An Allison V-1710 with a two-speed supercharger in 1942

[Steamed_Banana]

Now you just have to build a much larger plant in the US to build more P-40s and come up with thousands of workers. Or 'just' come up with a new plant in in the UK. You can't make P-40s in a Hawker or Gloster factory that was building Hurricanes, or at least not anywhere near as many per month. Add in the fact that it took a number of months to change over/retool and just about all the tooling would have to be shipped in from the US.

On the plus side you'll lose about 1/4 as many aircraft (and pilots) so you'll be able to keep more in the inventory and replace fewer, though granted in a combat these still only have a life span of 3-6 months before they are clapped out.

Building P-40Ls with Merlins in mid 1943 and later instead of P-40Ns with Allisons doesn't really change things that much.

Definitely disagree. P-40Ns were fine for the Pacific or CBI (though P-40F or L are better) but were simply not capable of coping with Luftwaffe or Regia Aerontautica fighters past mid 1942 on an equal footing due to the altitude limitation. P-40F or L is still viable at 25,000 feet, P-40N definitely isn't. Operational history shows us that the British flown Allison P-40s were being lost at a much higher rate, as many as 2-3 times more, than the F/L were (as flown by both British and US units.) 3 RAAF Sqn even converted to Kittyhawk III briefly, before switching back to Kittyhawk II after losses went sharply up, which required a lot of work in finding spare engines and parts as they were running out at that point. I actually have a followup question about this in fact but I'll ask that in a later post.

Problem for the British barely useful beats the heck out of no aircraft at all for certain months.

But let me pose a question - if you have 50 aircraft which are being lost at a rate of 5-6 per month is that worth more than 200 aircraft that are being lost at a rate of 30-40 per month?

British got a very large amount of P-40Ms and Ns as it was.
"Just on time" delivery of components is a fairly modern concept. If you are trying to build 200-400 fighters a month in a factory they wanted several weeks or months' worth of engines on site "just in case". Problems at the engine factory, problems with transportation (mostly railroads in WW II) problems with weather (Detroit, Indianapolis, Buffalo NY). Moving engines from Detroit to Los Angeles was over 2000 miles by rail. In 1943 you can pretty much forget truck.
Shipping engines to England was lot risker. Beauforts stayed with Taurus engines after the first 200 P&W engines got sunk in transit. Poor engines beats no engines.

Nevertheless, if they can ship all those Kittyhawk I, Ia, III and IV to England, and all those Bostons, Baltimores, Lancasters, Avengers, Catalinas and etc., they could just as easily be shipping Kittyhawk IIs.

And in fact, many of those Kittyhawk IIIs and IVs that they got could simply be re-engined with the Merlin XXs, and suddenly you have aircraft that could be used in Sicily or Italy as fighter-bombers and as fighters.

 

[Shortround6]

Pretty much same answers here. P-40s were a lot better for fighter bomber work, A-36s even more so.

An awful lot depends on when. Hurricanes could carry two 500lb bombs earlier than the P-40s could. P-40s got better, Hurricanes did not but the big change was not until around mid 1943. A-36 is a red herring. The A-36 was a funding trick to keep the production line open. There were never going to be any more. The Production line had changed over to newer model about 2-3 months before the first A-36 combat operation. It doesn't matter how good the A-36 is, in the summer of 1943 every A-36 built is a P-51B not built.

those 40mm guns on the IIDs sounded good but were fairly well a disaster when they tried to use them.

The guns actually worked fairly well. Problem was that between the idea and first combat use things had changed. German tanks got thicker armor and the Germans got better/more AA guns. And much like the Ju 87Gs, you need air supremacy to really use them. Air superiority is not enough.

I think Hurricane IVs could be configured as a fighters though too... ? I could be wrong.

It is wrong, you need to change the wing.
However they didn't stop making Hurricane IICs when they were building Hurricane IVs. The IICs could carry either bombs or rockets or drop tanks.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

An awful lot depends on when. Hurricanes could carry two 500lb bombs earlier than the P-40s could. P-40s got better, Hurricanes did not but the big change was not until around mid 1943.

I don't think Hurricanes were carrying more than two 250 lb bombs in most cases, while Kittyhawks were carrying 500 lb on the centerline quite early as we have recently discussed in other threads.

Kittyhawks also had 50% more range, and had coolant plumbing in the nose, which seemed to make them less vulnerable to ground fire.

They also of course had a considerably better chance of survival when intercepted by a fighters.

Turns out Kittyhawks could also carry rockets, though I think they only did it in the CBI

A-36 is a red herring. The A-36 was a funding trick to keep the production line open. There were never going to be any more. The Production line had changed over to newer model about 2-3 months before the first A-36 combat operation. It doesn't matter how good the A-36 is, in the summer of 1943 every A-36 built is a P-51B not built.

A-36 may have been a 'funding trick' but they were quite effective as fighter-bombers. I think it shows the potential of the early Mustangs in that role, even if you don't put dive brakes on them (how hard was that modification?) they still have the considerably enhanced range over a Hurricane (about 220%) plus much higher speed, especially on egress. They worked well in Italy in a quite dangerous environment. I believe the Mustang I and II were also used as fighter bombers on occasion.

The guns actually worked fairly well. Problem was that between the idea and first combat use things had changed. German tanks got thicker armor and the Germans got better/more AA guns. And much like the Ju 87Gs, you need air supremacy to really use them. Air superiority is not enough.

Guns are fine, the 2 pounder can kill a lot of things, the problem was carrying them under a Hurricane and shooting them from the Hurricane. The former slowed it down to ~ 220 mph top speed and the latter almost stopped it dead in the air. Some Hurricane IV were also fitted with these guns but they were rarely used with them because it did indeed require "air supremacy" to use them without getting slaughtered. IIRC they took very heavy losses in North Africa when they briefly tried them out. In the long run they found that the rockets worked a lot better, Hurricane IV could carry those.

It is wrong, you need to change the wing.
However they didn't stop making Hurricane IICs when they were building Hurricane IVs. The IICs could carry either bombs or rockets or drop tanks.

Are you sure? I thought hte "E' wing could be configured for different purposes...?

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Take your own advice

So where have I been speaking for others present here?

Which doesn't match Shores research, clearly.

Clearly, in fact the 4 sources do not always match each other despite all being official Air Force Documents, notice that?, here is a 5th,

Record Group 18 Entry 7 Box 5938, 12th Air Force, monthly operations and control statistics.

