at first to possibly be replaced by torpedo Beaufighters later on (there is def. already talk of using them in that role by late summer, but they don't seem to have been used like that until later).

The Beaufighter TF.X started production in December 1942.

When it comes to radios the Beaufighter VI came in two versions, one for the RAF mostly night fighter force and one for Coastal Command, which was expected to communicate with the RN.

With strike forces, the Mustang or Spit would just rely on the navigation of the bombers they were escorting.

So they would do escort, stay within sight of the bombers and withdraw with them. How about Combat Air Patrol sorties?

I do believe that I have already answered the "climbing fighters" question at least twice.

No you have indicated they are needed but not yet put together the Malta Air Force, strength and composition, day and night defence and offence. 32 Mustangs arrived in Britain in 1941, then another 117 in Q1/42, given the extra time required to ship to Africa that is about all the P-51 available, split between the two destinations, 150 available, 75 per theatre, around 2 squadrons with 100% reserves per theatre.

Of course, they have to keep Spitfires there to satisfy this requirement and in any scenario they would outnumber Mustangs considerably.

Malta has limited airfields to accommodate the force.

there may be no need for Mustangs if enough 90 gal drop tanks (or a combo of 90 and 30 gal) are supplied, although for naval recon (which are not typically flown at high altitude, btw) the additional drop tanks would be the best choice.

As internal fuel for the Spitfire of the time was 85 gallons it was restricted to around 155 miles from base at fast cruise at altitude, you can extend that by climbing less and flying slower. 85 gallons minus 36 for combat minus 18 for a 30 minute reserve, assuming the external tank can refill the internal tanks or be used for the 23 gallons needed for warm up, take off and climb to 20,000 feet, in crude terms 23+31 external fuel, plus say 5 gallons for the extra drag, can be used for range, the rest for patrol time. The consumption figures are for the Spitfire VIII (which had more fuel), the V was a little more fuel efficient.

you have the possibility of bringing some in on cargo a/c or on a ultra-fast RN minesweeper that made periodic trips to Malta, or you just include them as cargo on the merchant ships being convoyed in,

Moving drop tanks is a problem, their shapes do not fit the usually rectangular storage areas or stack well together and 100 US gallons takes up 13.4 cubic feet of space. For efficiency the tanks need to be in parts for assembly at destination.

There will def. need to be an increase from that, probably about 50% more (so around 200-225) or perhaps a bit less arguably would have been sufficient (I won't go into a breakdown for now, but certainly 90-100 Spits and a large number of torpedo bombers), but nothing like the increase in capacity involved for Husky,

Assuming half the capacity is defensive and half the offensive is bombers, around 50 P-51. Husky was very much a temporary emergency arrangement backed by solid supply lines. The Beaufort could carry around 8 short tons of load, assuming 6 tons of that was used per sortie times 50 aircraft times 15 sorties per month is 4,500 short tons, double that for all the other aircraft, 9,000 tons per month.

(I will take the opportunity here to dispel the myth that the tanker Ohio carried aviation fuel;

It has been well debunked on this site.

In the time frame I am talking about, ground losses were not nearly as severe as earlier in the war.

That is due to the Luftwaffe reducing its effort, which periods are you comparing? The appearance of a viable anti shipping force, one that will also inflict losses on the Luftwaffe would change axis dispositions.

Luftwaffe sorties against Malta are from Eagle in Flames, which does not give late 1941 figures, the Italians were also raiding Malta. The RAF lost and damaged figures are from the summary page of AIR 22/401, the individual losses from the monthly reports, and yes the two do not always agree.

Month

LW Sorties

RAF Lost

RAF Damaged

Beaufighter

Beaufort

Blenheim

Gladiator

Hurricane

Maryland

Spitfire

Swordfish/Albacore

Wellington

Other

Jun-40​

2​

0​

2​

Jul-40​

5​

4​

3​

1​

1​

Aug-40​

8​

9​

2​

1​

2​

2​

Sep-40​

3​

2​

1​

Oct-40​

0​

0​

Nov-40​

6​

8​

7​

1​

Dec-40​

0​

2​

Jan-41​

451​

5​

6​

2​

1​

2​

Feb-41​

387​

12​

4​

8​

2​

2​

Mar-41​

511​

12​

0​

Apr-41​

637​

8​

1​

9​

2​

May-41​

755​

23​

6​

2​

2​

14​

1​

Jun-41​

14​

6​

5​

6​

1​

2​

Jul-41​

13​

3​

1​

6​

4​

1​

1​

Aug-41​

11​

2​

5​

2​

2​

2​

Sep-41​

19​

9​

1​

10​

4​

3​

1​

Oct-41​

15​

6​

8​

5​

2​

Nov-41​

26​

5​

9​

6​

1​

6​

4​

Dec-41​

32​

15​

2​

13​

16​

3​

2​

4​

Jan-42​

1,468​

19​

11​

5​

8​

2​

4​

1​

Feb-42​

1,935​

21​

6​

1​

8​

8​

2​

3​

Mar-42​

4,300​

18​

11​

11​

1​

4​

3​

2​

Apr-42​

8,788​

32​

39​

2​

11​

16​

2​

5​

May-42​

2,476​

36​

30​

5​

30​

1​

5​

Jun-42​

956​

30​

12​

2​

1​

1​

17​

1​

9​

1​

Jul-42​

1,819​

49​

61​

8​

1​

40​

1​

1​

Aug-42​

862​

34​

18​

9​

6​

1​

29​

2​

2​

Sep-42​

391​

15​

2​

6​

5​

8​

1​

Oct-42​

2,842​

42​

42​

4​

40​

2​

Nov-42​

103​

37​

1​

18​

3​

14​

1​

7​

1​

Dec-42​

21​

5​

11​

9​

1​

7​

2​

Total

28681​

568​

326​

59​

23​

77​

3​

121​

15​

209​

30​

67​

16​

The Luftwaffe increased it presence in December 1941. In September 1942 the RAF at Malta did 440 sweep, 63 escort (aircraft or ships), 27 search/strafe and 708 defensive sorties, in November offensive operations were almost totally shut down after the first week, the RAF did 50 sweep, 8 escort (aircraft or ships), 3 search/strafe and 1,897 defensive sorties

What your stats show is that some months there were light losses, while at other times there were heavy losses (it's a mistake to attribute all to Malta, however, since probably the majority came from a/c and subs not based on the island, at least post-Pedestal).

Maybe better to say a they were all cause losses to all allied forces rather than "mistake", also it would be best to have an idea of where the successful allied forces were based rather than speculate. When does post Pedestal end?

it does look like you have 13 figures for 1942 for the Libya run by month for 1942)

Yes, I scooped up January 1943 which I meant to ignore as the amount of cargo was small. Essentially allied forces were inflicting comparable losses on shipment to Libya as the early Tunisian convoys from around July 1942 onwards.

also the claim that "no [Allison] engines are immediately available due to the planned increase in production of Bell P-39s to 600 a month." ... there is a potential source of extra engines for the Mustang without cutting anything in already approved programs.

What is the logic? The engines were not available as they were not being built.

I might add that P-39 output averaged 200/mo the last half of 1942 (avg. is less if you include earlier months) and peaked for the year at 302 in December. Overall peak was 511 the following April, so it never got that close to 600/mo.

Maybe because they could not obtain the engines? It shows Bell reporting they can go to 600 airframes a month if the engines are available but cannot. Allison 1 stage production was 20,549 in 1943, peaked in August at 2,103 and was down to around 1,700 or so end 1943.

I really think the nearly 15,000 Allisons produced in 1942, despite all the padding another contributor to this thread wants to throw in there,

I have a name and "really think" is no substitute for the data about US engine status, including those reserved against early 1943 production.

Britain May 1942, 4,568 new engines built, plus 116 received from US, there were 4,506 engines under repair as of end of month, while 2,293 repaired engines had been delivered for the month. In April 532 engines had been allocated for export, while on 25 April stocks in Britain were 12,423 serviceable and 2,689 unserviceable engines, total 15,112 or over 3 months production. Add overseas holdings.

Allison production for 1942, 1,101, 1,041, 1,177, 1,151, 1,203, 1,252, 1,265, 1,326, 1,330, 1,379, 1,301, 1,378

gives plenty of room for a substantial (at least 1,000) additional "Mustang I" production in 1942

Except Bell at least is saying they can absorb 300 or more extra engines a month if they can get them, which they did not, and the P-39 had a very satisfied customer.

There were only 2812 AAF fighter a/c arrivals overseas anyways, and some of those were P-38s,

Which reference gives this data?

The only thing objectively limiting Mustang production in 1942 IMO was ink on a contract and the true capacity of the Inglewood assembly line, so it is not out of the question that up to 2600 could have been made that year.

So the US is one signed contract and a reallocation of workers from upping 1942 fighter production by over 20% and overall production by 4%, how does this not apply to every other manufacturer, give them a bigger contract, like Bell to 600 a month and see even bigger increases in US production? German had hit full employment pre war, mobilising caused economic problems as a result, the Western allies had large pools of unemployed people to deploy but it took years to do so. US unemployment had fallen to 17.2% in December 1939, 14.6% in December 1940, 9.9% in December 1941, 4.7% in December 1942, 1.9% in December 1943. Plenty of workers though many needed a lot of training, including overcoming years of unemployment, what about factory space and component supply? Raw materials?

World War II Aluminum | Montana Aluminum's War Effort

Discover the pivotal role of Montana Aluminum during Timeline II - The War Years. Explore aluminum production's impact on World War II.

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"1941 – During World War II, the U.S. government appropriated $2 billion to increase the generating capacity of the Columbia River hydroelectric dams by six-fold, enabling the operation of new government-owned aluminum smelters in Spokane and Tacoma, Wash., and Troutdale, Ore. One estimate was that Grand Coulee Dam alone produced the power to produce the aluminum used in making one-third of the planes built during the war.

1941 – Aluminum production in the U.S. increased from 164,000 tons per year in 1939 to a peak of 1.25 million tons in 1944. During World War II, Alcoa invested $300 million of its own money in expanding its own aluminum production facilities. The company also built $450 million worth of government-owned aluminum plants."

2,000 more Mustangs is asking for 3 to 4,000 tons of aluminium.

Curtiss built 17,746 C-532 and C-5315 propellers in 1942, they need to built 2,000 more.

I want to take the opportunity to clarify a statement I made in an earlier post, which, upon reflection, was really misleading. What I meant about the Allies overwhelming the GAF with lots of good pilots and planes was over France in support of Overlord, not previous to that. I also do NOT mean to suggest that fighter escort, specifically Mustang escort of AAF heavies over Germany was a waste of time or did not accomplish anything significant. I am only pushing back against the idea that it "destroyed" the Luftwaffe and the like.

The claim was the Luftwaffe day fighter force held pilot quality in early 1944, no one claimed the force was destroyed. There is a chance the Luftwaffe "won" the battle against the USAAF, that is shot down more US aircraft than it lost to US aircraft, it certainly won in terms of cost of materials and easily won in terms of personnel casualties. It also suffered a strategic defeat, a loss of average pilot quality, like the one during the Battle of Britain only this time the allies could more than replace their losses and keep up their quality.

I don't see a chance the GAF could ever have been strong enough to make a major difference during a cross-Channel attack either in mid-1944, even without as big of an air campaign deep into Germany as what took place (there's really no chance of 8th and 15th AFs standing down completely) or even back in 1943 or 1942.

In 1942 the Germans effectively disputed the airspace above Dieppe, in mid 1943 the USAAF especially but also the RAF were weaker than mid 1944, while the Germans had the option of holding the forces historically committed to Kursk, the Luftwaffe does not have to win in 1943, just allow the German ground forces to arrive in a timely manner reasonably intact to rope off the bridgehead. Next comes providing enough support the ground forces can launch corps level or larger counter attacks.

That's a major theme of Part II of my study. In fact the record from German sources is clear - the best way to attrit their fighter forces is to mount major ground operations with support from fighters and AA (the accomplishment of early 1944 was truly doing it the hard way - though given all the existing factors it still was overall the best use of AAF forces there during that time period).

So the Luftwaffe lost large numbers of aircraft over Italy September 1943 onwards? Attack targets the Luftwaffe wants to defend, Spaatz put forward the idea the Luftwaffe had to defend its fuel sources, quite true, but could the allies damage them enough the Luftwaffe had to react?

As for hard way, if you take 31 August 1944 as the date the continental airfields became available to take damaged allied heavy bombers then the following figures apply for the 8th Air Force. In the period to 31 August 1944 some 2.7% of B-17s listed as lost to fighters made it back to allied territory, versus 6.4% of those listed as lost to flak. For the period 1 September 1944 to the end of the war the figures become 5.8% and 16.6%. The price of fighting at long range.

Switching themes. The SBD-3 was the main version in use in 1942, production switched to the SBD-4 in November. The -3 had a comparable range to the -2. The USN thinks the SBD-5 had a combat radius of between 95 and 420 nautical miles. The former with 165 gallons and a 1,600 pound bomb on board, the latter with a 500 pound bomb and 370 gallons on board (2x58 gallon external), with 254 gallons and a 1,000 pound bomb, 240 nautical miles, add 20 miles if carrying a 500 pound bomb.

 

[tomo pauk]

I'm really impressed by the knowledge people are sharing here.

Souring that knowledge-sharing with snarky comments is really superfluous.

 

[Shortround6]

The Mustang was a near miracle in timing from start to first deployments.
But even that not as quick as some people think. While NA had built 620 Mustang Is by July 1942 but a number of them are still in the US. The RAF had 4 squadrons operational Aug 18th 1942.

The US screwed up with the purchase/deployment of the P-40F/L. They purchased/allotted about 20% extra engines which was not enough. This was a lower percentage of spare engines that most/all Allison powered aircraft. The British 'gave' around 600 used Merlins to the USAAF in NA to be used for spare parts. Accounts differ as to use for cannibalization and/or donor engines used at rebuild/overhaul facilities.
Merlin engines are claimed to have had a shorter life than Allisons in P-40s in the same conditions. Supposedly due to the lower air-intake and/or different filtering.
US later repowered at least 100 Merlin powered P-40s in the US starting in Feb 1944 in training commands. Not all conversions may have been properly recorded.
Number of spare engines needed has to cover spare engines on hand for replacement by units, engines in transit to overhaul facility, engines being overhauled or scrapped and engines in transit from the overhaul facility to front line units (or repair facilities).

 

[SaparotRob]

Thinking like that will quickly have everyone throwing insults around.


Actually there would, run into even moderate weather and watch formations fall apart. In 1940 the British assigned their most experienced aircrew to prove flying across the Atlantic was a viable option, in 1944 it was routinely new crews with their new aircraft. The P-39 losses on ferry flights from England to North Africa were considered too costly.


For the record that seems to have stopped in the operation USS Wasp participated in, by end 1942 a few Spitfire fighters with 170 gallon external tanks had flown from Gibraltar to Malta. PR Spitfires had been flying out from England since 1941. The cross Africa ferry flights from Takoradi generally had 1 aircraft with a dedicated navigator from the start in 1941. Some of the Hurricane shipments used RN carrier aircraft as navigators.

If you look at the USAAF exports it was doctrine for single engine types to go as cargo, apart from a few exceptions.


