An Allison V-1710 with a two-speed supercharger in 1942 (4 Viewers)

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This is what I used to think until pretty recently, but I found out that the P-40s which were presented to GC II/5 "Lafayette" in early 1943 were apparently brand new to the Theater P-40Ls, very much in demand by both US and British units. The deal was controversial (very shortly after this unit was in combat against the US and British forces during Torch) and was arranged by Colonel Harold Willis - they upgraded from Hawk 75s.
There were extensive issues that were kept from public debate during this period. British forces at sea, on land and in the air had been fighting the French on several fronts since the summer of 1940 until December 1942. The integration of Free French forces with Vichy forces caused much friction especially as de Gaulle politically sided with the ex Vichy forces to help legitimise his government and the Free French forces felt themselves demeaned by the Vichy forces who claimed to be enthusiastic combatants but were felt by the Free French to be ex collaborators. Later this was exacerbated by the issues and actions of Alsatian's and Lorrainers conscripted into the German army. All not helped by the national sport of politics. Then there was the matter of the majority of the new French army being West and North African until enough French territory was liberated to draw upon Metropolitan French conscripts in large enough numbers and the colonial troops could be politically hidden from sight. A minor, but illustrative example is of Free French regiments all but mutinying when ordered by the ex Vichy forces to swap their British uniforms for the new standard French army American ones. The Free French were proud of their British uniforms and that they represented the only support they received and were a symbol of their sacrifices whilst the Vichy forces were an actual enemy they had met on the field of battle. The ex Vichy air forces were the same as those who had fought the Commonwealth in the skies from Gibraltar to Madagascar and Morocco to Lebanon in the preceding three years and were conscious of the maltreatment of shot down aircrew by Vichy in North Africa. De Gaulle had been kept on a very tight reign by the Commonwealth so it was no wonder that he shifted his allegiances swiftly to the Americans who pretty well let him do anything he wanted to, even in opposition to overall Allied command decisions. In respect of P40s it may well have been a recognition of all the internal tensions that prompted an effort to integrate the ex Vichy forces into the Allied structure as soon as possible with peer equipment and not in some separate secondary role. I am not totally familiar with the later role of the French Air Force in Italy and North West Europe but I have seen little of it reported other than the FFI operations with obsolete aeroplanes upon the besieged German pockets on the west coast and would be grateful for any input on the subject.

Today the matter of the colonial troops is a live issue still and recognised; but the integration of Vichy forces is still a taboo subject lost in the 'we were all resistants' myth. My mother being active in the actual resistance in 1941. That elite ex Vichy squadrons got new peer fighters very soon after, effectively, changing sides makes sense in advertising á new Allied air force even if the line squadrons got used P40s.

One might like to read The Free French Air Force and the Liberation of France in 1944. to get a flavour of the political atmosphere even in England. My mother eventually worked with De Gaulle's office on London and was less than impressed.
 
There were extensive issues that were kept from public debate during this period. British forces at sea, on land and in the air had been fighting the French on several fronts since the summer of 1940 until December 1942. The integration of Free French forces with Vichy forces caused much friction especially as de Gaulle politically sided with the ex Vichy forces to help legitimise his government and the Free French forces felt themselves demeaned by the Vichy forces who claimed to be enthusiastic combatants but were felt by the Free French to be ex collaborators. Later this was exacerbated by the issues and actions of Alsatian's and Lorrainers conscripted into the German army. All not helped by the national sport of politics. Then there was the matter of the majority of the new French army being West and North African until enough French territory was liberated to draw upon Metropolitan French conscripts in large enough numbers and the colonial troops could be politically hidden from sight. A minor, but illustrative example is of Free French regiments all but mutinying when ordered by the ex Vichy forces to swap their British uniforms for the new standard French army American ones. The Free French were proud of their British uniforms and that they represented the only support they received and were a symbol of their sacrifices whilst the Vichy forces were an actual enemy they had met on the field of battle. The ex Vichy air forces were the same as those who had fought the Commonwealth in the skies from Gibraltar to Madagascar and Morocco to Lebanon in the preceding three years and were conscious of the maltreatment of shot down aircrew by Vichy in North Africa. De Gaulle had been kept on a very tight reign by the Commonwealth so it was no wonder that he shifted his allegiances swiftly to the Americans who pretty well let him do anything he wanted to, even in opposition to overall Allied command decisions. In respect of P40s it may well have been a recognition of all the internal tensions that prompted an effort to integrate the ex Vichy forces into the Allied structure as soon as possible with peer equipment and not in some separate secondary role. I am not totally familiar with the later role of the French Air Force in Italy and North West Europe but I have seen little of it reported other than the FFI operations with obsolete aeroplanes upon the besieged German pockets on the west coast and would be grateful for any input on the subject.

Today the matter of the colonial troops is a live issue still and recognised; but the integration of Vichy forces is still a taboo subject lost in the 'we were all resistants' myth. My mother being active in the actual resistance in 1941. That elite ex Vichy squadrons got new peer fighters very soon after, effectively, changing sides makes sense in advertising á new Allied air force even if the line squadrons got used P40s.

One might like to read The Free French Air Force and the Liberation of France in 1944. to get a flavour of the political atmosphere even in England. My mother eventually worked with De Gaulle's office on London and was less than impressed.

Cheers Yulzari,

My grandfather and grandmother were also in the 'real' Resistance during the war, my mother (born 1940) and aunt only saw them about once a year for the first four years of her life.

I think all of what you noted above is also complicated by events like the Battle of Mers el Kébir in which the British surprise-attacked and severely wrecked the rather impressive French naval fleet (killing 1200 men and sinking a battleship and severely damaging several other ships), to keep it out of the hands of the Germans. They had been allies fighting together just a couple of weeks prior, many French saw it as a ruthless betrayal.

As I'm sure you know, the resistance itself was also sharply split between many factions - pro British / managed by MI6, pro American / managed by OSS, former Spanish anarchists and socialists, former Spanish communists (who hated the anarchists and vice versa), and Soviet controlled Communist / Stalinist groups, as well as many groups of unaffiliated young men who were fleeing conscription and slave labor in Germany and hiding out in the woods. There was bad blood between the Communists and other groups and sometimes even killings.

