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The PBs were a solution to getting a great deal of firepower to sea, with moderate protection. Their great advantage was their range and firepower....their protection was good, but not invulnerable. There speed was also at best only adequate. They would have been far more dangerous if their speed was 3 or 4 knots more than it was...ie about 30-32 knots
I dont believe the british cruisers were up to the task of defeating her in 1939. I am not so sure about how the AGS would have fared against the heavier cruisers of the later war period......
To me, a stern chase would have been very interesting. It would have taken some time for the Brits to overtake the AGS and to get into range for the eight inch guns of Exeter and even longer for the six inch guns. In the meantime the AGS would have probably used her aft triple turret to engage Exeter at long range. If her gunnery had knocked out Exeter before Exeter could reply, then the two Brit CLs would probably have been reduced to shadowing. If she could not disable Exeter and all the Brits got into range then the CLs could have probably been able to work undisturbed.
Actually, that may have been the proper tactic for Langsdorff. I do understand that at first the Germans misidentified the British ships thinking they were a weaker group than they actually were. Perhaps a fatal mistake.
I am not an expert but isnt some of this being wise after the event? If AGS has 700 of 11" caliber shells how many of those would the captain reasonably use on three cruisers not knowing if a group of battleships and cruisers is just over the horizon. If using just 25% takes out 1 cruiser then taking the other 2 out may leave him at sea facing a larger opponent with almost nothing. As long as AGS was being followed by even 1 small cruiser re supply at sea would be impossible.
I don't disagree that ultimately surface raiding proved a failure, because the units undertaking the raiding were invariably operating in an isolated fashion, were outnumbered, and vulnerable to damage. But this was not the product of the ship undertaking the mission, it was the inherent risk required for a nation heavily outnumbered having to take risks to get anything at all out of their surface fleets. And the nation undertaking the raiding is strategically pursuing a policy of "sea denial", whilst the nation undertaking the movement of goods across the ocean is pursuing a policy of "sea control".
I never said they wern't designed for a purpose. The primary purpose was political, a statement of Germany's determination to get out from under the shackles of Versailles. The naval purpose was commerce raiding. The ship's succeeded in that they caused quite the sensation when deployed due to their very heavy armament which caused panic and stress in many quarters due to the idea that they could defeat anything they could not outrun, with the exception of the three surviving British battlecruisers. Even professional naval circles grew concerned. Technical minded men tend to think along lines of strength vs. weakness on a ship for ship basis. The Panzerschieffs in fact sparked a new naval arms buildup with the French laying down the Dunkerque class in 'response' to the PzSchf, which in turn sparked a response from Italy etc etc. The USN also responded eventually though more so to reports of ultra powerful Japanese cruisers and the Scharnhorsts.Whilst I agree that a single 8 inch cruiser was a dangerous opponent to an isolated Panzerschiff, it would have been outgunned and the odds heavily against it. Call the Pocket battleships a political statement if you like, but I believe they were designed for a purpose, and that purpose was the very thing you term "bugaboo"….to defeat anything smaller and faster than it and be able to outrun anything big enough to kill it.
What I said was that a 2nd generation cruiser, such as NO class vessel would be a more formidable threat. I don't agree that the Savo Island debacle discredits the NO as a a class. It did expose weaknesses, most of which were not integral to the design itself. It is a noted irony that the losses hit the USN's theoretically best class suffered the worst during the fight but that only emphasises the point that in actual warfare, outside of paper studies, its often circumstances and damage that get a ship, not what the engineers and drafters predict. For example subsequent study of the battle by the US BeauOrd cited the overabundance of ready ammo and flamable materials, particularily in the vacinity of the aircraft hangers as primary factors in the losses of the ships present. (Astoria was the best example). Quincy and Vincennes' primary loss factor was torpedoes, but the aiming of such was aided by the bright fires started on the ships. Underwater protection was seconded to shellfire protection in the class....a neccessity given the tonnage restrictions under which the designers worked. However compensations to protect bouyancy and power were worked in as well.If you want to talk about "bugaboo" I think all this inference about the New Orleans being far superior to British heavy cruisers is the real bugaboo. They were superior, make no mistake, but one only has to examine their performances in the opening months of the pacific to see just how limited these ships were as well.
I am not an expert but isnt some of this being wise after the event? If AGS has 700 of 11" caliber shells how many of those would the captain reasonably use on three cruisers not knowing if a group of battleships and cruisers is just over the horizon. If using just 25% takes out 1 cruiser then taking the other 2 out may leave him at sea facing a larger opponent with almost nothing. As long as AGS was being followed by even 1 small cruiser re supply at sea would be impossible.
Most definately! Hindsight makes brilliant generals and admirals of all of us. Thats why i mentioned that the River Platte battle makes for an excellent wargame scenario. Gifted with such hindsight as knowing the strengths of the OPFORCE, I know what strategy i would employ. It might work....but then again it might not, but i know i won't repeat Langsdorff's error in mistaking two CL's for two DD's. I also know that its probably not a good idea to split fire unless the situation is dire. Sadly...i am not doing nearly as well in my current play by email as 1/2 of the empire of Japan. I'm short of hindsight there.
Nik, a minor point but I think I have a correction for you. At the Komandorski Battle, I have to defend my uncle's cruiser. He was the CGM in charge of the five inch guns and he told me of firing at the Japanese spotter plane. However you stated that SLC expended more than 800 rounds of eight inch and got no hits. I had always thought that SLC got several hits on the Japanese CAs. There is a very good article online by Vincent P O Hara which says the following: