One that could shoot down a Whitley. Dowding was a keen advocate of the only method that would work (RADAR) but was negative about the mad cap proposals that wouldn't work. Unless he was supposed to develop airborne radar and Beaufighters himself the "nightfighter" angle to his dismissal was pure fiction.
Battle of Britain - 80yrs Ago This Summer - Discussion Thread
- Thread starter Hornchurch
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So, give him a nice desk job as a consultant, to be consulted as to what he would do if he was a LW commander in France faced with the RAF proposals for "leaning forward into France".
In theory a good idea but I doubt that Leight-Mallory or Sholto Douglas would have been keen to follow his advices.
Bill Newton Dunn wrote a sympathetic biography of Leigh-Mallory, 'Big Wing' (maybe in response to Vincent Orange's hatchet job in his biographies of Park and Dowding) in which he illustrates a pit fall that catches far too many writers on the period. On the 7th September conference at which Park, Dowding and Evill tried to cajole Douglas into a sense of reality, Dunn wrote
"He [Dowding] was tired of the strain of the Battle and his readiness to admit defeat, expressed at the conference on 7 September, could have been interpreted as a lack of will to win."
The question is interpreted by who? By Douglas or by Dunn? Another writer might interpret Dowding's response as having the courage to see and state things as they really were, without attempting to escape the fact that they were his responsibility. Nothing that Dowding wrote, said or did would give any rational person cause to believe that he was ever ready to admit defeat.
It seems to me that there were a lot of people on both sides of the Channel and both sides of the Atlantic who preferred to shoot the messenger rather than look at facts. In this instance both Goering and Leigh Mallory/Douglas were convinced that some massive aerial "Waterloo" would see them stride away from the battle as victors while Park and Galland knew they wouldn't.
Deleted member 68059
Staff Sergeant
- 1,058
- Dec 28, 2015
Interestingly this role-reversed later in the war when the strategic bombing ramped up after the Casablanca conference. Galland was trying to get 1000 fighter`s up at once agains the Allied formations. Göring turned his idea down after months of preparation as he wanted to divert much of the fighter force towards the Allied forces which had come onto the mainland after Normandy. Galland and Milch made the case that if they let the industry get bombed the war was over anyway, so it had to have priority despite the invasion. Apparently the main issue Galland reported with the logistics of getting the fighters up was weather, and it took months of waiting to get the right conditions across Germany to permit it, by which time Göring gave it the "no" vote. Galland stated that he was therefore never able to get together a German "super-big wing". This is all from an Allied interrogation of Galland in late 45.
Galland indulged in a lot of self justification after the war, usually exonerating himself (the General of the Jagdflieger) from any responsibility for its manifest failure against the Anglo-American bombing offensives at the expense of those no longer able to defend themselves, many because they were dead.
His responses above ignore the fact that the most success that German fighters ever had against the Americans in daylight came when raids were intercepted both on the way to and from the targets by a succession of units, often having diverted or stripped away fighter escorts...exactly as Park did in 1940.
I always have a bucket of salt handy when reading Galland's post war interrogations and later opinions.
His responses above ignore the fact that the most success that German fighters ever had against the Americans in daylight came when raids were intercepted both on the way to and from the targets by a succession of units, often having diverted or stripped away fighter escorts...exactly as Park did in 1940.
I always have a bucket of salt handy when reading Galland's post war interrogations and later opinions.
Peter Gunn
Master Sergeant
Totally agree.
I always felt that there was a strong element of self preservation in this. Galland and Baders preferred option when they got to choose was to have as many wing men as possible around them. Even in theory Baders tactic doesn't work, you cannot be "up sun" with a 60 aircraft formation attacking a formation almost 40 miles long and 8 miles wide.
Deleted member 68059
Staff Sergeant
- 1,058
- Dec 28, 2015
His closest associates in his role as inspector of fighters were Kesselring, Milch, Goring, Tank, Heinkel and Messerschmitt. All of whom were alive and perfectly well during the time he was interviewed.
Udet and Mölders died long before the strategic campaign started, and Galland was a VERY long way from being the sole critic of both men.
