Battle of Midway, a better plan

Why would large numbers of these planes be lost shuttling 50 miles? 46 of these would be manned by marine or navy pilots. I would use all surviving, unwounded fighter pilots from Lexington and Yorktown, none would be sent home. The AAF pilots in P36's would just follow the Navy and Marine pilots to the island just like later on when P40's were flown directly from Hawaii to Midway following a B17 who navigated, P38's flying to Britain with a B17 navigator. Midway wasn't contested, YET, it was about to be, but the air and sea to the southeast was never scouted before the battle. Also, these planes can be flown in early on June 3 or even on June 2 giving them time to rest, sleep or eat (if any of that is possible before big battle) and fighters serviced and fueled before the June 4 morning attack. These planes would have been well serviced before leaving Pearl so they shouldn't fall apart after a 50 or 100 mile flight to Midway.

Historical scramble was ordered at 0545 but pilots in their planes with engines running couldn't hear the alarm so someone had to drive a truck down and tell them to launch. Again, 20 wildcats should be on CAP at say 12,000 feet and should immediately start climbing to 20,000 when radar picks up the raid. Shattered Sword or First team said every single plane was off of Midway by 0600, so they must have been cranking them out in a hurry to get that many bombers off the runway along with the fighters. First fighter 'tallyho' was at 0619 0620 or 0621, all aircraft were gone from Midway by 0600.

Battle of Britain and 'Big Wing' concept is a little different. The British never knew what the exact target was and they were having to assemble aircraft from multiple fields into one group and try to guess where they should assemble because they didn't know what the exact target was. At Midway, the entire possible target was one airfield and one island the same size as the airfield right beside each other. Every fighter was on one strip and they could have actually just pointed straight up and told all the pilots to orbit the airfield and other island until the bad guys show up. If you have 20 Wildcats on CAP, that leaves the same number of fighters to scramble as Midway had total planes, and on page 135 of Shattered Sword it says all aircraft were gone by 0600. If the first 'Tallyho' was 20 minutes later, then that gives even a Buffalo time to get some altitude, the P36's should have been at 20,000 with little problem if they launched first, P36's showing 0-20,000 in less than 7.6 to 7.8 minutes.

At Guadalcanal, they had almost nothing to work with, pilots lived in the mud with the Marines, planes patched together to make them work, pilots and Marine grunts helping to service planes, refuel and re-arm fighters and bombers alike. (I read that B17 crews on Midway serviced their own planes as well) The first battle would not be a problem, armed when they left the carrier, fueled and serviced afternoon of June 3. There was no 2nd attack at Midway, historically. IF, in my plan, there was a 2nd strike, then there would be plenty of time to re-arm and refuel the US fighters since the Japanese had to switch out the torpedo with bombs before they could mount a 2nd strike.

Oh, on hacking Japanese bombers out of the air: Guadalcanal, Enterprise and Hornet attack, Hornet was eventually lost. There were 53 Wildcats airborne at the time of the attack but they were badly directed by the Fighter Controller on the carriers. The Japanese air groups that attacked the Enterprise and Hornet were devastated, hammered, slaughtered, (Pick your term) Now, we lost the Hornet as a result of these attacks, but there were few Japanese survivors left to cheer those results. In my setup, they can't sink Midway, so the pilots can concentrate on shooting down bombers without being concerned whether or not they have a home to land on after the fight.

(My apologies on the re-armed P36s at Pearl Harbor, that was the gentleman before you)

Greg Boeser said:

At Pearl, the 46th PS had time to fully arm four P-36As between the first and second waves. They had to brave a burning building to get the .50s. These four bounced the Japanese over Kaneohe, claiming 3, but in reality only damaging a few. Lt Sterling was shot down and the other a/c suffered damage to some extent. Lt. Harry Brown of the 46th PS claimed two kills, both B5N's from Soryu. He had only one functioning gun. Look up David Aiken's excellent reconstruction of the dogfight over Koneohe NAS, published in Flight Journal magazine, Oct 2002?

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Interesting. I had not heard or read that. Any way you could find a link to that? I would be very interested in reading that account. Thank you

There is no way on gods earth that any carrier admiral would ever risk taking his carriers to within 50 miles of a known target like that. ALWAYS, the relieving fighters are launched at much greater ranges than thet. Look at what happened at guadacanak and the WASP. Ships as valuable as those carriers in June 1942 are never going to be risked to that extent. .

Using the remains of the CAGs from Lexington in that way is another nutbrain idea. You keep your CAGs together, as a cohesive unit, replace losses and make sure the replacement fillers are fully integrated into the team. you don't fritter your air assets away by deploying them to an exposed airbase where they run a real risk of being captured.

it is obvious that you have NO CLUE as to the reasons the Japanese began to suffer heavy casualties after Midway. By the time of Santa Cruz, the CV CAGs were fully worked up and up to strength, with vast numbers of veterans, but more importantly, everybody fully trained with new tactics. Start doing the stunts you are suggesting and you would rapidly lose those advantages.

You also are ignoring what you don't want to read. Having more aircraft packed into the same logistic package is going to slow your response times down to a crawl. not having a coherent fully trained unit is going to ruin your tactical planning. This would be a massacre alright...of US Navy pilots no less!

Give it up this is a dud plan with no hope of working that is ignoring some hard truths and underlying principals. .If this were a planning proposal submitted for testing april 1942, it would be dropped like a stone, because it would immediately be seen for what it is, a sure way to lose.

To put it a bit more nicely (perhaps). Yes, having more and better planes in the air over Midway is an excellent idea. However, what was actually done was to put about as many planes as feasible over Midway of what was considered the best types available. Adding more subtracts from serviceability, add logistical complexity and, in short, quickly leads to diminishing returns.

Also, a point you discarded earlier is still valid. They didn't want to shoot down Zeros, that was just bonus. They wanted to sink carriers. And they did.

I will post a correction. There were several occasions where carriers were taken in close to an airbase. But not one where the carriers were chock full of deck loaded reinforcements. I can think of a few memorable occasions, some successful some not.

Taranto, a success, in which fully worked up CAG was launched at night against a poorly defended target. 10 January 1941, whilst escorting a relief convoy for Malta, Illustrious was set upon by stukas after shee blundered to within 60 miles of enemy airbases. She was easily located, tracked and almost sunk.

April 1941, HMS Formidable was nearly sunk when she allowed herself to proceed just south of Crete, within 100 miles of enemy airbases. again, no deck cargo, fully closed up CAP but still not enough.

1939, HMS Courageous, was lost SW of Ireland when she stumbled into a declared U-boat area. it was a known enemy hotspot, not a base as such, but same effect. The British paid the price for their stupidity and lost her, with heavy loss of life.

USS Wasp, previously mentioned, USS saratoga (twice), CVE off Tarawa all lost in circumstances similar to this. And just so people are aware the IJN were in the process of deploying an I boat picket line, which unfortunately for them was too late to do its job, but still sank the crippled Yorktown. Problem is the USN was unsure as to their exact whereabouts during the battle, but the closer to the atoll, it would need to be assumed the greater the risk of the most priceless advantage a carrier has.....its not being located.

One more quibble. How are you going to use a carrier as a "delivery van" full of Army and Marine/Navy aircraft and the next day have it with a fully functioning CAG? Hangar deck on most carriers can't accommodate the entire CAG.
Cheers,
Wes

Hi Parsifal,

We're not talking about ground troops, we're talking about front-line aircraft. Individually, ground troops can be beaten with superior tactics by smaller forces. It happens all through history since large numbers of ground troops historically can only move as fast as they can jog. Not everyone was on a horse. They are basically trapped where they are encountered except for slow advance or movement to the side or rear.

That is very far from the case with aircraft. They are not trapped and are not slow. If they are attacking your ship and you ignore one for as little a 20 seconds, you can lose a ship. Also historically, larger numbers of attacking aircraft usually get through unless flown by novices. You might recall that a few aircraft took out the Yamato, the Prince of Wales, and the Repluse, just to mention a few.