P-40 units in 1944
January, 42 claims made by 33rd, 79th, 324th Groups, plus 99th squadron. No claims by the P-40 still in the 57th.
February, 24 claims made by 79th, 324th Groups. No claims by the 33rd or P-40 in the 27th and 86th
March, 3 claims made by the 27th, 334th groups. No claims made by P-40 still in 79th. (86th back to A-36 only)
April, no claims made by the 27th, 334th groups. No claims made by P-40 still in 79th.
May, 2 claims made by the 334th group and 99th squadron. No claims made by P-40 still in 27th, or those in the 86th.
June, no claims made by the 334th group and 99th squadron. No claims made by P-40 still in 27th, or those in the 86th.
July, 4 claims made by the 334th group, the only unit now reporting P-40 on strength.

Frank Olynyk first became known for compiling fighter pilot victory credits from the start of air warfare and trying for as many nations as possible. One of his stories is AFHRA thought it had two copies of the 9th Air Force victory list, so discarded one leaving itself with the incomplete copy. To repeat myself, USAAF claims could take weeks to months to be awarded, creating inconsistencies, the Frank Olynyk lists are considered the best available, ones the Mediterranean Air War books had access to.

Once again, this summary doesn't match Shores daily operational history, which may due to which Air Force the various units were assigned to I don't know, but the data speaks for itself.

More exactly it does not match the Olynyk lists. However it needed to be posted to show it was a primary source given claims of invented data.

Did not notice the contradictions in the 4 lists posted, now 5, or which list was considered the best and then think what it meant? Frank Olynyk and Bill Marshall did work on Study 85 noting problems, not sure if it included MTO work. Compiling the lists in Shores et. al. would be a very useful check/correction on the official figures. Instead it seems burn the witch was preferred. Another one of those useful checks is discovering the USAAF Statistical Digest includes jettisoned bombs when counting tonnages.

I didn't say you made it up,

Actually you did, including where I pulled the data from.

USAAF Study 85, Fighter Victory Credits
Air 40/1096 Statistical Summary of 9th Air Force Operations 16 Oct 1943 to 8 May 1945, MTO operations,
15th Air Force, fighter victory credits
AFHRA 670.308-2, 15th AF Campaign Statistics
AFHRA 670.308-3, 15th AF Target and Duty sheets Dec 43 to Feb 44 (incomplete)
AFHRA 670.308-4, 15th AF Daily/Monthly statistics March to October 1944
US Archives,
Target and Duty Sheets, 15th Air Force, Record Group 18 Entry 7, Boxes 5927 (Apr-44), 5928 (Aug,Sep-44), 5939 (Jun,Jul-44) 5940 (Dec-43 to Mar 44, May and Oct 44)
Record Group 18 entry 7, Boxes 5924, 5925 15th AF Monthly Report Apr 44 to Mar 45 (except Oct 44). Note sortie figures are pilot sorties = effective + non effective crossing enemy lines.

I said you got it from a summary in a secondary source, which is clear that you did.

Please let everybody know what is the definition of a primary source and why the above fail that test.

It didn't occur to you those can be misleading or wrong.

You mean like pointing out the differences between the Statistical Digest and the Study 86 results? Or mentioning Frank Olynyk?

B.S.

Make the connections, after listing large numbers of USAAF fighter claims and noting they were mostly for enemy fighters, so few enemy fighters actually lost says trying to figure out the better USAAF fighters should really become why were a collective near failure, disguising this by massive over claiming, or the enemy losses figures are incorrect instead more like the ones in Williamson Murray

Except, if you were familiar with the operational history, which you clearly are not, you would know that the other units were escorting medium bombers just like the 325th was - including both B-26s and B-25s, as well as British A-20 DB-7s and Baltimores which may be classified as either light or medium, and fighter bombers. All of the FG flew the same types of mission profiles, the only difference is what other units they were linked to

It goes like this the 325th was assigned to the strategic air force and so had a different mission profile to the other USAAF P-40 groups, the above seems to be an attempt to say it was all the same. No actual data.

I just pointed out the reality, to which you took umbrage because that, old boy, is how you roll..

People can go back and discover the rewrites if they choose. Actually what I said was 1 Spitfire group was assigned to the coastal air force and this needs to be accounted for, no mention of missions, note how things are generously reworded.

Please provide the list of what subjects I am supposed to know something, which usually tells more about the person making the list. Make the claim, back it up.

nice try

Good to know claims will not be backed up.

I think you play games, which have already been described.

Or imagined instead of actually backing up claims.

Nobody is going to get killed just because you make a fool of yourself over and over. Trust me. Otherwise the death toll would be breathtaking.

The squawks here are generally meaningless. Part of this exchange is watching the "Trust me" claims be destroyed by the person making them.

This post by "Geoffrey"' claims 12.5 victories in the month of Jan 1944 for the 79th FG and 8 for the 33rd FG.

Apparently Study 86 is now mine. By the way why put the name in quotes? Tell all your real name, if you are going to do things like that.

As an example of escorting 'Strategic bombing' by medium bombers, on Jan 1 US 33rd FG escorted 43 x B-25s from 57th bomb wing and 73 B-26s from 42nd Bomb Wing to hit targets near Nice

Date? Targets?

On 1 November 1943 when formed the 15th Air Force took the 42nd Wing and its B-26 groups along with the B-17 and B-24 groups, the B-26 flew their final missions under the 15th on 30 December. On 1 January 1944 the 42nd Wing was transferred to the 12th Air Force. The 325th by this stage was a P-47 unit in the 15th Air Force.

Agreed, there were also 1400 Hurricane IV built in Canada,

486 I, 515 IIB, 400 XII (B wing armament), 50 Sea I, total 1,451. Many of the 1943 arrivals in Britain were fitted with C wings before issue, some marked as conversions, some as IIC.

The Hurricane IV was in production in December 1942 and was released to the Service in January 1943. Wings contained basic armament of 2 x 0.303 inch Browning machine guns and catered for the following alternative installations, which were carried under the wings, two "S" type guns (40mm) or two B.H. type guns, (40mm) or eight Rockets (25 or 60 pound warheads) or two 250 or 500 pound bombs or two SBC (small bomb containers) or SCI (smoke curtain installation) or two 45 or 90 gallon drop tanks.

Hurricane IV production ended with 1 in March 1944, IIB production ended in November 1942, IIC July 1944, few IIB were fitted with wing racks, almost all IIC were. Gloster ceased Hurricane production in March 1942, Austin built 300 Hurricanes February 1941 to October 1942.