Given that Galland was interrogated in the same facility, at the same time, by the same interrogators as those who spoke to Milch, Kesselring and Goring, all of whom would have spent weeks in each others company in Berlin and Carinhall at the Generallufzeugmeister conferences, Galland would have been extraorinarily stupid to have made up the history of entire air campaigns, they were all trying to look good to either escape the gallows, or get jobs with the Allies. This obviously takes the form of polishing ones own resume, but being noted as a fantasist and a liar was not something he tried to do.
He was certainly (as most aces seem to be) in posession of an ego, but I`m entirely unconvinced that Gallands testimony is so biased as to be historically unsound as a record.
I`d also be interested to hear where you read that he "exonerated himself from any responsibiliy for its manifest failure against the Anglo-American bombing offensive".
There is an entire section in his interrogation dedicated to self analysis of his faults and policy failures, of which I attach two snippets, sorry for the poor quality of the
photographs.
I`m sure he did lots of "polishing" and the interrogators make it clear they can see he`s trying to defend his position, and I`m sure he did omitted a lot of his errors, but your stated view on his interrogation is perhaps a bit too far to one side.
By counterpoint, in some of the documents prepared by those talking to Goring, you`ll find notes from the interrogators about his widespread theft and embezzlement of
state and private assets. They knew the dirt on the men they spoke to.
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Si parva licet componere magnis... (Virgil).
By my personal point of view, the Luftwaffe Blitz in 1940 and the Allied air offensive were not at all, by my personal point of view, exactly comparable ...
And yet several comparisons between the period of the BoB following Adlertag and 'Big Week' have been written.
Two air forces fighting a defensive battle against enemy formations intent on their destruction. Even the command and control systems were similar. Apart from that, not so much in common.
I don't see the relevance of the aircraft manufacturers. He reserved most of his vitriol for Goering who was dead when Galland's campaign of self justification got underway. he even annoyed some of the men who had flown under him. He was still trying to re-write history in 1985, as Ulrich Steinhilper discovered,
"Even today I find the issue very frustrating and it becomes exasperating when I read in Jagerblatt, June -July 1985, Adolph Galland's comments in an article entitled '45 Years Ago-At the Channel'. He writes, "Looking back at the Battle of Britain, there was no direct radio communication possible with the bombers, due to the differing frequencies. A situation almost unbelievable, which amongst other things had serious consequences when rendezvous points were missed or escorts/bombers were a little late." When I read this now it turns my stomach when I think of all the frustrations I had with this man when trying to sell good communications to the squadron leaders. He and our other 'Spaniards' were so entrenched in their views that they, collectively, put the Luftwaffe well behind and may even have cost us the Battle of Britain by their inflexibility. Adolph Galland was against progress in all forms of communications within I/JG 433 and later I/JG 52. He could apparently see no reason at all to have Funkgerate (FuG) in a fighter aircraft. Wing signals in the air and a telephone briefing would be sufficient..... What motivated this apparent obstinacy? I don't know but maybe it was a desire to be free in the air, unfettered by a ground based commander or directions from a bomber group. Equally, it could have been a complete lack of foresight; one can still only speculate after such a long time. It still angers me to read comments by a man who, along with his colleagues, was at the root of our poor communications."
Ulrich Steinhilper, Nachrichtenoffizier, I/JG 433 and I/JG 52.
Edit: Bader was another who simply failed to grasp how the British air defence system worked (in 1940).
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Crimea_River
Marshal
One shouldn't forget how young these guys were, Galland being only 33 at the end of the war.
Deleted member 68059
Staff Sergeant
- 1,058
- Dec 28, 2015
That jogged my memory, and going back and looking again - I rememebered why. Also some evidence here to keep Stona happy
The tired argument does ring true though, both were tired and needed a rest, regardless of the measures that were taken to remove them, but their tiredness could and should have been dealt with better than it was. I certainly agree that they were removed with selfish intent in mind. Dowding was due for removal; he had been in his post for longer than usual and it was only under the circumstances of the battle that he remained where he was, rightly so, but again, that's a separate issue to how he was removed and the subsequent attempts at justifying it by Mallory and Douglas. Again, it could and should have been dealt with differently.
I agree with the scandal, Both felt agrieved at how it was done, as did a lot of people throughout Fighter Command.