It is apples to oranges when it comes to troops and combat planes. Maybe not so much if the planes are cargo planes and can't fight back. Fighters very definitely don't fall into that category. More fighters could only help Midway and I can't see how you can argue otherwise. Fewer is NOT better.

If all encounters are equally lucky (or unlucky), then Lanchester's Law might apply. More is still better, when the quality is unchanged.

But, the outcome is already known, so it doesn't really matter, in the end.

XBe02Drvr said:

One more quibble. How are you going to use a carrier as a "delivery van" full of Army and Marine/Navy aircraft and the next day have it with a fully functioning CAG? Hangar deck on most carriers can't accommodate the entire CAG.
Cheers,
Wes

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That is a reasonable point. I do not have data showing how many aircraft a Yorktown class carrier can carry and I couldn't find any hard data in a quick internet search. The following is all I could find...

"Their internal carrying capacity becomes even greater when one remembers that Hornet carried virtually her entire air group below decks during the Doolittle Raid. True, many of these aircraft would have been knocked down in order to make them fit, but that alone indicates just how much internal volume the Yorktowns featured, especially considering she carried two full squadrons of non-folding wing SBDs and the fact that their hangar deck was pierced by their center elevator, further reducing usable hangar volume."

I don't know what "virtually her entire air group" means. Yorktown class carried anywhere from 77 to 90 planes.

I know the three US ships carried 77, 78 and 79 planes into the Midway battle.

If anyone has the exact number a Yorktown class carrier could squeeze into the hanger it would be helpful.

Tkdog said:

To put it a bit more nicely (perhaps). Yes, having more and better planes in the air over Midway is an excellent idea. However, what was actually done was to put about as many planes as feasible over Midway of what was considered the best types available. Adding more subtracts from serviceability, add logistical complexity and, in short, quickly leads to diminishing returns.

Also, a point you discarded earlier is still valid. They didn't want to shoot down Zeros, that was just bonus. They wanted to sink carriers. And they did.

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Serviceability and logistics: I agree with this point IF it was a longer drawn out battle and they couldn't keep them supplied. But, in this one instance, again, the fighters would arrive with full ammo and in good condition before leaving Hawaii. After the flight in from the carrier (pick your range you wish to launch them 50, 100, 150, 200 miles) they are fueled and topped off with oil. If any had mechanical issues, they could have a day or 2 to fix them. Once the battle begins, nearly all launch for first battle, some don't come back, some are damaged badly, those that can are refueled and launched IF there is a second attack. Historically there was no second attack. If Japanese decided on second attack they would have had to switch from torpedos to bombs so it was going to be a while giving them time to refuel and re-arm Midway fighters. As on Guadalcanal, there would be no shortage of grunts to assist with fuel and re-arming under supervision of pilots. As in carrier battles, badly damaged planes are moved out of the way, and planes that might not normally fly are committed to battle.

Agree that shooting down Zeros isn't the goal, but every Zero brought down over Midway is one less that can defend a Japanese carrier or escort a strike on US carriers, along with every bomber shot down over Midway is a bomber that can't attack a US carrier.

Also, large numbers, if not most of the pilots on the Japanese carriers survived to fight again. Aircrew shot down over Midway were gone and as we know now, were irreplaceable. These were the best, most experienced carrier borne pilots and crew Japan had, quite possibly the best in the world. Eliminating as many as possible over Midway would help not only later in Midway battle, but would have a ripple effect through the rest of the war.

Re my previous posting, can I ask everyone to treat it with the contempt it deserves, lord only knows what was going on in my head, because I don't.

parsifal said:

There is no way on gods earth that any carrier admiral would ever risk taking his carriers to within 50 miles of a known target like that. ALWAYS, the relieving fighters are launched at much greater ranges than thet. Look at what happened at guadacanak and the WASP. Ships as valuable as those carriers in June 1942 are never going to be risked to that extent. .

