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HiI think the only thing that could slow down (not stop the 8th airforce bomber build up) would be to somehow hit the bombers while on the ground, something the 8th AA never had to deal with. That and sinking the Oil tankers before they reach England. But I think both options were out of the Germans capacity by 1943.
I never did understand why they never even tried to send one of the low level FW190 hit and run raids to one of the closest USAAC bomber bases at sunrise. I am sure other more informed members will enlighten me.
HiI was aware that they did night time intruder missions, but I believe they were all (or Mostly ) against RAF Bases. I do not remember any directed at 8th AF Bases.
I do agree that the FW190 may not have had the range with a bomb load. But I think it was a missed opertunity, could they have a large impact by 1943? Probably not, but it is easier to destroy A/C on the ground than it is in the air. Plus it could have made the 8th AF expend alot of manpower in building bomb resistant parking areas.
But thanks for the reminder of the intruder missions.
IMO - impossible to change the response by LW absent realization by itler and Goering and Jeschonnek that US Strategic bomber frces were an existential threat. Speer and Milch and Galland were more concerned and vocalized such concerns in ealy 1943 to no avail. It was only mid 1943 that Milch received authority to increase Day Fighter production - which was somewhat complicated by his actions to distribute/decouple large concentrated manufacturing centers for Ball Bearings, engines and aircraft. Simply, Push the assets and commitments in plase in summer 1943 to begin in ernest in Q4/1942For the sake of discussion, let's say that WAllies read the tea leaves a bit better between 1940 and 1942, and deploy a sizable (if imperfect) long-range fighter force from the UK against Germany by Spring of 1943. Talk a combination of Spitfire VIII with 150 imp gals, Mustang with any Merlin that can be spared , two groups of P-38s for starters, and, from Summer of 1943, P-47s; all of them with drop tanks' facility. By early 1944, the Spitfire XIV with rear tank is introduced, the 'proper' Merlin Mustang, as well as Tempest with 190+- imp gals (instead in late Summer of 1944). WAllies deploy about 400 of LR fighters total in April 1943, with new arrivals as it is plausible.
What kind of response should Luftwaffe try to deploy, in 1943 and then again in 1944? Focus is on the Luftwaffe, not RAF+USAAF here.
HiIn december 1943 some 20 odd fw 190's from jg2 or jg 26 attacked 1 or 2 airbases of 9 af, I think. I have never seen any reports of damage done.
Anyone have anything on this?
Given that the primary focus of western Allies was Overlord and that planned dates of Invasion were May/Early June 1944, the 'happy outcome' for Germany is that the Invasion planners and SHAEF and Churchill/Roosevelt deem those dates 'high risk' of failure. Had Churchill's vision of the 'soft underbelly of Europe' proven correct, the Wermacht would have been defeated handily and by some miracle able to force into Germany via Austria and southen France. The thought died a lonely death in 1943 as Kesslering demonstrated brilliance in defense.As one who habitually claims that the two desisive battles of ww2 took place in the beginning of desember 1941, it may seem strange that I bother. But this is kind of intriguing.
Now, luftwaffe cannot respond properly by themselves, they need the rest of Germany on the team. While Luftwaffe does what they did historically, denude the other fronts of fighter cover to make the schwerpunkt in the west one year before, Germany as a whole need to be strictly on the defensive. Pull out of North Africa is possible (they need to see the writing on the wall to do that in time) and don't attempt Kursk. They'll still loose North Africa, of course and be driven back on the eastern front. But arguablu the allies will not be gifted a whole years advance on the two other fronts, summer 43 will not play out as summer 44. The allies does not have that much numerical superiority yet, production will not have accumulated as much and Germany will not have lost so much materiel and experienced personel.
The same goes for Luftwaffe, whether the fuel situation is any better I can't say. I believe that in quality the Fw 190 of early 43 is better matched to allied fighters than in 1944. Of course Germany need to ramp up production of fighters one year early as well, and just maybe, on account of not having lost so many JU-52's in a futile attempt to supply North Africa, training of new pilots could be less of a problem. Anyway, put the bomber pilots that haven't yet been wasted over the Mediterranean, the eastern front and the baby blitz into fighters, with some trainig,I should add. Being less at a disadvantage in quality of aircraft and pilots, and not outnumbered as badly, they might make a desent showing.
