Arc Light One

I read a book called Arc Light One, by Don Harten, who flew B-52's, F-105's later on, and the F-111's.

The title of the mission was the operation he was involved with: Initially, it called for a low altitude raid on Phuc Yen by 30 x B-52F's operating out of Andersen AFB. The aircraft would fly along the coast at low-altitude; then pass over Hanoi, and bomb Phuc-Yen into a moonscape; then cruise back to Anderson.

The mission was shelved and instead, the B-52's would be used to attack troop-strongholds in the jungle's of North Vietnam. This mission would be flown at altitude (30,000 feet), but the mission included an atypical refueling, radio-silence, precise time requirements to refuel with the tanker, and a massive typhoon (Dinah) that was basically pulling them along at a higher than normal ground-speed. There also was a problem with one aircraft having a bomb/nav malfunction, requiring aircraft 1 & 2 in the formation to switch places.

The higher ground-speed would place them on the tanker too early, so they did a 360, and it was a bit wider than needed, and they crashed into an aircraft in the cell behind them. The collision sheared off part of the B-52's wing causing it to go out of control, and several crew-members (including Harten) ejected. Ultimately 8 people died, and to make it worse, the rescue aircraft also sprung a leak, attempted to take off, and crashed (they were ultimately rescued by a ship nearby).

While many of SAC's actions in Vietnam were fairly badly executed, this one actually seemed to decently well thought out, as initially planned. Phuc Yen was one of North Vietnam's best airfield's and would have thrown a monkey-wrench into much of the plans the North Vietnamese had in mind.

My guess was there was some kind of concern about killing Russian military advisors or drawing China into the conflict: I'm not sure that was really a case because

• The Chinese did not have a mutual-defense pact with North Vietnam
• We could always claim we didn't know there were Russian advisors at the base: It sounds silly, but they weren't supposed to be there anyway...

Did China have a mutual defense treaty with North Korea when they crossed the Yalu ? Do you really think it would make a difference ?

There were more nations than just Russia and China with personnel in North Vietnam, and why shouldn't they be there ? We never declared war on North Vietnam.

Quite a number of nations were involved with North Vietnam, aside from China and the Soviet Union, there were local Asian outfits like Cambodia, North Korea and neighboring communists groups along with several Warsaw pact nations and Cuba.

Not just communist aligned nations had personnel in North Vietnam, but French and Japanese nationals were present, I've heard of a few from Ireland too..
Doctors, sanitation engineers, agriculture experts, etc.
Doctors Without Borders wasn't formed till the early 70s, but there were plenty of people, or small organizations, performing a similar service before that.

A lot of the rest of the world didn't have the same viewpoint of the war as the US government.
We saw it as protecting South Vietnam from North Vietnam's aggression.
A lot of the rest of the world saw it as the US trying to impose it's will on one side of a civil war.

tyrodtom said:

Did China have a mutual defense treaty with North Korea when they crossed the Yalu?

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I don't know

Many people also fail to realize that the war in Vietnam wasn't started by the U.S. but

tyrodtom said:

Not just communist aligned nations had personnel in North Vietnam, but French and Japanese nationals were present, I've heard of a few from Ireland too..
Doctors, sanitation engineers, agriculture experts, etc.
Doctors Without Borders wasn't formed till the early 70s, but there were plenty of people, or small organizations, performing a similar service before that.

A lot of the rest of the world didn't have the same viewpoint of the war as the US government.
We saw it as protecting South Vietnam from North Vietnam's aggression.
A lot of the rest of the world saw it as the US trying to impose it's will on one side of a civil war.

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And the vast majority of modern history ignores the fact that the Vietnam war was a result of the Viet Mihn defending French Indo-China from France trying to take back their former colony after WWII.
Ho Chi Mihn and his cohorts were trained guerilla fighters to cause damage to Imperial Japanese occupation. They used their tactics well in trying to retain their homeland later against the French.
Korea, French Indo-China, Burma and other asian countries all became a hotbed of communist insurgencies in the vacuum left by the withdrawel of Imperial Japanese forces...

