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General LeMay did want to take his B-52's into China to hammer Lop Nor.
I was curious what the JCS, intelligence guys, and the politicians thought at the time, and what was actually valid (we have the luxury of knowing things they didn't know back then).
So a lot of people didn't believe the rift was all that serious, and if anything happened to China, the USSR would respond aggressively?
General LeMay did want to take his B-52's into China to hammer Lop Nor.
I actually didn't know what the term meant, but it fits LeMay pretty well.Yabut I specified "strategist", lol. LeMay was always a great example of Maslow's Hammer.
I'm just basing it on the supposed proposals for Arc Light, which involved attacks on Phuc Yen, followed by attacks on infrastructural targets, and Lop Nur was one idea as a target.The Chinese set off their first atomic bomb in 1964, their first hydrogen bomb in 67, LeMay retired in 1965.
I'm having a little trouble with your timeline.
I actually didn't know what the term meant, but it fits LeMay pretty well.
Considering Harten's comments about follow-up Arc Light sorties to include the possibility of Lop Nur, indicate that it might have been more prevalent in the USAF (SAC especially) than just LeMay.
I'm just basing it on the supposed proposals for Arc Light, which involved attacks on Phuc Yen, followed by attacks on infrastructural targets, and Lop Nur was one idea as a target.
Didn't China have their first aerially-deliverable bomb by 1965?
Intervention was impossible. China was not friendly to the USSR anymore, Soviet Navy was not yet a "blue-water navy", there were no bases in the region. Moscow did have plans for Indonesia but after 1965 purges there was no chance for the military cooperation.While I'm not sure what the prospects for Soviet intervention actually were,
All of these facts were known to the United States? In particular, the Joint Chiefs, the Intelligence Agencies, the Department of Defense, and the President of the United States.Intervention was impossible. China was not friendly to the USSR anymore, Soviet Navy was not yet a "blue-water navy", there were no bases in the region. Moscow did have plans for Indonesia but after 1965 purges there was no chance for the military cooperation.
All of these facts were known to the United States? In particular, the Joint Chiefs, the Intelligence Agencies, the Department of Defense, and the President of the United States.
Why was Johnson worried about public opinion about his actions in Vietnam? After the Gulf of Tonkin, he had large scale public support, right?
It seemed the majority were pro-involvement all the way into early/mid-1966. I'm guessing the anti-war sentiment grew from the lack of progress/success and the media.You have to remember that public opinion in America featured a sharp division. Many Americans were pro-involvement; many Americans were anti-involvement, and that sentiment grew as time went on.
Even if he ran and won a second term, I have a strong suspicion he wouldn't have made it through, as he had heart problems.That shift in public opinion eventually harmed his chances enough that he decided not to run for a second full term.
Is that the problem? That he saw it as a "police action" rather than a war?I think of him as a tragic figure trying to push a positive agenda through while saddled with a war (police action?) he couldn't win.
I'm curious if he was unusual in his concern for public opinion, and/or had irrational or unusually irrational concerns about Vietnam spiraling out of control because, from what I've heard
- There seemed to be little issue about the USSR joining in China's aid, even if they did send the hordes across the border like in the Korean War
- Experiences in Korea seemed to indicate that, as long as we acted as if we didn't know that we killed Russian advisors at bases (much like how we didn't acknowledge the MiGs they flew were piloted by Russians), we'd probably avoid a major conflict.
Also, what was McNamara's attitude? I figure, if he didn't trust the JCS (fire-breathers), I figure he might have defaulted to him as the voice of reason.
Even if he ran and won a second term, I have a strong suspicion he wouldn't have made it through, as he had heart problems.
McNamara was a former Lt. Colonel with the USAAF, serving from 1940 through 1946 where he conducted analysis of bombing efficiency under LeMay, among other things.I know very little about McNamara, frankly. If he was the voice of reason, he was using inapt reasoning. While warfare is amenable to reason, it has its own logic and its own rationality that civilians may or may not understand. It seems to me he was one of those civilians who didn't understand .
McNamara was a former Lt. Colonel with the USAAF, serving from 1940 through 1946 where he conducted analysis of bombing efficiency under LeMay, among other things.
The information I've seen says McNamara joined as a Capt. in 1943, and discharged as a Lt. Col. in 46.McNamara was a former Lt. Colonel with the USAAF, serving from 1940 through 1946 where he conducted analysis of bombing efficiency under LeMay, among other things.