B24 ceiling vs. B17 ceiling

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PM sent, and with attached Statistical Digest file in Excel.

I have watched Geoffrey's post with interest to date as he seems to like data. So do I. Perhaps we can form a united front. It would be nice and has the potential to bring out a LOT of data. I tried that in a thread once, it didn't really go anywhere.

Maybe a collaboration of two interested people would be better after all. Stranger things have happened. Just look at politics! Pick your country and laugh.

Hey Geoffrey, where are you located? I'm in Chino, California, U.S.A. .
 
I haven't read every post here, by my Uncle perished in his B-24 from fragmentation bombs dropped by B-17s from above. April 14, 1945, mission to bomb submarine pens in Royan, France. He was in the 389th BG, a flight engineer. His group was over the sub pens on time at 18,000, but declared over cast and to circle around for 2nd run. Not sure of communication, but 20 minutes later 447th BG of B-17s were to bomb same area from 24,000, and so the 389th bombers were under the bombs dropped from the B-17s. Five B-24s were struck, three making it to emergency landings. Big AssBoid 42-51233 and my uncle's Standby, 42 -50774 were both lost. I believe all on Big Assboid perished, and from my uncle's aircraft, three perished including him. HIs pilot actually parachuted and drowned in the Atlantic.
 

I think that the dates are really important.

Prior to mid 1943 the Luftwaffe had relatively few fighters in the west.

Then as the threat of 8th AF bombing increased, so did the fighter defences.

By mid 1944 the Luftwaffe fighter arm in the west was largely destroyed.

In early 1944, bomber losses on individual missions could be 60 or 70 aircraft.

Could you compare the July 1944 statistics to those of January through May 1944?
 
Hi Wayne,

Attached is a jpg copy of Table 159 that I entered into Excel.

It shows Heavy Bomber losses to Fighters from Jan – Jun 44 as 1,124 versus 609 losses to AAA. But, from Jul – Dec 44, it shows 392 Heavy Bomber losses to fighters and 978 to AAA (flak). That's 1,516 losses to fighters for 1944 and 1,587 losses to AAA for 1944.

The last month for which fighters shot down at least 100 heavies was Sep 1944 when they got 137. After that, the highest loss month was Apr 45 when they got 73. Coincidentally, Apr 44 was when the Luftwaffe collapsed as a fighting force, as seen in another table, Table 166: Enemy Aircraft Destroyed, by Theater, Feb 42 – Aug 45. Check ETO victories in April 1945!

Cheers.

I am assuming, of course, that the Statistical Digest of World War Two is basically a good document. The copy I have has a cover letter date of 23 Feb 2011, but was declassified in 1978. The Digest itself was commissioned in 1959 and released in July 1966.

I left a link to the pdf document in Post #59.
 

Attachments

  • Table 159.jpg
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pbehn said:
Interesting article here The Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress, or the Consolidated B-24 Liberator?
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The USAAF was very aware of the B-24's issues, after all it was only seen as an interim design until the definitive single tail version with more powerful engines hit the road.
This, other than the B-24K in 1943, that proved the excellence of the modifications, was the B-24N that was ordered to the tune of over 5,000 and was intended to become the primary USAAF medium bomber from 1945.
 
Bomb shortages,
33k in the air said:
There certainly was in 1944, with the RAF having to use American SAP and GP bombs, as well as expending its own stocks of GP bombs, to make up for a shortage of MC bombs.
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The UK Statistical Digest repots British bomb production generally went up in 1942 from 39,959 tons in Q1 to 64,562 in Q4, but Q1/43 was 50,610 tons, Q2 was 38,511 tons then things began to climb again. The War Production Board report as expected shows the expansion of US production in 1942, 34,000 tons in January to 109,000 tons in December. 132,000 tons in January 1943, but down to 81,000 tons in March before returning to the 120,000 or so tons mark in April, further expansion from September. So there was a slowdown in early 1943. The US increased bomb production by almost 2.5 times 1942 to 1943, the British 6% more, the lift 1943 to 1944 was 26% for the US and 38% for the British, not sure why there are such large monthly fluctuations.
GregP said:
Did we get up on the wrong side of the bed? Perhaps actual discourse is indicated. I'm willing if you are. Sounds like we both have a lot of data.
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I learnt a while ago not to let the online spill over into day to day, except for a laugh. Reactions like the above tell so much. As noted before I do not do public release of personal data, a long standing policy started by how "passionate" some people become over issues and reinforced after watching what happens when someone is hit by identity theft and finally as I want the data to stand alone.

The logic I see being deployed is

fighters smaller number of chances times greater lethality = X (the number of bombers lost) = flak greater number of chances times smaller lethality => fighters lethality = flak lethality since X is the same. If this is true then there should be examples of flak causing high losses to a raid like fighters did.

A big data set of the Allied strategic bombers, US 4 engine, RAF 205 Group and Bomber Command are the Richard Davis spreadsheets.

Except as mentioned the last time this claim was the USAAF production reports contradict the claim. As of March 1945 of the 8,852 heavy bombers, 4 engine, medium range, which is not the same as a medium bomber, 3,847 were B-17 and 3,976 were B-24N, the rest being B-24M, the B-17 and B-24N programs to end in June 1946. The medium bombers were the twin engine types, with the B-26 about to end production.
 
As far as I can see they arent issues, just traits. The B-24 was different to the B-17, for the British the B-24 had more uses because of its range and size. Carrying people, documents and other "stuff" across the Atlantic was a force multiplier no one really considered, same as the ASW role.
 

There would be some delay between production and deployment to squadrons, given the length of the logistical train.


Harris certainly had things to say about bomb supplies, as stated in his Despatch on War Operations:

"The 1,000-lb. M.C. bomb which was introduced into the Command in the spring of 1943 proved to be a most valuable and effective weapon. Supplies, however, were always inadequate, and during 1944, in spite of many requests for increased output from this Command, recourse had to be made to American type bombs, to 500-lb. British bombs, and even to 250-lb. bombs. The shortage of 1,000-lb. M.C. bombs at times gave rise to the gravest concern and stocks had to be husbanded with the very greatest care."

"Supplies of 500-lb. (No. 14) clusters started to trickle into the Command at the end of 1943, and these were followed by the 750-lb. (No. 15) cluster, in the summer of 1944 and by the M.17 (American) cluster. Deliveries of the 1,000-lb. (No. 16) clusters did not commence until the autumn. The supply position was always precarious and supplies were always behind production forecasts. In addition, insufficient transit cases were available, and such as existed were of unsuitable design, being either cumbersome steel crates, laborious to open, or wooden crates flimsy and non-weatherproof. The clusters themselves were extremely fragile, and once out of their crates were easily damaged in handling or by moisture."


The document Armament — Volume I — Bombs and Bombing Equipment published in 1952 by the Air Historical Branch details the development of the various bombs used during the war. Reading through that illustrates the factors which impacted production. For example, the testing of designs and fixing any revealed issues; cast versus forged versus welded bomb body designs, each having its own benefit and drawback; operational use revealing issues requiring changes and a new bomb mark; and so forth.

The shift in the spring of 1944 from predominantly area incendiary attacks to high explosive usage in the run-up to D-Day contributed as well, as it meant the demand for HE bombs rose quickly. The emphasis on HE bombs by Bomber Command remained for the rest of the war.

That demand for HE bombs causing supply issues can be seen in the fact that Bomber Command dropped 2.5 times more of its old 500-lb GP bombs in 1944 than it did in all other years of the war combined. Indeed, the 500-lb GP bomb was the most used HE bomb for that year. Use of the 1,000-lb MC bomb went from about 17,500 in 1943 to some 203,000 in 1944.
 
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JDCAVE said:
You would be shot down if you didn't take action against radar guided flak. You had to change your track or you would be shot down. Pilots took evasive action when they had determined they were being predicted.
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I always knew night bombers did this because they flew individually.

But how would a daytime formation handle this? With individual planes moving within the formation?

Thank you for your consideration
 
gruad said:
I always knew night bombers did this because they flew individually.

But how would a daytime formation handle this? With individual planes moving within the formation?

Thank you for your consideration
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All I have on this are my dad's recollections. In order to determine if you were being "predicted" was by observing the flak. Dad related the following, daylight operation to Hanover 25-March-1945. Hughes was the second pilot on his training flight with dad, who was on his last op:

"When we got to Hanover, I was telling Hughes, as I did to all of them, what the pilot was supposed to do…We got through [the bombing run] and he said you were jinking all over you started to dive and that, and I said yes, we were "predicted". And he said, "Gee, I didn't notice that. And I said, "Hell, well, I'll help you around [understand], so I came out of the bomber stream, did an orbit, came around and went through it again and by this time after the attack was over and we were all alone. So, I was able to say "Now, see the burst there? Right! Now, they are predicting us! Now this is what we do!" Then I went through the drill for him to do over the target so he could understand it. The crew said they were absolutely petrified! I didn't realize it myself."



On the subject of shortages of bombs. Dad carried 4 X 250 lb GP bombs to Dresden. These were an incredibly ineffective bomb. So the shortage was real. He was also still carrying small bomb containers, even into March 1945.

Jim
 
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Unfortunately, the table tells us nothing about loss rates which are more useful indices of what was going on. We know that the number of sorties by the 8th increased until throughout the end of the war. At least until March 1945. So loss rates by both fighters and flak likely declined through the winter of 1944-Spring 1945. I believe (not certain, requires a reference) that some AA flak units were transferred to the Eastern Front later in the war.

Someone made a comment earlier on the mobility of flak units. Some were mobile, but were not sufficiently mobile to "chase" bombers during the course of a raid. The briefing documents for Middleton St. George (November 1944-April 1945) reveal that crews were briefed on flak positions and in some cases the number of guns.



 
That Table, Table 159: Airplane Losses on Combat Missions in the ETO, by Aircraft Type and Cause, Aug 1942 to May 1945, tells you ETO Losses to fighters, AAA, and Other Causes.

Another table, Table 118: Combat Sorties Flown, by Theater, Dec 1941 to Aug 1945, tells you sorties.

If you want loss rates, just divide the Losses by Sorties, simple.

But, I don't really understand where you are going. Loss rates and the combination of losses and sorties tell you exactly the same data. When loss rates for some month go up, so do losses, exactly in proportion to sorties. Also, most statisticians use loss rates to predict losses ... but we HAVE the losses.

So, I don't get where you are going with your post.

Not that my understanding of it is important; it isn't. The data is in the digest. We just have to look at it and decide what it is saying.
 
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