- Thread starter
- #157
Hornchurch
Airman
- 38
- Jul 3, 2020
-
By chance, whilst checking out the tale of one 74 Sqdn Spitfire pilot who was shot-down (& survived), 80-yrs ago today... I found this
A chance metal detector find in Manston one cold morning in January has led to extensive research revealing the last moments of a wartime pilot and a presentation at the Spitfire and Hurricane Memorial Museum.
Detectorist Trevor Benson, with the consent of the farmer, was in the area known as "The Shallows", when he discovered a gold cufflink, engraved with the Royal Air Force crest and the initials "J.R.B.W."
Trevor showed this John Vaughan, a friend and historian who manages and is editor of The South East History Boards, an online history forum. The search to find out more about the cufflink and its owner then began.
Initial research by forum members focused on the cufflink and examination of the hallmark and other markings, provided some useful information.
The cufflink
After careful cleaning all of the symbols could be discerned, and they revealed the maker was Payton, Pepper & Sons Ltd. of Vyse Street, Birmingham.
The cufflink is of 9-carat gold, the anchor symbol denotes Birmingham, and the letter J in the cropped square dates the piece to 1858-59.
It can be assumed that it was a family possession that was later engraved as a gift for Rex White, but that is impossible to prove.
War records
John checked the initials against the database of casualties held by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission and it was soon discovered that they matched those of a Sergeant Pilot who lost his life on July 3, 1940, when his Spitfire crashed in 'The Shallows'.
Further detailed research involved visits by John to the National Archives at Kew, extensive research with the Air Historical Branch of the Royal Air Force, the British Newspaper Archives and a significant number of online avenues of investigation.
The National Archives at Kew held the Operations Record Book for 74 Squadron and that provided a number of unique and significant documents about the pilot in question -Sergeant Rex White. More documents from the RAF historical records helped to complete the picture of what happened, and how the cufflink came to be in a farmer's field.
Another file at the National Archives also held vital information. This was a file from the World War II Air Ministry Casualty Branch and was only permitted to be opened for public viewing on June 30, 2017. The file description is:
"Sergeant J R B White: killed; presumed aircraft struck by lightning, Spitfire K9928, 74 Squadron, 3 July 1940."
Members of John's South East History Boards Forum also gave substantial assistance with online research using subscription resources.
Surviving relatives
Having identified who the pilot was, the next step was to find out if he had any relatives – who would be his next-of-kin?
A relative of Sergeant White was successfully traced and it transpires that the Royal Air Force line in his family continued. His relative, a nephew, is Air Commodore Barry Dickens, RAF, a retired gentleman with a highly distinguished career.
The cufflink, in a presentation case, was given by Trevor Benson to Air Commodore Barry Dickens who warmly accepted it on behalf of his family.
John also presented Air Commodore Dickens with a detailed booklet which he had produced which included all of the documents about Sergeant Rex White and all of the research that had been conducted.
The Actual Spitfire in Question - Involved in the 'Cufflink' Search/Trace Incident
The story of Sergeant Rex White
Sergeant (Pilot) 742734 John Rex Bergis White , known to his family, friends and RAF colleagues as "Rex" was born on April 15, 1913.
Rex White was a member of 74 Squadron.
The squadron was equipped with the iconic Supermarine Spitfire and was based at RAF Hornchurch in Essex.
One of Rex's fellow pilots on 74 Squadron was Flight Lieutenant A.G. Malan, one of the most famous fighter pilots of the Battle of Britain
– known as "Sailor Malan". The battle of Britain was to 'officially' start a week after Rex White's death.
The chronological run-in went like this....
June 26 – Local flying to give new pilots familiarity with their local area, recognising landmarks and suchlike.
June 28 – Formation flying in P9393
June 29 – Air Drill in P9465
June 30 – Practicing No.2 Attacks in P9465
July 1 – Battle Climb in P9393 and then No.3 Attacks in P9393
July 2- Sector reconnaissance and experience of constant speed airscrew in N3091
July 3 – Took off at 3.05pm in K9928 with two others to practice Air Drill.
The entry on July 3 was the last for Rex White. This is the day that Rex was killed whilst flying Spitfire K9928. The flight started as an 'Air Drill flight' with two other Spitfires, but before they landed they were called by radio and at 1.25pm the section of three Spitfires was diverted to patrol the Canterbury area due to a possible incoming German raid. They were then sent to Manston where there were reports of an enemy aircraft in that area at approximately 5,000 feet.
