FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
XW435, registered here in the states as N4XW.
B-29 REMOTE CONTROL GUNNERY SYSTEM
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XW435, registered here in the states as N4XW.
CRASHGATE3
Airman 1st Class
Thanx....
I will look through my pix....
I will look through my pix....
27 destroyed credits to B-29's in Korea, right v. almost 800 credited to F-86's. B-29's were credited with more than any plane *besides* the F-86. But as we discussed on 'gunner kills' thread, victory credits to bombers typically exceeded enemy losses by much more than fighter credits of the same air arm at the same time. It was more difficult to weed out duplications, and the bomber couldn't follow its fighter target to destruction so more estimating was needed; but morale was a factor weighing against being too strict about crediting gunners with victories. Anyway I studied B-29 v MiG-15 engagements closely, found the 'MiG' and US accounts of pretty much all of them (almos all v Soviet AF MiG's), and B-29's seem to have really downed 3 or 4 MiG's, and strangely 2 of the sure kills were *not* credited at the time. That's a much lower accuracy rate than fighter claims so B-29's didn't even actually shoot down the second most enemy a/c in Korea, F-80's did. MiG-15's destroyed 20 B-29/RB-29 in Korea counting planes written off from MiG damage, possibly one other writeoff and another RB-29 of the 91st SRS, which lost a/c over Korea, also lost one near the USSR to MiG-15's in 1952. The B-29's gun system, state of art in 1945, could not cope with swept wing jet targets.
In WWII 74 B-29 losses were attributed to fighters, 54 to AAA, and 19 to a combination. The reason losses were considered barely sustainable as of early 1945, was heavy operational losses in addition: long range with no emergency field until Iwo Jima was captured, and the B-29 was still a buggy airplane. B-29's were credited with 914 Japanese fighters destroyed. The accuracy ratio of those credits appears to be somewhat higher than in Korea, perhaps 1/4-1/3 that many enemy planes were actually downed. More than a few rammed, so those 'kills' are without doubt, though usually resulted in the B-29's loss as well.
The ratio of credited victories to losses due to fighters in WWII was much (around 3 times) higher for the B-29 than the B-17/24 in ETO.
Joe
Screaming Eagle
Senior Master Sergeant
Thanks for that FBJ, it was a very fascinating read
delcyros
Tech Sergeant
I am personally not convinced that experiences from the PTO service of B-29 can be extrapolated to europe, particularely the latter part, say from feb. 45 to august 45.
Tactics were simply to different there. In order to allow precise bombardement, the B-29 had to fly comparably low for most of the mission, something which was eased by the airspace condition (approach to and return from destiny was over empty ocean and not enemy (better: contested) airspace. The remote gunnery system usually was removed from the B-29 A and -B during this period, leaving the tail guns only. Another important tactical difference lies in the formation flying. Over Japan, there wasn´t exactly any kind of a tight formation flying with single or pairs of B-29 operating independently, this was forced by the long range requirement (air assembly of large formations is a long lasting and fuel gulping task).
Things in europe would differ greatly:
1.) It is not reasonable that B-29 would operate at low altitude as they did in Japan. That would be negative here over contested airspace (lots of Flak, too.) and it isn´t necessary due to the generally shorter ranges.
2.) It is not reasonable with the tight AAA concentration and the proposed Luftwaffe interceptor capabilities (both night and day) that the B-29 would remove their remote gunnery system.
3.) The higher range tolerances would allow the assembly of large formations prior to entering contested airspace at least in daylight operations (open formations would remain in night sorties).
These differences will have both, tactical and logistical consequences:
A1.) The formations, flying higher and equipped better will become increasingly difficult to attack with means of conventional airplanes, esspeccially LW nightfighters (barring the few Ju-388J) and old 8.8cm AAA, thus the number of losses should be expected to proportionally reduce compared to B-17/B-24 raids.
A2.) As a direct reaction to A1.) - we would have to admit the possibility that the Luftwaffe transformes it´s bomber hunter Fw-190 groups into bomber hunter Me-262 groups more rapidly than historically. It is also reasonable that the AAA concentrates their advanced 8.8cm Flak 41 over key targets as we would expect means to extend their effective AAA ceiling. I even wouldn´t rule out that the high altitude mission profile of the B-29 would force the mass production of SAM, which was rejected in exactly this timeframe. None of these countermeasures would develop a notable effect until april 45 but they would give an uncomfortable prospect to future operations.
B1.) The number of B-29 accidents would increase substantially compared to B-17/B-24 raids (conditions comparable to the early, say 1944 period of the B-29 operations vs. Japan), mostly due to engine overheating problems.
