Battle of Britain - 80yrs Ago This Summer - Discussion Thread

[Deleted member 68059]

Its worth noting as a general point of reflection that on 7th September 1940, Keith Park recieved an order from the Air Ministry to make preparations necessary to render every aerodrome in south-east England un-usable to the enemy (i.e. blow up the whole lot). Park refused on the grounds that it would have a fatal impact on the morale of the pilots, and guarantee their failure. Later that same day Churchill called Park and informed him that they expected barges to depart France imminetly.*

I`m just pointing out that the men there at the time believed that things were extremely tight at the time, and I dont think anyone should be saying thinsg like "I still think invasion impossible." with a high degree of confidence.

Its a valid point to deride the condition of the German barges compared to the craft used on D-Day, but having said that Britain managed to get a third of the total of 330,000 soliders who were taken off the Dunkirk beach & habour under fire with a bunch of leisure craft.... so the manner in which its done, doesnt preclude its occurance. Best estimates are that 1/3 of that total (i.e about 100,000) were taken over by the "little ships" over 9 days, and that was WITHOUT total air superiority (although admittedly the Luftwaffe certainly didnt put their full weight against them).

I`m not trying to compare invading England with evacuating France, but just making the point that crossings with very large numbers of troops under pretty sub-optimal conditions at the time was clearly "possible" in general terms. Although I`m sure it would have been harder going the other way due to the more remote locations of suitable beaches etc.

Dunkirk- The Rescue Fleet and Numbers Rescued. » Dunkirk 1940 - The Before, The Reality, The Aftermath

*pg 108 of the Park Biography,
V. Orange, "Sir Keith Park - If one man ever won the Battle of Britain, he
did.," Methuen London Ltd, 1984.

 

[Juha3]

The Luftwaffe had to do it at about 5:1, which was very optimistic.

Aircraft production was not the defining factor for the British. It was pilot replacement, and not just young men coming off the shortened training courses and from the OTUs. The critical shortage that the British faced historically, even at the level of losses they sustained, was of combat ready, operational, pilots. The often quoted figure showing that Fighter Command had 200 or so more pilots at the end of the Battle than the beginning ignores that about one third of the total (more than 300) were not operational.

If the Luftwaffe was actually inflicting the damage its own pilots claimed, then it would have won the Battle, but of course it wasn't.

Hello Stona
You surely tried to write that FC had 1,200 or so more pilots.
The LW also suffered from the lack of combat ready fighter pilots, on 28 Sept. 40 they had 712 combat ready 109s but only 676 combat ready pilots for them. Establishment was 1132 109s and pilots. So in end the critical figure on both sides was the number of combat ready, operational, fighter jockeys. And in that Germans were disadvantaged, because most of the CW pilots who were shot down could return combat sooner or later when most of the German pilots were lost for the war effort.

 

[Peter Gunn]

Its worth noting as a general point of reflection that on 7th September 1940, Keith Park recieved an order from the Air Ministry to make preparations necessary to render every aerodrome in south-east England un-usable to the enemy (i.e. blow up the whole lot). Park refused on the grounds that it would have a fatal impact on the morale of the pilots, and guarantee their failure. Later that same day Churchill called Park and informed him that they expected barges to depart France imminetly.*

I`m just pointing out that the men there at the time believed that things were extremely tight at the time, and I dont think anyone should be saying thinsg like "I still think invasion impossible." with a high degree of confidence.

Its a valid point to deride the condition of the German barges compared to the craft used on D-Day, but having said that Britain managed to get a third of the total of 330,000 soliders who were taken off the Dunkirk beach & habour under fire with a bunch of leisure craft.... so the manner in which its done, doesnt preclude its occurance. Best estimates are that 1/3 of that total (i.e about 100,000) were taken over by the "little ships" over 9 days, and that was WITHOUT total air superiority (although admittedly the Luftwaffe certainly didnt put their full weight against them).

I`m not trying to compare invading England with evacuating France, but just making the point that crossings with very large numbers of troops under pretty sub-optimal conditions at the time was clearly "possible" in general terms. Although I`m sure it would have been harder going the other way due to the more remote locations of suitable beaches etc.

Dunkirk- The Rescue Fleet and Numbers Rescued. » Dunkirk 1940 - The Before, The Reality, The Aftermath

*pg 108 of the Park Biography,
V. Orange, "Sir Keith Park - If one man ever won the Battle of Britain, he
did.," Methuen London Ltd, 1984.

No argument what the "little ships" managed to accomplish and basically agree with much of your post, but they did that under cover of both the RAF and more importantly the Royal Navy. Doing the reverse in the face of one of, if not the most powerful fleet in the world at the time does not bode well for the invaders, especially when what the KM was going to try to bring to the table.