Sidetracked is not how I would describe it, more they solved the problem in front of them, more easily getting the fighters to the front line. Just how many long range bombers were around in 1942 to escort? The lingering of peace time worries about the safety of external fuel tanks can be seen in ideas about self sealing combat tanks.


The USAAF external rack was designed to handle external fuel or bombs. They were fitted to the P-39 and P-40, with minimal ground clearance Republic came up with a non standard fitting to enable a large external fuel load. The P-38 had a strong wing centre section to keep the engines on plus a tricycle undercarriage that gave plenty of room under the wing. Hanging weights off the wings has its engineering issues, consider when the P-38 put racks on its wings outboard of the engines.

Also the P-75 project was initiated, with optimistic ideas of when B-29 would be available in numbers a next generation fighter was urgently needed to have B-29 range, maybe using existing components could get the P-75 into production in numbers to match the B-29?


I was actually referring to the A-36 (P-51 design) the upside of it was the P-51 wing was adapted to carry up to a 1,000 pound bomb, making carrying 100 gallons at 700 or so pounds quite viable when the rack continued to be fitted in the P-51A and later.


Bill provided the full details, as he notes people like Doolittle were being informed about ideas on the P-51, that is "everyone" was being asked and so talking about it. Like everyone there is a limit to how much time and so detailed references in replies.


Actually part of the proposal is the idea of inflicting noticeable losses on the Luftwaffe. Mostly in the Mediterranean.

The axis ran convoys from Italy and Greece to Tripoli and Benghazi, the more Malta was suppressed the easier it was to stay out of range of other allied airpower and the shorter the voyage time. Convoys were in the order of 2 or 3 ships partially loaded with a similar number of escorts, reflecting Benghazi harbour capacity in particular. The advantage of the Wellington torpedo bomber in 1942 was its range.

How do the land and sea based air forces work together to allow P-51 to intervene in carrier operations? How many examples of USAAF aircraft co-operating with USN carriers in 1942 in combat exist as a template for the P-51 being added?


Perhaps it would have been better to comment on how accurate the statement is and if "unsound operations" occurred in 1942 give examples, The USAAF in the Mediterranean worked out they needed to escort the heavy bomber, then came learning how to do it.


I suggest dropping things like the final phrase in brackets. In 1941 and 1942 the RAF had problems providing viable maritime strike aircraft and trained crews. So did the RN.


The Beaufighter TF.X started production in December 1942.

When it comes to radios the Beaufighter VI came in two versions, one for the RAF mostly night fighter force and one for Coastal Command, which was expected to communicate with the RN.


So they would do escort, stay within sight of the bombers and withdraw with them. How about Combat Air Patrol sorties?


No you have indicated they are needed but not yet put together the Malta Air Force, strength and composition, day and night defence and offence. 32 Mustangs arrived in Britain in 1941, then another 117 in Q1/42, given the extra time required to ship to Africa that is about all the P-51 available, split between the two destinations, 150 available, 75 per theatre, around 2 squadrons with 100% reserves per theatre.


Malta has limited airfields to accommodate the force.


As internal fuel for the Spitfire of the time was 85 gallons it was restricted to around 155 miles from base at fast cruise at altitude, you can extend that by climbing less and flying slower. 85 gallons minus 36 for combat minus 18 for a 30 minute reserve, assuming the external tank can refill the internal tanks or be used for the 23 gallons needed for warm up, take off and climb to 20,000 feet, in crude terms 23+31 external fuel, plus say 5 gallons for the extra drag, can be used for range, the rest for patrol time. The consumption figures are for the Spitfire VIII (which had more fuel), the V was a little more fuel efficient.


Moving drop tanks is a problem, their shapes do not fit the usually rectangular storage areas or stack well together and 100 US gallons takes up 13.4 cubic feet of space. For efficiency the tanks need to be in parts for assembly at destination.


Assuming half the capacity is defensive and half the offensive is bombers, around 50 P-51. Husky was very much a temporary emergency arrangement backed by solid supply lines. The Beaufort could carry around 8 short tons of load, assuming 6 tons of that was used per sortie times 50 aircraft times 15 sorties per month is 4,500 short tons, double that for all the other aircraft, 9,000 tons per month.


It has been well debunked on this site.


That is due to the Luftwaffe reducing its effort, which periods are you comparing? The appearance of a viable anti shipping force, one that will also inflict losses on the Luftwaffe would change axis dispositions.

Luftwaffe sorties against Malta are from Eagle in Flames, which does not give late 1941 figures, the Italians were also raiding Malta. The RAF lost and damaged figures are from the summary page of AIR 22/401, the individual losses from the monthly reports, and yes the two do not always agree.

Month

LW Sorties

RAF Lost

RAF Damaged

Beaufighter

Beaufort

Blenheim

Gladiator

Hurricane

Maryland

Spitfire

Swordfish/Albacore

Wellington

Other

Jun-40​

2​

0​

2​

Jul-40​

5​

4​

3​

1​

1​

Aug-40​

8​

9​

2​

1​

2​

2​

Sep-40​

3​

2​

1​

Oct-40​

0​

0​

Nov-40​

6​

8​

7​

1​

Dec-40​

0​

2​

Jan-41​

451​

5​

6​

2​

1​

2​

Feb-41​

387​

12​

4​

8​

2​

2​

Mar-41​

511​

12​

0​

Apr-41​

637​

8​

1​

9​

2​

May-41​

755​

23​

6​

2​

2​

14​

1​

Jun-41​

14​

6​

5​

6​

1​

2​

Jul-41​

13​

3​

1​

6​

4​

1​

1​

Aug-41​

11​

2​

5​

2​

2​

2​

Sep-41​

19​

9​

1​

10​

4​

3​

1​

Oct-41​

15​

6​

8​

5​

2​

Nov-41​

26​

5​

9​

6​

1​

6​

4​

Dec-41​

32​

15​

2​

13​

16​

3​

2​

4​

Jan-42​

1,468​

19​

11​

5​

8​

2​

4​

1​

Feb-42​

1,935​

21​

6​

1​

8​

8​

2​

3​

Mar-42​

4,300​

18​

11​

11​

1​

4​

3​

2​

Apr-42​

8,788​

32​

39​

2​

11​

16​

2​

5​

May-42​

2,476​

36​

30​

5​

30​

1​

5​

Jun-42​

956​

30​

12​

2​

1​

1​

17​

1​

9​

1​

Jul-42​

1,819​

49​

61​

8​

1​

40​

1​

1​

Aug-42​

862​

34​

18​

9​

6​

1​

29​

2​

2​

Sep-42​

391​

15​

2​

6​

5​

8​

1​

Oct-42​

2,842​

42​

42​

4​

40​

2​

Nov-42​

103​

37​

1​

18​

3​

14​

1​

7​

1​

Dec-42​

21​

5​

11​

9​

1​

7​

2​

Total

28681​

568​

326​

59​

23​

77​

3​

121​

15​

209​

30​

67​

16​

The Luftwaffe increased it presence in December 1941. In September 1942 the RAF at Malta did 440 sweep, 63 escort (aircraft or ships), 27 search/strafe and 708 defensive sorties, in November offensive operations were almost totally shut down after the first week, the RAF did 50 sweep, 8 escort (aircraft or ships), 3 search/strafe and 1,897 defensive sorties


Maybe better to say a they were all cause losses to all allied forces rather than "mistake", also it would be best to have an idea of where the successful allied forces were based rather than speculate. When does post Pedestal end?


Yes, I scooped up January 1943 which I meant to ignore as the amount of cargo was small. Essentially allied forces were inflicting comparable losses on shipment to Libya as the early Tunisian convoys from around July 1942 onwards.


