I believe the B-36 was an effective deterrent, but I would shift the timeline to the right. When in March 1951 the FEAF floated the idea of conventional B-36 missions from CONUS over North Korea with dual purpose of helping that effort and providing realistic training, SAC replied that only around 30 were fully mission capable. The B-36's real combat capability in numbers only dated from late 51-early 52 and by same token real B-47 capability post dated the Korean War, though it didn't have the degree of teething problems as the B-36. Also, the SAC of formidable repuation for relentless training and readiness was a work in progress in pre KW period. But on the defense, it was really more like ca. 1957 when the Soviet air defense system seriously compromised the crediblity of the B-36 year round*, especially after B-36's were stripped down for higher altitude operation from around '54 (in part to counter improved Soviet capabilities and in part because the retractable gun turret system was never fully debugged). The B-36 was an effective nuclear strike a/c from around '52-'57, give or take a year on either end, not long by today's standards but long enough to be important in those times.
In the very early Cold War the number of US nukes and credible delivery systems was pretty limited, though the number of bombs was skyrocketing by early Korean War, and training and readiness of B-29 and B-50 units had reached a level where they posed a significant nuclear threat to at least parts of the USSR. By same token, the US acted circumspectly about Soviet capabilities once they detonated their nuclear test device in 1949, but in reality the operational versions failed their initial test, and the Soviets had no real deliverable nuclear weapons until around '52, and a very limited capability v CONUS for some years after that. But both sides tended to assume a worst case, so in morale terms you might be right that the B-36 was important even before 1950, but it lacked much actual operational capability until later on.
*since operations v the USSR would often cross high latitudes, 'day and night' tended to mean 'summer and winter'. The Soviets lacked enough high performance radar equipped interceptors to credibly counter B-36's in non-VFR conditions until around '57. The arrangement using radar directed searchlights and non-AI radar MiG-15's to bring down a few B-29's at night over Korea, in 100's of tries, defending only a small area, was not a credible counter to a general nuclear attack on the USSR.
Joe