The first three factions cooperated together and were the most militarily effective, especially the Spanish anarchists who were military veterans of the Spanish Civil War, 350 of whom ended up forming most of the recon battalion of Leclerc's Free French 2e Division Blindée (2nd Armored division) a mixed French / Algerian / Moroccan / Senegalese unit which defeated a Panzer brigade in Lorraine and later liberated Paris. Leclerc had quite a dramatic ordeal fighing his way up from Cameroon and Senegal, where he had been sent by de Gaulle, and he successfully made it into Libya, defeating Italian, German and Vichy French forces on the way.

I think the US wanted to bring as many French soldiers over to the Allied side as possible, and they had less baggage with the French than the British did.

The GC II/5 fought for a while in North Africa until being rotated out due to combat losses, but they fought hard in early 1943 and helped the cause during that very difficult period, being one of the few units to shoot down some of the JG 2 Fw 190s which arrived in Theater in Jan 43 and were a major shock to British and US air forces. GC II/7 (aka 326 RAF) was fighting with Spitfire Mk V and later Mk IX, and they also shot down some Fw 190s. This unit was later involved in the liberation of Corsica. I don't know that much about what happened after that except as you noted, they used a variety of oddball planes to fight isolated pockets of Germans in France and also participated in the fighting in Italy, where some were assigned P-39s. I don't know what unit though.

There seems to be some info here, probably more in the French Wiki

 
I thought the Mers-El-Kabir incident had a lot to do with a senior French officer with an oversized ego. He refused to deal with a British officer who wasn't senior enough. I don't think it was a sneak attack.
I really don't know too much of this action.
 
I thought the Mers-El-Kabir incident had a lot to do with a senior French officer with an oversized ego. He refused to deal with a British officer who wasn't senior enough. I don't think it was a sneak attack.
I really don't know too much of this action.

That's interesting I hadn't heard that story, quite possible as there were a lot of high-ranking French officers with that kind of mentality in 1940
 
Cheers Yulzari,

My grandfather and grandmother were also in the 'real' Resistance during the war, my mother (born 1940) and aunt only saw them about once a year for the first four years of her life.

I think all of what you noted above is also complicated by events like the Battle of Mers el Kébir in which the British surprise-attacked and severely wrecked the rather impressive French naval fleet (killing 1200 men and sinking a battleship and severely damaging several other ships), to keep it out of the hands of the Germans. They had been allies fighting together just a couple of weeks prior, many French saw it as a ruthless betrayal.

As I'm sure you know, the resistance itself was also sharply split between many factions - pro British / managed by MI6, pro American / managed by OSS, former Spanish anarchists and socialists, former Spanish communists (who hated the anarchists and vice versa), and Soviet controlled Communist / Stalinist groups, as well as many groups of unaffiliated young men who were fleeing conscription and slave labor in Germany and hiding out in the woods. There was bad blood between the Communists and other groups and sometimes even killings.

The first three factions cooperated together and were the most militarily effective, especially the Spanish anarchists who were military veterans of the Spanish Civil War, 350 of whom ended up forming most of the recon battalion of Leclerc's Free French 2e Division Blindée (2nd Armored division) a mixed French / Algerian / Moroccan / Senegalese unit which defeated a Panzer brigade in Lorraine and later liberated Paris. Leclerc had quite a dramatic ordeal fighing his way up from Cameroon and Senegal, where he had been sent by de Gaulle, and he successfully made it into Libya, defeating Italian, German and Vichy French forces on the way.

I think the US wanted to bring as many French soldiers over to the Allied side as possible, and they had less baggage with the French than the British did.

The GC II/5 fought for a while in North Africa until being rotated out due to combat losses, but they fought hard in early 1943 and helped the cause during that very difficult period, being one of the few units to shoot down some of the JG 2 Fw 190s which arrived in Theater in Jan 43 and were a major shock to British and US air forces. GC II/7 (aka 326 RAF) was fighting with Spitfire Mk V and later Mk IX, and they also shot down some Fw 190s. This unit was later involved in the liberation of Corsica. I don't know that much about what happened after that except as you noted, they used a variety of oddball planes to fight isolated pockets of Germans in France and also participated in the fighting in Italy, where some were assigned P-39s. I don't know what unit though.

There seems to be some info here, probably more in the French Wiki
According to the France Archives site :

'' As early as May 1943, the Allies had made it clear to the French that rearming the Air Force was subject to the creation of an independent French air command. ''

1st July 1943 : all air units were unified (this comprized the FAFL units, the former Forces Aériennes d'Afrique du Nord and the Normandie group in USSR (Commandement de l'Aviation Française.)

The units were however serving under operational and technical control of the relevant Allied air forces.

On december 1st 1944 was officially created a First Air Corps to command the French Air assets under control of the 1st US Tactical Air Force. It was mainly the air support asset of the 1st French Army, as the XII Tactical Air Command was the air support the US 7th Army, both armies under command of the US 6th Army Group.

A specific Commandement des Forces aériennes de l'Atlantique was created on November 29, 1944 and disbanded on Une 30, 1945, for the air support of the units involved in the siege of the German pockets of the Atlantic ports.
 
I thought the Mers-El-Kabir incident had a lot to do with a senior French officer with an oversized ego. He refused to deal with a British officer who wasn't senior enough. I don't think it was a sneak attack.
I really don't know too much of this action.
It is worth reading about and there is some impressive film.
My impression of the affair (as a Brit) is that a quite firm but realistic demand by the British was treated in a very offhand way by the French Naval Commander, who does not appear to have had orders that absolutely required him to refuse the British ultimatum. Furthermore, it seems to me that the French Naval Commander was willing to risk his ships and men under his command in an ambiguous status (and in an obviously vulnerable situation).
Of note, other elements of Vichy forces did fight against Allied forces.

Cheers

Eng
 
Cheers Yulzari,

My grandfather and grandmother were also in the 'real' Resistance during the war, my mother (born 1940) and aunt only saw them about once a year for the first four years of her life.