What is the logic? The engines were not available as they were not being built.


Maybe because they could not obtain the engines? It shows Bell reporting they can go to 600 airframes a month if the engines are available but cannot. Allison 1 stage production was 20,549 in 1943, peaked in August at 2,103 and was down to around 1,700 or so end 1943.


I have a name and "really think" is no substitute for the data about US engine status, including those reserved against early 1943 production.

Britain May 1942, 4,568 new engines built, plus 116 received from US, there were 4,506 engines under repair as of end of month, while 2,293 repaired engines had been delivered for the month. In April 532 engines had been allocated for export, while on 25 April stocks in Britain were 12,423 serviceable and 2,689 unserviceable engines, total 15,112 or over 3 months production. Add overseas holdings.

Allison production for 1942, 1,101, 1,041, 1,177, 1,151, 1,203, 1,252, 1,265, 1,326, 1,330, 1,379, 1,301, 1,378


Except Bell at least is saying they can absorb 300 or more extra engines a month if they can get them, which they did not, and the P-39 had a very satisfied customer.


Which reference gives this data?

So the US is one signed contract and a reallocation of workers from upping 1942 fighter production by over 20% and overall production by 4%, how does this not apply to every other manufacturer, give them a bigger contract, like Bell to 600 a month and see even bigger increases in US production? German had hit full employment pre war, mobilising caused economic problems as a result, the Western allies had large pools of unemployed people to deploy but it took years to do so. US unemployment had fallen to 17.2% in December 1939, 14.6% in December 1940, 9.9% in December 1941, 4.7% in December 1942, 1.9% in December 1943. Plenty of workers though many needed a lot of training, including overcoming years of unemployment, what about factory space and component supply? Raw materials?

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"1941 – During World War II, the U.S. government appropriated $2 billion to increase the generating capacity of the Columbia River hydroelectric dams by six-fold, enabling the operation of new government-owned aluminum smelters in Spokane and Tacoma, Wash., and Troutdale, Ore. One estimate was that Grand Coulee Dam alone produced the power to produce the aluminum used in making one-third of the planes built during the war.

1941 – Aluminum production in the U.S. increased from 164,000 tons per year in 1939 to a peak of 1.25 million tons in 1944. During World War II, Alcoa invested $300 million of its own money in expanding its own aluminum production facilities. The company also built $450 million worth of government-owned aluminum plants."

2,000 more Mustangs is asking for 3 to 4,000 tons of aluminium.

Curtiss built 17,746 C-532 and C-5315 propellers in 1942, they need to built 2,000 more.


The claim was the Luftwaffe day fighter force held pilot quality in early 1944, no one claimed the force was destroyed. There is a chance the Luftwaffe "won" the battle against the USAAF, that is shot down more US aircraft than it lost to US aircraft, it certainly won in terms of cost of materials and easily won in terms of personnel casualties. It also suffered a strategic defeat, a loss of average pilot quality, like the one during the Battle of Britain only this time the allies could more than replace their losses and keep up their quality.


In 1942 the Germans effectively disputed the airspace above Dieppe, in mid 1943 the USAAF especially but also the RAF were weaker than mid 1944, while the Germans had the option of holding the forces historically committed to Kursk, the Luftwaffe does not have to win in 1943, just allow the German ground forces to arrive in a timely manner reasonably intact to rope off the bridgehead. Next comes providing enough support the ground forces can launch corps level or larger counter attacks.


So the Luftwaffe lost large numbers of aircraft over Italy September 1943 onwards? Attack targets the Luftwaffe wants to defend, Spaatz put forward the idea the Luftwaffe had to defend its fuel sources, quite true, but could the allies damage them enough the Luftwaffe had to react?

As for hard way, if you take 31 August 1944 as the date the continental airfields became available to take damaged allied heavy bombers then the following figures apply for the 8th Air Force. In the period to 31 August 1944 some 2.7% of B-17s listed as lost to fighters made it back to allied territory, versus 6.4% of those listed as lost to flak. For the period 1 September 1944 to the end of the war the figures become 5.8% and 16.6%. The price of fighting at long range.

Switching themes. The SBD-3 was the main version in use in 1942, production switched to the SBD-4 in November. The -3 had a comparable range to the -2. The USN thinks the SBD-5 had a combat radius of between 95 and 420 nautical miles. The former with 165 gallons and a 1,600 pound bomb on board, the latter with a 500 pound bomb and 370 gallons on board (2x58 gallon external), with 254 gallons and a 1,000 pound bomb, 240 nautical miles, add 20 miles if carrying a 500 pound bomb.

Multiple informatives plus like equals bacon.
I just hope you forget to give us the weekly quiz.

 

[SaparotRob]

I'm really impressed by the knowledge people are sharing here.

Souring that knowledge-sharing with snarky comments is really superfluous.

Superfluous was my favorite superhero.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

It was very common both in the Med and in the Pacific for single-engined fighters to be accompanied on long trips by a plane like a Lockheed Hudson, a Beaufighter, or even a B-17. Particularly if it was a very long flight like a ferry flight or if it was a mission like an escort but over an unfamiliar route the SE pilots weren't familiar with.

Australian Ace (and John Cleese lookalike) Clive Caldwell mentioned in an interview that he once nearly killed the crew of a Beaufighter that was accompanying him and some other Spitfire pilots on a long flight over the Pacific. They hit some weather (very dangerous in that area) and he radioed them for a position fix, and then found out they weren't and hadn't been navigating the whole time. He said he was so p.o. that he maneuvered behind them and charged his guns, fully determined to shoot down the Beau before running out of fuel and ditching in the South Pacific, when they radioed that they had figured out their location and which way to go...

I'll try to find the passage and transcribe it if anyone is interested, it's darkly amusing.

 

[ColFord]

The RAF had 4 squadrons operational Aug 18th 1942.

At 1 July 1942, the RAF had 14 Squadrons, all within Army Co-operation Command that were converted over to the Mustang I. Some were considered to be 'operational' whilst others were considered to still be 'working up' and not yet operational for a number of reasons.

Of those, three Squadrons, 26 (10 May 1942), 239 (22 June 1942) & 268 (26 June 1942) had conducted operational sorties as "fully operational".

Of the other Squadrons, pilots on attachment from the other ACC Squadrons would from the beginning of July 1942 start to be attached either individually or in some cases at up to Flight strength at a time, to the 'operational squadrons' for operational experience.

A number of the other ACC Mustang Squadrons including 2(AC), 4 (AC), 16 (AC), 225 and 613 were considered to be at an operational status, meaning that if required they could be moved to an airfield in a more forward area to commence full scale operational flying if required.

Most of those squadrons in the timeframe June-July-August 1942 were heavily involved in a range of large scale Army 'summer' exercises in the UK.

A couple of the Squadrons that did convert across to the Mustang I did not get to use them operationally before the Squadrons, less aircraft were posted to the MTO in December 1942 as a part of the RAF's reinforcements/contribution for Operation TORCH.

400 RCAF and 414 RCAF were both still working up to operational status and were considered to have reached operational status mid-August 1942 - just before Dieppe. Which brought the number of RAF Mustang I Squadrons that were officially considered available for operational use by the time of Dieppe up to 10.

Of the other four RAF Mustang Squadrons, two were still considered to be working up and would soon be considered 'operational' and the other two for various reasons largely remained in secondary roles, focussing on advanced training and supporting large scale Army exercises or the less frontline Army Commands eg Northern Ireland, Scotland.

Another three RAF Squadrons would convert across the the Mustang I by the end of 1942 - some of those would take up aircraft being passed on by two Squadrons being posted to the MTO in December 1942.