Westland began building 50 Spitfire 1 in July 1941, swichign to mark V in December

Merlin X production was 1,204 in 1940, 1,898 in 1941. Main users, new production, Whitley 387 in 1940 and 464 in 1941, Wellington II 35 in 1940, 307 in 1941, each needing 2 engines plus spares.

Merlin 21 production was a batch of 47 in the first months of 19941 then from September onwards. Merlin 22 start production in August 1942 and take to December to reach over 100 in a month, Merlin XX production was running at over 1,000 a month during this time. To end July 1942 there were 423 Halifax II and 292 Lancaster I built, with their combined new aircraft requirements easily exceeding Merlin 22 output for some time after.

Lancaster II production began in August 1942, III in December. Lancaster I production was effectively shut down in April 1943 and revived in September, for the 6 months, 17, 0, 0, 5, 0, 18. The arrival of the Lancaster in place of the Manchester put holes in the 1940/41 engine production forecasts.

Bristol built 1 Beaufighter IIf in September 1940 then another 449 March 1941 to July 1942.

Rolls Royce say 339 Merlin XX In 1940 and 4,788 in 1941.

When it comes to Stirlings in 1940 Short built 9 and Short Harland 5, in 1941 Short built 40, Short Harland 73 and Austin 40. Short also built 1 mark II.

Plenty of Tomahawks but very few Kittyhawks were sent to Britain, the latter mostly for experimental purposes.

In 1940/41 every engine and airframe being built in Britain was committed even if it was just providing something better than previous in the training system. A lot of capacity was being opened in 1940/41. For Merlins Crewe started in June 1939, Glasgow in November 1940 and Ford in August 1941. Rolls Royce says Merlin output in 1941 was 5,330 Derby, 5,076 Crewe, 1,711 Glasgow, 184 Ford, total 11,450.

On the plus side you'll lose about 1/4 as many aircraft (and pilots) so you'll be able to keep more in the inventory and replace fewer, ...

But let me pose a question - if you have 50 aircraft which are being lost at a rate of 5-6 per month is that worth more than 200 aircraft that are being lost at a rate of 30-40 per month?

This comes down to if we are talking RAF loss rates or Steamed Banana loss rate for unliked aircraft.

 

[wuzak]

Agreed, there were also 1400 Hurricane IV built in Canada, Merlin powered Beaufighters which weren't really a successful experiment, and several others.

From what I can find on the internet, Hurricanes built in Canada were the I, IIB, XII and the Sea Hurricane Mks I and XII.

Canadian built IIBs had, as far as I can tell, Merlin XXs.
XIIs had Packard built Merlin 29s.

There were also the X and XI, but these are not official designations. Many of tehse were shipped to Britain without engines.

No Mk IV or IID built in Canada.

As explained by SR6, the Merlin Beaufighter was built to compensate for an expected shortage of Hercules.

The air frame changes required to make the Beaufighter II suitably stable were carried through for later marks.

Also, what would you consider unsuccessful about them?

 

[Steamed_Banana]

More exactly it does not match the Olynyk lists. However it needed to be posted to show it was a primary source given claims of invented data.

You said air to air combat was "largely over" for a series of fighter groups in 1943. It clearly was not the case because they were still engaged in air combat right to the end of 1943, and then during Anzio, which I had already pointed out. Now you are assigning this to Olynyk and etc. You made a definitive statement and don't want to admit you were wrong. So you continue to make endless, churlish, surly posts which say very little of any merit or value.

Which is really childish and a waste of time.

Make the connections, after listing large numbers of USAAF fighter claims and noting they were mostly for enemy fighters, so few enemy fighters actually lost says trying to figure out the better USAAF fighters should really become why were a collective near failure, disguising this by massive over claiming, or the enemy losses figures are incorrect instead more like the ones in Williamson Murray

I do not know the exact real aircraft loss figures for the Germans + Italians in 1942-43. I have seen some old charts which purport to show summaries but these do not necessarily hold up. More pertinent here, I've yet to see any evidence of greater overclaiming by US vs British units in Theater. If that is what you are suggesting then provide evidence? Overclaiming appears to be a constant, and I've yet to see any evidence .

It goes like this the 325th was assigned to the strategic air force and so had a different mission profile to the other USAAF P-40 groups, the above seems to be an attempt to say it was all the same. No actual data.

As I've pointed out several times, they were flying the same kinds of missions. 325th FG flew many fighter-bomber sorties (while flying P-40s) and also flew escort missions for light and medium bombers, much more rarely for heavy bombers, as well as fighter sweeps and combat air patrol. Same as all the other P-40 units. I don't think it changed that much for that matter for the 325th once they switched to P-47s though I haven't looked into it that closely.

People can go back and discover the rewrites if they choose. Actually what I said was 1 Spitfire group was assigned to the coastal air force and this needs to be accounted for, no mention of missions, note how things are generously reworded.

And I was pointing out the (lack of) significance of these assignments vis a vis mission profiles. Do you have evidence that one of the US Spitfire equipped fighter groups was flying less combat missions or encountering fewer enemy aircraft than the other? more importantly, why do you care?

Please provide the list of what subjects I am supposed to know something, which usually tells more about the person making the list. Make the claim, back it up.

I retract that, I don't think you know anything. "Backing up" in such hostile exchanges as every exchange I've ever had with you is not something you can really do online with anonymous forum profiles.

Apparently Study 86 is now mine. By the way why put the name in quotes? Tell all your real name, if you are going to do things like that.

You made definitive statements before ever mentioning your sources, that came later when it was demonstrated that there were errors in your claims

Date? Targets?

I gave the date, Jan 1 1944. Targets were near Nice, that's all it said in the book (Shores MAW Vol IV, in the entry for that date)

On 1 November 1943 when formed the 15th Air Force took the 42nd Wing and its B-26 groups along with the B-17 and B-24 groups, the B-26 flew their final missions under the 15th on 30 December. On 1 January 1944 the 42nd Wing was transferred to the 12th Air Force. The 325th by this stage was a P-47 unit in the 15th Air Force.

So what?

This comes down to if we are talking RAF loss rates or Steamed Banana loss rate for unliked aircraft.

No, it doesn't. Would you like to compare loss rates for Hurricanes vs P-40F, Spit V, P-38? Because we can definitely do that.

I'm glad you posted that though, because I think this is pretty revealing. Your motivation for all your sour, monotonous, repetitious insults and posturing appears based on the best evidence available to me, to be perceived insults by non British for any British hardware in the war. An affliction which is not rare around here and works both ways.