POST WORLD WAR II VIETNAM
The causes of the Vietnam War trace their roots back to the end of World War II. A French colony, Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, & Cambodia) had been occupied by the Japanese during the war. In 1941, a Vietnamese nationalist movement, the Viet Minh, was formed by Ho Chi Minh to resist the occupiers. A communist, Ho Chi Minh waged a guerilla war against the Japanese with the support of the United States.
Near the end of the war, the Japanese began to promote Vietnamese nationalism and ultimately granted the country nominal independence. On August 14, 1945, Ho Chi Minh launched the August Revolution which effectively saw the Viet Minh take control of the country.

Following the Japanese defeat, the Allied Powers decided that the region should remain under French control. As France lacked the troops to retake the area, Nationalist Chinese forces occupied the north while the British landed in the south. Disarming the Japanese, the British used the surrendered weapons to rearm French forces that had been interned during the war. Under pressure from the Soviet Union, Ho Chi Minh sough to negotiate with the French who desired to retake possession of their colony. Their entrance into Vietnam was only permitted by the Viet Minh after assurances had been given that the country would gain independence as part of the French Union.
Discussions soon broke down between the two parties and in December 1946, the French shelled the city of Haiphong and forcibly reentered the capital, Hanoi.
These actions began a conflict between the French and the Viet Minh known as the First Indochina War. Fought mainly in North Vietnam, this conflict began as a low level, rural guerilla war as Viet Minh forces conducted hit and run attacks on the French.

In 1949, fighting escalated as Chinese communist forces reached the northern border of Vietnam and opened a pipeline of military supplies to the Viet Minh. Increasingly well-equipped, the Viet Minh began more direct engagement against the enemy and the conflict ended when the French were decisively defeated at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. The war was ultimately settled by the Geneva Accords of 1954, which temporarily partitioned the country at the 17th parallel, with the Viet Minh in control of the north and a non-communist state to be formed in the south under Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem. This division was to last until 1956, when national elections would be held to decide the future of the nation.

THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT
Initially, the United States had little interest in Vietnam and Southeast Asia, however as it became clear that the post-World War II world would be dominated by the US and its allies and the Soviet Union and theirs, isolating communist movements took an increased importance. These concerns were ultimately formed into the doctrine of containment and domino theory. First spelled out 1947, containment identified that the goal of Communism was to spread to capitalist states and that the only way to stop it was to "contain" it within its present borders.
Springing from containment was the concept of domino theory which stated that if one state in a region were to fall to Communism, then the surrounding states would inevitably fall as well. These concepts were to dominate and guide US foreign policy for much of the Cold War.

In 1950, to combat the spread of Communism, the United States began supplying the French military in Vietnam with advisors and funding its efforts against the "red" Viet Minh. This aid nearly extended to direct intervention in 1954 when the use of American forces to relieve Dien Bien Phu was discussed at length. Indirect efforts continued in 1956, when advisors were provided to train the army of the new Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) with the goal of creating a force capable of resisting Communist aggression. Despite their best efforts, the quality of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was to remain consistently poor throughout its existence.

THE DIEM REGIME
A year after the Geneva Accords, Prime Minister Diem commenced a "Denounce the Communists" campaign in the south. Throughout the summer of 1955, communists and other opposition members were jailed and executed. In addition to attacking the communists, the Roman Catholic Diem assaulted Buddhist sects and organized crime, which further alienated the largely Buddhist Vietnamese people and eroded his support. In the course of his purges, it is estimated that Diem has up to 12,000 opponents executed and as many as 40,000 jailed. To further cement his power, Diem rigged a referendum on the future of the country in October 1955 and declared the formation of the Republic of Vietnam, with its capital at Saigon.

Despite this, the US actively supported the Diem regime as a buttress against Ho Chi Minh's communist forces in the north. In 1957, a low-level guerrilla movement began to emerge in the south, conducted by Viet Minh units that had not returned north after the accords. Two years later, these groups successfully pressured Ho's government into issuing a secret resolution calling for an armed struggle in the south. Military supplies began to flow into the south along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the following year the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (Viet Cong) was formed to carry out the fight.

FAILURE AND DEPOSING DIEM
The situation in South Vietnam continued to deteriorate with corruption rife throughout the Diem government and the ARVN unable to effectively combat the Viet Cong. In 1961, the newly elected Kennedy Administration promised more aid and additional money, weapons, and supplies were sent with little effect. Discussions then began in Washington regarding the need to force a regime change in Saigon. This was accomplished on November 2, 1963, when the CIA aided a group of ARVN officers to overthrow and kill Diem. His death led to period of political instability that saw the rise and fall of a succession of military governments. To help deal with the post-coup chaos, Kennedy increased the number of US advisors in South Vietnam to 16,000.
With Kennedy's death later that same month, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson ascended to the presidency and reiterated the US' commitment to fighting communism in the region.