By 1 December 1942, nine of the ACC Mustang Squadrons had conducted operational sorties as an 'operational Squadron', whilst four more would have conducted their first operational sorties by the end of December 1942.

Another three RAF Squadron would re-equip with the Mustang I in early 1943 and have conducted operations in the first half of the year - in the case of two of those Squadrons the posting in of a number of operationally experienced pilots from other RAF Mustang Squadrons sped up their process to commence operational flying.

Equivalent of another two Squadrons strength of Mustang Is was in use at 41 OTU as the primary ACC and Tac/R training unit in the UK.

 

[drgondog]

Sad to hear that. If I ever produce anything half as good as you all did on that book, I will be proud.

Based on your posts, whatever you deliver will be well researched.

If memory serves, Ford was the one with the original NAA docs. Do you still have access to them? Two things I found in Michael O'Leary's "Production Line to Frontline" book on the P-51 I would feel a whole lot better if I could confirm and get fuller context from original docs (or from someone with extensive knowledge on the subject such as yourself):

Both Lowell and Bob combined had perhaps 75% of the images and documents. And yes I do have all. That said the library is poorly organized with respect to the 'early days' through 1942.

1. "During December 1941, North American was building 3 1/2 Mustangs per day to fulfill the British order, but Kindelberger felt that he could raise production to...ten fighters per day within three weeks of a substantial Army order" (p. 43; this may be sandwiching Col. Sanders's of the 51st FG recollections from mid-1942 back into December, which I guess is when he flew the Mustang in So Cal, but we are relying on his memory from months later as to what K. actually said, so I would like to get this straight. I recall seeing this same representation - triple production within 3 weeks - as being a K. message for Arnold also from Dec 41, but I cannot find it and so am wondering if I got it wrong.)

I have not seen that letter. I do have the letter of Feb 42 in which he appeals to Echols, copy to Arnold, for orders based on pending end of the RAF Mustang orders. Offhand, the '3 1/2 per day' is plausible for late 1941 but I am uncertain what Kindelberger and Smithson would have to do to -reassign some skilled resources including space given that AT-6 and B-25 were in place and Dallas was not yet ready.

2. "North American officials seriously considered the implications of mass-producing the new B-model alongside the huge order for 1200 P-51As, and, accordingly a simple and efficient production line was designed and implemented that could accommodate the delivery of 20 Mustangs per day." Later NAA reconfigured Ingelewood to build -Bs only when the -As were cancelled. (p. 74)

A lot of moving parts here. NAA requested increased plant investment and A-1 priorities in 1942 when the order was placed for 1200 P-51A's. At the very beginning of that order Mid June, Mil.Rqmnts was excited about the potential of the XP51B project (XP-78) and inserted the provision to convert the P-51A to P-51B 'as soon as practicable'. I do Not have AC-30479, nor any other contract vehicle so what I relate here are snippets of related correspondence.

IIRC the B-25 production was around 2 per day and ramping up, the A-36 tooling and training was complete and prototype tested in late May, Dallas plan was in full operations with AT-6 and the initial order for B-24s was received for Dallas. The actual A-1 priority for sub-contractors was not delivered until mid-1943 which was a problem stifling full production capability for both Inglewood and Dallas.

The political battles for control over NAA production orders was still very much on the forefront between Fairchild and Echols but the change in CAS doctrine to favor airspace battle superiority and glide bombing over dive bombing sealed the fate of A-36 line in favor of P-51A. The success of the XP-51B sealed the fate of the P-51A

Yes, you mentioned that in a previous post, but I already poured over both 10 days ago or so and what I found there was the basis of many of my comments of the last several days.

I can't tell you how elated I was to find those two case histories. It did hit me towards the end of my first pass at them, however, that they are a curated set of documents. I am not charging deliberate bias here or anything, but it struck me that the 1945 introduction to the FAREP case history states "Initiated to insure continuous fighter cover for bombardment aircraft." While that is perhaps a fair statement of what it became later on, for 1942 and early 1943 that seems highly misleading at best. More to the point, though another summary of the FAREP study in that collection refers to the conference in Arnold's office on 20 Feb 1942, there is nothing more about what actually was said there, and what Arnold's actual directive was, which, for one thing, would clue me in as to whether Materials did truly push Arnold's original in a different direction.

The cover page of A2069 has Boylon circa 1956 IIRC and I agree that they may be construed and assembled to support Boylon's future USAF Study 136 on long-range escort history. That said the Study 136 citations are far more extensive and became a rabbit hole to source from NARA and USAFHRC during and after Covid.

There is very little regarding the agenda or deliberations of the Fighter Conference. Offhand To 'Command the Sky' states that the objective was to increase fighter range, but the TO 1016 explicitly states 'Increase range of fighter, attack and light bomber tactical aircraft pe A2069. My primary sources are the correspondence between the organizations after Arnold issued TO 1016 'Extend Range of all tactical aircraft' which had mixed priorities 'assumed' between Ferry and Combat tanks. A core element (Materiel Command) labored under the assumption that drop tanks for fighter combat were subordinate to Ferry tanks, but other leaders including subordinates like Kelsey were very much behind extending combat range. George Brett was one of the few that was very specific about his perceived command in Pacific and by proximity the CBI, When Kenney replaced him, he continued the thread of focus on extending range of P-39s and P-40s. Both were pragmatic in that 'attachable fire bombs' combined with pilot judgement regarding dropping them when engaging in a fight, took priority over stateside regulations.

MC Command also was somewhat confused regarding priorities but the succeeding memos and cables contained in A2069 show the steady activity toward combat tank development. My criticism is that that they made a science project out of the tanks which definitely resulted in long lead times - which forced Kenney and Eaker to seek local sources.

I would also like to know some more about the actual content of the "several cablegrams from the various theaters of operation" which "in almost all cases expressed a demand for increased range in pursuit". Now it is conceivable some or all of these related to ferry range, but it seems more likely they had more concerns about combat range.

Absolutely. They had already received the benefit of fighters ferried to their commands.

As an aside, around this same time Wavell from his ABDA command sends a flaming message back to London (paraphrasing) "why do the bloody Japanese fighters have so much more range than ours? It is a MAJOR problem that is a HUGE factor in us getting our arses whipped!!" This starts a back and forth between Churchill and Portal on the subject of fighter range, drop tanks, etc. I deal with that in Part I of my study, but don't want to go off too much more on that tangent here other than to add the ironic thing was that the Dutch gov't in exile was asking the Brits in mid-1941 to get an allocation of Mustang Is, undoubtedly for use in the NEI! I'm sure Wavell would have been quite happy to get those (to close the range gap somewhat) if that had actually taken place in time (the delay in Mustang production in 1941 prob. - I think due to lack of Allison allocations, but it's also possible due to working out problems with the a/c itself or the assembly line, I wish I were more certain - made that impossible).

I'm clueless regarding the RAF guiding force that requested the auxiliary fuel cell project in Jan 1941 to extend Mustang I range but that result of 'circa 1700 mile' range was noted in some of the FAREP aircraft data by type and model for the P-51.

Hey, if your answer to this or any of my other questions is "it's in the book" I can certainly wait since I know replying to these messages can take up a lot of time maybe best devoted to "real" work.

I most certainly do! I've had it for several years. I do find it benefits from a LOT of good research, but it could have used a better editor since it jumps around a lot IMO. Yeah, while the Echols narrative in there seems to be based on fairly solid, I was interested to see that the take in "Bastard" (also manifestly a well-researched work - though it didn't keep me from verifying the drop-in fuel tanks thing with my own two eyes when I was last at the British National Archives and had access to the Mustang I's pilot manuals) was similar.

