Arc Light One

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I was curious what the JCS, intelligence guys, and the politicians thought at the time, and what was actually valid (we have the luxury of knowing things they didn't know back then).
So a lot of people didn't believe the rift was all that serious, and if anything happened to China, the USSR would respond aggressively?

General LeMay did want to take his B-52's into China to hammer Lop Nor.

The Chinese set off their first atomic bomb in 1964, their first hydrogen bomb in 67, LeMay retired in 1965.
I'm having a little trouble with your timeline.
What Lemay said once he was a civilian didn't have much importance.

I have no idea what the generals and such were talking about among themselves, that's private, and probably always will be. And memoirs written later tend to be a little revised and self serving.
I only know what was talked about by the troops around me, mostly enlisted, and lower ranking officers.
 
Yabut I specified "strategist", lol. LeMay was always a great example of Maslow's Hammer.
I actually didn't know what the term meant, but it fits LeMay pretty well.

Considering Harten's comments about follow-up Arc Light sorties to include the possibility of Lop Nur, indicate that it might have been more prevalent in the USAF (SAC especially) than just LeMay.

The Chinese set off their first atomic bomb in 1964, their first hydrogen bomb in 67, LeMay retired in 1965.
I'm having a little trouble with your timeline.
I'm just basing it on the supposed proposals for Arc Light, which involved attacks on Phuc Yen, followed by attacks on infrastructural targets, and Lop Nur was one idea as a target.

Didn't China have their first aerially-deliverable bomb by 1965?
 
I actually didn't know what the term meant, but it fits LeMay pretty well.

Considering Harten's comments about follow-up Arc Light sorties to include the possibility of Lop Nur, indicate that it might have been more prevalent in the USAF (SAC especially) than just LeMay.

I'm just basing it on the supposed proposals for Arc Light, which involved attacks on Phuc Yen, followed by attacks on infrastructural targets, and Lop Nur was one idea as a target.

Didn't China have their first aerially-deliverable bomb by 1965?

I'm sure there were more than LeMay amongst the generals who were fire-breathing, so my statement about him being alone is probably not accurate. However, I don't think they really had access to policy at that time in order to bring such an operation within the realm of possibility.
 
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Intervention was impossible. China was not friendly to the USSR anymore, Soviet Navy was not yet a "blue-water navy", there were no bases in the region. Moscow did have plans for Indonesia but after 1965 purges there was no chance for the military cooperation.
All of these facts were known to the United States? In particular, the Joint Chiefs, the Intelligence Agencies, the Department of Defense, and the President of the United States.
 
Why was Johnson worried about public opinion about his actions in Vietnam? After the Gulf of Tonkin, he had large scale public support, right?
 
Why was Johnson worried about public opinion about his actions in Vietnam? After the Gulf of Tonkin, he had large scale public support, right?

You have to remember that public opinion in America featured a sharp division. Many Americans were pro-involvement; many Americans were anti-involvement, and that sentiment grew as time went on.

That shift in public opinion eventually harmed his chances enough that he decided not to run for a second full term.

By 1967, LBJ had had almost half-a-million troops deployed in-country, right as the shift in public opinion supporting the war fell below 50% (see table below). Once NVN launched Tet and Cronkite aired his special report, even many who supported our war effort were questioning it, and LBJ had likely lost any chance of re-election, hence his withdrawal from the race.

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Digital History

Put graphically:

Gallup-Polls-3-768x578.jpg

Gallup Polls #3 – US attitudes to the Vietnam War
 
I heard an interesting factoid about LBJ. As most of his male relatives died in their early 60's LBJ may have considered his own mortality as well and didn't want to die in office. I had to get this from some PBS (public broadcasting/ educational) channel.
 
You have to remember that public opinion in America featured a sharp division. Many Americans were pro-involvement; many Americans were anti-involvement, and that sentiment grew as time went on.
It seemed the majority were pro-involvement all the way into early/mid-1966. I'm guessing the anti-war sentiment grew from the lack of progress/success and the media.

I'm not sure what Johnson was like as a person: Some described him as boorish, unscrupulous, and willing to do nearly anything to get what he wanted, yet he oversaw considerable positive changes (I don't want to touch that anymore since it might run afoul of the forum rules).

I'm curious if he was unusual in his concern for public opinion, and/or had irrational or unusually irrational concerns about Vietnam spiraling out of control because, from what I've heard
  1. There seemed to be little issue about the USSR joining in China's aid, even if they did send the hordes across the border like in the Korean War
  2. Experiences in Korea seemed to indicate that, as long as we acted as if we didn't know that we killed Russian advisors at bases (much like how we didn't acknowledge the MiGs they flew were piloted by Russians), we'd probably avoid a major conflict.
Also, what was McNamara's attitude? I figure, if he didn't trust the JCS (fire-breathers), I figure he might have defaulted to him as the voice of reason.
That shift in public opinion eventually harmed his chances enough that he decided not to run for a second full term.
Even if he ran and won a second term, I have a strong suspicion he wouldn't have made it through, as he had heart problems.
 