I think all of what you noted above is also complicated by events like the Battle of Mers el Kébir in which the British surprise-attacked and severely wrecked the rather impressive French naval fleet (killing 1200 men and sinking a battleship and severely damaging several other ships), to keep it out of the hands of the Germans. They had been allies fighting together just a couple of weeks prior, many French saw it as a ruthless betrayal.

As I'm sure you know, the resistance itself was also sharply split between many factions - pro British / managed by MI6, pro American / managed by OSS, former Spanish anarchists and socialists, former Spanish communists (who hated the anarchists and vice versa), and Soviet controlled Communist / Stalinist groups, as well as many groups of unaffiliated young men who were fleeing conscription and slave labor in Germany and hiding out in the woods. There was bad blood between the Communists and other groups and sometimes even killings.

The first three factions cooperated together and were the most militarily effective, especially the Spanish anarchists who were military veterans of the Spanish Civil War, 350 of whom ended up forming most of the recon battalion of Leclerc's Free French 2e Division Blindée (2nd Armored division) a mixed French / Algerian / Moroccan / Senegalese unit which defeated a Panzer brigade in Lorraine and later liberated Paris. Leclerc had quite a dramatic ordeal fighing his way up from Cameroon and Senegal, where he had been sent by de Gaulle, and he successfully made it into Libya, defeating Italian, German and Vichy French forces on the way.

I think the US wanted to bring as many French soldiers over to the Allied side as possible, and they had less baggage with the French than the British did.

The GC II/5 fought for a while in North Africa until being rotated out due to combat losses, but they fought hard in early 1943 and helped the cause during that very difficult period, being one of the few units to shoot down some of the JG 2 Fw 190s which arrived in Theater in Jan 43 and were a major shock to British and US air forces. GC II/7 (aka 326 RAF) was fighting with Spitfire Mk V and later Mk IX, and they also shot down some Fw 190s. This unit was later involved in the liberation of Corsica. I don't know that much about what happened after that except as you noted, they used a variety of oddball planes to fight isolated pockets of Germans in France and also participated in the fighting in Italy, where some were assigned P-39s. I don't know what unit though.

There seems to be some info here, probably more in the French Wiki


Sorry to contradict you but even the famed 2e DB was only partly from Free French background, only about 1/3 of its personnel. The mix did not begin well at first as the commanding general Leclerc was at the begining prejudiced about whoever was not a former Free French.

About the main units :

The republican Spanish served in the armored infantry regiment, not with the recon ( Régiment de Marche du Tchad).

The reconnaissance regiment was the 1er Régiment de Marche Spahis Marocains that as its title implies was partly from Morocco : not Free French.

Two of the armored regiments had a former Army of Africa, not Free French, origin (12e Régiment de Cuirassiers, 12e Régiment de Chasseurs d'Afrique).
Only the 3rd armored regiment had a Free French origin (501e Régiment de Char de Combat.)

The Régiment Blindé de Fusiliers Marins (RBFM) was an interesting outfit : it was composed for a great part of French Navy sailors and officers captured by the British at Diego Suarez in 1942 and interned in Great Britain. It was consequently out of order to see them serve under British command. As sailors they were good mechanics and gunners, they formed the tank destroyer regiment of the division. As they found the M47A2 telescope of the US M10 tank destroyer ineffective for long range fire, they replaced them with surplus french naval telescopes. At first, Leclerc was very suspicious of the regiment because of their Vichy Navy background but finally changed his mind as it become the most efficient of the French army when it comes to destroyed enemy tanks.

Initially, the division comprised 8,343 Europeans, 2,470 North Africans, 398 Syrians, and 4,348 Senegalese. Under pressure of the US command, because of the discriminated policy then in use by the US Army, the european element was strongly augmented : it was unconceivable to have black troops playing a prominent role in the liberation of France. It was also believed they did not have the technicity mandatory for mechanized warfare.

Consequently, because of this US command reluctance, and along to the other two other armored divisions (1e and 5e) , the 2e DB during the liberation days was strongly composed of non indigenous troops (about 75 %). Things were however different for the infantry divisions of the French army as in WW2 was a meatgrinder comprized strongly of colonial troops, and even in this case, because of the necessity ofmechanization and tecnucs, about 40 % of the personnel was european. By the way, because of this attrition, the 2e DB as all the other divisions, had to replace its casualties by former Resistance members, diluting even more the Free French tradition and reducing the indigenous proportion.

For example, my stepfather regiment (11th Colonial Engineers) by november 1944 replaced its indigenous sappers by native French as the poor Senegalese were unable to suffer the chilly climates of the Vosges mountains, and they were repatriated via Marseille. This practised called '' whitening '' was general with almost all units during the 1944 winter. It also enabled the concerned veterans to benefit from a well earned rest (some units were fighting since the North Africa or Italy campaigns).



 
Sorry to contradict you but even the famed 2e DB was only partly from Free French background, only about 1/3 of its personnel. The mix did not begin well at first as the commanding general Leclerc was at the begining prejudiced about whoever was not a former Free French.

"Prejudice" vis a vis Free French vs former Vichy, while not necessarily entirely fair, was understandable because there were many Nazi sympathizers and some still had divided loyalties even late in the war.

About the main units :

The republican Spanish served in the armored infantry regiment, not with the recon ( Régiment de Marche du Tchad).

I guess they were in the recon company of that regiment then, i don't know. I met one of the guys from it, he was the commander of an M8 Greyhound. He had pictures from their first days in Paris.

The reconnaissance regiment was the 1er Régiment de Marche Spahis Marocains that as its title implies was partly from Morocco : not Free French.

Two of the armored regiments had a former Army of Africa, not Free French, origin (12e Régiment de Cuirassiers, 12e Régiment de Chasseurs d'Afrique).
Only the 3rd armored regiment had a Free French origin (501e Régiment de Char de Combat.)

