Avoiding the Bomber B project (1 Viewer)

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RAF evaluation of crashed Me-210 considered the remote control barbettes to be outstanding (Me-210 evaluation is on this forum). Why would Ju-288 and Do-317 remote control turrets and/or barbettes be worse?

Engines are the real issue and only because Luftwaffe opted for unproven V24 rather then using existing DB606 engine.

The DB606 never worked right with any design and was ridiculously heavy and fuel consuming.
 
Maybe they aren't worse, they are just 1-2 years late. French and British were mounting power turrets in 1939/40, latter ones may have been better. Germans don't get more than a few power turrets until 1942? and the manned single MG 131 is rather suspect.

We don't know if the power barbettes delayed things or took a while to develop because the engines delayed things so long.

Using the DB 606 was desperation. Some estimates claim it saved 3% in drag over using 4 separate engines. Was it worth the delay and problems? OF course once you have just about finished a heavy twin you are rather forced into using the DB 606 or designing a whole new wing. Aside from the marginal drag reduction the only reason for using a big twin instead of 4 separate engines was to try to meet the dive bombing requirement. And the idea of trying to dive bomb with 35-50,000lb airplanes (of the time) is rather ridiculous as they found out.
 
You are part right. the He 111H-23 wasn't really that good but then it didn't show up until late 1943 or 1944, well past it's "use by date". However if it had showed up in 1941/early 1942 it might have made a more valuable contribution.

B-17 was modified rather extensively from the C/D to E model. I am not advocating putting a tail turret in a HE 111 but better armament sooner may have paid dividends. Germans making a fully powered manned twin MG 131 turret might have paid off sooner than sticking with the Drehlafette DL 131 turret, which seems (correction welcome) to have been powered for fast slew but the gun was allowed 25 degrees or so on manual traverse inside the turret and had manual? elevation so it was really a pretty poor power turret. Getting a power turret closer in performance to the British and American power turrets may well have paid dividends over the Russian front. Instead development went to the remote barbettes and the bombers had to "make do" with with either the poor turret or NO power mount for about 2 years too long.

I don't know if the He 111 could have been arranged for horizontal bomb stowage or if one or both spars could have been "kinked" for a bit more room in the bomb bay if interest was high enough.

Production of He 111 was 1337 in 1942, 1403 in 1943 and 756 in 1944, Production of Do-217 bombers in 1942 was 564, in 1943 506 and in 1944 it was 0.

They kept expecting to replace the He 111 with something else but never did. A bit more effort in 1940/41 developing what they had might have given better results over the long term than investing in the "pie in the sky" uber futuristic aircraft.
Barely updating the defensive guns from the BoB until the summer of 1942 ( and then it was a rather pathetic upgrade) and keeping the same engines and claiming the design was dated is hardly fair. A 1942 Wellington was hardly the Wellington of Aug 1940 after all. Same basic airframe but over a 60% increase in engine power for take-off and rather different gun mounts. Perhaps by 1943 it to was by it's "best used by" date but at least the British tried to update it some.

The problem wasn't the turrets, but rather the bomb capacity and speed; it could only use vertical racks, which capped the types of bombs that could be carried and the payload.
He111+05.jpg

http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-FNgnK13CNK4/Tk1Fp33Uk8I/AAAAAAAADOU/35MqPIbM47Q/s1600/h1.jpg
Heinkel He 111 bomb bay « World War Photos
The bombs had to fall through the wings, as you can see.
Its frame was a dated design that was not able to be made that much faster. The Do 217 was faster, had a better internal carrying capacity and diversity, and was more heavily defended, plus available in 1941-42 when you propose the He 111 H23 could have been around.

I get your point about the historical production numbers, but these were the function of not wanting to change over production lines to anything else for fear of disrupting the already limited numbers of bombers. This was partly a function of fixating too much on producing the Ju88, so they could only really upgrade it into the Ju188, which had worse capabilities than the Do217, rather than phasing in a new design; by the time the Do217 was phased out, in 1944, Germany was switching to fighter production, so being the last it production, the Do 217 became the first out due to being the least produced for all the bombers. The Ju88 and He111 could be limited, but kept in production, while there was too few Do 217s to justify keeping them around, even if they were better, due to the need to keep the greater number of existing Ju88s and He111s in service with newly produced spare parts. Shutting down those lines was just not an option by 1944; with better planning from 1936 on thanks to no Ernst Udet in this scenario, there is a very different set of options available with the Do217.