For the record, I do not dislike the Hurricane, I really like it in fact. There are four Hurricane model kits built carefully by myself sitting on shelves right behind me as I type this. I think the Hurricane was key to British victory in the Battle of Britain and was a very effective and helpful war machine in North Africa, in Malta etc. through 1941 and somewhat into 1942.

I am also not under any illusions that the Hurricane was still viable as a fighter after 1942. Many here have made that observation, more importantly many British service personnel made that observation DURING THE WAR as well as after it. This is why the Hurricane was for the most part taken out of the role as a front line fighter in the Mediterranean by mid 1942 at the latest, and was fully out of the game in that role by mid 1943. That's why there are no Hurricane fighter claims during sorties over the beaches at Salerno or Sardinia or Naples or Anzio, at least not that I am aware of. Hurricane service as a fighter in Burma was a travesty which was widely recognized at the time and became a significant controversy in Theater there, though it continued to be used into 1945. And no it should not have been the main air defense over Cyrprus in 1946 either.

Similarly I would never argue that the Spitfire VIII, Mustang IV, Kittyhawk II etc. were viable as fighters during the Korean War, as much as I like those planes and believe they were still useful in 1943 or 1944.

 

[drgondog]

Yes, agreed, and in this case I think Shores research is more accurate and much more current, though I also have unit histories for all five fighter groups and for the 99th FS etc.

I know the Study 85 thing misses a lot of the claims and loss data for the MTO for whatever reason, I never really looked into why, but some of it I think is due to units moving from group to group (like some 57th and 33rd FG Sqns which were attached to British units, and 99th FS which moved through multiple US FG) and groups being assigned to different Air Forces (12th, 15th, DAF, NAAF etc.) I remember one summary I looked at didn't include USAF unit claims from when they were attached to British units and another one left off the HQ units claims. Several of them leave off 99th FS too for some reason.

USAF 85 parsed a lot of VC's based upon the actual encounter reports and victory credits assigned with no witness, or dubious description of destruction. In other words, when the victim was described as a 190 in a spin and disappeared in a cloud deck, that VC was moved to either Probable or Damaged. Sometimes there was only a squadron daily report and no formal Victory Credit Board as existed in ETO.

USAF 85 was based on pilot and current unit with dog tags consistent through all transfers to different units.

For example if you look to John D landers you will see victory credits at 9th FS, (49FG SWP), 38FS/55th FG ETO, 357Hq 357FG ETO, and 78FG Hq 78FG ETO

In other words USAF 85 didn't 'miss a lot'. What 85 didn't not adequately address were the POW Returnee reports in which claims were made after the return. Olynyk was the single best expert and researcher of US Victory Credits and his update were always sent to USAFHRC for integration into the AAF/USAF database until Covid and Frank's passing.

Frank was working with Shores. I have the 2020 latest AAF database as well as the most current (through 2020) update of RAF Mustang VCs.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

From what I can find on the internet, Hurricanes built in Canada were the I, IIB, XII and the Sea Hurricane Mks I and XII.

Canadian built IIBs had, as far as I can tell, Merlin XXs.
XIIs had Packard built Merlin 29s.

There were also the X and XI, but these are not official designations. Many of tehse were shipped to Britain without engines.

No Mk IV or IID built in Canada.

Fair enough, I stand corrected. Whatever specific designation, I think the Merlin XX (or slightly later derivation) should have been used for other aircraft.

As explained by SR6, the Merlin Beaufighter was built to compensate for an expected shortage of Hercules.

The air frame changes required to make the Beaufighter II suitably stable were carried through for later marks.

Also, what would you consider unsuccessful about them?

I gather they were difficult to maintain and prone to accidents. This is what the Wiki says:

"Flight tests found that the Merlins left the aircraft underpowered, with a pronounced tendency to swing to port, making take-offs and landings difficult and causing a high accident rate – out of 337 Merlin-powered aircraft, 102 were lost to accidents.[8]​[10]"​

Their sources for this appear to be:

White, Graham (2006). The Long Road to the Sky: Night Fighter Over Germany. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Casemate Publishers. ISBN 978-1-84415-471-5.
Moyes, Philip J.R. (1966). The Bristol Beaufighter I & II (Aircraft in Profile Number 137). Leatherhead, Surrey, UK: Profile Publications Ltd.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

USAF 85 parsed a lot of VC's based upon the actual encounter reports and victory credits assigned with no witness, or dubious description of destruction. In other words, when the victim was described as a 190 in a spin and disappeared in a cloud deck, that VC was moved to either Probable or Damaged. Sometimes there was only a squadron daily report and no formal Victory Credit Board as existed in ETO.

USAF 85 was based on pilot and current unit with dog tags consistent through all transfers to different units.

For example if you look to John D landers you will see victory credits at 9th FS, (49FG SWP), 38FS/55th FG ETO, 357Hq 357FG ETO, and 78FG Hq 78FG ETO

In other words USAF 85 didn't 'miss a lot'. What 85 didn't not adequately address were the POW Returnee reports in which claims were made after the return. Olynyk was the single best expert and researcher of US Victory Credits and his update were always sent to USAFHRC for integration into the AAF/USAF database until Covid and Frank's passing.

Frank was working with Shores. I have the 2020 latest AAF database as well as the most current (through 2020) update of RAF Mustang VCs.

Interesting. Postwar revision of claims is always very fraught I think. IMO the claims confirmed as such during the war are the basis of what determines a 'valid' wartime claim. Actual losses are a different matter and we are only starting to begin to be able to shed some light on that (a big part of what Shores was doing with his later work).

It does get complicated when some claims got adjusted at various levels in the military hierarchy during the war, but that was not quite as common I think.

By the way I'm not claiming that Shores is free of errors or biases either, I just think he's the best available to use for this (MTO) Theater in particular at the moment. Fully hope and expect that more authors will keep working at this and keep improving our understanding, yourself included.

 

[yulzari]

Those 40mm guns on the IIDs sounded good but were fairly well a disaster when they tried to use them.