Using the remains of the CAGs from Lexington in that way is another nutbrain idea. You keep your CAGs together, as a cohesive unit, replace losses and make sure the replacement fillers are fully integrated into the team. you don't fritter your air assets away by deploying them to an exposed airbase where they run a real risk of being captured.

it is obvious that you have NO CLUE as to the reasons the Japanese began to suffer heavy casualties after Midway. By the time of Santa Cruz, the CV CAGs were fully worked up and up to strength, with vast numbers of veterans, but more importantly, everybody fully trained with new tactics. Start doing the stunts you are suggesting and you would rapidly lose those advantages.

You also are ignoring what you don't want to read. Having more aircraft packed into the same logistic package is going to slow your response times down to a crawl. not having a coherent fully trained unit is going to ruin your tactical planning. This would be a massacre alright...of US Navy pilots no less!

Give it up this is a dud plan with no hope of working that is ignoring some hard truths and underlying principals. .If this were a planning proposal submitted for testing april 1942, it would be dropped like a stone, because it would immediately be seen for what it is, a sure way to lose.

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1. USS Wasp was 300-350 miles from Guadalcanal when torpedoed. I believe Saratoga was close to Pearl the first time she was torpedoed. There were Uboats sinking ships within sight of the cities on the Atlantic coast. Subs, by their very nature can show up anywhere.

2. Yorktown went to battle with a mixed air group. Thach and a few pilots were combined with some of the remaining Yorktown pilots, while some of the Yorktown pilots were shipped back to the states. It was exactly what you are saying not to do. Also, the 21 F4F's from Joe Bauer's Marine Fighter Squadron 212 would be fighting as a unit.

3. Why did the Japanese begin losing more pilots after Midway? You say I have no clue? Please re-read Shattered Sword and The First Team. The US Navy pilots that fought from Midway to end of the year were the lowest time, least trained US Navy pilots of the war. (I believe that is in The First Team) So how did we shoot down the best Japanese pilots with substandard planes like the Wildcat? 1. Japanese planes weren't very survivable 2. at Guadalcanal Zeros had to fly 450 plus miles one way to do battle so it was a bad tactical set up for them 3. Navy pilots were taught deflection shooting which allowed snap shots at Zeros from a slower less maneuverable plane into an unarmored flying gas tank 4. Radar 5. We made fewer mistakes strategically and tactically than the Japanese

4. in this one instance, again, the fighters would arrive with full ammo and in good condition before leaving Hawaii. After the flight in from the carrier (pick your range you wish to launch them 50, 100, 150, 200 miles) they are fueled and topped off with oil. If any had mechanical issues, they could have a day or 2 to fix them. Once the battle begins, nearly all launch for first battle, some don't come back, some are damaged badly, those that can are refueled and launched IF there is a second attack. Historically there was no second attack. If Japanese decided on second attack they would have had to switch from torpedos to bombs so it was going to be a while giving them time to refuel and re-arm Midway fighters. As on Guadalcanal, there would be no shortage of grunts to assist with fuel and re-arming under supervision of pilots. As in carrier battles, badly damaged planes are moved out of the way, and planes that might not normally fly are committed to battle.

5. The 'dud' plan is almost exactly what we did at Guadalcanal. Keep planes on the island flown in from aircraft ferries, escort carriers and damaged or sunk fleet carriers. Get altitude advantage and make a firing pass at the Zeros and the bombers. Repeat passes at the bombers (mostly 2 engine Betty) if Zeros weren't around


You say in one place that this is too many planes to work, too many, can't co-ordinate them, too much like 'Big Wing' at Battle of Britain. The alternative to 'Big Wing' in Battle of Britain was attack in piecemeal as they get aloft. But then you turn around and say that they can't operate at less than squadron level.