B2.) As a direct result to B1.) adaequate cooling techniques would be developed as they were historically.
C1.) The high altitude mission envelope would confront the bombing crews with the jet stream, making navigational issues more problematic and precise bombardements more a matter of luck than anything else (this problem was encountered over Japan, too and was adressed with the low altitude mission profile, which followed from feb. 45 onwards).
C2.) As a direct result of C1.) the altitude mission profile would have been lowered somehow, but not as deep as it was done over japan. A normal high altitude mission profile (at around 20.000-25.000 ft.) would have been accepted for the bombing run.
It can go different ways but I suspect that fractionally more B-29 would return than B-24/B-17 for each given mission.
The Luftwaffe interceptor capabilities for the timeframe in question are a bit overstated - little would change. The Fw-190 Sturmgruppen are to slow and couldn´t operate high enough to play a role while the Me-262 could still get in for the shot. I expect that most high altitude interceptions indeed would result from the jets say from mid feb. 45 onwards with little change to historical loss ratios which were low for the bombers and high for the interceptors in this timeframe!
Tactics were simply to different there. In order to allow precise bombardement, the B-29 had to fly comparably low for most of the mission, something which was eased by the airspace condition (approach to and return from destiny was over empty ocean and not enemy (better: contested) airspace. The remote gunnery system usually was removed from the B-29 A and -B during this period, leaving the tail guns only. Another important tactical difference lies in the formation flying. Over Japan, there wasn´t exactly any kind of a tight formation flying with single or pairs of B-29 operating independently, this was forced by the long range requirement (air assembly of large formations is a long lasting and fuel gulping task).
Things in europe would differ greatly:
1.) It is not reasonable that B-29 would operate at low altitude as they did in Japan. That would be negative here over contested airspace (lots of Flak, too.) and it isn´t necessary due to the generally shorter ranges.
2.) It is not reasonable with the tight AAA concentration and the proposed Luftwaffe interceptor capabilities (both night and day) that the B-29 would remove their remote gunnery system.
3.) The higher range tolerances would allow the assembly of large formations prior to entering contested airspace at least in daylight operations (open formations would remain in night sorties).
These differences will have both, tactical and logistical consequences:
A1.) The formations, flying higher and equipped better will become increasingly difficult to attack with means of conventional airplanes, esspeccially LW nightfighters (barring the few Ju-388J) and old 8.8cm AAA, thus the number of losses should be expected to proportionally reduce compared to B-17/B-24 raids.
A2.) As a direct reaction to A1.) - we would have to admit the possibility that the Luftwaffe transformes it´s bomber hunter Fw-190 groups into bomber hunter Me-262 groups more rapidly than historically. It is also reasonable that the AAA concentrates their advanced 8.8cm Flak 41 over key targets as we would expect means to extend their effective AAA ceiling. I even wouldn´t rule out that the high altitude mission profile of the B-29 would force the mass production of SAM, which was rejected in exactly this timeframe. None of these countermeasures would develop a notable effect until april 45 but they would give an uncomfortable prospect to future operations.
B1.) The number of B-29 accidents would increase substantially compared to B-17/B-24 raids (conditions comparable to the early, say 1944 period of the B-29 operations vs. Japan), mostly due to engine overheating problems.
B2.) As a direct result to B1.) adaequate cooling techniques would be developed as they were historically.
C1.) The high altitude mission envelope would confront the bombing crews with the jet stream, making navigational issues more problematic and precise bombardements more a matter of luck than anything else (this problem was encountered over Japan, too and was adressed with the low altitude mission profile, which followed from feb. 45 onwards).
C2.) As a direct result of C1.) the altitude mission profile would have been lowered somehow, but not as deep as it was done over japan. A normal high altitude mission profile (at around 20.000-25.000 ft.) would have been accepted for the bombing run.
It can go different ways but I suspect that fractionally more B-29 would return than B-24/B-17 for each given mission.
The Luftwaffe interceptor capabilities for the timeframe in question are a bit overstated - little would change. The Fw-190 Sturmgruppen are to slow and couldn´t operate high enough to play a role while the Me-262 could still get in for the shot. I expect that most high altitude interceptions indeed would result from the jets say from mid feb. 45 onwards with little change to historical loss ratios which were low for the bombers and high for the interceptors in this timeframe!
Delcyros:
Well it is reasonable to assume your response was to a significant degree aimed at my previous comments where i stated the if the B-29s would have had to operate in the ETO, then their losses would have been certainly larger.
As you might have read, i made no mention of any particular Luftwaffe fighter as potential weapon to cause B-29 losses to increase if compared to losses known for the PTO experience.