They were far more accurate than the rockets. The HE rounds were also a better match to the .303" ranging guns and the HE was much used in Burma with the accuracy allowing closer firing to friendly forces and hitting point targets. One must remember that the S Gun was completely different to the tank 2 Pounder and, whilst it had a slower muzzle velocity it added the Hurricane's airspeed to the ballistic muzzle velocity which raised it's effective muzzle velocity somewhat. After all you are chucking the bullet at the target at over 200mph if you just threw it out of the cockpit. Well able to penetrate ą typical Japanese tactical bunker. If you needed even more muzzle velocity then the Littlejohn Adaptor will do that, if only for APCNR/APSV rounds. With the Littlejohn Adaptor the Hurricane could penetrate the side armour of any Panther tank, and even, potentially, a Tiger II at close range at an ideal 0 degree impact. The issue was not the guns as weapons but the gross degradation of aeroplane performance through drag and weight. You could kill a lot more tanks with these 40mm cannon than with salvos of 65lb rockets but lose a lot more aeroplanes. What the rockets were better at was throwing wild salvos of 65lb warheads at the supporting logistics.

wwiiequipment.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=97:vickers-40mm-qsq-gun&catid=44:gunsrockets&Itemid=60

 

[ColFord]

A-36 may have been a 'funding trick' but they were quite effective as fighter-bombers. I think it shows the potential of the early Mustangs in that role, even if you don't put dive brakes on them (how hard was that modification?) they still have the considerably enhanced range over a Hurricane (about 220%) plus much higher speed, especially on egress. They worked well in Italy in a quite dangerous environment. I believe the Mustang I and II were also used as fighter bombers on occasion.

Adding dive brakes was hard and added a considerable additional servicing and maintenance requirement on the ground crew - both in check in daily servicing and a lot more during the larger scheduled servicing. The servicing and maintenance of purely the hydraulic system aspects of the dive brakes added about 20% additional requirements over those of the earlier NA-91 P-51 and NA-99 P-51A not fitted with dive brakes.

The RAFs NA-73 & A-83 Mustang I and NA-91 P-51 Mustang IA were not fitted ex the factory with underwing stores carriers and as such did not carry bombs or drop tanks or other underwing stores. The exception was the handful of Mustang I aircraft modified by AA&EE for trials of the 'low attack wing' concept, but these were not used operationally. The RAF did not use any of its Allison engine Mustangs in the fighter bomber role. They did conduct strafing attacks on targets of opportunity on the ground. Even the NA-99 P-51A Mustang II when they received them, had the external underwing hard points removed as they were not required for the intended low level Tac/R role with the RAF. It was not until post war, that a couple of the remaining Mustang IIs had the external underwing hard points re-installed so that modified drop tanks or stores carriers could be fitted and used for external carriage of items eg. the pilot's overnight bag, items purchased/obtained for the Squadron Mess, etc.

The USAAF's NA-99 P-5As in the ETO were all modified for use in the Tac/R role and also had their underwing hard points/stores carriers removed. The USAAF P-51As in the CBI retained their underwing hard points/stores carriers and they were used for carriage and use of both drop tanks and underwing stores/bombs - in some instances they carried both drop tanks and underwing stores. Example of P-51A with USAAF Air Commandos in CBI.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

So if I understand you correctly the bomb shackles that did come with some of the early Mustangs were removed for the recon missions they were expected to fly?

Where did they put the cameras by the way?

 

[andy1967]

So if I understand you correctly the bomb shackles that did come with some of the early Mustangs were removed for the recon missions they were expected to fly?

Where did they put the cameras by the way?

The F.24 camera was fitted behind the cockpit.

 

[BarnOwlLover]

I don't think that drop tank/bomb racks (aside from experimental fittings) came in until the A-36 (NA-97) and P-51A aka Mustang II (NA-99). Either way, they didn't interfere with camera mountings. Not sure what the RAF did with the P-51A drop tank racks in service.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

There is near zero aviation content in this. I see the smile insults continue, for those into childish and waste of time.

You said air to air combat was "largely over" for a series of fighter groups in 1943.

Yes, using study 85 exaggerated the effect, using the Olynyk lists brings that back, but stays within the definition.

It clearly was not the case because they were still engaged in air combat right to the end of 1943, and then during Anzio, which I had already pointed out.

All you need to do is explain why largely is being redefined as totally.

Now you are assigning this to Olynyk and etc.

Really, presenting the contradictions between 5 different sources and recommending Olynyk as the better list is assigning?

You made a definitive statement and don't want to admit you were wrong.

So which one of the groups shot down more aircraft before the given dates than after them? Given the insults why not continue watching the spending of so much time on the "big mistake", that is the definition of largely is (largely?) wrong. Not to mention the continued statements of how much work is being done for little or no reward.

I do not know the exact real aircraft loss figures for the Germans + Italians in 1942-43.

Yet the posted figures for the Luftwaffe, far more importantly after compiling allied claims meaning either the Luftwaffe figures were wrong or the USAAF fighters alone were massively over claiming. Instead of addressing this we now have denial.

I have seen some old charts which purport to show summaries but these do not necessarily hold up. More pertinent here, I've yet to see any evidence of greater overclaiming by US vs British units in Theater. If that is what you are suggesting then provide evidence? Overclaiming appears to be a constant, and I've yet to see any evidence .

An obviously incorrect figure was posted, now suddenly it becomes British versus US. Try the Luftwaffe figure was incorrect, simple, not flee forward to a new insult.

As I've pointed out several times, they were flying the same kinds of missions.

And as been pointed out several times this is not the full answer.

325th FG flew many fighter-bomber sorties (while flying P-40s) and also flew escort missions for light and medium bombers, much more rarely for heavy bombers, as well as fighter sweeps and combat air patrol.

The 325th sent to the strategic force was firstly on call for escort duties, how many fighter bomber sorties after that assignment?

Same as all the other P-40 units.

So even for the 325th the ratios between the various missions was the same, fighter bomber to fighter to escort to ….

I don't think it changed that much for that matter for the 325th once they switched to P-47s though I haven't looked into it that closely.

325th Group, 15th Air Force, December 1943 to 24 May 1944, effective sorties, 3,000 Bomber Escort, 65 Special Escort, 814 Sweep, 3,879 Total. From then on used P-51. Apart from 1 ton dropped by P-51 near the end of the war the 15th Air Force fighter bomber sorties were all P-38.

And I was pointing out the (lack of) significance of these assignments vis a vis mission profiles.

And having it pointed out how you are wrong.

Do you have evidence that one of the US Spitfire equipped fighter groups was flying less combat missions or encountering fewer enemy aircraft than the other?