The Vietnam war escalation began with the Gulf of Tonkin incident. On August 2, 1964, USS Maddox, an American destroyer, was attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin by three North Vietnamese torpedo boats while conducting an intelligence mission. A second attack seemed have occurred two days later, though the reports were sketchy (It now appears that there was no second attack). This second "attack" led to US air strikes against North Vietnam and the passage of the Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution by Congress.
This resolution permitted the president to conduct military operations in the region without a formal declaration of war and became the legal justification for escalating the conflict.

A word about Dien Bien Phu. Its purpose was to cut off Viet Minh supply lines into the neighboring Kingdom of Laos, a French ally, and tactically draw the Viet Minh into a major confrontation that would cripple them. It was an "airhead", that is a fortified position supplied by air. As such its position at the bottom of a valley surrounded by high hills was not considered a problem by the French commanders. The establishment of such "airheads" was based upon the French experience at Na San in Nov – Dec 1952. The Na San airhead had been repeatedly attacked by the Viet Minh forces who had suffered very heavy losses inflicted by superior French artillery, armor, and air support.

The French had made three serious errors: One, at Na San the French artillery had full control of the high ground with overwhelming force. None of the French commanders believed that the Viet Minh had heavy artillery let alone a 4:1 advantage nor that it was possible to move and emplace such artillery through the heavy jungle. Two, the Viet Minh had not been prepared to attack a fortified base like Na San and simply used "human wave" tactics. At Dien Bien Phu they (Viet Minh) spent months preparing. They stockpiled ammo and food, emplaced heavy artillery and anti-aircraft guns on the hilltops around Dien, Viet Minh spies had entered the French camp and located all of its gun emplacements. The French on the other hand knew nothing about the Viet Minh emplacements or even how many. Third, at Na San, the Viet Minh had few anti-aircraft guns and air re-supply had not been interdicted. At Dien, massed anti-aircraft fire quickly shut down the airfield and made re-supply almost impossible.

In short, the French superiority complex had led them into the always fatal mistake of underestimating your enemy

Zipper730 said:

I don't know

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One would think that you would have researched that before putting forth your theory that the lack of a mutual defense treaty between North Vietnam and China meant China would not enter the Vietnam war in a more active posture.

There is new evidence from China that suggests that Mao was seriously prepared to intervene. There was a secret agreement between Hanoi and Beijing that if the Americans launched a ground invasion of North Vietnam (at that time, the United States had restricted itself to a bombing campaign), China would send ground troops into North Vietnam and would not allow the United States to defeat Hanoi. If the Americans bombed North Vietnam, China would match the American military action by taking measures to protect North Vietnamese cities and to rebuild roads and bridges. They would also send anti-aircraft artillery units and army engineers to support North Vietnamese troops and help them deal with the air bombing pressure.

In China, Mao was making preparations in anticipation of war with the United States. He relocated industries, universities, and research institutions in the coastal areas of eastern China to the mountainous areas of southwest China. He ordered his people to build anti-air shelters throughout China.

Mao took the American escalation seriously; he interpreted it as a security threat. But he also believed that the success of North Vietnam had ideological significance. At that time Mao was criticizing the Soviet Union for not giving enough support to national liberation movements, for pursuing détente with the United States. Thus he hoped to use the Vietnam War as a way to embarrass Khrushchev.

Not new, this from 1995. Skip down to pg 5. where, in 1965, China told North Vietnam they would come to its aid and how they would co-ordinate operations

http://www3.nccu.edu.tw/~lorenzo/Jian China Involvement Vietnam.pdf

tyrodtom said:

One would think that you would have researched that before putting forth your theory that the lack of a mutual defense treaty between North Vietnam and China meant China would not enter the Vietnam war in a more active posture.

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I didn't really give it much thought, I figured the Chinese did have such an agreement in place since the hordes plowed across the border by the hundreds of thousands.

mikewint said:

There is new evidence from China that suggests that Mao was seriously prepared to intervene.