I don't mean to derail the topic with diversions to Sealion, there was a thread here years ago that did a pretty thorough examination of why it would fail.

 

[stona]

As per Snowygrouch's post above, when the 'infamous' conference was convened on 7th September at Bentley Priory, attended by Dowding, Park, Evill and Nicholl of Fighter Command, Sholto-Douglas and a Group Captain from the Air Ministry with an NCO taking minutes, Park made it quite clear that he thought he was losing the Battle, and the crucial issue was the supply of combat ready pilots. Park pointed out that pilot casualties in 11 Group were running at almost 100 a week. On that day nine of his squadrons had started with fewer than fifteen pilots and the day before he had been forced to combine elements of different squadrons and send them out as composite units. This is the point at which Dowding intervened to say, directly to Douglas, "You must realise that we are going down hill".
It was as a result of this meeting that the stabilisation system was introduced to keep squadrons in 11 Group (and 12 Group) up to strength by stripping experienced pilots from squadrons in other Groups. This had the effect of making some of those squadrons of limited effectiveness (B Class) or non-operational in any meaningful sense (C Class).

What nobody at the meeting could possibly know was that the Luftwaffe had even more severe problems than they did.

 

[pbehn]

My issue here is that we taking cause and effect.

Germany HAS to invade.
Germany HAS to park tanks on the Buckingham Palace lawn.

No invasion and no tanks then no win.

You can destroy every radar and Spitfires all day long. You can then turn Kent into a moonscape. But if the British keep fighting then it doesn't matter.

British bad weather and the onset of Winter means any invasion would have to wait until May 1941.

The Kriegsmarine couldn't invade UK in 1940 by any logical standard.

So realistically it was bombing and reducing the British will to fight.

You don't win wars by shooting down a Spitfire in a dogfight.

Unless you have German troops marching down Whitehall then and only then is the war lost.

The weather outside is piddling down and it's a British Summer! The weather alone could have defeated any invasion.

There is another school of thought. The French had just surrendered without Paris being occupied, and in the space of 1 year Germany had over run Poland Norway Belgium as well as France. If the RAF was destroyed the UK would have the choice of opposing an invasion and seeing every town and city destroyed or sullenly seeking "terms". It is all just a matter of perception and bluff. The LW didn't really have the bomber force to destroy all of the UK but they certainly could do a lot of damage. How many in 1940 knew the difference between those two possible outcomes on both sides? They could have used half their bomber force to attack cities by night and the other to attack RAF radar and fighter stations by day, from ASAP after the fall of France, but Adolf had ideas of an agreement, he was also discussing attacking Russia before he had really started attacking the UK. There were at least 4 philosophies at work which almost guarantees failure of any one in particular

 

[MikeMeech]

Its worth noting as a general point of reflection that on 7th September 1940, Keith Park recieved an order from the Air Ministry to make preparations necessary to render every aerodrome in south-east England un-usable to the enemy (i.e. blow up the whole lot). Park refused on the grounds that it would have a fatal impact on the morale of the pilots, and guarantee their failure. Later that same day Churchill called Park and informed him that they expected barges to depart France imminetly.*

I`m just pointing out that the men there at the time believed that things were extremely tight at the time, and I dont think anyone should be saying thinsg like "I still think invasion impossible." with a high degree of confidence.


*pg 108 of the Park Biography,
V. Orange, "Sir Keith Park - If one man ever won the Battle of Britain, he
did.," Methuen London Ltd, 1984.

Hi

However, pipe mines were laid under airfields and other locations. These were supposed to have been removed post war, however, they have a habit of turning up, in 1989 there was the MOD's 'Operation Crabstick' which was supposed to remove many after they had turned up at some airfields that were still being used. This was fairly successful but some still turn up I think 2016 was the last time but there may have been some since? I have attached part of a document showing airfield sites investigated under 'Crabstick'.

Mike

 

[Deleted member 68059]

Hi

However, pipe mines were laid under airfields and other locations.

Thanks Mike, thats really interesting - I had no idea that had happened.

 

[stona]

What is surprising is that they were still mining airfields for potential demolition in late1942.

 

[Juha3]

To me as an ex-junior sapper NCO it is surprising that they did not know what had happened to the mines, were they removed or not and were all or only part of them removed.

 

[Elmas]

What is surprising is that they were still mining airfields for potential demolition in late1942.

The power of beaurocracy...

 

[Glider]

The power of beaurocracy...

What you may find equally surprising is that at Lee on Solent after the war, they forgot about the pipe bombs under the runway. They were only found when the airfield was decommissioned in the early 2000's and handed over to the coastguard

 

[The Basket]

The Kriegsmarine suffered heavy losses in Norway so any even remotely possible UK invasion was sunk at the bottom of a Fjord.

To me the invasion of Britain and the Battle of Britain are the same. As they are the tactical and strategic reasons for the whole shooting match in the first place.

