Ark Royal vs Bismark

[delcyros]

Up to the begin of war, these cruisers carried 150 rpg but they had space to carry up to 200. In fact, that much was carried by them at the begin of the action. But most of these 50 rounds composed of drill and practice rounds. ACHILLES, beeing the more battle capable of the two CL´s fired 1248 rounds ruing the action, and may have as much as 352 rounds remaining (44 rpg), most of them must have been practice or drill ones. At high rate of fire, this corresponds to 7-8 minutes of firing time.
AJAX had still quite considerable amounts of ammunition and three turrets aviable (one barrel not servicable, which makes it effectively a five gun cruiser).
CUMBERLAND was undamaged and had a full ammo outfit. Altough she was given a nice 4.5in very shallow belt, her overall protection was not better than that of EXETER. But APC hitting her would likely pass the entire ship before exploding, except if they hit the few armoured surfaces beforehand.

 

[Nikademus]

The PBs were a solution to getting a great deal of firepower to sea, with moderate protection. Their great advantage was their range and firepower....their protection was good, but not invulnerable. There speed was also at best only adequate. They would have been far more dangerous if their speed was 3 or 4 knots more than it was...ie about 30-32 knots

I dont believe the british cruisers were up to the task of defeating her in 1939. I am not so sure about how the AGS would have fared against the heavier cruisers of the later war period......

The British 8in gun cruisers would have been dangerous opponents for an isolated Panzerscheiff. A key point iis that when it comes to surface raiding, the 'raider' is acutely more sensitive to damage vs. the defenders due to isolation and geography. A single damaging hit of signifigance could seriously impair the raider's ability to continue it's mission, or worse, evade counter-forces and make it home. The reality of this is apparant in Langsdorff's actions. AGS was only struck by two 8 inch shells from the weakest of British treaty heavy cruisers in a setting that favored the German in terms of visability, sea state and range yet still suffered a substanial (if repairable) hit. Often in naval warefare it's the unexpected consequences of damage that gets a ship. A 2nd generation CA would have been more dangerous still, particularily a New Orleans class or better. The PSch still has the firepower edge but would be forced to use armor piercing ammo and hope for a critical hit while not recieving one in return.

The PSch design was ultimately a political statement as much, if not more so than any set naval purpose. They fully succeeded in that they caused such a stir that poplular press' of the time labeled them "Pocket Battleships", a term never used by the Germans themselves. As genuine raiders....they were less optimal. (Personally, more speed with a more conventional cruiser armament would have been better IMO) The advent of genuine fast battleship designs made the concept obsolete and as the British demonstrated at RP, the non-hysteria laden solution to the "more powerful than any ship it couldn't outrun bugaboo" was simply multiple "inferior" warships. (on a one by one comparison point. (coupled with these German ships, the Scharnhorsts and reputed Japanese ultra heavy cruiser designs....the USN would complete two Alaska class "Large cruisers" aka "Battlecruisers" but cancel the other 4). The Germans acknowledged the changed reality by canceling the remaining PSch designs and building much heavier designs.

Had Langsdorff realized immediately what he was facing his best course of action would have been evaison, if possible. (I think everyone knows that of course....just mentioning the obvious in the face of all the paper comparisons of warship strengths) His mission was commerce raiding, not taking on the RN. Even sinking one or more cruisers, while a nice propaganda piece would do little to alter the balance of naval power.

 

[renrich]

Nik, I enjoyed your post. I don't see how the AGS could have avoided an engagement with the Brit CA and CLs. I believe that AGS was sighted early in the morning with very good weather and visibility and Harwood was hoping (expecting) to sight her. If the AGS had chosen to retire the Brits had the speed advantage and tactically a stern chase would have put the AGS at more of a disadvantage than what, in the event, actually happened.

Actually, the AGS was in somewhat the same tactical situation as was Von Spee during the Falkland Island battle. He faced an enemy that had the speed advantage in good weather with the whole day available to run him down. The big difference being gun power.

 

[Nikademus]

Hi,

Yes...given the speed edge, it would have been challenging for AGS to evade prior to nightfall at least. The British could have chosen to shadow though the risk therin would have been losing their querry. Even with radar, the Bismarck at one point managed to elude her shadowers at night.