The Régiment Blindé de Fusiliers Marins (RBFM) was an interesting outfit : it was composed for a great part of French Navy sailors and officers captured by the British at Diego Suarez in 1942 and interned in Great Britain. It was consequently out of order to see them serve under British command. As sailors they were good mechanics and gunners, they formed the tank destroyer regiment of the division. As they found the M47A2 telescope of the US M10 tank destroyer ineffective for long range fire, they replaced them with surplus french naval telescopes. At first, Leclerc was very suspicious of the regiment because of their Vichy Navy background but finally changed his mind as it become the most efficient of the French army when it comes to destroyed enemy tanks.

I bet Naval telescopes were a big improvement.

Ironically based on the rest of your story here, some of the US M10 units active in 1944 were manned by black troops, one was very successful, heroic the other one had some tragic problems with insubordination and fighting, probably due to racism and the annihilating pressures of combat at this time, though they too ultimately acquitted themselves well in combat.

Initially, the division comprised 8,343 Europeans, 2,470 North Africans, 398 Syrians, and 4,348 Senegalese. Under pressure of the US command, because of the discriminated policy then in use by the US Army, the european element was strongly augmented : it was unconceivable to have black troops playing a prominent role in the liberation of France. It was also believed they did not have the technicity mandatory for mechanized warfare.

Consequently, because of this US command reluctance, and along to the other two other armored divisions (1e and 5e) , the 2e DB during the liberation days was strongly composed of non indigenous troops (about 75 %). Things were however different for the infantry divisions of the French army as in WW2 was a meatgrinder comprized strongly of colonial troops, and even in this case, because of the necessity ofmechanization and tecnucs, about 40 % of the personnel was european. By the way, because of this attrition, the 2e DB as all the other divisions, had to replace its casualties by former Resistance members, diluting even more the Free French tradition and reducing the indigenous proportion.

For example, my stepfather regiment (11th Colonial Engineers) by november 1944 replaced its indigenous sappers by native French as the poor Senegalese were unable to suffer the chilly climates of the Vosges mountains, and they were repatriated via Marseille. This practised called '' whitening '' was general with almost all units during the 1944 winter. It also enabled the concerned veterans to benefit from a well earned rest (some units were fighting since the North Africa or Italy campaigns).

it's an ugly episode, but I'm sure these troops were glad to go home rather than continue in the brutal fighting
 
"Prejudice" vis a vis Free French vs former Vichy, while not necessarily entirely fair, was understandable because there were many Nazi sympathizers and some still had divided loyalties even late in the war.



I guess they were in the recon company of that regiment then, i don't know. I met one of the guys from it, he was the commander of an M8 Greyhound. He had pictures from their first days in Paris.



I bet Naval telescopes were a big improvement.

Ironically based on the rest of your story here, some of the US M10 units active in 1944 were manned by black troops, one was very successful, heroic the other one had some tragic problems with insubordination and fighting, probably due to racism and the annihilating pressures of combat at this time, though they too ultimately acquitted themselves well in combat.



it's an ugly episode, but I'm sure these troops were glad to go home rather than continue in the brutal fighting
There was no recon company in the Regiment de Marche du Tchad that was organized along the US TOE of armored infantry. The recon assets were in each battalion's HQ company, that is a recon section (corresponding to a US platoon) of one officer and 20 men on jeeps.

Following US TOEs, the M8 was found and used in the cavalry reconnaissance squadrons of the cavalry regiments and in the reconnaissance squadron of the tank destroyers regiments.

To complicate matters, there is a discrepancy between US and French military units designations :

- to a US platoon corresponds a French peloton (mounted troops) or section (troop on foot, mainly infantry and engineers).
- The US company is a French compagnie.
- The US battery is a French batterie.
- The US cavalry troop is a French squadron.
- The US cavalry squadron (battalion size) is a French cavalry regiment.
- The US cavalry regiment would be a brigade in France.
- The combat Command of Armored divisions was a Groupe Tactique in the 2e DB ; the 1e and 5e DB kept the US Combat Command denomination.
- For practical motives, the US Regimental Combat Team structure was adopted by the infantry divisions.
- By exception, in the 1e Division Française Libre of Free French origin (later redesignation 1e Division Motorisée d'Infanterie), the British Brigade structure was retained, but in practise this corresponded to a Regimental Combat Team.

WW2 was a great infantry grinder and the US Army by the fall of 1944 had a great infantry manpower trouble. This was less the case for the French because :
contrarily to the US Army, there was a pool of non divisional regiment or battalion size infantry units of various origins. They were used to reinforce when needed the standard divisions. Furthermore, as more and or territories were liberated, the more or less organized and disciplined Resistance units were integrated by the Army willingly or by force.
 
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Tere was no recon company in the Regiment de Marche du Tchad that was organized along the US TOE of armored infantry. The recon assets were in each battalion's HQ company, that is a recon section (corresponding to a US platoon) of one officer and 20 men on jeeps.

Following US TOEs, the M8 was found and used in the cavalry reconnaissance squadrons of the cavalry regiments and in the reconnaissance squadron of the tank destroyers regiments.

To complicate matters, there is a discrepancy between US and French military units designations :

- to a US platoon corresponds a French peloton (mounted troops) or section (troop on foot, mainly infantry and engineers).
- The US company is a French compagnie.
- The US battery is a French batterie.
- The US cavalry troop is a French squadron.
- The US cavalry squadron (battalion size) is a French cavalry regiment.
- The US cavalry regiment would be a brigade in France.
- The combat Command of Armored divisions was a Groupe Tactique in the 2e DB ; the 1e and 5e DB kept the US Combat Command denomination.
- For practical motives, the US Regimental Combat Team structure was adopted by the infantry divisions.
- By exception, in the 1e Division Française Libre of Free French origin (later redesignation 1e Division Motorisée d'Infanterie), the British Brigade structure was retained, but in practise this corresponded to a Regimental Combat Team.