After taking part in training flights (including those notorious 'Fighting Area Attacks' that were to be responsible for the deaths of so many good pilots in the upcoming months) the training was over and Sergeant White took part in his first, and last, operational flight.
Pilot Officer Stevenson was the Section Leader – "Red One", Pilot Officer Hastings was "Red Two" and Sergeant Rex White was "Red Three".
The weather in Kent was stormy and the skies above Manston had large dark clouds. The three Spitfires of "Red Section" flew in "search formation" to the south of Manston and then, as part of their search pattern, flew north.
When they were north-west of Manston they were faced with two massive, dark, deep, clouds and Pilot Officer Stevenson took the three aircraft between two of these large dense clouds at about 6,000 feet.
They flew through a gap of thinner cloud. When they came out the other side into clear air "Red Three" wasn't with them. His aircraft was hurtling towards the ground and crashed in flames in "The Shallows."
It is believed that Spitfire K9928 was struck by lightning causing catastrophic and terminal damage and this led to the death of the pilot, Sergeant Rex White.
The wreckage of Spitfire K9928 was examined on site, and then excavated and removed by No. 49 Maintenance Unit of the Royal Air Force. In cases such as this, all major components are likely to have been recovered and removed, but many smaller fragments would have remained behind and been distributed far from the actual site by ploughing. The aircraft was officially struck off charge at the end of the month.
The crash site was cleared as much as possible and a week later came the Battle of Britain.
Sergeant (Pilot) 742734 John Rex Bergis White was buried in Highgate Cemetery.
The field where Rex White crashed in his Spitfire returned to arable farming and has been ploughed and planted, year after year – and is still in the same farming family. Between July 1940 and now, that is how the crash site remained, only disturbed by the annual plough until Trevor Benson made his discovery.
.
By chance, whilst checking out the tale of one 74 Sqdn Spitfire pilot who was shot-down (& survived), 80-yrs ago today... I found this
A chance metal detector find in Manston one cold morning in January has led to extensive research revealing the last moments of a wartime pilot and a presentation at the Spitfire and Hurricane Memorial Museum.
Detectorist Trevor Benson, with the consent of the farmer, was in the area known as "The Shallows", when he discovered a gold cufflink, engraved with the Royal Air Force crest and the initials "J.R.B.W."
Trevor showed this John Vaughan, a friend and historian who manages and is editor of The South East History Boards, an online history forum. The search to find out more about the cufflink and its owner then began.
Initial research by forum members focused on the cufflink and examination of the hallmark and other markings, provided some useful information.
The cufflink
After careful cleaning all of the symbols could be discerned, and they revealed the maker was Payton, Pepper & Sons Ltd. of Vyse Street, Birmingham.
The cufflink is of 9-carat gold, the anchor symbol denotes Birmingham, and the letter J in the cropped square dates the piece to 1858-59.
It can be assumed that it was a family possession that was later engraved as a gift for Rex White, but that is impossible to prove.
War records
John checked the initials against the database of casualties held by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission and it was soon discovered that they matched those of a Sergeant Pilot who lost his life on July 3, 1940, when his Spitfire crashed in 'The Shallows'.
Further detailed research involved visits by John to the National Archives at Kew, extensive research with the Air Historical Branch of the Royal Air Force, the British Newspaper Archives and a significant number of online avenues of investigation.
The National Archives at Kew held the Operations Record Book for 74 Squadron and that provided a number of unique and significant documents about the pilot in question -Sergeant Rex White. More documents from the RAF historical records helped to complete the picture of what happened, and how the cufflink came to be in a farmer's field.
Another file at the National Archives also held vital information. This was a file from the World War II Air Ministry Casualty Branch and was only permitted to be opened for public viewing on June 30, 2017. The file description is:
"Sergeant J R B White: killed; presumed aircraft struck by lightning, Spitfire K9928, 74 Squadron, 3 July 1940."
Members of John's South East History Boards Forum also gave substantial assistance with online research using subscription resources.
Surviving relatives
Having identified who the pilot was, the next step was to find out if he had any relatives – who would be his next-of-kin?