The situation was somewhat similar to AGS's namesake with the notable difference that the pursuers in that case had both the speed and firepower advantage and could run down their weaker adversaries and bombard them at a range where they retain a substantial edge. (Though requiring practically their entire shellrooms to acomplish the job). The Faulklands Island battle was unique in that it was the one pure case whereby Fisher's whole Dreadnought Armored Cruiser (aka the "Battlecruiser") concept worked as envisioned...the warship more powerful than anything it couldn't outrun, hunting and destroying weaker cruiser type ships. In the larger picture the BC concept was flawed in that once the other Nation or Nations replied with a similar type, you just ended up with two contests vs. one (Battlefleet vs Battlefeet and BC fleet vs BC fleet) The only difference being that the BC fleet was a bit more "expendible" than the other hence we got two major BC vs BC engagements during the war to one BF vs BF engagement.

The similarity comes from the situation the "raider" faces when he knows there are naval forces lurking nearby in pursuit. Even in decisive victory over Craddock at Coronel, the shell rooms of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were partially emptied and the odds against them in future engagements increased further. Spee was fortunate in having no appreciable damage but the thought provided him little comfort. There's a famous quote he made afterwards while at a neutral port after having been given a boquet of flowers...."Thank you....these will look lovely over my grave" (or some such similar)

 

[renrich]

To me, a stern chase would have been very interesting. It would have taken some time for the Brits to overtake the AGS and to get into range for the eight inch guns of Exeter and even longer for the six inch guns. In the meantime the AGS would have probably used her aft triple turret to engage Exeter at long range. If her gunnery had knocked out Exeter before Exeter could reply, then the two Brit CLs would probably have been reduced to shadowing. If she could not disable Exeter and all the Brits got into range then the CLs could have probably been able to work undisturbed.

Actually, that may have been the proper tactic for Langsdorff. I do understand that at first the Germans misidentified the British ships thinking they were a weaker group than they actually were. Perhaps a fatal mistake.

 

[Juha]

Hello Delcyros
thanks for the exact number of rounds fired by Achilles.

Hello TEC
yes, better planes, increasing number of aircraft carriers, better communications and greater number of radar equipped ships alongside with the new fast BBs made PBB concept obsolete. IMHO better solution for commercial raider would have been faster, say 34-35knots CL with long endurance. It could have run away from proper warships and 6" armament was enough to handle merchant ships. Of course advantagements in planes and in communication technology would have made also them obsolete fairly soon. On ammo supplies, I don't know has KM any supply ship with 11" ammo in Southern Atlantic, IIRC Tacoma didn't carry them and Altmark carried only oil and provisions for AGS' crew.

Juha

 

[Juha]

Hello Renrich
AGS spotted Force G earlier than they saw her. The first observation of AGS was the smoke which was generated when AGS began to accelerate to engage Force G. But most probably forenoon recon flights by the floatplane/amphibians of Force G would have found her.

Juha

 

[Nikademus]

To me, a stern chase would have been very interesting. It would have taken some time for the Brits to overtake the AGS and to get into range for the eight inch guns of Exeter and even longer for the six inch guns. In the meantime the AGS would have probably used her aft triple turret to engage Exeter at long range. If her gunnery had knocked out Exeter before Exeter could reply, then the two Brit CLs would probably have been reduced to shadowing. If she could not disable Exeter and all the Brits got into range then the CLs could have probably been able to work undisturbed.

Hi,

Agreed, a dedicated chase would have made things interesting. Langsdorff would have been faced with the quandry of spending precious ammunition in the hopes of a lucky hit at long range vs. conservation. Using only one turret would make it even more difficult but course changes to bring all main guns to bear would help the British in catching up/maintaining contact.

Conversely, the British would have to work up to full speed and choose between evasive manevers to help throw off the German aim vs. the need to close the distance. Most likely a combination of both for both sides depending on the situation. A long battle would probably ensue.