You are trying to achieve a military objective and win or lose is based on this objective.

So we must know what the Germans were trying to achieve and what the British were trying to achieve.

Saying that the Germans were trying to get peace or a truce? Don't send a Junkers send a letter!

We have seen time and time again the failure of using military means to get a political end.

Either you fight to win cos the only alternative is to fight to lose.

 

[pbehn]

....you have to wonder how much of a role 'ULTRA' played in the 'early warning system', it never seems to be mentioned in the context of the BoB. The major Luftwaffe strike operations must have required a certain amount of pre-planning and thus communications, giving the code-breakers more time to identify targets and coordinate defenders. I don't know, but I can't believe it was all down to radar, so even had the Germans succeeded in destroying the masts, a certain amount of target intelligence was always going to be available especially after the change in strategy..

I found this
"The RAF also had access to the reports from men eavesdropping on German frequencies. The German weather reconnaissance units were not asked simply for general information but for weather conditions at the intended targets. As an added risk to security such aircraft sent radio reports while still over Britain. This, and any other Luftwaffe radio traffic, was correlated by a secret unit known as the 'Y" service. And as each German aeroplane was prepared for an operational flight, its radio was tested. Monitoring of these test signals provided intelligence with a fairly accurate guess at the number of aircraft to be used in the following 24-hour period. As Eagle Day approached, the listening service was able to tell Dowding that he was about to be attacked on a scale far exceeding all previous attacks. "
Len Deighton Fighter Pluriform 1993 p158

and

At this point certain threads came together, as they often do at critical moments. The bombs which fell on London on the night of August 24/25 had immediate repercussions; 81 aircraft of Bomber Command attacked Berlin the following night. This was an act which deeply pleased the Prime Minister, the Government, the Press and the overwhelming majority of a public which was displaying unexpected reserves of belligerency. The Air Staff was less pleased; it had little faith in the effectiveness of pure reprisals, and still firmly believed that its slender bomber forces could do real damage to military targets. How much damage Bomber Command actually did to Berlin on August 25/26 is uncertain; that it caused considerable annoyance to Hitler and Goering, who had boasted that such a thing would never happen, is obvious. And some damage was certainly done by attacks on other targets in Germany. 'Thus Hitler had more than one motive for rescinding his prohibition of deliberate attacks on the British capital, and Goering now ordered the matter to be put in hand with immediate effect. On September 5 the "Y" Service intercepted his order for an attack by over 300 bombers with massive fighter cover on the London docks on the afternoon of September 7.
Thanks to Ultra, Goering's signal was in the hands of the Prime Minister and of Dowding within minutes of its despatch.
John Terraine Right of the Line Hodder & Stoughton 1985 p207
here September 7th 1940

 

[Hornchurch]

-

One of the American lads named Earl, said to me (on another forum)......

"I can't wrap my head around is why it took so long for the US to join the fight when the stakes were so high".

"What were they thinking and were some preparing to form a non aggression pact with Germany,
the public thinking it wouldn't have been so bad?"

"There were some well known public figures during that time who admired the Nazis who might have hoped Britain fell, and possibly used their influence and power to keep the US neutral for so long".


The THREE paragraph/lines above, were NOT from me, but from a born/bred/raised U.S citizen, Today, in Aug' 2020 - By chance, I read this.....

80-years ago, on the 4th August 1940, whilst Charles Lindbergh was appeasing the Nazi's, General Pershing had other ideas *(Thank God !)

I wrote what I'd found...... (By chance)


"80-years ago EXACTLY TODAY, a famous WW.I American General spoke on an all-important Public-Address....


"American General John J. Pershing gave a nationwide radio broadcast urging that aid be sent to Britain".

"It is not hysterical to insist that democracy and liberty are threatened"

"Pershing said. "Democracy and liberty have been overthrown on the continent of Europe".

"Only the British are left to defend democracy and liberty in Europe".


"By sending help to the British we can still hope with confidence to keep the war on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean,

.....where the enemies of liberty, if possible, should be defeated" - AUGUST 4th 1940

.

 

[nuuumannn]

Senior Nazi leadership tended to work on assumptions rather than facts.

Their predilection for disagreement with each other and currying favour and empire building certainly didn't help and this childish behaviour by them could arguably have lost the war for the Nazis.

The thing is, the Germans believed their own propaganda, but some of this became rooted in fact following the successes in Europe. The German armed forces were not the largest, nor did they operate the best equipment in 1940, but they had some excellent personnel and individual capability that gave them an edge in certain scenarios. Before the war and even into it, the Luftwaffe had the largest and best aerial reconnaissance network and system in the world. Nothing else with any other air force, the RAF and USAAF included compared. German intelligence, the Abwehr was an independent organisation run by a canny individual with little in the way of ties to Goring and the Nazi hierarchy. That's not to say Canaris wasn't tempted by the lure of power, but he wielded his own influence outside of those currying favour within the Reichs Chancellery, and he cocked up on numerous occasions.