If you read about the attacks on the Lexington, Yorktown, Hornet and Enterprise, all of them start out with a MAX of maybe 4 Wildcats in a section and then quickly break down into 1 on 1, or 1 on 2, or 1 on 3 or 4 with the Wildcats and Zeros all getting separated from their buddies and single Wildcats jumping single Zeros or 1, 2, 3 or 4 bombers still in some sort of formation. Or maybe 1 Wildcat sees 1 Wildcat against 2 Zeros and makes a pass to help the other guy out.

Also, stop with the "NO CLUE", "dud plan" and "your ignoring what you don't want to read". Surely 2 adults can keep this civil. Neither side can be proven or disproven, this is all supposed to be in fun, not getting mad because I don't agree with you. Wouldn't be much of a forum if we all thought the same thing.

There is no way to guess how a single air battle will go: 4 P38's vs 1 Zero? Zero doesn't have a chance, he's going to die quickly. Ask Tommy Mcguire and at least one other in that flight how that one turned out. See? No way to know. No use in getting all tore up about it.

A thought. If you are going to give the USA the privilage of modernised tactics then its only fair you do the same to the Japanese. The easiest chnge wold be to keep the Battleship groupl with the Carriers. This I beleive would have definately changed the outcome of the battle.
A) because of the increased AA fire
B) plus the simple fact that the extra targets would have diluted the attacks on the carriers
C) and finlly because the Japanese battleships had radar, the carriers didn't

I thought the premise was to leave everything s it was except find a way to field more aircraft over Midway.

Was I wrong here?

PINSOG,
Here's a link to an interview of Phil Rasmussen, one of the P-36 pilots at Pearl.
https://www.nps.gov/valr/learn/historyculture/upload/PhilRasmussen.pdf
I think he would know.

Greg Boeser said:

PINSOG,
Here's a link to an interview of Phil Rasmussen, one of the P-36 pilots at Pearl.
https://www.nps.gov/valr/learn/historyculture/upload/PhilRasmussen.pdf
I think he would know.

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Great article. Holding the 50 handle back and then letting it go to shoot down a plane. Wow.

Doesn't say what he thought of the P-36, though. All it describes is his one dogfight experience, with regard to the P-36.

GregP said:

Hi Parsifal,

We're not talking about ground troops, we're talking about front-line aircraft. Individually, ground troops can be beaten with superior tactics by smaller forces. It happens all through history since large numbers of ground troops historically can only move as fast as they can jog. Not everyone was on a horse. They are basically trapped where they are encountered except for slow advance or movement to the side or rear.

That is very far from the case with aircraft. They are not trapped and are not slow. If they are attacking your ship and you ignore one for as little a 20 seconds, you can lose a ship. Also historically, larger numbers of attacking aircraft usually get through unless flown by novices. You might recall that a few aircraft took out the Yamato, the Prince of Wales, and the Repluse, just to mention a few.

It is apples to oranges when it comes to troops and combat planes. Maybe not so much if the planes are cargo planes and can't fight back. Fighters very definitely don't fall into that category. More fighters could only help Midway and I can't see how you can argue otherwise. Fewer is NOT better.

If all encounters are equally lucky (or unlucky), then Lanchester's Law might apply. More is still better, when the quality is unchanged.

But, the outcome is already known, so it doesn't really matter, in the end.

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Hi Greg

Planes are quick in the air, slow to service on the ground, slower to service if you overwork your support facilities. moreover, if the spot rate (the rate that you can get things off the ground) is at a certain frequency and you overload that spot rate, you basically paralyse the system, and it slows to a crawl. then you have to consider the size of your CAP and the time to altitude. You can attack from below but you are at a disadvantage, and you still need to be within gunnery range.

The Japanese attack plan was to close to the island above 10000 ft, then to drop quickly to 5000 feet either over the target for the vals or in a steep glide (ie faster at time of drop) from about the position of the outer flak zone for the bombers, whilst the fighters stayed outside this zone to keep the CAP busy....it didn't quite pan out as well as that I admit, but that was the plan and that's what we, as the defending team, so to speak, need to assume will happen..... This was pretty standard stuff really, but it makes for difficulty to intercept. Basically from initial detection to the point where the enemy is entering the flak zone the midway defenders had a little over 15 mins to intercept . the strike aircraft were already airborne , but it still took a mighty effort to get just 9 of the available CAP airborne and in reasonable position by 0615. The remainder of the CAP were late and fought at a disadvantage because of poor placement.

Numbers count, but only if you have the logistic support to support them and make them effective. Simply dumping a gaggle of fighters the night before on the atoll for a variety of reasons cannot be considered an adequately supported force. most wont even be ready for the attack I dont think. getting them to the pointy end, other than being shot down because they are struggling to gain altitude, or worse, on the deck is the issue . they would otherwise be a liability if the tactical planning (meaning tactics and battlefield procedures....'you break left and I will break right" ) have not been worked out. by definition, the sources for this reserve force will have none of those skills, despite some of them being experienced. taking aircrew from the lost carrier Lexington (with holes already shot into the CAG to fragment its cohesion as a unit) and placing them again in harms way in an exposed position is a very bad idea. these are the CAGS that the USN had to use wisely at that time. they would not have risked them on an exposed atoll like Midway, where they might be captured.

Numbers are important and helpful, but only if you can get them where you need them in a functional and effective manner. I am not confident that this "plan" (if you want to flatter with that term) would deliver that.

submarines always deploy to choke or concentration points of some kind. In the western approaches, or the SW approaches, the 'choke points are the convoy routes themselves. Later in the war, after the Uboat codes had been broken, the western approaches command was able to re-route the convoys to avoid the wolfpacks 9to a degree. it was far from a random event. in wartime you just cant wander the ocean as you please, if you do, you will probably be sunk (more than likely by friendly forces).

San Cristobal was across the known traffic route to guadacanal. allowing the Wasp to loiter in that sea lane was stupid, and allowed the Japanese to locate her, and then sink her. Same thing happened to the Courageous. you will find that in most cases, this was the way u-boats caught their carrier prey....it wasn't a case of the uboat sailing along singing hearty renditions of "life on the ocen waves" as they tried their luck...they worked to a plan, based on intell mostly of various kinds. guess, what, the choke point for operation MI was the atoll. the Japanese wanted a pickert line some 200 miles from the atoll, but were too late to trap the carriers. this was not exactly known to the USN at the time, but they did know the IJN was trying to use the atoll as bait to lure the USN CVs into that trap. Ordering the US carriers into the trap is just dumb, and would never happen because of what CinCPac knew already.

this whole concept is very bad, and not worth the risk. we do not know how the Japanese might have reacted to this, but likely something would have happened, though hard to tell what and hard to say if decisive. I dont know if US crypto analysis knew this, but Japanese radio intercepts did notice an increase in USN signal traffic particularly submarine activity and message traffic in the days leading to the battle (IJN SIGINT was able to tell if the signals were submarine carrier based or airborne). If even more traffic was detected as arrangements for this quick reinforcement unfolded, coupled with the lack of air activity in other areas, I think the Japanese stand a good chance of cottoning on and blowing the whole plan to pieces. The Japanese made some silly mistakes, but it would be a mistake to assume they were utterly devoid of any sense at all.

The signal traffic information was picked up from the Marshalls and passed to Yamamoto prior to the battle. Japanese plans were not changed, which is inexplicable really. Later, as the battle unfolded, Yamamoto, at sea in BB Yamato, assumed Nagumo had received an appropriate signal from Tokyo , a lot has been made of Yamamotos failure to pass on this information, but it was really of minor importance. He had good reason not to transmit, he was observing radio silence (USN were actually pretty lax when it came to signals discipline. lucky for them they didn't have to worry too much, they had cracked the JN25 code and could read IJN intercepts at a strategic level 9but not at a tactical level yet, to get them out of trouble) however, these messages were, contrary to earlier historical accounts, also received by Nagumo before the battle began. For reasons which remain unclear, Nagumo did not alter his plans or take additional precautions. If a carrier was detected that close to the target the day before, and it probably would, ther is no telling what the Japanese reaction or readiness might be. suffiice it to say that the detection of a carrier that close was likely to happen, just on signals analysis alone, and would almost certainly have resulted in a change in the Japanese plans

Pinsog,

You buying any of this? Now we're talking about the Japanese battle plan and maritime choke points where your premise was to reinforce the existing Midway aircraft with more aircraft.

From my point of view, more planes at Midway would have been better than not having them, and off-the-topic discussions of planes and submarine tactics won't affect that in the slightest. This is exactly why I should stay out of what ifs. There is no point where you can safely get away from a counter argument that makes no sense, either on the surface or when you get down into the details.

WWII happened some 75 years ago. We know the outcome. Adding a few more resources to the winning side cannot have been a bad thing, and neither the Japanese nor the U.S.A. would have changed what they did. We'd just have a few more aircraft. With a few more aircraft, the Japanese might have lost even more ships. Maybe, maybe not. If so, it would have been better for our side. If not, nothing would have changed.

Midway has been called "the most stunning and decisive blow in the history of naval warfare," and it only lasted 3 days. More aircraft could have made it even more so. I cannot see how having more aircraft would have reversed the outcome or, indeed, would have resulted in a lesser victory. There are some possibilities for making it a better victory, but they also might not happen.

Most of the world sees Midway as a miracle victory for the U.S.A. because we were outnumbered so heavily. But ... we HAD broken the Japanese code and KNEW the attack was coming, and they WERE spread out over a large part of the Pacific. So, despite the Japanese having a massive advantage in ships, including battleships and carriers, we were able to have our land-based planes airborne when the attack happened and save a few planes. Then, right when the first wave was on deck refueling, the planes from the three U.S. carriers found and struck the Japanese carriers.

In this situation, more planes available to the U.S. could only have helped, and we MIGHT have sunk more carriers with them.

I can tell you this: We put on an annual airshow comprised mostly of WWII aircraft. In a typical airshow, we usually sortie about 65 aircraft a day, for 3 days. In 10 years, that's 1,950 sorties of 75 year old WWII aircraft. In those 10 years, we have had maybe 10 aborts, total. Now, these planes are NOT fitted out for war, but their systems are VERY reliable. It is impossible for me to believe the most of the aircraft could not be rearmed and turned around with minimal or no maintenance except fuel, oil, and armament. The battle only lasted 3 days, and we don't have major mechanical or maintenance issues with these same planes (U.S. and Japanese) 75 years later. My bet is they would perform just fine for the 3 days, with maybe a few going down for maintenance. The real issue was to avoid the many expert Japanese fighter pilots when they were fat with fuel and ammo, and get them instead when they landed to refuel/rearm.

We did that and it worked.

I will say this in regards to the idea that the handful of P-36s should have been committed to Midway. The P-36 lacked armor, self sealing fuel tanks and was considered obsolete. What air force commander is going to risk his precious pilots in what had been relegated to an advanced trainer? That a handful got off at Pearl and lived to tell about it is not a very good selling point. The NEIAF had H75A-7s with 4x .303s and some pilot armor and they got slaughtered. The French did OK with them against Bf 109Ds, but against Bf 109Es, they got slaughtered. Later, vs USN F4F-4s at Casablanca, they got slaughtered. And these were veteran French pilots. The Finns liked them, but they were facing a bunch of recruit pilots flying obsolete junk. The good Russian units were facing the real threat further south.
As to using the carriers as taxis for the "unused" planes at Pearl,the USN prior to Midway pushed their VF strength to 27 per carrier, they already faced a challenge of integrating new pilots into the increased force structure. The F4F-3s were left behind because they were fixed wing, took up too much space. It would have been impossible for the VF squadrons to conduct any training at all with the flight decks covered with cargo. Plus, Nimitz had to prepare his forces for future operations. The units that arrived on the 29th were earmarked as replacements for the casualties that Nimitz knew would be incurred at Midway, not to mention that they had just docked and the a/c had to be off loaded and probably reassembled, or at least, unpacked. You don't ship combat ready aircraft.