The Komandorski Islands battle gives us an idea of how such would go as does the Java Sea engagement. (aka alot of shells over a long stretch of time for a few hits) In the Komandorski fight (a long range fight between 16,000 - 24,000 yards), Salt Lake City had about 200 8in shells fall within 200 yards of her but only 5 actually hit. Of these 5 hits only 1 was signifigant, and that only because the ship's DC teams made a critical error. In turn she fired about 832 8-in shells, emptying her aft magazine in the process and didn't score a single hit.

The Japanese had two 8-inch gun cruisers (total 20 x 8-in). AGS, depending on the exact circumstances might be firing at long range with as little as 3 guns. Main gun ammo can't be replaced.....you need to keep a reserve for the home trip in addition to the primary mission. Makes for a great wargame scenario.

Me, i'd probably use my main guns sparingly at long range in a stern chase to back the cruisers off and make them alter course to evade, buying me some searoom and time and try to out-last them and break contact during the night.

Actually, that may have been the proper tactic for Langsdorff. I do understand that at first the Germans misidentified the British ships thinking they were a weaker group than they actually were. Perhaps a fatal mistake.

Given how events panned out....it was a fatal error!

 

[parsifal]

The British 8in gun cruisers would have been dangerous opponents for an isolated Panzerscheiff. A key point iis that when it comes to surface raiding, the 'raider' is acutely more sensitive to damage vs. the defenders due to isolation and geography. A single damaging hit of signifigance could seriously impair the raider's ability to continue it's mission, or worse, evade counter-forces and make it home. The reality of this is apparant in Langsdorff's actions. AGS was only struck by two 8 inch shells from the weakest of British treaty heavy cruisers in a setting that favored the German in terms of visability, sea state and range yet still suffered a substanial (if repairable) hit. Often in naval warefare it's the unexpected consequences of damage that gets a ship. A 2nd generation CA would have been more dangerous still, particularily a New Orleans class or better. The PSch still has the firepower edge but would be forced to use armor piercing ammo and hope for a critical hit while not recieving one in return.

The PSch design was ultimately a political statement as much, if not more so than any set naval purpose. They fully succeeded in that they caused such a stir that poplular press' of the time labeled them "Pocket Battleships", a term never used by the Germans themselves. As genuine raiders....they were less optimal. (Personally, more speed with a more conventional cruiser armament would have been better IMO) The advent of genuine fast battleship designs made the concept obsolete and as the British demonstrated at RP, the non-hysteria laden solution to the "more powerful than any ship it couldn't outrun bugaboo" was simply multiple "inferior" warships. (on a one by one comparison point. (coupled with these German ships, the Scharnhorsts and reputed Japanese ultra heavy cruiser designs....the USN would complete two Alaska class "Large cruisers" aka "Battlecruisers" but cancel the other 4). The Germans acknowledged the changed reality by canceling the remaining PSch designs and building much heavier designs.
I don't disagree that ultimately surface raiding proved a failure, because the units undertaking the raiding were invariably operating in an isolated fashion, were outnumbered, and vulnerable to damage. But this was not the product of the ship undertaking the mission, it was the inherent risk required for a nation heavily outnumbered having to take risks to get anything at all out of their surface fleets. And the nation undertaking the raiding is strategically pursuing a policy of "sea denial", whilst the nation undertaking the movement of goods across the ocean is pursuing a policy of "sea control".

The great attraction about se denial is that it generally requires a great deal of resources to bring to heal, and can operate against an enemy numerically superior, but dispersed, and therefore individually weaker. This was precisely the scenario faced by the AGS. She was being hunted by no less than nine hunting groups at the time of her demise, representing an enormous investment by the allies in time, money and personnel. She had achieved massive dislocation trade and the shipping of goods. Far in excess of the 50000 tons of shipping she actually sank. It was not until the advent of the CVE that the concept of the surface raider became obsolete, and even then, did not disappear entirely. In the post war environment, the Russians adapted the surface raider concept to a new post war world. Sure, it is not as effective as the sea control strategy so ardently pursued by the western navies, but then, neither the Russians nor the Germans enjoyed the luxury of naval supremacy. It is essentially the strategy of the weaker opponent…it has inherent weaknesses as a strategy, but it is still the best strategy to be pursued by he who lacks the necessary strength to usurp control. The only other strategy available, really, was that of the "fleet in being", which is what the germans did after the loss of the Bismarck (with one or two opportunistic exceptions) .