A relative of Sergeant White was successfully traced and it transpires that the Royal Air Force line in his family continued. His relative, a nephew, is Air Commodore Barry Dickens, RAF, a retired gentleman with a highly distinguished career.
The cufflink, in a presentation case, was given by Trevor Benson to Air Commodore Barry Dickens who warmly accepted it on behalf of his family.
John also presented Air Commodore Dickens with a detailed booklet which he had produced which included all of the documents about Sergeant Rex White and all of the research that had been conducted.
The Actual Spitfire in Question - Involved in the 'Cufflink' Search/Trace Incident
The story of Sergeant Rex White
Sergeant (Pilot) 742734 John Rex Bergis White , known to his family, friends and RAF colleagues as "Rex" was born on April 15, 1913.
Rex White was a member of 74 Squadron.
The squadron was equipped with the iconic Supermarine Spitfire and was based at RAF Hornchurch in Essex.
One of Rex's fellow pilots on 74 Squadron was Flight Lieutenant A.G. Malan, one of the most famous fighter pilots of the Battle of Britain
– known as "Sailor Malan". The battle of Britain was to 'officially' start a week after Rex White's death.
The chronological run-in went like this....
June 26 – Local flying to give new pilots familiarity with their local area, recognising landmarks and suchlike.
June 28 – Formation flying in P9393
June 29 – Air Drill in P9465
June 30 – Practicing No.2 Attacks in P9465
July 1 – Battle Climb in P9393 and then No.3 Attacks in P9393
July 2- Sector reconnaissance and experience of constant speed airscrew in N3091
July 3 – Took off at 3.05pm in K9928 with two others to practice Air Drill.
The entry on July 3 was the last for Rex White. This is the day that Rex was killed whilst flying Spitfire K9928. The flight started as an 'Air Drill flight' with two other Spitfires, but before they landed they were called by radio and at 1.25pm the section of three Spitfires was diverted to patrol the Canterbury area due to a possible incoming German raid. They were then sent to Manston where there were reports of an enemy aircraft in that area at approximately 5,000 feet.
After taking part in training flights (including those notorious 'Fighting Area Attacks' that were to be responsible for the deaths of so many good pilots in the upcoming months) the training was over and Sergeant White took part in his first, and last, operational flight.
Pilot Officer Stevenson was the Section Leader – "Red One", Pilot Officer Hastings was "Red Two" and Sergeant Rex White was "Red Three".
The weather in Kent was stormy and the skies above Manston had large dark clouds. The three Spitfires of "Red Section" flew in "search formation" to the south of Manston and then, as part of their search pattern, flew north.
When they were north-west of Manston they were faced with two massive, dark, deep, clouds and Pilot Officer Stevenson took the three aircraft between two of these large dense clouds at about 6,000 feet.
They flew through a gap of thinner cloud. When they came out the other side into clear air "Red Three" wasn't with them. His aircraft was hurtling towards the ground and crashed in flames in "The Shallows."
It is believed that Spitfire K9928 was struck by lightning causing catastrophic and terminal damage and this led to the death of the pilot, Sergeant Rex White.
The wreckage of Spitfire K9928 was examined on site, and then excavated and removed by No. 49 Maintenance Unit of the Royal Air Force. In cases such as this, all major components are likely to have been recovered and removed, but many smaller fragments would have remained behind and been distributed far from the actual site by ploughing. The aircraft was officially struck off charge at the end of the month.
The crash site was cleared as much as possible and a week later came the Battle of Britain.
Sergeant (Pilot) 742734 John Rex Bergis White was buried in Highgate Cemetery.
The field where Rex White crashed in his Spitfire returned to arable farming and has been ploughed and planted, year after year – and is still in the same farming family. Between July 1940 and now, that is how the crash site remained, only disturbed by the annual plough until Trevor Benson made his discovery.
.
- Thread starter
- #158
Hornchurch
Airman
- 38
- Jul 3, 2020
Just to mention....... As we now leave the 13th August behind......
80-Years Ago Today/Yesterday = 13th August 1940
- Or in other words, known to the Germans as...
ADLER TAG = 'Eagle Day'
This apparently, is when the German Luftwaffe 'decided to get serious' !!!!!!
"Adlertag was the first day of Unternehmen Adlerangriff....
which was the codename of a military operation by Nazi Germany's Luftwaffe...."