Now all that said, I agree that if all else remained the same as historical except that the Jumo 213 were available sooner, then yes, it would make total sense to upgrade the He111 with all you suggest; its just that all else is not remaining the same in this scenario without the Bomber B, so why keep a worse aircraft around longer than needed?
 
Maybe they aren't worse, they are just 1-2 years late. French and British were mounting power turrets in 1939/40, latter ones may have been better. Germans don't get more than a few power turrets until 1942? and the manned single MG 131 is rather suspect.

We don't know if the power barbettes delayed things or took a while to develop because the engines delayed things so long.

Using the DB 606 was desperation. Some estimates claim it saved 3% in drag over using 4 separate engines. Was it worth the delay and problems? OF course once you have just about finished a heavy twin you are rather forced into using the DB 606 or designing a whole new wing. Aside from the marginal drag reduction the only reason for using a big twin instead of 4 separate engines was to try to meet the dive bombing requirement. And the idea of trying to dive bomb with 35-50,000lb airplanes (of the time) is rather ridiculous as they found out.
The LW did not invest much in power turrets, so when they were available, it required a fairly large amount of redesign work to upgrade the old designs, which again brings us back to no wanting to disrupt production lines of mainstay bombers; look how long it took to put even the marginal Ju188 into production!
 
The problem wasn't the turrets, but rather the bomb capacity and speed; it could only use vertical racks, which capped the types of bombs that could be carried and the payload.

AS built it used vertical bomb racks. Question is could the bomb bay have been modified? The seems to be a central structural member dividing the bomb bays left and right so lets assume that has to stay. The bomb racks fit were the 4 seat smoking compartment was on the commercial version. I don't know if the bomb "boxes" added any structural strength or not but they could be removed and replaced with fuel tanks so the likelyhood is not high that they added strength. Now IF some rework was done could different bomb racks be used that would hold the bombs horizontal? Perhaps 4 SC 250 bombs would not fit between the floor and roof with horizontal storage but could a SC 500 fit, length and width through the existing bomb doors if horizontal? Could a pair fit on each side?

Its frame was a dated design that was not able to be made that much faster. The Do 217 was faster, had a better internal carrying capacity and diversity, and was more heavily defended, plus available in 1941-42 when you propose the He 111 H23 could have been around.

Other air frames were dated but useful, even if not very fast. Night bombers don't need to be fast, they need range and payload. One reason the HE 111 hung around was that it carried much more internal fuel than a JU-88 without filling the bomb bay with fuel.
The defense of the Do 217 wasn't that much better and only because it got the priority on the crappy turret. Do 217 got the 'turret' with 13mm mg while the He 111 was still making do (for around a year?) with a single 7.9mm mg feed by a 75 round drum magazine in the dorsal position. The Do 217 got another 13mm belt feed gun out the ventral step while the He 111 had to make do with another drum feed 7.9mm mg out the 'bathtub". Do 217 and He 111 had the same guns out the front and the same guns out the sides except the He 111 often had an extra crewman to fire the waist guns. Who was firing the 7.9mm mg sticking out side of the cockpit on the Do 217? the turret gunner or the ventral step gunner? A lot of early German bombers had some rather illusionary defensive armament ( one gunner manning 4 guns, no two of which pointed in the same direction?).
There was absolutely NO reason what so ever that the HE 111 air frame could not take the MG 131 in the dorsal and ventral positions except perhaps the lack of guns in the supply chain. Not a fault of the design.

Now all that said, I agree that if all else remained the same as historical except that the Jumo 213 were available sooner, then yes, it would make total sense to upgrade the He111 with all you suggest; its just that all else is not remaining the same in this scenario without the Bomber B, so why keep a worse aircraft around longer than needed?

Because the He 111 has a few attributes the JU-88 and Do 217 do not. It's bigger wing means slower take-off and landing speeds meaning it may be able to operate from crappier airfields. While not as good as the DO 217 it does out range the JU-88 with heavy loads. Maybe it was a mistake to keep building it in 1944 but a better version in 1941/42 was not hard to do and would have given a good return on investment. I repeat, they were building essentially the same version in 1942 that they were in 1940 and I don't know how many other air forces were doing the same thing.
 
Luftwaffe did not invest in heavy bombers with cruising speed (with payload) of 180mph. Hence their bombers did not need to be turret farms.

Seem to have forgotten the facts that A, the Germans rarely flew large formations with their "heavy " bombers, and B, there is a big difference between one or two effective turrets and aturret farmand Oh, yeah, the most common German "Heavy" bomber had about SIX defensive gun positions even if they were not ALL turrets. If the German heavies were so fast why did they need 6 weapons stations?
 