Whilst I agree that a single 8 inch cruiser was a dangerous opponent to an isolated Panzerschiff, it would have been outgunned and the odds heavily against it. Call the Pocket battleships a political statement if you like, but I believe they were designed for a purpose, and that purpose was the very thing you term "bugaboo"….to defeat anything smaller and faster than it and be able to outrun anything big enough to kill it. The fact that Exeter was a six gun 8 inch cruiser, only diminishes its probability per salvo of hitting, not its killing power so much. At the ranges likely to occur for an engagement each salvo would be lucky to achieve even a single hit out of every 60 or so rounds fired off. Having an 8 gun broadside as opposed to a 6 gun salvo only increases the odds of achieving a hit by 25%, nothing else. If it takes 32 mins to fire off those 60 rounds with a 6 gun broadside, this time only reduces to 28 mins for an eight gun broadside. Big deal….thats an insignificant effect in my book, especially if you consider the following. If the PB can start to engage effectively some 6-8000 yards further out than the 8in guns of the cruiser (please note I don't have access to my reference material where I am posting at the moment, so these figures are rubbery at best), and the rate of closure for the cruiser on the PB is effectively 3 knots per hour. The cruiser will have been under fire for more than an hour before it could effectively shoot back. That' means that the PB would have fired off approximately 700 rounds before being fired back on. If the germans have a similar statistical probability of a hit (a BIG assumption I know) she can expect to have hit her opponent 11 times before an effective retaliation can be made. On that basis, I fail to see how it can be argued that in theory the PBs were not a good design.

The fact that Langsdorf screwed the pooch, and was more interested in getting full broadsides in, and "closing with the enemy" should not colour this debate. If I had been in his shoes, I would have been far more cautious at the out set. Getting the floatplane airborne for a start would have been a great help. Once the British TF was identified, I would have turned and run like hell, accepting a single turret broadside rather than two and maintaining the range for as long as possible. For the Exeter to be effective she had to get therange down to below 19000K. If the AGS spotted her at 24K and turned away immediately she would have had time to try and get a lucky shot in. Ammunition expenditure was not as big a problem for her as one would expect, because of the supply ships supporting her.

If you want to talk about "bugaboo" I think all this inference about the New Orleans being far superior to British heavy cruisers is the real bugaboo. They were superior, make no mistake, but one only has to examine their performances in the opening months of the pacific to see just how limited these ships were as well. Take away the advanced radars being introduced by that stage, and I don't see a significant advantage at all. The newer Bostons may have a great advantage, but the new Orleans class were a flawed design in my opinion, and not much better than the brit treaty cruiser, judging by their losses and performance in 1942.

 

[Juha]

Hello Parsifal
A couple question
Quote: "Having an 8 gun broadside as opposed to a 6 gun salvo only increases the odds of achieving a hit by 25%, nothing else."

True, but when every hit might achieve significant damage, is that increase insignificant?

Quote; "If it takes 32 mins to fire off those 60 rounds with a 6 gun broadside, this time only reduces to 28 mins for an eight gun broadside."

Why so low rate of fire? Historically at least RN used far higher RoF

And RN considered 6 gun broadside minimum acceptable in 30s, just because smaller group mede hit probability unacceptable low during long-range engagements. That decided the sizes of Cathedral and Arethusa classes.

Quote:"That' means that the PB would have fired off approximately 700 rounds before being fired back on."

Impossible by rear turret alone, AGS carried 630-720 11" rounds altogether according to Koop Schmolke.

Juha

 

[tail end charlie]

I am not an expert but isnt some of this being wise after the event? If AGS has 700 of 11" caliber shells how many of those would the captain reasonably use on three cruisers not knowing if a group of battleships and cruisers is just over the horizon. If using just 25% takes out 1 cruiser then taking the other 2 out may leave him at sea facing a larger opponent with almost nothing. As long as AGS was being followed by even 1 small cruiser re supply at sea would be impossible.