Given the original analysis was about the number of enemy aircraft shot down, the amount of combat seems to be a requirement. What I do have in evidence is that a Spitfire group operating as part of 12th Air Force main mission army support, had different mission and combat experiences to one assigned to defence of the supply lines. The Luftwaffe tended to use different tactics and aircraft attacking ground troops compared with ports for example.

more importantly, why do you care?

Preference for accuracy. The problems with a simple analysis with its blanket they were all doing the same thing on average.

Please provide the list of what subjects I am supposed to know something, which usually tells more about the person making the list. Make the claim, back it up.

I retract that, I don't think you know anything.

Change the insults as a reply. Remember we have someone really concerned about the effects of getting personal on the readership.

"Backing up" in such hostile exchanges as every exchange I've ever had with you is not something you can really do online with anonymous forum profiles.

So why was my name put in quotes and what is yours?

You made definitive statements before ever mentioning your sources,

If you look I include or exclude the sources, it depends.

that came later when it was demonstrated that there were errors in your claims

Have the dictionary people accepted your definition of largely? Needed to create the error. Actually the references were added after the not to be forgiven or forgotten claims the data was made up. Which became claims it was not primary data which became to how about forgetting the whole thing. Big miss there after proclaiming forbearance with the personal stuff for the sake of other readers, here was a gigantic chance to provide a real service, show made up data was being used. Still waiting, rather ruins the credibility of the accuser.

I gave the date, Jan 1 1944. Targets were near Nice, that's all it said in the book (Shores MAW Vol IV, in the entry for that date)

I asked as the 2 groups where the mission lists are easily available both reported no sorties. Still waiting on targets so we can see what rates as strategic.

Regarding who controlled what on 1 January 1944

So what?

As of 31 December 33rd Fighter Group was 12th Air Force, the B-26 units 15th, next day everyone was 12th, bigger chance the 33rd would do B-26 escort, reflecting the way command arrangements effect missions, like Strategic versus Coastal versus 12th Air Force Command.

No, it doesn't. Would you like to compare loss rates for Hurricanes vs P-40F, Spit V, P-38? Because we can definitely do that.

Still waiting for the Blenheim data, start with that. For help,

AIR 22/401 (my copy)
p1 fighter sorties ME/Malta from Sep 42, daily by type, monthly reporting period
p146 NWA fighter sorties January 1943 on, daily by type, monthly reporting period
p392 RAF/Allied casualties from Jun 40, daily by type, monthly reporting period
p531 casualties monthly by sub theatre, plus cumulative from Jun 40

CBI, Far East in part two.

I have posted excerpts but interestingly the search engines seem to not index the data if it is in spreadsheet format.

I'm glad you posted that though, because I think this is pretty revealing. Your motivation for all your sour, monotonous, repetitious insults and posturing appears based on the best evidence available to me, to be perceived insults by non British for any British hardware in the war. An affliction which is not rare around here and works both ways.

Lets see now the Steamed Banana Blenheim, data long promised to back the conclusions, now the Steamed Banana Hurricane, both downgrades, Steamed Banana P-40 with 1,000 pound bombs or 1,000+ pound loads in the Western Desert in 1942, loads missed by the unit histories, an upgrade. Steamed Banana data tends to the anecdotes, likely to contain a higher percentage of exceptions, then poor analysis. If you dispute the three conclusions above guess what accusation can be made. Go from not only right to righteous, start handing out halo clusters, tell the judges hear only the prosecution or defence cases only, much simpler.

Now go find where someone enhanced a British design or downgraded a US design and see what was said. The from the near start of the internet clueless long range mental state and character detection system is still clueless.

For the record, I do not dislike the Hurricane, I really like it in fact.

I try to avoid liking or disliking an aircraft, it inevitably effects your judgement. Same for the people. Passing judgments needs to understand there are a number of WWII commanders I would not want to be around much and there is also a number of WWII commanders who would not want me around much.

Meantime consider the Hurricane design was effectively frozen in 1941, still had the same engine in 1944 with a little more power, even with the Merlin 22 and 24 available, the P-39 and P-40 gained more powerful engines. Why? The 1941 upgrade was a lot to do with staying a viable bomber destroyer.

Next comes the need for fighters and also replacing the Lysander in the tactical reconnaissance units, the Blenheim as a light bomber. The RAF has the story of the Battle losses in France but also how quickly it was retired from service, the Blenheim had about the same performance as the Battle. Overlaid by the RAF accepting cuts in airframe and aircrew quality in 1941/42 to have the numbers, something the axis would face in 1944/45.

Hurricane service as a fighter in Burma was a travesty

It will be interesting to see what data equals travesty.

And no it should not have been the main air defense over Cyrprus in 1946 either.

The Hurricane IV was not an air defence airframe, anyway who was threatening Cyprus at the time? Anything to do with the post war violence in the Balkans? The ability to operate cheaper aircraft in lower threat environments?

USAAF rule of thumb WWII, 1/3 aircraft losses in US, 1/3 not due to enemy action (including war weary), 1/3 enemy action. Citing a third lost by accidents is no a good way to decide quality.

Beaufighter II, Bristol built 1 Beaufighter IIf in September 1940 then another 449 March 1941 to July 1942. It was underpowered compared to the Hercules versions. RAF Census, February 1943, 91 all cause losses at home, 1 synthetic trainer, 5 to instructional, 2 converted. End June 1944, 166 all cause losses at home, 2 more overseas, 1 synthetic trainer, 34 to instructional, 86 to Admiralty, 2 converted.

Served in 15 squadrons, night fighter, which would up the accident rate a third lost to accidents says few lost in combat.

The dihedral tail was the stability fix, it was reported disliked by at least some fighter pilots.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

I don't think that drop tank/bomb racks (aside from experimental fittings) came in until the A-36 (NA-97) and P-51A aka Mustang II (NA-99). Either way, they didn't interfere with camera mountings. Not sure what the RAF did with the P-51A drop tank racks in service.

The two questions were unrelated

 

[Steamed_Banana]

There is near zero aviation content in this. I see the smile insults continue, for those into childish and waste of time.

Yes, using study 85 exaggerated the effect, using the Olynyk lists brings that back, but stays within the definition.


All you need to do is explain why largely is being redefined as totally.


Really, presenting the contradictions between 5 different sources and recommending Olynyk as the better list is assigning?


So which one of the groups shot down more aircraft before the given dates than after them? Given the insults why not continue watching the spending of so much time on the "big mistake", that is the definition of largely is (largely?) wrong. Not to mention the continued statements of how much work is being done for little or no reward.