The funny thing is that looking back into Ludwig recently (prompted by the discussion here) I found two significant things in that book that I failed to note before:

1. On p. 74 you see not only an AAF officer in March 42 referring to the "competing" B-25 production question when it came to shutting down the Mustang, but also the claim that "no [Allison] engines are immediately available due to the planned increase in production of Bell P-39s to 600 a month." I am thinking Bell's extra allocation of Allisons is related to the recent cancellation of the P-60A (something I found in the AFHRA docs), though since the P-60A wasn't due start production until Sept. maybe it wasn't since the quote states "immediate", but regardless, there is a potential source of extra engines for the Mustang without cutting anything in already approved programs. I might add that P-39 output averaged 200/mo the last half of 1942 (avg. is less if you include earlier months) and peaked for the year at 302 in December. Overall peak was 511 the following April, so it never got that close to 600/mo.

Competing political agendas IMO, guided objections to ordering Mustangs. I suspect that two underlying reasons for the objections were 'not invented here', and that Echols clearly was not going to buy them, until forced to do so. None of his key acolytes like Kelsey delivered favorable opinions following flight testing, in stark contrast to other external favorable flight experiences in AAF.

I really think the nearly 15,000 Allisons produced in 1942, despite all the padding another contributor to this thread wants to throw in there, gives plenty of room for a substantial (at least 1,000) additional "Mustang I" production in 1942 (it also appears that the P-51A could have started production earlier as well). There were only 2812 AAF fighter a/c arrivals overseas anyways, and some of those were P-38s, and front line fighter forces at that time were not super big, so even that amount could have meant a lot compared to the force actually deployed.

Much more to comment on here and below, but for the moment I have to beg off.

2. Perhaps even more to the point, on pp. 75-6 you have Gen. Fairchild directing in April 1942 that more P-51s be produced as "dive bombers" even before the mods to put the dive brakes on have been completed, which that interim production could "be used as fighters". So this relates to what I posted before that I don't completely subscribe to the "they only had budget remaining for dive bombers" argument as to why more Mustang fighters could not have been procured in 1942. I have thought for a long time "just put some bomb shackles on and call them a dive-bombers" so I was pleased to discover that someone in authority (Fairchild was the superior to Echols when it came to procurement at least, according to Ludwig) at the time had already come to the same solution. There are at least 2 other ways it (meaning, getting around the supposed 1942 limit) could have been done that I can think of. And now we see how far Allison production exceeded fighter production that year. The only thing objectively limiting Mustang production in 1942 IMO was ink on a contract and the true capacity of the Inglewood assembly line, so it is not out of the question that up to 2600 could have been made that year. Even well under that number could have provided ample numbers to make real contributions that year that might have had an outsized impact on the war, when you consider the relatively small number of fighter a/c on which a number of important operations turned. Really, a few hundred more on top of RAF allocations might have had a real impact if used correctly at the right place and time.

I want to take the opportunity to clarify a statement I made in an earlier post, which, upon reflection, was really misleading. What I meant about the Allies overwhelming the GAF with lots of good pilots and planes was over France in support of Overlord, not previous to that. I also do NOT mean to suggest that fighter escort, specifically Mustang escort of AAF heavies over Germany was a waste of time or did not accomplish anything significant. I am only pushing back against the idea that it "destroyed" the Luftwaffe and the like. Lacking the Mustang in early 1944 GAF fighter losses probably are significantly less, etc. so the air war over Normandy would have been more involved and costly, but I don't see a chance the GAF could ever have been strong enough to make a major difference during a cross-Channel attack either in mid-1944, even without as big of an air campaign deep into Germany as what took place (there's really no chance of 8th and 15th AFs standing down completely) or even back in 1943 or 1942. That's a major theme of Part II of my study. In fact the record from German sources is clear - the best way to attrit their fighter forces is to mount major ground operations with support from fighters and AA (the accomplishment of early 1944 was truly doing it the hard way - though given all the existing factors it still was overall the best use of AAF forces there during that time period). The Merlin Mustang, however, also undoubtedly saved a lot of AAF bomber crews - so I have no problem with the concept reflected in the subtitle "The Bastard Stepchild that Saved the Eighth Air Force" despite the impression my earlier post might have given.

I will be very interested to read about those.

The title was all mine over the objections of Osprey. Distinctively marketing hyperbole, but there is a thread of truth that a lot of bomber crew would support. More to say later but in general I agree your points. That said, it wouldn't have taken much to tip the scales on Omaha beach had transports been hit - even with huge LW losses. The attrition to not only day fighter (single and twin) but also to night fighter crews tasked to attack 8th AF, culled a lot of crews with even small bomb capability that could make attacks at night in large numbers. More later.

Quick edit. The A-36 Low Altitude Allison Powered Attack Airplane Spec was completed in Nov 1941 and reviewed with Hq Plans. In parallel, Robert Lovett prodded Arnold to duplicate LW success in CAS with Ju 87. Mat.Cmd already purchased various dive bomb projects and had invited Brewster to build the XA-32 as low level attack.

The A-36 as proposed had both dive brakes as well a 20mm wing batteries. Within a very short time following execution/go ahead for the A-36 project in April, the prototype complete with bomb racks, fuel feed for drop tanks and dive brakes was completed and tested first on May 30th (? have to check actual late May date). There is implication, but not evidence in hand, that Mil.Reqmnts (Fairchild) offered suggestions to NAA beltway bandit in Wah DC. in 1941.

I am deeply curious about the possibility as the recon and CAS directorates in planning were working closely with US Army counterparts to increase effectiveness of both types for future operations. To date I have not even conceptualized where to start looking at NARA or USAF HRC.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Army Co-Operation Command 15 and 21 August 1942, squadrons
32 Wing/Scottish Command 241 Mustang, 309 Lysander, 614 Blenheim, 652 Taylorcraft
33 Wing/Northern Command 4, 63, 169 all Mustang but 63 and 169 non operational
34 Wing/Eastern Command 2 Mustang, 140 Blenheim/Spitfire, 168 Tomahawk (Non OP), 268 and 613 Mustang, 652 Taylorcraft
35 Wing/South Eastern Command 26 Mustang, 171 Tomahawk (Non Op), 239, 400, 414 Mustang, 653 Tiger Moth, 1 CACU Spitfire.
36 Wing/Southern Command 13 Blenheim, 16, 170 (Non Op), 225 Mustang
37 Wing/Western Command, no squadrons assigned
38 Wing/HQ Airborne Division 295 (Forming), 296, 297 Whitley
70 Group 654 (Forming) Tiger Moth.

Only change is 21 August mentions 231 Tomahawk squadron under RAF Northern Ireland. As of 15 August most Mustang squadrons have the odd Tomahawk on strength, for 2, 4, 13, 16, 26, 63, 168, 169, 170, 171, 225, 231, 239, 241, 268, 309, 400, 414, 613, 614 squadrons establishment 274 aircraft, 21/2 (Serviceable/Non Serviceable) Blenheim, 17/8 Lysander, 148/63 Mustang, 42/21 Tomahawk, total 322 aircraft.