"To destroy the British Royal Air Force".
I came across this interesting comment, by one of the then-serving Heinkel He.111 Pilots, from KG.30...
"We had been briefed the day previous to Adler Tag that we would be going across the Channel in strong formations to attack England.
At last, we would be concentrating in large bomber formations with a fighter escort.
For so long, we had been flying our individual missions on simple operations like photographic reconnaissance or minelaying duties.
Some, like us, had not even seen a British fighter or even fired a shot in anger.
It hardly seemed as if a war was on at all.
Now, our airfields had many bombers at the ready, many had been flown in from inland airfields,
and I could see that now our great Luftwaffe would be at last attacking England".
Feldwebel Karl Hoffmann 1/KG30
Also this.....
"0510hrs: The German bombers began to take off from various airfields and the first major assault on Britain was about to begin.
Most of them were airborne and were beginning to form their respective formations,
when a last minute message was sent to all units that this first assault had been postponed....
.....and that all aircraft were to return to their bases.
Amazingly,
The message was not received by the 74 Dornier bombers of KG 2 led by Oberst Johannes Fink,
and he was to be escorted by 60 Bf110's of ZG 26 commanded by Oberstleutnant Joachim Huth.
The weather started to deteriorate further, the forecast had been for clear and fine conditions
but a blanket of low cloud covered both the French and the English coasts and the order went out....
"Angriff beschrankin (Attack Cancelled)"
This message was received by Huth, who relayed the message to the rest of his 60 fighter-bombers.
However, Fink's Dornier had a malfunction in its long-range radio that he did not know about and was therefore unaware
To compact the situation, there was no radio communication between the Bf110's and the Dorniers,
and as the bombers were flying in heavy cloud Fink's Dorniers did not realize that the Me 110's had returned to base.
Approaching the English coast, the Dorniers broke up into two separate formations.
One headed for Sheerness, near the Isle of Sheppy, while the other headed towards the Coastal Command station at Eastchurch.
"I had seen the fighter escort earlier and had observed some unusual antics by Joachim Huth but thought that he was only trying to indicate to me that he had made the rendezvous with our bombers. We carried on through the cloud which hindered our visibility, it was at times very heavy in places.
I received a misunderstood message from the second wing leader radio operator 'Angriff ausfuhren' which was the order to proceed with attack.
I kept a look out and instructed other crews to do the same
but we saw no sign of the escort,
we assumed that in the cloud they were keeping their distance.
I was constantly on the lookout for some of my less experienced pilots in these conditions as it was easy to stray too close to another aircraft.
Then suddenly there was a break in the cloud.
We were at about 10,000 feet and on course coming in to the Thames Estuary. I could see the coast of North Kent to my left.
We had passed the naval base of Sheerness which was one of our targets, but the other target of Eastchurch Airfield lay dead ahead.
What is even more surprising, was that with only ten minutes flying time to the RAF airfield we had no opposition,
it now seemed that Eastchurch was there for the taking".
Oberst Joachim Fink Commander Kampfgeschwader 2 - (Dornier Do.17's - K.G.2 machine of that Geschwader, seen below, 1940)
80-Years Ago Today/Yesterday = 13th August 1940
- Or in other words, known to the Germans as...
ADLER TAG = 'Eagle Day'
This apparently, is when the German Luftwaffe 'decided to get serious' !!!!!!
"Adlertag was the first day of Unternehmen Adlerangriff....
which was the codename of a military operation by Nazi Germany's Luftwaffe...."
"To destroy the British Royal Air Force".
I came across this interesting comment, by one of the then-serving Heinkel He.111 Pilots, from KG.30...
"We had been briefed the day previous to Adler Tag that we would be going across the Channel in strong formations to attack England.
At last, we would be concentrating in large bomber formations with a fighter escort.
For so long, we had been flying our individual missions on simple operations like photographic reconnaissance or minelaying duties.
Some, like us, had not even seen a British fighter or even fired a shot in anger.
It hardly seemed as if a war was on at all.
Now, our airfields had many bombers at the ready, many had been flown in from inland airfields,
and I could see that now our great Luftwaffe would be at last attacking England".
Feldwebel Karl Hoffmann 1/KG30
Also this.....