I agree with almost everything you said, and i believe your comments validate mine: in the ETO/MTO the B-29s would have faced a far more capable enemy in terms of air defence systems.
With this i did not suggest the Luftwaffe was in 1945 in such position to effectively defeat B-29 formations, focusing the idea only on higher losses inflicted to the superfortresses if we keep in mind losses the Japs proved capable to inflict.
I do not see any reason to have the B-29s flying over Europe in a fashion different to that of the streams of B-17s and B-24s. Of course they will fly bombing runs with the tactics previously adopted in the case of the other types of heavy bombers.
Not entirely sure if the Fw 190 A-8/R8´s were "too slow" to counter the menace posed by the B-29s though, but as i said, i made no specific reference to any type of German craft eventually displayed to intercept them...but implied or covered in my comments was your observation: the Me 262 was already operational and the necessary tactical adjustements would surely have been made in the Luftwaffe to deploy them accordingly; their degree of success i would not know, but again, only higher losses of B-29s when seeing the PTO case.
More importantly and going back to the computer controlled defensive gunnery system of the B-29, it could have been precisely over Europe where the true worth of such equipment could be put to test. Being so complex and new, and based on the experiences of both sides with regard to new sophisticated systems used in combat, it is my belief the results would not have been so succesful.
Well it is reasonable to assume your response was to a significant degree aimed at my previous comments where i stated the if the B-29s would have had to operate in the ETO, then their losses would have been certainly larger.
As you might have read, i made no mention of any particular Luftwaffe fighter as potential weapon to cause B-29 losses to increase if compared to losses known for the PTO experience.
I agree with almost everything you said, and i believe your comments validate mine: in the ETO/MTO the B-29s would have faced a far more capable enemy in terms of air defence systems.
With this i did not suggest the Luftwaffe was in 1945 in such position to effectively defeat B-29 formations, focusing the idea only on higher losses inflicted to the superfortresses if we keep in mind losses the Japs proved capable to inflict.
I do not see any reason to have the B-29s flying over Europe in a fashion different to that of the streams of B-17s and B-24s. Of course they will fly bombing runs with the tactics previously adopted in the case of the other types of heavy bombers.
Not entirely sure if the Fw 190 A-8/R8´s were "too slow" to counter the menace posed by the B-29s though, but as i said, i made no specific reference to any type of German craft eventually displayed to intercept them...but implied or covered in my comments was your observation: the Me 262 was already operational and the necessary tactical adjustements would surely have been made in the Luftwaffe to deploy them accordingly; their degree of success i would not know, but again, only higher losses of B-29s when seeing the PTO case.
More importantly and going back to the computer controlled defensive gunnery system of the B-29, it could have been precisely over Europe where the true worth of such equipment could be put to test. Being so complex and new, and based on the experiences of both sides with regard to new sophisticated systems used in combat, it is my belief the results would not have been so succesful.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Gentlemen, while there is validity in many of your statements, there is nothing indicating anywhere at anytime that the B-29's firecontrol system worked less than as advertised, but to hypothesize about the aircraft being used in the ETO, I would say there would of been more issues with the propulsion system than anything else....
Here's a more specific example of WWII B-29 claim accuracy. Henry Sakaida in "B-29 Hunters of the JAAF" describes from both sides ten different B-29 raids, one over Manchuria and the rest over Japan, prior to the switchover to night raids in March 1945. Later on B-29's flew more day raids, but let's take the example of before the night raids, where there's no deconfliction issue with US fighter claims over Japan at the same time. I filled in some details of victories credited to the B-29's from Rust "20th Air Force Story" where Sakaida didn't give them.
To summarize the B-29's were credited with 214 Japanese fighters destroyed in those raids (with many more 'probable' and 'damaged'). Sakaida gives combined JAAF and JNAF fighter losses adding by my count to 51, so 24% claim accuracy. However in a few of those cases the JNAF participated or may have and its losses aren't known, and at least one case he gives JAAF pilot KIA's not plane losses. So the actual % is probably a bit higher, but doesn't seem likely to have exceeded 1/3. And again, one feature of these missions was lots of ramming by the Japanese, accounting for most of the B-29 and fighter losses. It doesn't mean necessarily the claim accuracy % would be much lower without it, surely fighters which had rammed and were falling in flames were often credited to a gunner or several gunners inadvertently, so the claims would probably have been lower without those planes seen falling. One aside is that the B-29s' bombs destroyed 87 (per Sakaida, some other sources quote a bit lower) Type 4 Fighters, Ki-84 Hayate or "Frank" on Nakajima's assembly line at Ota on one of those raids, Feb 10 '45. It was almost surely the greatest single destruction of fighters by B-29's in one action.
Joe
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