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- #101
Thank you. I'll read this as soon as I can.
Battle of Midway, a better plan
- Thread starter pinsog
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Thank you. I'll read this as soon as I can.
- Thread starter
- #102
That was a good read. He actually did make the initial interception of the Val dive bombers, a head on firing pass in which he reported shooting down either 2 or 3 Val's in flames on his first pass. After he recovered he mistook 3 climbing Zeros for his own people until they were too close to evade.
My take on that article is: 1. Our fighters were out numbered 2. Our fighters were out performed
Buffnut is correct, no way to get 95 (give or take a few) fighters in position from that small a field in that length of time.
My revised plan would be: (trying not to let exact knowledge of the raid cloud my pre battle plan)
1. a reasonable CAP of 20 Wildcats orbits over field at 20,000 ft.
2. As historical, all fighters on field, pilots in cockpit, engines running
3. The first fighters in line are the 22 P36's due to climb rate. At the message from PBY of incoming raid, the 22 P36's launch and climb to meet Wildcat CAP circling overhead. Wildcat CAP leads P36's to historical intercept say 30-40 miles northeast of Midway
4. Wildcat CAP and P36's instructions are to go after Zero escort, 20 Wildcats make initial firing pass through Zero escort,hopefully scattering Zeros. P36's follow and engage in WW1 style turning dogfight, Wildcats zoom up for altitude, dive back into fur ball making firing passes and zooming up again. Who knows what happens. Hopefully 1 to 1 exchange for however many fighters on each side go down. Main thing is, Zeros are tied up with what they would/should think is the entire Midway fighter force. No reason for Zeros to disengage, they should have their hands full as the P36 is a close match to the Zero in climb and turn, P36 tougher and retaining high speed handling, Zero with edge in firepower until it runs out of 20 mm.
5. Remaining 21 buffalos and 35 Wildcats scramble as fast as possible, forming in 2 or 4 plane sections and climbing as quickly as possible. No larger groups should attempt to form as there is not time. 56 total US fighters vs now unescorted Japanese bombers, no radios in Zeros tied up in fur ball out of sight from bombers. Should be a 1 sided slaughter of bombers, with few if any surviving.
That's the plan. US carriers stay X miles south (don't know visibility that day) letting island defenses thin out Japanese air power until time for counter attack
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- #104
I'm not sure. If your suggesting to loiter at 10,000 and make the final climb after radar contact, that would probably be a better choice. I'm easily swayed by small details. CAP needs to be at a reasonable altitude, but in hindsight, 20,000 is probably way too high until radar contact has been made
You could safely get away with 12 or 13K without O2 for the relatively brief time you're likely to be there and every little bit helps in terms of time to climb if needed, and fuel burn while loitering. I've ridden as passenger on a number of wave flights in a sailplane with extended (2+hours) stays at 16-17K with O2 available, but didn't use it. (Mask was a medieval torture instrument!) I was able to do photography, navigate, read maps, take notes, talk on the radio, etc, with no ill effects. I even got a little stick time and had no trouble flying. Don't try this at home, kids! I've had a couple chamber rides to 40+K, and know my limits.
Cheers
Wes
Cheers
Wes
Greg Boeser
1st Sergeant
Fascinating thread.
A few comments. P-36s at Pearl engaged in two fights: Flight of four vs 6 + 3 Zeroes over Kaneohe P-36s bounced unsuspecting Zeroes but lost one while inflicting minor damage on a few Zeroes. All other surviving P-36s were damaged to some extent. Gun failures occurred on at least two a/c due to hasty arming. Second engagement - two P-36s ambush retreating, unescorted B5Ns - two kills to Lt Brown.
Agreed that P-36 was a far more maneuverable a/c than F2A-3 or F4F-4, but was also 25-30MPH slower, which makes it 40MPH slower than A6M2. In air combat, speed is life. PINSOG expects a slower, more lightly armed a/c, flown by an inexperienced pilot, to best the finest dogfighter in the world.