WW2 was a great infantry grinder and the US Army by the fall of 1944 had a great infantry manpower trouble. This was less the case for the French because :
contrarily to the US Army, there was a pool of non divisional regiment or battalion size infantry units of various origins. They were used to reinforce when needed the standard divisions. Furthermore, as more and or territories were liberated, the more or less organized and disciplined Resistance units were integrated by the Army willingly or by force.
There are two ways to view the equipping of the French army in 1944/5. One was as a lend-lease loan from the USA at generous terms. The other is that the French manned the extra divisions of equipment which the USA planned to send to Europe which saved them from conscripting the USA troops who would have otherwise manned them. I have seen it written somewhere as 'the Americans gave us tanks, we gave them blood'. Both have a validity but it gave the French a seat at the victory table as active allied combatants and an occupation zone in Germany.
 
There are two ways to view the equipping of the French army in 1944/5. One was as a lend-lease loan from the USA at generous terms. The other is that the French manned the extra divisions of equipment which the USA planned to send to Europe which saved them from conscripting the USA troops who would have otherwise manned them. I have seen it written somewhere as 'the Americans gave us tanks, we gave them blood'. Both have a validity but it gave the French a seat at the victory table as active allied combatants and an occupation zone in Germany.
That was rather the viewpoint in the US military circles.

Roosevelt was not a fan of the renaissance of France as a great power. It must also be reminded that for a long time he was perfectly at ease with diplomatic relations with the Vichy authorities.
His AMGOT project was also received as an insult to a country occupied for five years by the Germans to be treated like an occupied nation.
 
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Now, to return on plane matters, a pic from the 110th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron in the South Pacific after it switched from the P-40 to the P-51 (from a Missouri ANG publication).


P-51 - 110th TRS.jpg
 
There was no recon company in the Regiment de Marche du Tchad that was organized along the US TOE of armored infantry. The recon assets were in each battalion's HQ company, that is a recon section (corresponding to a US platoon) of one officer and 20 men on jeeps.

Following US TOEs, the M8 was found and used in the cavalry reconnaissance squadrons of the cavalry regiments and in the reconnaissance squadron of the tank destroyers regiments.

To complicate matters, there is a discrepancy between US and French military units designations :

- to a US platoon corresponds a French peloton (mounted troops) or section (troop on foot, mainly infantry and engineers).
- The US company is a French compagnie.
- The US battery is a French batterie.
- The US cavalry troop is a French squadron.
- The US cavalry squadron (battalion size) is a French cavalry regiment.
- The US cavalry regiment would be a brigade in France.
- The combat Command of Armored divisions was a Groupe Tactique in the 2e DB ; the 1e and 5e DB kept the US Combat Command denomination.
- For practical motives, the US Regimental Combat Team structure was adopted by the infantry divisions.
- By exception, in the 1e Division Française Libre of Free French origin (later redesignation 1e Division Motorisée d'Infanterie), the British Brigade structure was retained, but in practise this corresponded to a Regimental Combat Team.

WW2 was a great infantry grinder and the US Army by the fall of 1944 had a great infantry manpower trouble. This was less the case for the French because :
contrarily to the US Army, there was a pool of non divisional regiment or battalion size infantry units of various origins. They were used to reinforce when needed the standard divisions. Furthermore, as more and or territories were liberated, the more or less organized and disciplined Resistance units were integrated by the Army willingly or by force.

I don't remember the precise TO&E myself (though I could look it up) but 2e DB did apparently have both M8 armored cars and M10 tank destroyers and they were present both in the liberation and the post-liberation parade. These are some photos from Life magazine August 1944 photographed by Bob Landry

1778196203209.png


1778196219423.png


1778196232015.png
 
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I don't remember the precise TO&E myself (though I could look it up) but 2e DB did apparently have both M8 armored cars and M10 tank destroyers and they were present both in the liberation and the post-liberation parade. These are some photos from Life magazine August 1944 photographed by Bob Landry

View attachment 877983

View attachment 877984

View attachment 877985

The M8 could be from the 1er Régiment Blindé de Fusiliers Marins (Tank Destroyers) or the 1er Régiment de Marche de Spahis Marocains (reconnaissance).

Along with US warfare doctrine, batteries, squadrons and companies of the various regiments and battalions were mixed to form ad hoc multi arms combat teams. On the second picture, the crewman in the turret wears a garrison cap (calot). The M8 is then from the 1er RMSM that wore red garrison caps.
A crewman from the RBFM wold have worn a navy cap (bachis) with a red pompon, or a Navy visor cap if an officer or senior NCO.

Notice the tendency of the French of wearing their tribal headgear instead of helmets even in combat situation.
 
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The M8 could be from the 1er Régiment Blindé de Fusislers Marins (Tank Destroyers) or the 1er Régiment de Marche de Spahis Marocains (reconnaissance).

Along with US warfare doctrine, batteries, squadrons and companies of the various regiments and battalions were mixed to form ad hoc multi arms combat teams. On the second picture, the crewman in the turret wears a garrison cap (calot). The M8 is then from the 1er RMSM that wore red garrison caps.
A crewman from the RBFM wold have worn a navy cap (bachis) with a red pompon, or a Navy visor cap if an officer or senior NCO.

Notice the tendency of the French of wearing their tribal headgear instead of helmets even in combat situation.

They are soldiers of course, but they are also French, one must represent and consider fashion at all times...
 
I will be glad to show some operational history examples so we can look at real numbers, as I did in the P-38 thread,
Except that showing was more promises than data.

In the 12 months to end August 1943 the 9th Air Force operated P-40 in the Mediterranean it recorded 101 combat losses from 16,508 sorties, making 229 claims for enemy aircraft shot down. 57th from August 1942, 79th and 324th from March 1943. (57th 127 claims, 51 P-40 missing, 79th 59/30, 324th 43/20).

The 12th Air Force started off 1944 with 3 P-40 groups plus an independent squadron, plus a group transitioning from P-40 to P-47, the final P-40 group, 324th, transitioned to P-47 end July 1944, with 145 12th Air Force P-40 lost to all causes in 1944.

When it comes to largely ceasing to engage in air combat the P-40 groups cut off dates were 33rd in September 1943, 57th in April 1943, 79th in June 1943, 324th in July 1943, 325th in August 1943.