Wotes against is that they've had less time to modify fighters for shooting down heavy bombers, and less time to develop tactics and other counter meassures. But how efficiently were they doing that while the daylight raids were not escorted and not so numerous? That question is perhaps more complicated than I feel comfortable answering.
The length of time to switch low time pilots and navigators inbound from US 'clear sky training' was bad enough ust coping with English weather in daylight. Imagine 3000 bombers in the sky every night over England, comng and going.I they do get the upper hand, what will the allied response be, apart from trying to implement ever better tactics? Politics may indeed dictate that daylight bombing is discontinued over ETO for a while. But the production plans are not that easily altered, and there'll be a clamour to use those bombers, maybe a shift to night bombing? If not a greater focus on attacking the axis' peripheries. Arguably night bombing would be less effective considering presision, but German night fighters may be swamped and do anyway not pose the threat they did in the winter 43/44. Will the hopes of the US day campaign be pinned on the B-29? If the US is willing to suffer the attrition, the Luftwaffe probably still will be defeated, and only slightly later albeit at greater cost.
The allies will still get to Berlin, at least the Red Army will, in the end Stalin would probably benefit the most from the earlier shift of focus away from the eastern front. I think the show would be over by fall of 45 anyway (there's this tiny detail of the bomb), though Japanmay last into 46.
In a documentary about Bletchley Park and the breaking of the Lorenz code, it said that before D-Day the Lorenz code was being broken and the allies were starting to get inside Adolf's head. While they werent able to force their way into Germany by Austria, they did exploit Hitler's "give no more ground" philosophy to bleed forces into defending Northern Italy and Austria with forces that would have made D-Day and the breakout from Normandy much more difficult.Given that the primary focus of western Allies was Overlord and that planned dates of Invasion were May/Early June 1944, the 'happy outcome' for Germany is that the Invasion planners and SHAEF and Churchill/Roosevelt deem those dates 'high risk' of failure. Had Churchill's vision of the 'soft underbelly of Europe' proven correct, the Wermacht would have been defeated handily and by some miracle able to force into Germany via Austria and southen France. The thought died a lonely death in 1943 as Kesslering demonstrated brilliance in defense.
They certainly did, but who's going to replace him? And how? As somebody have commented on in connection with the first world war, Germany wasn't exclusively dependent on Hitler to make a strategic mistake.I agree most of your points and questions to be answered. That said, Germany needed to remove Hitler before June 1941.
They certainly did, but who's going to replace him? And how? As somebody have commented on in connection with the first world war, Germany wasn't exclusively dependent on Hitler to make a strategic mistake.
That hope proved to be forlorn, but the allied vielded the wepon they had produced to great effect.
Deploy the 30mm cannon as the firepower answer to the USAAF heavy bombers, ignore the performance sapping the underwing cannon, rockets etc.For the sake of discussion, let's say that WAllies read the tea leaves a bit better between 1940 and 1942, and deploy a sizable (if imperfect) long-range fighter force from the UK against Germany by Spring of 1943. What kind of response should Luftwaffe try to deploy, in 1943 and then again in 1944? Focus is on the Luftwaffe, not RAF+USAAF here.
A concentrated allied attack increases the effectiveness of the defences, as the raids become more predictable and even with day fighter escorts the bombers were taking significant losses historically, similar for the night bombers. In 1943 the allies lack the bomb lift and the accuracy to hit even the historical oil targets hard enough. The USAAF was a visual bomber force only until 27 September 1943 (H2S) and 3 November 1943 (H2X), and through lack of equipment and training still largely visual to end 1943, with a radar bombing accuracy comparable to the 1942 night bombers. Bomber Command was still mostly thinking in terms of marking a city, not a specific target in the city, as it would change over to in France in early 1944.Had Bomber Command continued to hammer the Ruhr area in the second half of 1943 instead of switching to Berlin, and if a concentrated effort against transportation and oil (and electricity) by both the RAF and USAAF had been started in latter 1943, while that might not have prevented the need for ground troops entirely, it certainly would have hastened Germany's demise.