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wiking85
Staff Sergeant
The DB606 never worked right with any design and was ridiculously heavy and fuel consuming.
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RAF evaluation of crashed Me-210 considered the remote control barbettes to be outstanding (Me-210 evaluation is on this forum). Why would Ju-288 and Do-317 remote control turrets and/or barbettes be worse?
Engines are the real issue and only because Luftwaffe opted for unproven V24 rather then using existing DB606 engine.
You are part right. the He 111H-23 wasn't really that good but then it didn't show up until late 1943 or 1944, well past it's "use by date". However if it had showed up in 1941/early 1942 it might have made a more valuable contribution.
B-17 was modified rather extensively from the C/D to E model. I am not advocating putting a tail turret in a HE 111 but better armament sooner may have paid dividends. Germans making a fully powered manned twin MG 131 turret might have paid off sooner than sticking with the Drehlafette DL 131 turret, which seems (correction welcome) to have been powered for fast slew but the gun was allowed 25 degrees or so on manual traverse inside the turret and had manual? elevation so it was really a pretty poor power turret. Getting a power turret closer in performance to the British and American power turrets may well have paid dividends over the Russian front. Instead development went to the remote barbettes and the bombers had to "make do" with with either the poor turret or NO power mount for about 2 years too long.
I don't know if the He 111 could have been arranged for horizontal bomb stowage or if one or both spars could have been "kinked" for a bit more room in the bomb bay if interest was high enough.
Production of He 111 was 1337 in 1942, 1403 in 1943 and 756 in 1944, Production of Do-217 bombers in 1942 was 564, in 1943 506 and in 1944 it was 0.
They kept expecting to replace the He 111 with something else but never did. A bit more effort in 1940/41 developing what they had might have given better results over the long term than investing in the "pie in the sky" uber futuristic aircraft.
Barely updating the defensive guns from the BoB until the summer of 1942 ( and then it was a rather pathetic upgrade) and keeping the same engines and claiming the design was dated is hardly fair. A 1942 Wellington was hardly the Wellington of Aug 1940 after all. Same basic airframe but over a 60% increase in engine power for take-off and rather different gun mounts. Perhaps by 1943 it to was by it's "best used by" date but at least the British tried to update it some.
The LW did not invest much in power turrets, so when they were available, it required a fairly large amount of redesign work to upgrade the old designs, which again brings us back to no wanting to disrupt production lines of mainstay bombers; look how long it took to put even the marginal Ju188 into production!Maybe they aren't worse, they are just 1-2 years late. French and British were mounting power turrets in 1939/40, latter ones may have been better. Germans don't get more than a few power turrets until 1942? and the manned single MG 131 is rather suspect.
We don't know if the power barbettes delayed things or took a while to develop because the engines delayed things so long.
Using the DB 606 was desperation. Some estimates claim it saved 3% in drag over using 4 separate engines. Was it worth the delay and problems? OF course once you have just about finished a heavy twin you are rather forced into using the DB 606 or designing a whole new wing. Aside from the marginal drag reduction the only reason for using a big twin instead of 4 separate engines was to try to meet the dive bombing requirement. And the idea of trying to dive bomb with 35-50,000lb airplanes (of the time) is rather ridiculous as they found out.
The problem wasn't the turrets, but rather the bomb capacity and speed; it could only use vertical racks, which capped the types of bombs that could be carried and the payload.
Its frame was a dated design that was not able to be made that much faster. The Do 217 was faster, had a better internal carrying capacity and diversity, and was more heavily defended, plus available in 1941-42 when you propose the He 111 H23 could have been around.
Now all that said, I agree that if all else remained the same as historical except that the Jumo 213 were available sooner, then yes, it would make total sense to upgrade the He111 with all you suggest; its just that all else is not remaining the same in this scenario without the Bomber B, so why keep a worse aircraft around longer than needed?
Luftwaffe did not invest in heavy bombers with cruising speed (with payload) of 180mph. Hence their bombers did not need to be turret farms.
Make sure General Wever knows how to properly fly a He 111 and he won't be killed in one and Milch won't get anywhere near mucking up the Luftwaffe.
Wever was killed flying, or attempting to fly a He70, not a He111. The gust locks had not been removed.
Somebody evidently skipped the preflight.
On 3 June 1936 Wever flew from Berlin to Dresden, to give a lecture at the Luftkriegsakademie to a gathering of Luftwaffe cadets. When he received the news of the passing of a World War I German hero, he immediately set off for Berlin. On his return journey, the Heinkel He 70 Blitz that he was flying had not been properly examined during preflight checks, and the aileron gust locks were not removed. The aircraft was airborne when the wing dipped, and the Heinkel stalled and went into a horizontal cartwheel (akin to a ground loop, but at low altitude). It crashed and exploded in flames, killing Wever and his flight engineer.
Make sure General Wever knows how to properly fly a He 111 and he won't be killed in one and Milch won't get anywhere near mucking up the Luftwaffe
He himself acknowledged he wasn't which is why he trusted his knowledgable subordinates to make technical decisions. He wouldn't be making most of these, rather Erhard Milch, Wilhelm Wimmer, von Richthofen, and Fritz Loeb would, rather than Udet.Popular histories like to portray General Wever as an aviation expert far more capable then guys such as Milch. IMO that might be true and it might not. Wever didn't live long enough after reestablishment of Luftwaffe for us to determine how he would handle some of the more important decisions.
This was going to happen regardless due to Daimler not wanting to be forced into producing only aero-engines; they wanted a balanced contract portfolio, so they were fighting about having to invest in DB601 production......Jumo 211 engine production favored over production of DB601 engine.