Interestingly the 325th Group was assigned to the Strategic Air Force in early 1943, along with the 2 P-38 groups, the B-17, B-25 and B-26 groups. The 33rd Group was assigned to the Tactical Air Force. When it comes to the Spitfire both groups arrived in November 1942, the 31st and 52nd, both were assigned to the Tactical Air Force. When the Coastal Air Force formed in May 1943 the 52nd was transferred to it, ending up in Corsica, before both groups transitioned to Mustang as part of 15th Air Force.

That seems to be how things largely stayed until the November 1943 changes put the bombers and long range fighters under 15th Air Force, including the now P-47 equipped 325th. In early 1944 the medium bombers went to 12th Air Force.

As an aside as of 1 April 1944 the French component of the Coastal Air Force had 200 aircraft assigned, including in 3 P-39, 1 P-40 (with 1 P-40F and 24 P-40L) and 3 Spitfire squadrons.

The MTO USAAF thinks enemy aircraft shot down 2,526 of its aircraft, but only 124 of these September 1944 to May 1945. Fighter losses to enemy aircraft are put at 46 in 1942, 816 in 1943, 441 in 1944 and 24 in 1945.

By Feb 1943 the P-38 units were mostly flying longer-ranged bomber escort missions into Italy.
1943, P-38 NW Africa, sorties
January, 3 local defence, 29 offensive patrol/sweep, 123 strafing, 917 escort to aircraft,
February, 163 strafing, 74 strafing, 38 shipping attack, 604 escort to aircraft,
March, 3 local defence, 35 offensive patrol/sweep, 1,249 escort to aircraft,
April, 284 offensive patrol/sweep, 230 shipping attack, 895 escort to aircraft,
May, 8 local defence, 44 offensive patrol/sweep, 114 shipping attack, 8 shipping protection, 1,971 escort to aircraft.

The 9th Air Force started bombing Italian mainland targets in December 1942, Sicily in January 1943, the 12th Air Force started bombing Sardinia and Sicily in February 1943, the Italian mainland in April. It took until April 1943 before half the heavy bomber sorties credited with attacking were outside North Africa.


message 367, also note the promise in message 380,

1431 US victories claimed by the 3 P-38 FG in the MTO (most of these were over Italy from 1944) (another source says 608)
15th AF, fighter claims for destruction of enemy aircraft in the air, 1 November 1943 to 31 October 1944, P-38 560, of which 62 on missions to Italy, P-47 155, 108 Italy, P-51 771, 16 Italy. The main types claimed 825 Bf109, 277 Fw190, 88 Bf110, 44 each Me210 and Ju52. All up the 15th Air Force P-38 claimed 608 enemy aircraft destroyed, the P-51 976.

P-38 claims, in the 15th Air Force 608 enemy aircraft, add 663 January to October 1943, and 66.5 for 1942, total 1,337.5.
Luftwaffe lost 711 aircraft in 1943, 246 fighters (13% of German global fighter inventory)
According to Williamson Murray, the Luftwaffe lost 1,527 fighters to all causes in the south January to November 1943, out of 3,934 total aircraft losses. 246 is 13% of 1,893. The RAF puts German single fighter strength as 1,318 on 10 January 1943, peaking at 1,849 on 30 June, to 1,561 on 31 December, on average for the year, 1,590 single engine, 229 twin engine, and 70 fighter bombers, total 1,889. Inventory would be much higher. Also the US MTO fighters alone claimed nearly 1,400 enemy aircraft destroyed in the air, so if the Germans really only lost 711 in the south and all in the air on USAAF fighters hitting anything they were overclaiming 2 to 1, and way more as they were mainly claiming fighters.

The Spitfire totals are for a longer period of time, and also represent two or more types, Spit V and Spit IX. 31st FG also had some Spitfire Mk VIII.
The P-40 arrived earlier and left later, plus were more numerous.

For that matter, converting Spit Vs to use a Merlin XX or equivalent also seems like a winning idea, though I gather there were some 'fit' issues with the engine mounting etc. I think Spit V with Merlin XX is a lot more useful than Hurricane II with Merlin XX (or two speed V-1710).
In terms of engine altitude performance in North Africa end 1942 it was P-38, Spitfire V, Merlin P-40 and Hurricane, Allison P-39 and P-40. It is not a winning idea to cut the altitude performance of the Spitfire engine back to Hurricane levels, that would also mean it would also be a winning idea to replace all Merlin P-40 with Allison.

It is complex, and I agree confusing, but it looks like about ~1200-1300 F and ~700 L were built. I don't think several hundred made it to the British, who used them in only two squadrons (260 RAF and 3 RAAF), of which only one (3 RAAF) kept them for a really long time, due to both shortages of engines and airframes.
260 squadron kept the Kittyhawk IIA from June 1942 to May 1943, removing its last Kittyhawk I in September 1942 and adding Kittyhawk III in December. As of end February 1943 the RAF reported 2 Merlin P-40 in Britain and 105 in the Middle East on strength after 41 IIA lost overseas and 3 in in transit, end June 1944 it was 123 Merlin P-40 on strength in the Middle East, while 2 had been transferred to the USAAF. For the RAF in the MTO the Merlin P-40 was the anomaly.

The USAAF is quite sure, 1,311 P-40F were built, (plus 41-13696 for static tests only, never flew)
F 699
F-5 123
F-10 177
F-15 200
F-20 112

Also 700 P-40L
50 L-1
220 L-5
148 L-10
112 L-15
170 L-20

The RAF was allocated 150 P-40F/mark IIa and 100 P-40L/mark II, all 100 F to the Middle East, 2 IIa to Britain, 21 lost at sea, 127 to Middle East. Of the 1,500 P-40E-1 order meant for the British Empire it had 444 delivered in the US, the rest to other users.

The RAF was sent 191 P-40K-1, 52 K-5, 46 K-10, 50 K-15, 50 M-5, 44 M-10 and called them mark III.

As of December 1944 the USAAF reports official transfers of P-40 to the French were 24 F and 40 L September to December 1944 from British and US stocks. As of June 1945 it was 26 F and 56 L. Other P-40F and L used by the French were short term loans.