 

[parsifal]

Hi Juha

In answer to your questions

True, but when every hit might achieve significant damage, is that increase insignificant?

Thats the problem, at ranges above approximately 19000 yards not many of those hits are going to do much to AGS's armouring scheme. Conversely, nearly every hit by the AGS main armament is going to wreck something on Treaty cruisers of any description.

Why so low rate of fire? Historically at least RN used far higher RoF

I just assumed an an ROF of 3 rounds per minute, because it would be nearly impossible to achieve the theoretical rof in the scenario I would attempt to generate as the captain of the raider. If AGS operates fine by her bow, and the RN is trying to close range as fast as possible, they (the RN) will spend much more time with at least half their armament unable to fire because the angle to the bow is too fine. In the situation I am envisagingthe RN cruisers will be flat out reaching their optimum rof, because most their guns wont be able to fire, most of the time.


Impossible by rear turret alone, AGS carried 630-720 11" rounds altogether according to Koop Schmolke.

They would not be firing just their rear turret. If the forward turrets could be trained to say 20degrees off the aft centreline, and the Exeter is kept dead astern , then all the AGS has to do is every time she want to fire is alter course 20 degrees off the base course, and she has a full broadside. She does not need to hove to completely. Her firing might not be as accurate that way, but she will keep the range for longer.

We practised that manouvre till the cows came home. I dont see why the AGS could not do the same

The Brit cruisers, on the other hand, cannot afford this luxury. Their number one priority has to be get the range down, Because they are in a stern chase situation, they have to nearly heave to every time the rear turrets want to fire. Every time they do that, they lose time, time they cannot afford

 

[parsifal]

I am not an expert but isnt some of this being wise after the event? If AGS has 700 of 11" caliber shells how many of those would the captain reasonably use on three cruisers not knowing if a group of battleships and cruisers is just over the horizon. If using just 25% takes out 1 cruiser then taking the other 2 out may leave him at sea facing a larger opponent with almost nothing. As long as AGS was being followed by even 1 small cruiser re supply at sea would be impossible.

It is being wise after the event, and my reference to firing 700 rounds is not actually saying they would fire off 700 rounds. I am sayinhg that had langsdorf sought to keep the range, rather than doing what he did, he would have had plenty of time to pour some real hurt onto those pursuing British cruisers. In short, i dont think they would have been able to maintain their shadowing mission

 

[Nikademus]

I don't disagree that ultimately surface raiding proved a failure, because the units undertaking the raiding were invariably operating in an isolated fashion, were outnumbered, and vulnerable to damage. But this was not the product of the ship undertaking the mission, it was the inherent risk required for a nation heavily outnumbered having to take risks to get anything at all out of their surface fleets. And the nation undertaking the raiding is strategically pursuing a policy of "sea denial", whilst the nation undertaking the movement of goods across the ocean is pursuing a policy of "sea control".

Yes, hence my comment that a design more optimized for such a purpose would have been preferable. A optimal raider whose' primary target is unarmored and possibly unarmed merchants does not require 11 inch guns to be subdued. The prescence of such a raider or worse, a group of raiders (like the wolf pack concept employed by U-boats) will still require great resource commitment on the part of the defender to counter. This in fact became the primary reason why Donitz continued the Uboat war from 1943 onward despite the acknowledgement that the returns vs. losses were unfavorable.

Whilst I agree that a single 8 inch cruiser was a dangerous opponent to an isolated Panzerschiff, it would have been outgunned and the odds heavily against it. Call the Pocket battleships a political statement if you like, but I believe they were designed for a purpose, and that purpose was the very thing you term "bugaboo"….to defeat anything smaller and faster than it and be able to outrun anything big enough to kill it.