Make sure General Wever knows how to properly fly a He 111 and he won't be killed in one and Milch won't get anywhere near mucking up the Luftwaffe. :)
 
Make sure General Wever knows how to properly fly a He 111 and he won't be killed in one and Milch won't get anywhere near mucking up the Luftwaffe. :)

Wever was killed flying, or attempting to fly a He70, not a He111. The gust locks had not been removed.

Somebody evidently skipped the preflight.
 
Wever was killed flying, or attempting to fly a He70, not a He111. The gust locks had not been removed.

Somebody evidently skipped the preflight.

More evidence of why being in a hurry is a bad idea:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walther_Wever_(general)
On 3 June 1936 Wever flew from Berlin to Dresden, to give a lecture at the Luftkriegsakademie to a gathering of Luftwaffe cadets. When he received the news of the passing of a World War I German hero, he immediately set off for Berlin. On his return journey, the Heinkel He 70 Blitz that he was flying had not been properly examined during preflight checks, and the aileron gust locks were not removed. The aircraft was airborne when the wing dipped, and the Heinkel stalled and went into a horizontal cartwheel (akin to a ground loop, but at low altitude). It crashed and exploded in flames, killing Wever and his flight engineer.

Also there wasn't a full pre-flight checklist as we understand them today during WW2, so lots of pilots in all countries died in stupid accidents due to not remembering to do something pre- or inflight.
 
Make sure General Wever knows how to properly fly a He 111 and he won't be killed in one and Milch won't get anywhere near mucking up the Luftwaffe

Popular histories like to portray General Wever as an aviation expert far more capable then guys such as Milch. IMO that might be true and it might not. Wever didn't live long enough after reestablishment of Luftwaffe for us to determine how he would handle some of the more important decisions.
.....Jumo 211 engine production favored over production of DB601 engine.
.....Cancellation of funding for DB603 engine.
.....1938 decision to proceed with twin engine He-177A rather then follow Heinkel recommendation to proceed with four engine He-177B.
.....Decision to power Fw-190 with an unproven (indeed, not existent) radial engine rather then a Daimler-Benz V12.
.....Decision not to fund mass production of Fw-187 long range day fighter / recon aircraft.
.....Multiple decisions to push Me-210 into mass production before design was proven or ready.
.....Decision not to mass produce Jumo 004A jet engine during 1943.
.....Decision to kill Jumo 222 engine program via bureaucratic methods such as increasing HP requirement.
.....Decision to delay mass production of 300 liter drop tanks for fighter aircraft.
etc.
 
Popular histories like to portray General Wever as an aviation expert far more capable then guys such as Milch. IMO that might be true and it might not. Wever didn't live long enough after reestablishment of Luftwaffe for us to determine how he would handle some of the more important decisions.
He himself acknowledged he wasn't which is why he trusted his knowledgable subordinates to make technical decisions. He wouldn't be making most of these, rather Erhard Milch, Wilhelm Wimmer, von Richthofen, and Fritz Loeb would, rather than Udet.

.....Jumo 211 engine production favored over production of DB601 engine.
This was going to happen regardless due to Daimler not wanting to be forced into producing only aero-engines; they wanted a balanced contract portfolio, so they were fighting about having to invest in DB601 production.

.....Cancellation of funding for DB603 engine.
That was under Udet, I don't see that happening here, especially when its utility for the Bomber A would make it worth funding even at a low level.

.....1938 decision to proceed with twin engine He-177A rather then follow Heinkel recommendation to proceed with four engine He-177B.
This could just be post war rationalization by Heinkel, as I cannot find contemporary info about him recommending this. He is the only source for the claim AFAIK. Its really hard to say, because the coupled engine idea seems to have preceded the dive requirement. A LW officer overseeing the project supported the coupled engine idea according to Nowarra, but that was under Udet, so that same guy might not be in charge of it; Wever would certainly be specially interested in the project, so he would probably have some say over things; its really hard to say, so I suppose we could use our personal biases to guesstimate.

.....Decision to power Fw-190 with an unproven (indeed, not existent) radial engine rather then a Daimler-Benz V12.
IIRC that was Kurt Tank's decision and desire; the lack of DB601s made it virtually impossible to pick any other type of engine at that time.

.....Decision not to fund mass production of Fw-187 long range day fighter / recon aircraft.
That was going to get funded; Wever and Richthofen hated the Bf110 and wanted a long range escort fighter. Richthofen favored the FW187; Wever would favor Richthofen's choice.