That was under Udet, I don't see that happening here, especially when its utility for the Bomber A would make it worth funding even at a low level......Cancellation of funding for DB603 engine.
This could just be post war rationalization by Heinkel, as I cannot find contemporary info about him recommending this. He is the only source for the claim AFAIK. Its really hard to say, because the coupled engine idea seems to have preceded the dive requirement. A LW officer overseeing the project supported the coupled engine idea according to Nowarra, but that was under Udet, so that same guy might not be in charge of it; Wever would certainly be specially interested in the project, so he would probably have some say over things; its really hard to say, so I suppose we could use our personal biases to guesstimate......1938 decision to proceed with twin engine He-177A rather then follow Heinkel recommendation to proceed with four engine He-177B.
IIRC that was Kurt Tank's decision and desire; the lack of DB601s made it virtually impossible to pick any other type of engine at that time......Decision to power Fw-190 with an unproven (indeed, not existent) radial engine rather then a Daimler-Benz V12.
That was going to get funded; Wever and Richthofen hated the Bf110 and wanted a long range escort fighter. Richthofen favored the FW187; Wever would favor Richthofen's choice......Decision not to fund mass production of Fw-187 long range day fighter / recon aircraft.
No Bf110 under Wever if he got his way, so very likely no Me210, especially as Milch hated Messerschmitt, so there is consensus on that......Multiple decisions to push Me-210 into mass production before design was proven or ready.
There wasn't enough raw materials to make it, so it can't be......Decision not to mass produce Jumo 004A jet engine during 1943.
That was the product of the fight between Udet and Milch, so if Wever doesn't die, then Milch remains in charge, so he has no reason to kill the Jumo 222; however with Milch remaining around there is no Bomber B project, which was Udet's brain child; Milch didn't want to concentrate so much power in one company, so he wouldn't have sanctioned it in the first place. No Bomber B, but still a Jumo 222, but on lower priority. If focused on like historically it was, it would be ready in 1942 at 2000hp and it would have several aircraft that could take it like the He177B and Do217/317. Probably the Ju88 too or whatever follows it......Decision to kill Jumo 222 engine program via bureaucratic methods such as increasing HP requirement.
That was a function of the lack of aluminum, but the lack was also the result of so much being wasted by the aviation industry. So if Milch is around policing up that industry from 1936-1941 unlike historically, then its far less likely for that to be an issue. So Milch might actually enable that option. The question is whether there will be enough Me109s capable of mounting them in 1940 or whether there will even be enough Me109s and fighter pilots to compete with the RAF (there were major shortages of both post FoF. Wever and Milch will probably beef up pilot training and production respectively so that the lack of both won't happen. We also probably won't see the 'knight of the sky' stuff and more pack tactics, which suited Wever's personality better, being an army man, rather than a WW1 pilot with old notions of air combat......Decision to delay mass production of 300 liter drop tanks for fighter aircraft.
etc.
dumb question i suppose, and OT, but why not produce cheaper drop tanks out of plywood, such as other nations like the Japanese did?
"In late August 1940, the Bf 109E-7 began to arrive at fighter units.This differed from the Bf-109E-4 by having the capability to carry a 66-Imp gal (300 Litre) jettisonable plywood fuel tank.The lack of range had been one of the main disadvantages of the Bf-109 during the French campaign, and would further embarrass the Jagdgruppen over England, limiting combat time to just a few minutes.In practice, the tank was prone to terrible leaks and suspected of a tendency to ignite.It was rarely used in action due to the suspicions of the pilots"
The Germans did develop a drop tank for the Bf 109 prior to the invasion of France. Unfortunately, the design was rather hasty and the tank (made of plywood) tended to come 'unglued' (great shades of Ta 154!) when in use. The design allowed for about 70 gallons of fuel to be carried. Because of the leakage problems and the potential that resulted in it being a fire hazard it went unused. The original intent was that the Bf 109E-7 could use this tank to extend its range for use in both the French campaign and later against Britain.
This is another case of a single German manufacturer building a defective product on the spur of the moment and when the product fails to meet service requirements there is no suitable alternative. By the time the problem(s) comes to the attention of higher levels of command and is dealt with the operational effects have already caused debilitating losses.
Look at the same problem with the Bf 110. The D model with the Dackelbauch tank suffered a number of losses from explosions occurring when the tank emptied and the remaining fuel – air mixture was exposed to a spark. If anything, the technical incompetence of the Luftwaffe's technische Amt in providing suitable and adequate equipment and aircraft to that service was a disgrace. The Göring had the stupidity to place such non-technical officers such as Ernst Udet in command of this critical branch of the Luftwaffe only shows his own incompetence as a leader.
They couldn't get it to work right and it kept exploding/catching fire.
THE LUFTWAFFE AND DROP FUEL TANKS 1939-40[!?] | Weapons and Warfare
.....Jumo 211 engine production favored over production of DB601 engine.
.....Cancellation of funding for DB603 engine.
.....1938 decision to proceed with twin engine He-177A rather then follow Heinkel recommendation to proceed with four engine He-177B.
.....Decision to power Fw-190 with an unproven (indeed, not existent) radial engine rather then a Daimler-Benz V12.
.....Decision to kill Jumo 222 engine program via bureaucratic methods such as increasing HP requirement.
What 177B in in 1938? Alternate universe?
And what was the 1937 DB 603 really like? it sure wouldn't be the 1942/3 DB 603. There are only so many engineers and you don't create more over night by simply placing a contract. What else doesn't DB do if it works on the 603 in 1937/38?