I never said they wern't designed for a purpose. The primary purpose was political, a statement of Germany's determination to get out from under the shackles of Versailles. The naval purpose was commerce raiding. The ship's succeeded in that they caused quite the sensation when deployed due to their very heavy armament which caused panic and stress in many quarters due to the idea that they could defeat anything they could not outrun, with the exception of the three surviving British battlecruisers. Even professional naval circles grew concerned. Technical minded men tend to think along lines of strength vs. weakness on a ship for ship basis. The Panzerschieffs in fact sparked a new naval arms buildup with the French laying down the Dunkerque class in 'response' to the PzSchf, which in turn sparked a response from Italy etc etc. The USN also responded eventually though more so to reports of ultra powerful Japanese cruisers and the Scharnhorsts.

However....ultimately it was not Dunkerque, Alaska or any other ship whose design included a specific response to a ship type that sank AGS. It was three individually weaker ships. Hence yes, i term the panic revolving around the "faster than anything it couldn't outgun" a bugaboo caused mainly by organizations outside the militaries of the world. The ships were a concern....but as some historians later concluded, the non-panicy, less expensive solution was to simply compensate with the resources at hand, not build expensive ships to one-up the new design, none of which ultimately faced or sank a Panzerscheiff. All this belies the concept of the Commerce Raider. Thats the political part.

I don't recall saying the PzSchf was a "bad design"....what i said was that for her primary "Naval" function....aka 'raiding', her design was not optimal. But in the end an optimal commerce raider would not have made as big a splash on the world scene. The UK has always faced the prospect of inferior naval powers responding with a commerce war. Even during the War of 1812, despite overwhelming naval superiority, Yankee privatieers caused a good amount of grief to Britian's merchant fleet. Germany building a series of smaller, commerce raiding cruisers with large endurance, great speed and a more typical cruiser armament that is more than adequate in dealing with the merchants of the world as well as defending against enemy cruisers, would have alarmed the British government but her response would have been the same.....more cruisers and the building of fast battleships.

If you want to talk about "bugaboo" I think all this inference about the New Orleans being far superior to British heavy cruisers is the real bugaboo. They were superior, make no mistake, but one only has to examine their performances in the opening months of the pacific to see just how limited these ships were as well.

What I said was that a 2nd generation cruiser, such as NO class vessel would be a more formidable threat. I don't agree that the Savo Island debacle discredits the NO as a a class. It did expose weaknesses, most of which were not integral to the design itself. It is a noted irony that the losses hit the USN's theoretically best class suffered the worst during the fight but that only emphasises the point that in actual warfare, outside of paper studies, its often circumstances and damage that get a ship, not what the engineers and drafters predict. For example subsequent study of the battle by the US BeauOrd cited the overabundance of ready ammo and flamable materials, particularily in the vacinity of the aircraft hangers as primary factors in the losses of the ships present. (Astoria was the best example). Quincy and Vincennes' primary loss factor was torpedoes, but the aiming of such was aided by the bright fires started on the ships. Underwater protection was seconded to shellfire protection in the class....a neccessity given the tonnage restrictions under which the designers worked. However compensations to protect bouyancy and power were worked in as well.

The performance of Boise, (a CL but also a 2nd generation cruiser with heavier armor and thus similar in relation to the 1st generation treaty cruisers), and San Francisco (a NO class vessel) yielded much better results in the test of combat, in spite of the latter's point blank experience with a 14in armed battleship firing high incendiary ammo at her. She was struck at least 45 times from all gun-types and hit by a crashing airplane earlier in the day which started severe fires. All of the damage and the over 20 fires started during the night battle were brought under control and the ship survived. Boise survived a diving shell hit into her primary magazine while even more impressively, the cruiser Savannah survived a smart bomb hit of the same type that sank the battleship Roma over in the Med Theater. Subsequent further night actions in 42 showed that USN heavy cruisers and 2nd generation light cruisers in general had a very good chance of surviving one, even two powerful torpedo hits. Overall I think they showed great durability given the ordinances and situations they faced. New Orleans herself ate a Long Lance which caused a secondary ammo explosion tearing off her entire bow between Turret 1 and 2. The ship survived with her intact bulkheads limiting progressive flooding. Sister ship Minneapolis ate two LL's and survived. The NO class as a whole, with the exception of Tuscaloosa all suffered major war damage. Only during Savo, The USN's greatest blue-water debacle, were ships of the class lost. (Quincy, Astoria, Vincennes). Would any other cruiser have faired better? All ships have flaws, but 'flawed design' as a whole? I don't agree.