P-40 Contract
AC-12414, 1 XP-40F, taken from contract signed 26 April 1939
AC-15802, 31 P-40B, 193 P-40C, 79 P-40E, 999 P-40F (supplement 1 signed 6 October 1943)
AC-15865, 213 P-40F, 3 May 1941
AC-22714, 700 P-40K, 700 P-40L (supplement 1 signed 15 June 1942)
DA-913, 600 P-40K-1 (export version for Britain, most went to other users) signed 15 June 1942
AC-30491, 600 P-40M 24 August 1942

First P-40N contract 25 January 1943

The 1945 USAAF Aircraft Designations say 300 P-40R-1 (ex F) and 300 P-40R-2 (ex L), the 1946 version says 300 total, V-1610-81 engine (same as M).

Single stage Merlin production for the US ended in March 1943, with 2,833 accepted, along with 8 two stage Merlins. Of the 5,200 Merlin 28 built by Packard August 1942 to February 1943, Britain reports 5,165 shipped from the US, imports May 1942 to July 1943, 228 lost at sea, leaving 4,937 arrivals. Merlin 29 production of 480 for Canada February to December 1942. Both Merlin 28 and 31 (560 built) ended production in February 1943, initially replaced by the Merlin 38.
 
Far be it from me to contradict the very long winded and strongly opinionated, but here is some data from Shores A History of the Mediterranean Air War Volume Four

(counting only 'confirmed' claims)

Dec 15 1943
Allied Claims: 72 Sqn RAF (Spit Vc) 1 Bf 109G, US 324th FG (P-40L) 2 x Fw 190, US 31st FG (Spit IX) 1 x Fw 190 and 1 x Bf 109.
Allied Losses: 1 P-40 lost from 324th FG, 2 Spit IX from US 31st FG lost, 1 Spit VC lost from 126 Sqn RAF
Axis Losses 1 Fw 190 4.SG 4 lost, 2 x Bf 109G-6 1./JG 53 lost

16 Dec 1943
Allied Claims: 92 Sqn RAF (Spit VIII) 1 x Bf 109, US 57th FG (P-40F) 2 x Bf 109, US 57th FG (P-47) 4 x Bf 109, US 14th FG (P-38) 1 x Bf 109
Allied Losses: 2 x P-40F "by small arms fire", 1 P-40F damaged landed safely, 1 P-47 damaged landed safely, 1 x P-38 shot down
Axis Losses: 5 x BF 109G6 from JG 27 and 53 shot down, 1 Fw 190G-3 from II./SG 4 shot down

16 Jan 1944
Allied Claims: US 33rd FG (P-40L) 1 x Fw 190, US 31st FG (Spit VIII) 3 x Bf 109, B-26 gunners 5 x Bf 109
Allied Losses: 1 x Spitfire VIII lost, 1 x A-36A lost, 4 x B-26C lost, 2 x A-20B lost
Axis Losses: 3 x Bf 109G-6

22 Jan 1944
Allied Claims: US 79th FG (P-40L) 7 x Fw 190, US 325th FG (P-47D) 4 x Bf 109, US 31st FG (Spit IX) 1 x Bf 109
Allied Losses: 3 x P-40L lost (1 to fighters, 2 to engine trouble), 2 x P-47D lost, 1 x F-5C lost, 3 x A-36A lost, 2 x B-26B lost, 1 x B-17F lost
Axis Losses: 4 x Bf 109G6 lost, 2 x FW 190 (A6 and G3) crash landed with WiA pilots (one of the pilots who bailed out was Otto Schülz),

23 Jan 1944
Allied Claims: 324th WG (Spit IX) 1x Bf 109, 185 Sqn (Spit IX) 1 x Ju 88, US 79th FG (P-40L) damaged and probables, US 52nd FG (Spit Vc) 2 x Ju 88, 4 x He 111, 414 NFS (Beaufighter) 1 x Do 217K, 1 x Ju 88
Allied Losses: 1 x Kittyhawk IIa lost, 1 x Spitfire VIII lost, 1 x Spitfire Vc lost, 1x Kittyhawk IV lost, 1 x P-40F (33rd FG) lost
Axis Losses: 1 x Fw 190G3 "Lost in combat with P-40s, (pilot KiA), 3 x He 111 lost, 7 x Ju 88 lost, 2 x He 177 lost, 1 x Do 217 lost

24 Jan 1944
Allied Claims: 601 Sqn (Spit VIII) 2 x Bf 109, 72 Sqn (Spit IX) 1 x Fw 190, US 79th FG (P-40L) 1 x Fw 190, 1 x Bf 109, US 52nd FG (Spit VC) 2 x Do 217
Allied Losses: 2 x P-40L damaged but made it back to base, 3 x Spitfire Vc lost, 2 x B-17F ditched
Axis Losses: 2 x Bf 109G6, 2 x Fw 190G3 lost (one says "lost in combat to P-40 over Genzano"), 3 x Do 217E-5

25 Jan 1944
Allied Claims: 417 Sqn RAF (Spit VIII) various damaged and probable, US 79th FG (P-40L) 3 x Bf 109
Allied Losses: 1 x Spit VIII lost, 1 x Kittyhawk IV lost, 1 x Baltimore IV lost, 1 x P-40 (324th FG) crash landed, 1 x B-17F FTR
Axis Losses: 1x Fw 190G-3 lost "Combat with P-40s"

27 Jan 1944
Allied Claims: 72 Sqn RAF (Spit IX) 1x Fw 190, 417 Sqn RAF (Spit VIII) 1 x Bf 109, 93 Sqn RAF (Spit IX) 3 x Bf 109, US 79th FG (P-40L) 12 x Fw 190, US 33rd FG (P-40L) 3 x Bf 109, 1 x Fw 190, US 52nd FG (Spit Vc) 1 x Fw 190
Allied Losses: 3 x Spit IX lost, 2 x RAF Spit Vc lost, 3 x US Spit Vc lost, 4 x P-40L lost (one 'shot down by Spitfire), 2 x B-25 lost
Axis Losses: 5 x Bf 109G lost (all from JG 77)