I'm curious if he was unusual in his concern for public opinion, and/or had irrational or unusually irrational concerns about Vietnam spiraling out of control because, from what I've heard
  1. There seemed to be little issue about the USSR joining in China's aid, even if they did send the hordes across the border like in the Korean War
  2. Experiences in Korea seemed to indicate that, as long as we acted as if we didn't know that we killed Russian advisors at bases (much like how we didn't acknowledge the MiGs they flew were piloted by Russians), we'd probably avoid a major conflict.

He was no more nor less concerned about public opinion than any other American President, I reckon. What he was really concerned about was not getting bogged in a war with China, so that he could focus on his domestic agenda. The tragedy is that this caused him to pursue the war in a half-assed manner, which got us bogged down and prevented him focusing on his domestic agenda. The fact that the quagmire was in NVN and not PRC is almost irrelevant.

I doubt the USSR would have intervened conventionally in Vietnam. Once the Sino-Soviet breach happened, the USSR had no reasonable way of getting large numbers of troops and supplies to the theater without passing through waters controlled by America or China.


Also, what was McNamara's attitude? I figure, if he didn't trust the JCS (fire-breathers), I figure he might have defaulted to him as the voice of reason.

I know very little about McNamara, frankly. If he was the voice of reason, he was using inapt reasoning. While warfare is amenable to reason, it has its own logic and its own rationality that civilians may or may not understand. It seems to me he was one of those civilians who didn't understand .

Even if he ran and won a second term, I have a strong suspicion he wouldn't have made it through, as he had heart problems.

Quite possibly. He died in 1973, suffering two heart attacks before a third killed him. No doubt the stresses of the office would have added to his cardio issues.
 
No. I don't how the Vietnam war was classified. No declaration of war but it sure looked like one. LBJ was passionate about addressing social ills. This is from interviews of Doris Goodwin Kearns (Doris Kearns Goodwin?), an historian and biographer of LBJ who actually knew the President very well. He inherited a war from....well there are lots of fathers of this conflict, and did not want to go down in history as the first president in American history to lose a war.

I'm replying to post #53.
 
I know very little about McNamara, frankly. If he was the voice of reason, he was using inapt reasoning. While warfare is amenable to reason, it has its own logic and its own rationality that civilians may or may not understand. It seems to me he was one of those civilians who didn't understand .
McNamara was a former Lt. Colonel with the USAAF, serving from 1940 through 1946 where he conducted analysis of bombing efficiency under LeMay, among other things.
 
In the US it takes an act of Congress to officially declare war, and (by international law) war can only be declared on an actual sovereign nation. Although the US recognized the State of Vietnam as a sovereign nation in 1950, it was separated into North and South Vietnam in 1954. Since the US did not recognize North Vietnam as a sovereign nation we could not (legally) declare war on them. Note that a similar thing took place at the start of the Korean War.

The President on the other hand, may initiate war-like actions if it is felt that we are under attack or have been attacked, or attack is imminent.

The 1st attack in the Gulf of Tonkin incident took place well within what most nations considered its territorial waters, ie 12 nm. The 1st attack took place at about 8-9 nautical miles from the coast of North Vietnam. (North Vietnam claimed the same 12 nm limit as Vietnam had before the split. but since the US did not consider North Vietnam a sovereign nation it could not have any territorial waters rights.) The USS Maddox fired first when the NVN torpedo boats closed to with 10,000 yds. Subsequently, in the press releases and the information presented to Congress, it was stated that North Vietnam had previously claimed only a 5 nm limit, and that the NVN torpedo boats fired first. The movement of the USS Maddox was a part of numerous incursions/raids by the South into North Vietnam waters, and was intended to be a show of force and a chance to gather intel.

The President initiated military action after the 2nd part of the Gulf of Tonkin incident, which did not occur. Note that it is quite possible that the President did not know that the 2nd attack was not real, as there is no evidence that he was ever told. However, McNamara, our intel community, and the Military knew that the 2nd attack did not occur. In his memoirs, McNamara acknowledged that he was aware of the falsity of the 2nd attack, but did not mention that he had informed the President of this.

For a Police Action to become an actual War Congress would have to pass a Declaration of War, but for whatever reason they were unwilling to do so.

All of the above information (including official documents) pertaining to the Golf of Tonkin incident was declassified in the early 2000s, and made public by the NSA at the Congressional hearings (2005?) on this matter and other matters pertaining to the US conduct in starting previous wars.
 
McNamara was a former Lt. Colonel with the USAAF, serving from 1940 through 1946 where he conducted analysis of bombing efficiency under LeMay, among other things.
The information I've seen says McNamara joined as a Capt. in 1943, and discharged as a Lt. Col. in 46.
Another poster claimed McNamara was a 2nd lt. on Eisenhower's staff, I've found no evidence of that.
 

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