.....Multiple decisions to push Me-210 into mass production before design was proven or ready.
No Bf110 under Wever if he got his way, so very likely no Me210, especially as Milch hated Messerschmitt, so there is consensus on that.

.....Decision not to mass produce Jumo 004A jet engine during 1943.
There wasn't enough raw materials to make it, so it can't be.

.....Decision to kill Jumo 222 engine program via bureaucratic methods such as increasing HP requirement.
That was the product of the fight between Udet and Milch, so if Wever doesn't die, then Milch remains in charge, so he has no reason to kill the Jumo 222; however with Milch remaining around there is no Bomber B project, which was Udet's brain child; Milch didn't want to concentrate so much power in one company, so he wouldn't have sanctioned it in the first place. No Bomber B, but still a Jumo 222, but on lower priority. If focused on like historically it was, it would be ready in 1942 at 2000hp and it would have several aircraft that could take it like the He177B and Do217/317. Probably the Ju88 too or whatever follows it.

.....Decision to delay mass production of 300 liter drop tanks for fighter aircraft.
etc.
That was a function of the lack of aluminum, but the lack was also the result of so much being wasted by the aviation industry. So if Milch is around policing up that industry from 1936-1941 unlike historically, then its far less likely for that to be an issue. So Milch might actually enable that option. The question is whether there will be enough Me109s capable of mounting them in 1940 or whether there will even be enough Me109s and fighter pilots to compete with the RAF (there were major shortages of both post FoF. Wever and Milch will probably beef up pilot training and production respectively so that the lack of both won't happen. We also probably won't see the 'knight of the sky' stuff and more pack tactics, which suited Wever's personality better, being an army man, rather than a WW1 pilot with old notions of air combat.
 
dumb question i suppose, and OT, but why not produce cheaper drop tanks out of plywood, such as other nations like the Japanese did?

They couldn't get it to work right and it kept exploding/catching fire.
http://weaponsandwarfare.com/?p=2955
"In late August 1940, the Bf 109E-7 began to arrive at fighter units.This differed from the Bf-109E-4 by having the capability to carry a 66-Imp gal (300 Litre) jettisonable plywood fuel tank.The lack of range had been one of the main disadvantages of the Bf-109 during the French campaign, and would further embarrass the Jagdgruppen over England, limiting combat time to just a few minutes.In practice, the tank was prone to terrible leaks and suspected of a tendency to ignite.It was rarely used in action due to the suspicions of the pilots"

The Germans did develop a drop tank for the Bf 109 prior to the invasion of France. Unfortunately, the design was rather hasty and the tank (made of plywood) tended to come 'unglued' (great shades of Ta 154!) when in use. The design allowed for about 70 gallons of fuel to be carried. Because of the leakage problems and the potential that resulted in it being a fire hazard it went unused. The original intent was that the Bf 109E-7 could use this tank to extend its range for use in both the French campaign and later against Britain.

This is another case of a single German manufacturer building a defective product on the spur of the moment and when the product fails to meet service requirements there is no suitable alternative. By the time the problem(s) comes to the attention of higher levels of command and is dealt with the operational effects have already caused debilitating losses.

Look at the same problem with the Bf 110. The D model with the Dackelbauch tank suffered a number of losses from explosions occurring when the tank emptied and the remaining fuel – air mixture was exposed to a spark. If anything, the technical incompetence of the Luftwaffe's technische Amt in providing suitable and adequate equipment and aircraft to that service was a disgrace. The Göring had the stupidity to place such non-technical officers such as Ernst Udet in command of this critical branch of the Luftwaffe only shows his own incompetence as a leader.
 
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.....Jumo 211 engine production favored over production of DB601 engine.

Favored or , in early days having alternative engines?

.....Cancellation of funding for DB603 engine.

And what was the 1937 DB 603 really like? it sure wouldn't be the 1942/3 DB 603. There are only so many engineers and you don't create more over night by simply placing a contract. What else doesn't DB do if it works on the 603 in 1937/38?

.....1938 decision to proceed with twin engine He-177A rather then follow Heinkel recommendation to proceed with four engine He-177B.

What 177B in in 1938? Alternate universe?

.....Decision to power Fw-190 with an unproven (indeed, not existent) radial engine rather then a Daimler-Benz V12.

Really Alternate universe. FW 190 was designed around the BMW 139 radial engine which the RLM had stared initial funding for in 1935. It was no more "not existent" than the R-2800 was "not existent" when work started on the Corsair. The FW 190 was NOT the only aircraft that was designed around one engine but went into service with another engine ( Japanese Zero was another).