Yet the posted figures for the Luftwaffe, far more importantly after compiling allied claims meaning either the Luftwaffe figures were wrong or the USAAF fighters alone were massively over claiming. Instead of addressing this we now have denial.


An obviously incorrect figure was posted, now suddenly it becomes British versus US. Try the Luftwaffe figure was incorrect, simple, not flee forward to a new insult.


And as been pointed out several times this is not the full answer.


The 325th sent to the strategic force was firstly on call for escort duties, how many fighter bomber sorties after that assignment?


So even for the 325th the ratios between the various missions was the same, fighter bomber to fighter to escort to ….


325th Group, 15th Air Force, December 1943 to 24 May 1944, effective sorties, 3,000 Bomber Escort, 65 Special Escort, 814 Sweep, 3,879 Total. From then on used P-51. Apart from 1 ton dropped by P-51 near the end of the war the 15th Air Force fighter bomber sorties were all P-38.


And having it pointed out how you are wrong.


Given the original analysis was about the number of enemy aircraft shot down, the amount of combat seems to be a requirement. What I do have in evidence is that a Spitfire group operating as part of 12th Air Force main mission army support, had different mission and combat experiences to one assigned to defence of the supply lines. The Luftwaffe tended to use different tactics and aircraft attacking ground troops compared with ports for example.


Preference for accuracy. The problems with a simple analysis with its blanket they were all doing the same thing on average.

Please provide the list of what subjects I am supposed to know something, which usually tells more about the person making the list. Make the claim, back it up.


Change the insults as a reply. Remember we have someone really concerned about the effects of getting personal on the readership.


So why was my name put in quotes and what is yours?


If you look I include or exclude the sources, it depends.


Have the dictionary people accepted your definition of largely? Needed to create the error. Actually the references were added after the not to be forgiven or forgotten claims the data was made up. Which became claims it was not primary data which became to how about forgetting the whole thing. Big miss there after proclaiming forbearance with the personal stuff for the sake of other readers, here was a gigantic chance to provide a real service, show made up data was being used. Still waiting, rather ruins the credibility of the accuser.


I asked as the 2 groups where the mission lists are easily available both reported no sorties. Still waiting on targets so we can see what rates as strategic.

Regarding who controlled what on 1 January 1944

As of 31 December 33rd Fighter Group was 12th Air Force, the B-26 units 15th, next day everyone was 12th, bigger chance the 33rd would do B-26 escort, reflecting the way command arrangements effect missions, like Strategic versus Coastal versus 12th Air Force Command.


Still waiting for the Blenheim data, start with that. For help,

AIR 22/401 (my copy)
p1 fighter sorties ME/Malta from Sep 42, daily by type, monthly reporting period
p146 NWA fighter sorties January 1943 on, daily by type, monthly reporting period
p392 RAF/Allied casualties from Jun 40, daily by type, monthly reporting period
p531 casualties monthly by sub theatre, plus cumulative from Jun 40

CBI, Far East in part two.

I have posted excerpts but interestingly the search engines seem to not index the data if it is in spreadsheet format.


Lets see now the Steamed Banana Blenheim, data long promised to back the conclusions, now the Steamed Banana Hurricane, both downgrades, Steamed Banana P-40 with 1,000 pound bombs or 1,000+ pound loads in the Western Desert in 1942, loads missed by the unit histories, an upgrade. Steamed Banana data tends to the anecdotes, likely to contain a higher percentage of exceptions, then poor analysis. If you dispute the three conclusions above guess what accusation can be made. Go from not only right to righteous, start handing out halo clusters, tell the judges hear only the prosecution or defence cases only, much simpler.

Now go find where someone enhanced a British design or downgraded a US design and see what was said. The from the near start of the internet clueless long range mental state and character detection system is still clueless.


I try to avoid liking or disliking an aircraft, it inevitably effects your judgement. Same for the people. Passing judgments needs to understand there are a number of WWII commanders I would not want to be around much and there is also a number of WWII commanders who would not want me around much.

Meantime consider the Hurricane design was effectively frozen in 1941, still had the same engine in 1944 with a little more power, even with the Merlin 22 and 24 available, the P-39 and P-40 gained more powerful engines. Why? The 1941 upgrade was a lot to do with staying a viable bomber destroyer.

Next comes the need for fighters and also replacing the Lysander in the tactical reconnaissance units, the Blenheim as a light bomber. The RAF has the story of the Battle losses in France but also how quickly it was retired from service, the Blenheim had about the same performance as the Battle. Overlaid by the RAF accepting cuts in airframe and aircrew quality in 1941/42 to have the numbers, something the axis would face in 1944/45.


It will be interesting to see what data equals travesty.


The Hurricane IV was not an air defence airframe, anyway who was threatening Cyprus at the time? Anything to do with the post war violence in the Balkans? The ability to operate cheaper aircraft in lower threat environments?

USAAF rule of thumb WWII, 1/3 aircraft losses in US, 1/3 not due to enemy action (including war weary), 1/3 enemy action. Citing a third lost by accidents is no a good way to decide quality.

Beaufighter II, Bristol built 1 Beaufighter IIf in September 1940 then another 449 March 1941 to July 1942. It was underpowered compared to the Hercules versions. RAF Census, February 1943, 91 all cause losses at home, 1 synthetic trainer, 5 to instructional, 2 converted. End June 1944, 166 all cause losses at home, 2 more overseas, 1 synthetic trainer, 34 to instructional, 86 to Admiralty, 2 converted.

Served in 15 squadrons, night fighter, which would up the accident rate a third lost to accidents says few lost in combat.

The dihedral tail was the stability fix, it was reported disliked by at least some fighter pilots.

Dude I think you sprang a leak and are now sprung

 

[Steamed_Banana]

There is near zero aviation content in this.

You asked me to point out what your areas of expertise are. You nailed it right here. That is your most accurate statement that I have ever read on this forum.

My observation is that you will go to an enormous amount of effort to avoid admitting when you make a mistake.

Beyond that, I don't know how even you read that whole post, the chances of me reading it are zero. Which is the same chance of you ever owning up to an error when I point it out. Because this is a digital space rather than a bar-room, there is no way to resolve our mutual dislike. There is no traction and the wheels just spin forever, or in your case, forever to the power of infinity.

Here is my suggestion. Why don't you and I both just quit responding to each other's posts. That way we will definitely improve the experience for everyone on this forum, and everyone can go back to focusing on aviation.

 

[tomo pauk]

Here is my suggestion. Why don't you and I both just quit responding to each other's posts. That way we will definitely improve the experience for everyone on this forum, and everyone can go back to focusing on aviation.