 

[Nikademus]

I am not an expert but isnt some of this being wise after the event? If AGS has 700 of 11" caliber shells how many of those would the captain reasonably use on three cruisers not knowing if a group of battleships and cruisers is just over the horizon. If using just 25% takes out 1 cruiser then taking the other 2 out may leave him at sea facing a larger opponent with almost nothing. As long as AGS was being followed by even 1 small cruiser re supply at sea would be impossible.

Most definately! Hindsight makes brilliant generals and admirals of all of us. Thats why i mentioned that the River Platte battle makes for an excellent wargame scenario. Gifted with such hindsight as knowing the strengths of the OPFORCE, I know what strategy i would employ. It might work....but then again it might not, but i know i won't repeat Langsdorff's error in mistaking two CL's for two DD's. I also know that its probably not a good idea to split fire unless the situation is dire. Sadly...i am not doing nearly as well in my current play by email as 1/2 of the empire of Japan. I'm short of hindsight there.

 

[Juha]

Hello Parsifal
Quote:" at ranges above approximately 19000 yards not many of those hits are going to do much to AGS's armouring scheme "

I would say on the contrary, the AGS' side armour became progressively more invulnerable when range increased but decks became penetraterable around 22,000y (by 118kg US AP) or 20,500y (by 152kg US AP). I'm talking on US ammo because the discussion between Delcyros and I on PBB vs Wichita/Baltimore and because I don't have in hand penetration table for RN 116kg SAPC.

Quote:" I just assumed an an ROF of 3 rounds per minute, because it would be nearly impossible to achieve the theoretical rof in the scenario I would attempt to generate"

Nothing wrong in that 3rpm but problem seems to be in your math

Quote: "If it takes 32 mins to fire off those 60 rounds with a 6 gun broadside"

Now with 3rpmpg to fire 60 rounds would take only 3min 20 sec, ie significantly less.

Quote:" The Brit cruisers, on the other hand, cannot afford this luxury. Their number one priority has to be get the range down, Because they are in a stern chase situation, they have to nearly heave to every time the rear turrets want to fire. Every time they do that, they lose time, time they cannot afford."

Not necessarily, because the cruiser ought to anyway zigzag to confuse enemy's fire control. And if PBB's fore turret could fire 20degrees off the aft centreline, why cruiser's aft turret(s) would not be able to fire some 20degrees off the fore centreline?

And anyway, being faster the cruiser might have some degree of choice when to engage, that of course depends on general tactical situation.

Juha

 

[tail end charlie]

Most definately! Hindsight makes brilliant generals and admirals of all of us. Thats why i mentioned that the River Platte battle makes for an excellent wargame scenario. Gifted with such hindsight as knowing the strengths of the OPFORCE, I know what strategy i would employ. It might work....but then again it might not, but i know i won't repeat Langsdorff's error in mistaking two CL's for two DD's. I also know that its probably not a good idea to split fire unless the situation is dire. Sadly...i am not doing nearly as well in my current play by email as 1/2 of the empire of Japan. I'm short of hindsight there.

Nikademus ive never played a war game but Ive seen them on television, they should build absolute cockups into the rules It seems to me the bigger the ship or fleet the easier it was to be missed or wrongly identified/classified. Langsdorf used to rely on it when approaching merchantmen as I remember, his ability to sink ships without killing anyone or them sending a warning must count as a plus on his tactical nous.

 

[renrich]

Nik, a minor point but I think I have a correction for you. At the Komandorski Battle, I have to defend my uncle's cruiser. He was the CGM in charge of the five inch guns and he told me of firing at the Japanese spotter plane. However you stated that SLC expended more than 800 rounds of eight inch and got no hits. I had always thought that SLC got several hits on the Japanese CAs. There is a very good article online by Vincent P O Hara which says the following:
At 0850, with her 16th salvo at 16000 yards, SLC hit the Nachi. One eight inch shell hit the compass bridge, killing 11 men and wounding 21. A second shell hit the main mast, Two minutes later an eight inch shell hit the aft aircraft deck of Nachi, killing two and wounding five and causing all power to be lost to the main battery which was out of action for 30 minutes. At 1148 Nachi was hit again blocking her number one turret. Apparently, very early in the battle, SLC thought other hits had been obtained because of fires seen on one of the Japanese CAs but they must have been caused by near misses. SLC was hit four times with one shell being a dud but was damaged fairly significantly with two deaths. SLC expended 806 round of eight inch and 95 rounds of five inch.