.....Decision to kill Jumo 222 engine program via bureaucratic methods such as increasing HP requirement.

The fact that the Jumo 222 NEVER worked as advertised might have had something to with it?

Passing initial type test is very far from a guarantee that an engine is ready for service use.
 
@ SR6

What 177B in in 1938? Alternate universe?

The He 177 as four gondula a/c existed by plans and a wood model from Heinkel. Udet and Jeschonnek favored a dive capable He 177 with coulpled engines. To develop a normal four gondula He 177 from 1938 instead of a the original He 177A is far away from a Alternative universe, it is fact!

And what was the 1937 DB 603 really like? it sure wouldn't be the 1942/3 DB 603. There are only so many engineers and you don't create more over night by simply placing a contract. What else doesn't DB do if it works on the 603 in 1937/38?

I think we have discussed this a hundred times, from 1938 the focus of the development department was the DB 601, DB 604X (advertisement Bomber B) and development of the DB 606 (coupled engine for Bomber A/He 177). The DB 603 wasn't funded and developed on a very smal base from DB itself. That is no fiction that are facts.
A DB 603 as only development next to the DB 601 would be a much more devoloped DB 603 1942 then the original.

Both the Jumo 213 and DB 603 have lost 3 years (from 1937/38 ) of development time, through the Bomber B project and partly the Bomber A (coupled engines), why do you negate this?
 
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Was the 4 gondola model and plans truly the He 177B (common fuselage and tail) or an alternative design?

I am not negating the fact that time was lost. However some people want to negate the knowledge that was gained in general about engines and what was learned on other projects And claim that ALL of the lost time would have been made up if funding or programs had not be delayed.

In the US Wright started work on the R-2600 in early 1935, they started work on the R-3350 not long after. After all it was simply an R-2600 with two more cylinders per row :)

The R-3350 was put to one side for several years while work was concentrated on the R-2600. When work was restarted on the R-3350 they found they had learned so much working on the R-2600 that they essentially threw out most of what they had already done and started over. They knew more about materials, they knew more about vibration patterns and vibration dampers, they knew more about foundry work,etc. (Wright changed from forged aluminium crankcases to forged steel crankcases) and fuel had changed form 87 octane to 100 octane ( and would change again before the engine went into service).

Now if Wright had more money and more engineers how much faster would the R-3350 as we know it have shown up? or would you have two teams making the same discoveries/progress at roughly the same time but costing a lot more money?

Few people were using the same superchargers in 1942 that they were in 1937 and so on.
on the other hand perhaps DB would NOT have had the trouble with the DB 605 pistons in 1942 if they had figured out how to make the larger DB 603 pistons first :)
Increasing the diameter of the pistons lengthens the path the heat has to travel to the cylinder walls so larger diameter pistons are harder to cool. Large cylinders are harder to cool because you have a higher ratio of volume (burning fuel/air) to surface area. At any given RPM the 603 pistons are moving 12.5% faster than ta DB 601/605. Piston speed has little to do with piston rings but is an indicator of stress on the rod bearings, crankshaft and reciprocating parts. DB 603 is going to turn a bit slower than a DB 601/605 at any given stage of development because at the SAME rpm it is causing around 20% more stress in the reciprocating parts and crankshaft than the 601/605.

I am not sure how much time Jumo lost as the 211 went from 2200-2300rpm in the A models to 2400rpm in the B,C,D,H,G models to 2600 rpm in the F,J,L,M,R models and 2700 rpm in the N and P models. The 213 gained a lot of weight to stand up to the 3250 rpm but one has to wonder even with a weight gain if a 1940-41 Jumo 213 would have capable or running at 3250 rpm or would it have been limited to 2900-3000rpm?

Granted this article would be a bit dated ( British are unlikely to know lasted German developments in war time) But has pictures/diagrams of different early German superchargers.

engineer february | aircraft engineer | supplement toflight | 1940 | 0596 | Flight Archive

although this phrase "Not much was said on the Junkers tests, probably to spare the Junkers people's feelings, but the stationary air wedges between the boxes are stated to cause losses."

It goes on. prewar or 1939/early 1940 Junkers superchargers were not very good.

IF Junkers and Daimler Benz knew in 1937 what they knew in 1940/41 then the 1942/43 engines could show up in in 1941.

There was a lot more to designing a 1942/43 engine than just making a bunch of new drawings.
 

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