28 Jan 1944
Allied Claims: 1435 Sqn RAF (Spit IX) 2 x Bf 109, US 79th FG (P-40L) 7 x FW 190, 1 x Bf 109, US 33rd FG (P-40L) 1 x FW 190, 5 x Bf 109, US 31st FG (Spit IX) 1 x Bf 109, 1x FW 190, US 324th FG (P-40F) 1 x Fw 190
Allied Losses: 1 x A-36A lost, 2 x Spit Vc (US) lost, 2 x B-26 lost
Axis Losses: 5 x BF 109G6 lost,1x Fw 190G3 lost, 2 x Ju 88 lost

19 Feb 1944
Allied Claims: 601 Sqn RAF (Spit VIII) 1 x Bf 109, 111 Sqn RAF (Spit IX) 1 x Fw 190, 93 Sqn RAF 5 x Fw 190, 72 Sqn RAF (Spit IX) 1 x FW 190, US 79th FG (P-40L) 2 x FW 190, US 324th FG (P-40F) 1 x Fw 190, 1 x Bf 109, US 52nd FG (Spit V) 12 x Bf 109, US 31st FG (Spit IX) 1 x Bf 109, B-25 Gunners 7 x Bf 109, 1 x Fw 190
Allied Losses: 2 x Spit IX (RAF) lost, 1x Spit Vc (RAF) lost, 6 x Spit Vc (US) lost, 7 x B-25
Axis Losses: 10 x Bf 109G6 lost, 1 x Fw 190A6 lost, 1 x Do 217 lost

It's hard to say from the combat reports who shot down which enemy, but I think you can draw the following conclusions:

US P-40F and L from 79th FG, 57th FG, 33rd FG, and 324th FG were still in combat, fighting at Anzio in early 1944
They were engaging Axis fighters. Some were flying escort and fighter sweep missions at this point, some fighter-bomber, but making claims during both types of missions
They fought alongside Spitfire IX and VIII, Spitfire Vc and P-47s, and were holding their own, making claims and not taking particularly severe losses.

If you read the detailed descriptions they were also often on their own i.e. without top cover

(Edit: At this point the RAF were also still flying Kittyhawks, including some Kittyhawk II / P-40F or L, and as you can see above these took some losses, but by 1944 the British Kitythawks were being used almost exclusively as fighter-bombers)
 
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re
In terms of engine altitude performance in North Africa end 1942 it was P-38, Spitfire V, Merlin P-40 and Hurricane, Allison P-39 and P-40. It is not a winning idea to cut the altitude performance of the Spitfire engine back to Hurricane levels, that would also mean it would also be a winning idea to replace all Merlin P-40 with Allison.

The Merlin XX / V-1650-1 was a two-speed single-stage engine - with a higher altitude rating than the single-speed single-stage Merlin 45 used in the majority of the Spitfire Mk V. The better aerodynamics of the Spitfire and consequent higher speed and greater RAM effect is what allowed the Spitfire to operate at approximately the same altitudes as the Hurricane - even though the Merlin 45 was slightly inferior to the Merlin XX / V-1650-1.

Reference Spitfire Mk III to see the significant improvement in performance (predicted and found on testing) when fitted with the Merlin XX vs [the standard Spitfire Mk VB with] Merlin 45 & 46. Basically an altitude increase of about 4,000 ft over the Merlin 45, and a Vmax increase of 30 mph - with everything else being equal (ie same elliptical 'B' wing as the Spitfire Mk V, same fit/finish, etc).

Spitfire Mk VB w/Merlin 45______370 mph at 20,000 ft (RM5SM, float carb, standard 242 ft2 elliptical 'B' wing)
Spitfire Mk VB w/Merlin 46______370 mph at 21,000 ft (RM6S, float carb, standard 242 ft2 elliptical 'B' wing)
Spitfire Mk VB w/Merlin 46______370 mph at 22,500 ft (RM6S, RR SU pump carb, standard 242 ft2 elliptical 'B' wing)
Spitfire Mk III w/RM2SM________385 mph at 20,000 ft (RM2SM, float carb, new smaller span 220 ft2 'B' wing)
Spitfire Mk III w/Merlin XX_______398 mph at 22,500 ft (RM3SM, float carb, new smaller span 220 ft2 'B' wing)
Spitfire Mk III w/Merlin XX_______400 mph at 24,000 ft (RM3SM, float carb, standard 242 ft2 elliptical 'B' wing)

NOTE
1. All of the above speed and altitude data is from actual flight tests. Flying weights during testing of the Spitfrire Mk III were usually about 75 lbs more than the standard Mk V. Fitting the Mk III with a 4-blade propeller was under consideration but AFIK testing was discontinued before this was accomplished.

2. The Merlin 46 - similar to the Merlin 45, but with a modified supercharger with a larger Ø10.85" diameter impeller - theoretically offered about the same altitude rating as the Merlin XX, but it was found that the Merlin 46 suffered from rough running, surging, and detonation above about 19,000 ft, whereas the Merlin XX (which used the standard Ø10.25" impeller) did not. Fitting a Tropical radiator solved some of the Merlin 46 problems, but the Australians were still experiencing the problems when they did their tests in late-43(?). The original design that became the Merlin 46 was intended to have an after-cooler, but this was not carried through to the final design for some reason. Too bad, it probably would have made the Merlin 46 an effective improvement for the Spitfire.

3. For some development information on the Merlin RM2SM see "Mustang Origins"

4. Merlin 45, 46, RM2SM, and XX rated altitudes in S gear - at +9 lbs boost, except for RM2SM which is at +9.5 lbs boost.

Merlin XX______1145 BHP at +9 lbs boost at 18,250 ft
Merlin 46______1125 BHP at +9 lbs boost at 18,250 ft
RM2SM_______1140 BHP at +9.5 lbs boost at 16,750 ft
Merlin 45______1170 BHP at +9 lbs boost at 16,250 ft

Bleh! :coffee:

[edited in bold for clarity]
 
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