My uncle told me that the SLC expended all the ammo for the two aft turrets and had to move eight inch rounds from the forward magazines to the aft. At the end, she was firing HE because all AP had been expended.

IMO, the Pensacola Class CAs are superior to the early County Class CAs, primarily because of more efficient bollers which give them better range. Radius of action- 13000 miles at 15 knots with 1500 tons of fuel versus Rad of action- 10400 miles at 11-14 knots with 3400 tons of fuel. The Pensacolas were also pretty resistant to battle damage with Pensacola badly damaged at Tassafaronga, including being torpedoed and the Salt Lake City being damaged at Cape Esperance and Komandorski Islands. They were in the thick the whole war and were retired after the war. Two more eight inch guns also.

 

[Nikademus]

Nik, a minor point but I think I have a correction for you. At the Komandorski Battle, I have to defend my uncle's cruiser. He was the CGM in charge of the five inch guns and he told me of firing at the Japanese spotter plane. However you stated that SLC expended more than 800 rounds of eight inch and got no hits. I had always thought that SLC got several hits on the Japanese CAs. There is a very good article online by Vincent P O Hara which says the following:

Hi,

Yup....there are varying accounts in regards to the hits and number that were scored. Your correct on the O'Hara article online and reading it the other day reminded me of the conflicting accounts so last nite and this morning i brushed up on it. Friedman's book on US cruisers says 5 hits were scored on the SLC (OHare says four, another listed 6) In regards Nachi, Dull's Battle History of the Japanese navy quoted two x 8inch hits on Nachi while Ohare listed 3 while the Wiki article cited 6inch hits from the Richmond on Nachi.

Pulling out Lacroix's definitively mind numbing book on Japanese Cruisers of WWII, he states that in the course of the action, Nachi was hit by 5 x 12.7cm shells that killed 14 and wounded 27 in total. 3 struck around 0350; 1 struck the compass bridge damaging electical circuits for the fire control. The second shell damaged one of the struts of the mainmast. The third hit the aircraft deck aft damaging the catapult, killing 2 and wounding 5 in the torpedo room below. At 0648 Nachi recieved the fourth 12.7cm hit on the starboard front size of turret one, blocking it and killing one man and wounding another. The fifth and final 12.7cm hit (time unknown) occured near the signal platform to starboard causing light damage.

Given the amount of damage detail i've pulled out of Lacroix's book on each Japanese cruiser that fought during the war, my personal view is to lean towards that direction in terms of credability. Even allowing for the SLC's claimed 8inch hits though, the results of the battle were typical of a long range engagement (alot of shells for very few hits)

I used to not think much of the County's, being focused on immediate stats like armor and such but in later years i've learned to appreciate their other qualities. They had excellent freeboard for example that would serve them well in the stormy N. Atlantic and their turrets were roomier than the cramped turrets of the Pensacola and Northhamptons with individual gunlaying capability and high elevation.

 

[renrich]

Actually, when I started thinking about a stern chase between AGS and the Brit cruisers, I was reminded of the Komandorskis since I was very familiar with because of my uncle's involvement. A cruiser size ship traveling at 25-28 knots, end on, at 16000-20000 yards and chasing salvoes must be a difficult target. In a book I read, written by a crewman on the DD, Dale, at the Kormandorski, the writer was very critical of McMorris and the Richmond, because he said the Richmond stayed well in front of SLC, out of range of the enemy gunfire. I don't suppose the Richmond would have accomplished much though by staying back because her guns most of the battle did not have enough elevation to have the range to be effective.

A stern chase with AGS would have probably been a long drawn out affair.