USAAF Contracts with North American.
Dallas
3 October 1940, AC-15977 1,432 AT-6
28 June 1941, AC-19192 1,000 AT-6 plus DA-8 for 1,050 AT-6
August 1941 to April 1942 AC-19192 extended, including an Army for Navy component, 2,108 AT-6
June/July 1942 AC-24663 ultimately for 750 B-24 (Contract date in listing is 15 December 1943, for supplement 10)
8 June 1942 AC-29317 1,850 AT-6
28 June 1942 DA-2799 550 AT-6
28 December 1942 AC-33940 1,000 P-51
Rest of war orders Mustang except for
15 December 1943 supplement to AC-24663 216 B-24.
18 April 1944 AC-1909 1,756 AT-6

Inglewood built SNJ, Harvard and Yale etc. against foreign and USN orders 1939 to January 1942. Then came the foreign Mustang orders.
18 March 1939 AC-11994 74 O-47B
30 June 1939 AC-12969 177 trainers (BC/AT)
16 September 1939 251 BT-14
20 September 1939 183 B-25
10 March 1941 AC-12969 517 AT-6
24 September 1940 AC-16070 863 B-25
25 September 1941 DA-140 150 Mustang
23 January 1942 300 B-25
early 1942 Dutch contract for 162 B-25
25 June 1942 AC-27390 700 B-25
21 August 1942 AC-30478 1,000 B-25
24 August 1942 AC-30479 1,200 P-51

Kansas City
28 June 1941 AC-19341 1,200 B-25, supplement dated 21 August 1942 1,325 B-25

Some of the 15th Air Force 1945 monthly reports have Engine Change Reports, graphs of average running time per aircraft engine changed. Generally speaking the R-1830 radials in the B-24 and the R-1820 radials in the B-17 had at least an average of 300 hours running when changed, few had 400, with the R-1820 ahead, most having 350 or more hours. Overhauled engines usually had around half the average hours of new engines. The V-1650 Merlins and the V-1710 Allisons usually averaged over 200 hours, few made it to 300 until March/April. Overhauled Allisons were around half the new engine hours, overhauled Merlins more like a quarter.

 

[MikeMeech]

Hi
Just to help in the discussion, that has widened from the original post, I will add some statistics on operational sorties at various periods of different fronts, first for the Soviets on the Eastern Front (These are from 'Red Phoenix Rising' by Von Hardesty and Ilya Grinberg, probably the best one volume history on the Soviet air arm during the period):

The RAF AHB has campaign volumes that include some useful appendices, here from 'The Middle East Campaigns Volume III', sorties from 25 Feb-19 May 1942:

And from 'Campaigns in the Far East Volume IV', sorties and wastage from Dec 1943-Oct 1944 (India/Burma ops):

I hope these are useful.
Mike

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Very useful.

Look at the high number of losses of RAF Hurricanes (133!), Beaufighter fighter bombers, and Dakotas. Fairly high number of Spitfires too. Most of this tracks but i wasn't aware they lost so many Beaufighters.

US bomber losses, esp. B-25 and B-24, also seem pretty high, and C-47 losses again quite high.

That last one is interesting considering (AFAIK) the numbers of units. I believe this is the number of units by type for the US in Burma-India Theater in 1944:

P-40 3-6 fighter sqns (3 with 80th FG and another 1-3 with 51st FG, the latter of which were moving back and forth to China) of P-40s. One unit of 51st (2th FS) switched over to P-51 in late 44. One unit (90th FS) of 80th FG switched to P-47 in August 1944.
P-51 3-6 fighter sqns of P-51s (3 with 1st Air Commando Group, I think, and 311 FG moved to China in August)
P-38 2 fighter sqns of P-38s (459th FS and 449th FS)
P-47 4-5 fighter sqns of US P-47s (starting late 1944). RAF had some P-47s too but I think they came a bit later.

 

[ggiumarra]

At 1 July 1942, the RAF had 14 Squadrons, all within Army Co-operation Command that were converted over to the Mustang I. Some were considered to be 'operational' whilst others were considered to still be 'working up' and not yet operational for a number of reasons.

Of those, three Squadrons, 26 (10 May 1942), 239 (22 June 1942) & 268 (26 June 1942) had conducted operational sorties as "fully operational".

Thanks for that. I knew it was more than 4 sqdns., but you saved me from having to look it up!

More to the point, however, one of the things I found in the documents, already in May some 65 Mustangs that had only recently entered squadron service were going into storage to be replaced with newer arrivals fitted out with different radios (not 100% sure but I assume it's to communicate with the army since they are in Army Cooperation Command service, so it might be replacing their VHF radios with HF like the day Beaufighters). At the same time Churchill is doing his best to tease out of the supply chain as many of the day Beaufighters he can to send to Malta to prepare for Op Julius the following month. In the event, there was only 14 serviceable Beaufighters on Malta for the operation. Portal had already reminded him earlier in the year that Beaufighters could not compete with SE fighters, an observation abundantly verified during Julius. Meanwhile, the Desert AF, which was called upon to support the eastern convoy from near Gazala, which they did pretty well with their Kittyhawks, especially when you consider a lot of their airfields were overrun by Rommel like 1-2 days later, but as I mentioned before having an a/c with a much greater loiter time, like the Mustang I, would have given them a better chance to prevent the one merchantman loss that occurred during a brief break in DAF convoy coverage and also it would have saved a lot of Beaufighters and their crews who got really decimated by 109s at the same time. Tedder was also quite annoyed during this period that he wasn't getting the promised number of Kittyhawks from the Americans for his DAF. Wouldn't it have killed 2-3 birds with one stone to have sent those 65 Mustangs that were going into storage (they had to range to self-deploy with their auxiliary tanks) and send some to Malta and the balance to the the DAF? We'll never know, of course, but it does illustrate how Mustangs were being completely misused at the time.

 

[MikeMeech]

Very useful.

Look at the high number of losses of RAF Hurricanes (133!), Beaufighter fighter bombers, and Dakotas. Fairly high number of Spitfires too. Most of this tracks but i wasn't aware they lost so many Beaufighters.

US bomber losses, esp. B-25 and B-24, also seem pretty high, and C-47 losses again quite high.

That last one is interesting considering (AFAIK) the numbers of units. I believe this is the number of units by type for the US in Burma-India Theater in 1944:

P-40 3-6 fighter sqns (3 with 80th FG and another 1-3 with 51st FG, the latter of which were moving back and forth to China) of P-40s. One unit of 51st (2th FS) switched over to P-51 in late 44. One unit (90th FS) of 80th FG switched to P-47 in August 1944.
P-51 3-6 fighter sqns of P-51s (3 with 1st Air Commando Group, I think, and 311 FG moved to China in August)
P-38 2 fighter sqns of P-38s (459th FS and 449th FS)
P-47 4-5 fighter sqns of US P-47s (starting late 1944). RAF had some P-47s too but I think they came a bit later.

Hi
The Beaufighter's were mainly operating at low level so all sorts of hazards, flak, wires across valleys plus natural hazards, the same applies to other aircraft on ground attack missions of course.
Losses compared with what was going on in North West Europe is a different matter, from 'Fighter Command War Diaries' Part 4 and 5, by John Foreman, we have the following (overlapping the dates of the losses mentioned):

This was a much larger 'air war'.
Mike

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Yes it was obviously, CBI was probably the most remote battlefield, the amount of effort to get every aircraft and aircrew there, as well as supporting their logistics trail, was vastly more challenging.

WTF was a Defiant doing still flying in 1944? I'm a little surprised about the Whirlwinds too but I can at least grasp what they might be doing!

 

[ColFord]

Thanks for that. I knew it was more than 4 sqdns., but you saved me from having to look it up!

More to the point, however, one of the things I found in the documents, already in May some 65 Mustangs that had only recently entered squadron service were going into storage to be replaced with newer arrivals fitted out with different radios (not 100% sure but I assume it's to communicate with the army since they are in Army Cooperation Command service, so it might be replacing their VHF radios with HF like the day Beaufighters). At the same time Churchill is doing his best to tease out of the supply chain as many of the day Beaufighters he can to send to Malta to prepare for Op Julius the following month. In the event, there was only 14 serviceable Beaufighters on Malta for the operation. Portal had already reminded him earlier in the year that Beaufighters could not compete with SE fighters, an observation abundantly verified during Julius. Meanwhile, the Desert AF, which was called upon to support the eastern convoy from near Gazala, which they did pretty well with their Kittyhawks, especially when you consider a lot of their airfields were overrun by Rommel like 1-2 days later, but as I mentioned before having an a/c with a much greater loiter time, like the Mustang I, would have given them a better chance to prevent the one merchantman loss that occurred during a brief break in DAF convoy coverage and also it would have saved a lot of Beaufighters and their crews who got really decimated by 109s at the same time. Tedder was also quite annoyed during this period that he wasn't getting the promised number of Kittyhawks from the Americans for his DAF. Wouldn't it have killed 2-3 birds with one stone to have sent those 65 Mustangs that were going into storage (they had to range to self-deploy with their auxiliary tanks) and send some to Malta and the balance to the the DAF? We'll never know, of course, but it does illustrate how Mustangs were being completely misused at the time.