The Luftwaffe also had superior radio navigation aids, which enabled its bomber force a degree of accuracy that the likes of the RAF and USAAC/AAF would not achieve until a couple of years into the war. The Luftwaffe was a powerful and capable force and it was equipped with excellent individuals in positions of leadership, but all of that comes to nothing if the policymakers don't have their wits about them.

British Intelligence, for all its quirks and faults in the first few years of the war evolved into the greatest weapon the Brits had against the Germans and its role in defeating the Nazis was paramount, but the reality was that uneven leadership was the reason behind Germany's failure in the Battle of Britain and the war for that matter, for the reasons we have all put up here.

 

[The Basket]

Arrogance, ignorance and hubris are not military strategy. Who da thunk it?

Oddly the UK constantly overestimated the Germans. Which is not a bad thing.

The stars and the gods conspired that the RAF would have a tool such as fighter command in 1940. And leaders such as Dowding and Park. Consider the state of other aspects of the British military and I would say how fantastic it is.

 

[stona]

The Kriegsmarine suffered heavy losses in Norway so any even remotely possible UK invasion was sunk at the bottom of a Fjord.

To me the invasion of Britain and the Battle of Britain are the same. As they are the tactical and strategic reasons for the whole shooting match in the first place.

You are trying to achieve a military objective and win or lose is based on this objective.

So we must know what the Germans were trying to achieve and what the British were trying to achieve.

Saying that the Germans were trying to get peace or a truce? Don't send a Junkers send a letter!

We have seen time and time again the failure of using military means to get a political end.

Either you fight to win cos the only alternative is to fight to lose.

The Germans were hoping to avoid an invasion. A large amphibious operation against an island in possession of a hugely superior navy was always going to be difficult. Sealion was not a bluff before 19 September 1940, when assembly was halted, it was the ultimate back up. The Germans believed that by destroying the RAF (or at least Fighter Command) the conditions for a successful invasion could be established and that the British would understand this too, leading to negotiations and a solution not requiring Sealion to be launched. Blasting their now undefended cities might serve as some encouragement to come to the table. If the British remained recalcitrant, then the invasion would go ahead. It's why they sent 'a Junkers with a letter' in a rather silly attempt to influence British public opinion in favour of a negotiated settlement.

To launch an amphibious operation like Sealion you must control the sea, not just off the invasion beaches, but over the lines of reinforcement and re-supply. For the Germans this effectively meant controlling the English Channel. The fallacy in the German plan is that even if they had achieved air superiority over the Channel and SE England it would not have conferred control of the sea. The RN had dozens of destroyers and other light units and hundreds of light craft (patrol boats, trawlers, etc.) which could operate against the invasion fleets and their logistical tail stretching across the Channel, and, incidentally, do so with impunity at night. The Luftwaffe was committed to a large array of other tasks in support of Sealion, it did not have the resources to stop the RN wreaking havoc on the invasion fleets.

 

[The Basket]

Let's look at say June 1940 and then June 1941.

So Germany launches Battle of Britain 2 with all knowledge gained from the year before.

They now got Bismarck and other capital ships. Bf 109 Freidrich and Fw 190 and drop tanks aplenty. Scoured allies and conquered enemies for a suitable landing craft. And time to plan and organise and get it together.

1941 would not be good year.

 

[stona]

1941 would not be good year.

It would certainly be a better year, but they were rather busy elsewhere with an ideologically driven campaign which was one of the raison d'etres of the Nazi German state. Hitler was a chancer and Barbarossa was one of his greatest gambles. It was undertaken with half an eye looking across the Atlantic at the economic might and military potential of the United States. Time was not on the German side.

The Luftwaffe was already packing up to head east as what the British call the Battle of Britain petered out in the winter of 1940.

 

[pbehn]

Let's look at say June 1940 and then June 1941.

So Germany launches Battle of Britain 2 with all knowledge gained from the year before.

They now got Bismarck and other capital ships. Bf 109 Freidrich and Fw 190 and drop tanks aplenty. Scoured allies and conquered enemies for a suitable landing craft. And time to plan and organise and get it together.

1941 would not be good year.

By June1941 night raids on UK were no longer a free hit, the RAF had Radar equipped Beaufighters controlled by GCI RADAR , Germany was starting to need its own night fighter force and the battle of the Atlantic was starting to demand long range fighters/ raiders and the Bf110 and Ju88 were the tool. The RAF now had more and better Spitfires and Hurricanes armed with cannon with better trained pilots. However by 1941 Leigh Mallory was in charge so it would probably be over in a week.