"0510hrs: The German bombers began to take off from various airfields and the first major assault on Britain was about to begin.
Most of them were airborne and were beginning to form their respective formations,
when a last minute message was sent to all units that this first assault had been postponed....
.....and that all aircraft were to return to their bases.
Amazingly,
The message was not received by the 74 Dornier bombers of KG 2 led by Oberst Johannes Fink,
and he was to be escorted by 60 Bf110's of ZG 26 commanded by Oberstleutnant Joachim Huth.
The weather started to deteriorate further, the forecast had been for clear and fine conditions
but a blanket of low cloud covered both the French and the English coasts and the order went out....
"Angriff beschrankin (Attack Cancelled)"
This message was received by Huth, who relayed the message to the rest of his 60 fighter-bombers.
However, Fink's Dornier had a malfunction in its long-range radio that he did not know about and was therefore unaware
To compact the situation, there was no radio communication between the Bf110's and the Dorniers,
and as the bombers were flying in heavy cloud Fink's Dorniers did not realize that the Me 110's had returned to base.
Approaching the English coast, the Dorniers broke up into two separate formations.
One headed for Sheerness, near the Isle of Sheppy, while the other headed towards the Coastal Command station at Eastchurch.
"I had seen the fighter escort earlier and had observed some unusual antics by Joachim Huth but thought that he was only trying to indicate to me that he had made the rendezvous with our bombers. We carried on through the cloud which hindered our visibility, it was at times very heavy in places.
I received a misunderstood message from the second wing leader radio operator 'Angriff ausfuhren' which was the order to proceed with attack.
I kept a look out and instructed other crews to do the same
but we saw no sign of the escort,
we assumed that in the cloud they were keeping their distance.
I was constantly on the lookout for some of my less experienced pilots in these conditions as it was easy to stray too close to another aircraft.
Then suddenly there was a break in the cloud.
We were at about 10,000 feet and on course coming in to the Thames Estuary. I could see the coast of North Kent to my left.
We had passed the naval base of Sheerness which was one of our targets, but the other target of Eastchurch Airfield lay dead ahead.
What is even more surprising, was that with only ten minutes flying time to the RAF airfield we had no opposition,
it now seemed that Eastchurch was there for the taking".
Oberst Joachim Fink Commander Kampfgeschwader 2 - (Dornier Do.17's - K.G.2 machine of that Geschwader, seen below, 1940)
The raid on Eastchurch was a success for the Germans. The British estimated that 100 bombs fell across the airfield, 16 men were killed and 48 injured on the ground and many of the station's buildings destroyed, along with 5 Blenheims of No. 35 Squadron. Though a Coastal Command field No 266 Squadron's Spitfires were present, one of which was damaged. The squadron's ammunition and stores were destroyed. The airfield was operational again by 16.00 hrs. Other bombs were widely scattered over Leysdown and the Isle of Sheppey.
KG 2 did not escape unscathed, Nos. 74, 111 and 151 Squadrons all made interceptions and 5 of KG 2s Do 17s were shot down, another 7 returned damaged, some with wounded airmen on board. 'Adlertag' began with something of a farce.
KG 2 did not escape unscathed, Nos. 74, 111 and 151 Squadrons all made interceptions and 5 of KG 2s Do 17s were shot down, another 7 returned damaged, some with wounded airmen on board. 'Adlertag' began with something of a farce.
- Thread starter
- #160
Hornchurch
Airman
- 38
- Jul 3, 2020
'
Wanted to say a rather belated 'Thanks' for such an informative post - Quite a result that is - Going for a CASA & ending-up with "The Real Deal" !
During it's time in Spain, wouldn't it have taken quite some time & effort, in changing the engine mounts over, adapting, whatever, from Jumos to Merlin ?
(Please excuse my technical ignorance of whatever procedure involved)
Am naturally assuming this is (& would all be done), to keep it "within the 1950's CASA-fleet" that the Spaniards were then using ?
I'd just LOVE to know more about the "Eureka" moment - When they found-out that their presumed CASA, was in fact, a genuine Heinkel !!!!!
Begs the question as to 'What Now', regarding it's outdoor future ?
The mere thought of such a potentially 'Historic' airframe, sitting outside & exposed to ALL the nasty British elements - Like yesterday's downpour/violent thunder
.