The Mustang Is going into storage were primarily the very early AG series Mustang Is from the initial deliveries, those that had been issued out to Squadrons to allow them to convert onto the Mustang from Lysanders or Tomahawks. These early Mustang Is had not received the full suite of required modifications to allow them to be used operationally, except in an emergency. They were being replaced by Mustang Is from the later batches of arrivals that had received the required modifications for them to be used operationally. When ACC received the first Mustangs, the level of serviceability of the Tomahawks had hit a historic low, so to speed up acceptance of the Mustang and conversion of Squadrons to the Mustang, ACC accepted a number of unmodified Mustangs. These were later to go back to be modified when newlt delivered modified Mustangs were available. But then there was a disagreement regarding who would be responsible for conducting the modifications on the unmodified Mustangs, leading to a number going back into storage until who was responsible was sorted out, and also until the required resources, both the modification parts and the personnel were available to do the required works. The focus was more on getting the newer arrival Mustangs arriving in the UK being reassembled and modified for issue ot the Squadrons and to build up the numbers.

Of the unmodified Mustang Is that went into storage for a time, some went in an unmodified state to 41OTU to give them more airframes for all the Mustang I training they were doing, and others had to wait until the issue of who was responsible was sorted and the resources became available. They were then modified, brought up to the required operational state and became the ready reserve for issue to new squadrons forming, or as replacements for aircraft lost due to accidents or enemy action on operations.

One of the modifications was the set up of the radio equipment, wiring, power, mounting brackets, etc, to allow for either a HF set (primarily at that stage for communication with the Army and particularly for Arty/R work) or a VHF set, which they were required to have for their operations over the continent as the operations were mounted under the operational control of Fighter Command. The shuffling between HF sets and VHF sets remained an issue up until Exercise SPARTAN - for example when a Squadron moved from operational status requiring VHF, to participating in a large Army exercise where all the Squadron Mustangs required HF sets, it took the ground crew about a day to do the full changeover. (Nothing like spending a day swapping over the radios, only to have the exercise cancelled due to weather and then having to swap them back again the next day.) It also required the Squadron radio section to have both the HF and VHF sets and everything associated with supporting both types of radios.

At that time also, the supply chain for the spare parts for the Mustang Is was still catching up. A certain percentage of spares of all types were included in the contracts with NAA, but as the main focus had been on the 'complete' aircraft in the initial production by NAA and deliveries to the UK, there were periodic shortages of spares - so a little bit of cannibalism was sometimes required to keep what Mustangs were out with the Squadrons in the air. There were also spares issues with the Allison V-1710s fitted to the Mustangs and some sourcing and testing of alternatives available in the UK, eg spark plugs, fuel filters, oil filters. And on top of that, NAA factory derived modificatons that had to be implemented to a number of the early AG serial production aircraft, the 'stuff' resulting from the continued test flying programme in the USA and the early use in the UK, and modifications that had been implemented at the factory part way through the AG serial Mustang I production that needed to be retrofitted to the early delivery airframes.

May 1942 the majority of the ACC Squadrons that have received Mustangs are still working up. The A&AEE trials on the type are still ongoing, including the armament trials (initial report not until 17 June 1942), exhaust glare, performance, etc. They are finding and resolving a range of small and niggling issues as the introduction of any new type to service finds, so any thought of sending what Mustang Is the RAF already has in the UK with ACC overseas at that time would be to a degree premature. Particularly the results from the armament trials and the recommended modifications to improve the reliability and serviceability of the armament are one of the critical items to fully clear the Mustangs for operational use. You also have to look at the thinking going on within ACC and the War Office at that time - the greatest majority of the large scale Army exercises being held in the UK at that time that ACC is supporting still have a focus and scenario that was defensive - based on responding to an invasion - rather than an offensive - landing on the enemy shore - emphasis. Even some of the more offensive minded Army exercise were around the counter attack to the enemy landing scenario, not the invasion landing or exploitation phases. The Dieppe landing in August starts to mark a change in the emphasis and focus for future exercises.

May 1942, the ACC Squadrons that are further along in their conversion to the Mustang I and starting to fly operations, are also just starting to come to grips with the best operating techniques for the type, including the engine handling techniques to get the best balance of operational performance and range. The senior pilots in those Squadrons are just starting to do some of the long range practice navexes over the UK to see just how far they can eke out the Mustang's range and performance potential. They build on those early navexes over time to simulate a full long range operation at low to medium altitude, including navigation over the ocean over long distances out of sight of land - something new for ACC pilots, combining long distance transit, then simulated dogfighting or combat, with a long distance navigation and transit back to base. Then there is the process of the Squadrons and WIngs feeding the information and experiences gained from those early practice operations and navexes back up the chain to HQ ACC and informing them of what the Mustangs can actually do.

And I would also have to dig back in my files, to see the date when the tropical service trials were completed and the Mustang I was officially cleared for overseas service in the tropics.

 

[ColFord]

Losses compared with what was going on in North West Europe is a different matter, from 'Fighter Command War Diaries' Part 4 and 5, by John Foreman, we have the following (overlapping the dates of the losses mentioned):

Foreman unfortunately tends to lump all the RAF's Allison engine Mustangs into the broad category of "Mustang I", when in fact in the first table it should cover Mustang I, IA and II, and the second table the same, with a large percentage of the Mustang I losses listed being those lost on the Luftwaffe attacks on the Allied airfields on 1 January 1945.

 

[MikeMeech]

Foreman unfortunately tends to lump all the RAF's Allison engine Mustangs into the broad category of "Mustang I", when in fact in the first table it should cover Mustang I, IA and II, and the second table the same, with a large percentage of the Mustang I losses listed being those lost on the Luftwaffe attacks on the Allied airfields on 1 January 1945.

Hi
Yes, but he also does it with other aircraft types eg. "Spitfires" will cover a number of different marks. We always want more detail.

Mike

 

[andy1967]

Yes it was obviously, CBI was probably the most remote battlefield, the amount of effort to get every aircraft and aircrew there, as well as supporting their logistics trail, was vastly more challenging.

WTF was a Defiant doing still flying in 1944? I'm a little surprised about the Whirlwinds too but I can at least grasp what they might be doing!

Came across this whilst reading about Operation Steinbock on Wikipedia. 515 Squadron Home Defense.

 

[MikeMeech]

WTF was a Defiant doing still flying in 1944? I'm a little surprised about the Whirlwinds too but I can at least grasp what they might be doing!

Hi
Note the start date is July 1943. If we look at the ORBATs included in the volume, first the 1 July 1943:

You will note that No.263 Sqn. still has Whirlwinds and that No.515 Sqn. still has some Defiant IIs alongside Beaufighter IIs. Then the ORBAT for 1 January 1944 shows they are gone:

Mike

 

[MikeMeech]

Hi
No. 515 Sqn. and the Defiant is mentioned in 'The Aircraft of 100 Group' by Martin Streetly:

The same author's book 'Confound and Destroy' has some data on the type:

Mike