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Another Korean War scenario, except the Chinese had nuclear weapons this time. I'm not sure how big these weapons were in scale (our early weapons were around 8900 - 10,300 pounds) and what aircraft were intended to deliver them at first (Tu-95 seems like an obvious candidate).

There was a secret agreement between Hanoi and Beijing that if the Americans launched a ground invasion of North Vietnam (at that time, the United States had restricted itself to a bombing campaign), China would send ground troops into North Vietnam and would not allow the United States to defeat Hanoi.

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When you say "not allow", I assume that means they'd do anything they could if the bombs started to hit Hanoi...

In China, Mao was making preparations in anticipation of war with the United States. He relocated industries, universities, and research institutions in the coastal areas of eastern China to the mountainous areas of southwest China. He ordered his people to build anti-air shelters throughout China.

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This kind of came out of the recesses of my memory from years ago -- he seemed pretty gung-ho about nuclear war.

At that time Mao was criticizing the Soviet Union for not giving enough support to national liberation movements, for pursuing détente with the United States. Thus he hoped to use the Vietnam War as a way to embarrass Khrushchev.

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Is this why things reached such an extreme level of hostility?

I'm curious what the intelligence services and military knew about China-Soviet relations, and what they told the President?

fubar57 said:

Not new, this from 1995. Skip down to pg 5. where, in 1965, China told North Vietnam they would come to its aid and how they would co-ordinate operations

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Yikes...

mikewint said:

the CIA aided a group of ARVN officers to overthrow and kill Diem

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I thought Diem's death was caused from within? If the CIA did play a role, then it seems they went outside Kennedy's orders. It's not a surprise admittedly...

As for the Gulf of Tonkin -- the second attack never occurred and Johnson knew it on the day it happened. Even the Captain told Johnson that no battle occurred and the combination of weather and the ship's acoustical signature produced the predicament

The Chinese tested their first nuke in late 64.
How long it took for them to make them into a form that could be used as a weapon, I don't know.
They were more on their own as the 60's developed, them and the Russians were having border skirmishes in the late 60s.
Sorta doubtful the Soviets would have helped China develop weapons that could be used against themselves.

Yeah, in the 60's, China and the Soviet Union were actually in a shooting war along the Amur river - the two regimes were not on speaking terms in any sense of the word.

And those border skirmishes damn-near escalated into a full-blown war.

tyrodtom said:

The Chinese tested their first nuke in late 64.

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The weapon was a tower-test, but the first nuke was based on the tower-test article in May 1965. The aircraft that dropped it was a Hong-6 (H-6?) which was a Tu-16 clone.

How long it took for them to make them into a form that could be used as a weapon, I don't know.

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What's more a question is how quickly could they crank them out...

They were more on their own as the 60's developed, them and the Russians were having border skirmishes in the late 60s.

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When did the US realize the USSR & China were negatively relating with each other? Did the President of the US know this? Would the USSR have come to PRC's aid if we did attack them?

Zipper730 said:

When did the US realize the USSR & China were negatively relating with each other? Did the President of the US know this? Would the USSR have come to PRC's aid if we did attack them?

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I'm sure the President and JCoS had good intel regarding the heightened tensions between the Soviet Union and China and to be honest, at that point in time, if the U.S. and China got into a shooting war, the Soviet Union may have just sat back and let China take a beating. Doing this would have allowed the SU to solve their border issue while at the same time, reinforce the SU's position as a dominant power in the region after the dust settled.

Back to original topic.
Many thanks to Zipper730 for mentioning this book.
I just noticed that there is Kindle version on Amazon. Will look into free sample and will buy if it's interesting.

In 1984 the New York Times published recently declassified documents outlining the Eisenhower's Administrations plans to use atomic bombs in North Korea and in Communist China in 1953, if necessary, to end the Korean War.
Once the armistice was achieved, on July 27, 1953, the Eisenhower Administration continued to define plans to use nuclear weapons if the Communists renewed the war.

The fact that the Eisenhower Administration was ready to use nuclear weapons is not new. President Eisenhower, in his memoirs, said he came into office prepared to use them, if necessary, to break the deadlock. What is new in the 2,000 pages of documents now made public is the high level of planning and the detail of discussion on possible use of these weapons, and Mr. Eisenhower's interest in overcoming reluctance to use them. He indicated a readiness to use the weapons rather than face another debilitating war in Korea, according to a report of a National Security Council meeting on Dec. 3, 1953.