That is a great suggestion.

 

[ColFord]

So if I understand you correctly the bomb shackles that did come with some of the early Mustangs were removed for the recon missions they were expected to fly?

Where did they put the cameras by the way?

NA-73 Mustang I - no factory designed or installed hardware or airframe modifications to permit the installation or carriage of underwing stores carriers/bomb shackles/underwing drop tanks, etc.

NA-83 Mustang I - no factory designed or installed hardware or airframe modifications to permit the installation or carriage of underwing stores carriers/bomb shackles/underwing drop tanks, etc.

NA-91 P-51 Mustang / Mustang IA - no factory designed or installed hardware or airframe modifications to permit the installation or carriage of underwing stores carriers/bomb shackles/underwing drop tanks, etc.

Air Ministry AA&EE modified a handful of Mustang I aircraft to trial the 'low attack wing' concept for potential introduction onto RAF Mustangs. This permitted installation of a range of different underwing mounts and stores for the trials, including standard RAF specification bombs, stores carriers, SCI cannisters, 40mm Vickers S Guns and a couple of different styles of 3" RP mounts and rails. Similar to the Hurricane IId, the wing armament was reduced to a single MG for sighting/self defence purposes - nose guns were retained.

NA-97 A-36A Mustang introduced the internal wing strengthening and modifications to allow the fitment of underwing stores carriers hardpoints, as well as the plumbing to the fuel system to draw fuel from underwing drop tanks if fitted.

NA-99 P-51A Mustang /Mustang II - refined the wing modifications introduced on the NA-97 A-36A to allow the fitment of underwing stores carriers / hardpoints, and the plumbing to the fuel system for use of underwing drop tanks. The basic wing design and structure in relation to the underwing stores carriers / hardpoints, fuel plumbing, carried forward to the P-51B/C wing.

The RAF on the Mustang IIs they received and the USAAF in the ETO the P-51As they deployed there for the TAC/R role removed the external hardpoints - the internal structure remained the same. Given the sortie profile they didn't need the extra fuel that underwing drop tanks may have provided, or the risk the tanks represented to light AA at low level, plus taking the hardpoints off gave them another 3-5mph air speed.

RAF, initially installed their oblique F.24 reconnaissance cameras in the left hand side quarter rear window behind the cockpit - pointing with the lens out to the left side of the aircraft and angled down, aimed to take a photo of the ground just behind the trailing edge of the wing. That went through a number of refinements over time, improving the mount, and later making it so the single camera could point out to either side of the aircraft. Then a dual rear oblique mount allowing 'back to back' F.24s in the quarter windows behnd the cockpit. RAF experimented with a number of different positions in the lower rear fuselage for a downwards vertical camera, but eventually a standardised mount for a single downwards F.24 in the bay behind the radiator outlet duct and the tail wheel bay. RAF also introduced in a small number of their Musang IIs a FIVE camera rig, which added an oblique camera installed in the rear fuselage aiming out each side, allowing 180 degrees horizon to horizon coverage of linear targets on a single photo pass. RAF also developed a number of limited use special mounts for the their Tac/R Mustangs to allow fitment of 35mm cine cameras and forward facing F.24 recce camera for special use.

USAAF on the NA-91 P-51 Mustangs they retained from the UK Lend Lease order, NAA and USAAF developed similar mounts to the RAF, for a single oblique in a modified left side quarter window and vertical cameras but for US manufactured K.24 cameras. The NAA and USAAF mounts as compared to the RAF ones were over engineered and complicated. For example the USAAF vertical camera mount in the tail bay had a control in the cockpit to permit the movement of the camera mount in flight from a direct vertical view to a rear oblique view - looking back beyond the tail of the aircraft. The same basic mounts, were retained by USAAF on the P-51As they used for the Tac/R role in the ETO - there is photographic evidence that the USAAF 'in the field' modified, simplified, the camera mounts they used to be similar to the RAF ones, especially when the USAAF P-51As on the ETO were fitted with Malcolm Hoods after arrival inthe UK - the US designed oblique camera mounts would not work with the Malcolm Hood mod. The USAAF P-51As in the ETO also had the underwing external hardpoints removed - similar to the RAF their mission profile did not require drop tanks and they get the extra couple of mph airspeed. To best of information available, USAAF didn't progress the range of camera mount modifications the RAF did for their Allison Mustangs eg dual obliques, oblique to right hand side, etc.

As noted in my previous post, after VE-Day, a couple of the RAF's remaining Mustang IIs serving with BAFO in Germany had their hardpoints refitted so that either RAF style stores carriers or modified drop tanks could be fitted. This allowed carriage of items that would not fit in the limited space inside the fuselage or empty ammo bays in the wing. So generally used for fitting an overnight bag for a pilot making a trip away from base to attend a meeting or on leave back to the UK, carrying items of value eg. alcohol, food, souvenirs, latest UK newspapers, urgently needed spare parts.

A basic point, low level Tactical Reconnaissance is a different mission profile and set of operational parameters compared to high level photo reconnaissance operations. Being at low level the aircraft comes into a wider range of enemy AA, from light, thru medium to heavy. The segment of the sortie over enemy territory is usually conducted at a higher 'fast' cruising speed in order to provide a degree of protection from enemy AA and interception by enemy fighters, compared to the range related cruising speeds used by high altitude PR aircraft - speed vs range. The types of targets and area of responsibility that the low level Tac/R and high level PR have is different, but may overlap in some instances eg both covered V weapon sites and both covered enemy beach defences along the coast but for different types of photography.

Photo: USAAF Tac/R NA-91 P-51 in MTO - oblique camera in installation with 'blown' covering perspex window immediately behind cockpit and vertical camera installed in bay ahead of tail wheel - note the discolouration around the panel lines at the bottom of the fuselage where the bay where the camera is fitted has been accessed.

Photo: RAF Standardised Mount for oblique F.24 camera behind cockpit - simpler cutout in perspex quarter window allowing wider range of focal length lenses to be used. vertical camera in bay ahead of tail wheel pointing straight down.

One of the small number of RAF Mustang Is modified by AA&EE for the 'low attack wing' trials, NA-83 Mustang I AM106/G in this case during this stage of the trials fitted with a pair of 40mm Vickers S Guns. Note single MG port in wing leading edge. The AA&EE developed wing stores carrier/hard point was different in approach and how it looked to the standardised USAAF hardpoint.