The discussion about the possible use of nuclear weapons in Korea was followed by a policy of threatening to use such weapons in case of a large-scale attack by the Soviet Union. There was also discussion in 1954 of possible American nuclear support to aid French forces besieged at Dien Bien Phu in the war that ended French rule in North Vietnam.
On Korea, President Eisenhower asked Adm. Arthur W. Radford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the December 1953 meeting whether he agreed that there would be a war with China if South Korea were attacked anew.
Admiral Radford said he did and added, ''We would have to strike against the Communist Chinese in the air, from Shanghai all the way north.''

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who agreed that the United States should not shrink from using atomic weapons, nevertheless was alarmed at the recommendation. Dulles Favored Limited Use
According to the record of the meeting, Mr. Dulles felt that ''Admiral Radford's course of action contemplated general war with China and probably also with the Soviet Union because of the Sino-Soviet alliance.''
Mr. Dulles said the State Department preferred to limit a nuclear attack to North Korea and to nearby troop concentrations. He also said he could accept a naval blockade of China and seizure of offshore islands.
His concern, he said, was not just that the Russians might enter the war, but that American allies would not support the United States.
Eventually, on Jan. 7, 1954, the State Department and the Joint Chiefs compromised by saying that in case of a resumption of hostilities, the United States should undertake ''offensive air operations employing atomic weapons against military targets in Korea, and against those military targets in Manchuria and China which are being used by the Communists in direct support of their operations in Korea.

The nuclear issue arose twice in the Eisenhower Administration, the documents show. The first time was when Mr. Eisenhower, elected in 1952 on a pledge of ending the Korean War, expressed frustration at the drawn-out negotiations over a prisoner exchange, which, in turn, had delayed agreement on an armistice.

At a National Security Council meeting on Feb. 11, 1953, the record shows, Mr. Eisenhower, then in office less than a month, agreed with Mr. Dulles that ''we could not go on the way we were indefinitely.''
On March 27, 1953, at a subsequent meeting, they agreed ''that somehow or other the taboo which surrounds the use of atomic weapons would have to be destroyed''.
''While Secretary Dulles admitted that in the present state of world opinion, we could not use an A-bomb, we should make every effort now to dissipate this feeling,'' it says.

By May 13, 1953, the National Security Council was discussing a memorandum, designated NSC 147, which outlined six choices for ending military restraints, several of which involved ending the ban on bombing raids against China and increasing air attacks on North Korea.
Several military men said they saw no particular tactical value in using atomic weapons in North Korea.
Gen. J. Lawton Collins, the Army Chief of Staff, said:
''Personally, I am very skeptical about the value of using atomic weapons tactically in Korea. The Communists are dug into positions in depth over a front of 150 miles.''
He added that nuclear tests ''proved that men can be very close to the explosion and not be hurt if they are well dug in.''
President Eisenhower said he ''thought it might be cheaper, dollar-wise, to use atomic weapons in Korea than to continue to use conventional weapons against the dugouts which honeycombed the hills along which the enemy forces were presently deployed.''
By the summer of 1953, the terms for the armistice and return of prisoners were worked out, over the objections of President Syngman Rhee of South Korea, who opposed a truce. Mr. Rhee so antagonized American leaders that a plan called ''Ever Ready'' was drawn up to arrest him if he started trouble.

After the armistice went into effect, in July, American planners began to study a response to a possible resumption of hostilities.
There was concern, extending into the 1960's, that if a war was going to break out, it was likely to occur in the Far East involving China. The United States was drawn into Vietnam in part to contain China.

Although planning has changed through the years, the United States still maintains 40,000 troops in South Korea, and they have nuclear arms. American officials have said that in case of an all-out attack from North Korea, the United States retains the right to use nuclear weapons in defense.

On 29 Jauary 1955, congress passed a resoultion that authorized the use of force against China if they persisted in their attacks against Taiwan. It was after this, that Dulles announced in a public address that the use of nuclear weapons were being considered.
Eisenhower was having plans drawn up that following March designed to eliminate China's ability to wage war, but soon after (April), China backed down and wanted to negotiate.

So the prospect of nuclear war with the U.S. seemed to have changed Mao's mind.