PINSOG mentions the reserve a/c left at Pearl, but fails to recognize that there were insufficient crew to fly them. For the Midway operation, VF squadrons had been beefed up from 18 a/c to 27 a/c. Virtually all available combat ready USN fighter pilots were used to bring TF 16 and 17 up to strength. The remainder were worn out from nearly 6 months of sea duty, or necessary to ensure a cadre for the increasing flow of replacements. Nimitz also had to keep a large reserve of a/c at Pearl in the event the intel estimate was WRONG, or worse, his plan at Midway FAILED. Marine and USAAF pilots were not trained to the level of USN carrier pilots. VMF 221 pilots were mostly green, fresh from training school. The USAAF had strongly resisted defending islands with Army fighters because the pilots had not been trained in over water navigation. The Army were skeptical of Nimitz's intel, so would be unlikely to release the required assets to defend a minor base, far from a center of supply.
There were two fresh squadrons of B-26s in Hawaii, but they had just arrived from the States and were not operationally ready. They were flown to a "secret" airfield and held in reserve.
The idea of flying land-based planes from a carrier into a combat environment had been faced in the Wake Island reinforcement attempt, VMF 221's original destination. It had been deemed too risky.
A few comments. P-36s at Pearl engaged in two fights: Flight of four vs 6 + 3 Zeroes over Kaneohe P-36s bounced unsuspecting Zeroes but lost one while inflicting minor damage on a few Zeroes. All other surviving P-36s were damaged to some extent. Gun failures occurred on at least two a/c due to hasty arming. Second engagement - two P-36s ambush retreating, unescorted B5Ns - two kills to Lt Brown.
Agreed that P-36 was a far more maneuverable a/c than F2A-3 or F4F-4, but was also 25-30MPH slower, which makes it 40MPH slower than A6M2. In air combat, speed is life. PINSOG expects a slower, more lightly armed a/c, flown by an inexperienced pilot, to best the finest dogfighter in the world.
PINSOG mentions the reserve a/c left at Pearl, but fails to recognize that there were insufficient crew to fly them. For the Midway operation, VF squadrons had been beefed up from 18 a/c to 27 a/c. Virtually all available combat ready USN fighter pilots were used to bring TF 16 and 17 up to strength. The remainder were worn out from nearly 6 months of sea duty, or necessary to ensure a cadre for the increasing flow of replacements. Nimitz also had to keep a large reserve of a/c at Pearl in the event the intel estimate was WRONG, or worse, his plan at Midway FAILED. Marine and USAAF pilots were not trained to the level of USN carrier pilots. VMF 221 pilots were mostly green, fresh from training school. The USAAF had strongly resisted defending islands with Army fighters because the pilots had not been trained in over water navigation. The Army were skeptical of Nimitz's intel, so would be unlikely to release the required assets to defend a minor base, far from a center of supply.
There were two fresh squadrons of B-26s in Hawaii, but they had just arrived from the States and were not operationally ready. They were flown to a "secret" airfield and held in reserve.
The idea of flying land-based planes from a carrier into a combat environment had been faced in the Wake Island reinforcement attempt, VMF 221's original destination. It had been deemed too risky.
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- #107
Greg Boeser: you bring up some valid points.
P36's at Pearl Harbor had 1 30 caliber machine gun, the 50 had been removed because they were short of 50's on the island. P36's with1 30 were only being used for gunnery training. Any P36 kills at Pearl were accomplished with 1 synchronized 30
Top speed of P36 is somewhat debated with anything from 290-317 mph being quoted. I would definitely want (if I was a P36 pilot) to drag the fight down to 12,000 feet or so, but at least it retain its high speed handling, the high speed dive and roll being top notch, controls remaining light even at 400+. One USAAF report from early 1943 does state, from a test, that the P36 is faster and outclimbs a Zero below 10,000 (I'm not sure if I believe it's faster, but the report says it is) and almost matches it in turn (allied pilots state it could turn with a KI43 above 180-200 mph, Sgt Stuart Garnett)
A full fresh Wildcat squadron and 38 aircraft arrived at Pearl a day or 2 before Yorktown sailed, in fact, the 6 Avengers flown to Midway came from this ship. Agreed that pilots were tired, some still fought at Midway, some did not and were sent home for rest and to train more pilots.
AAF would not have released P39 or P40 from Hawaii because of defense (wise precaution) that's why I choose P36, it was historically there and they might have let them go because they were 'obsolete'. (Some here debate that P40 was step backward from P36 but that's whole new discussion)
P36 pilots would not have flown directly into combat from carrier (not sure you caught that) but would have followed 46 wildcats from carrier 1 or 2 days before attack with navy pilots navigating the short distance to Midway. (How ever close or far they decided to drop them) We know now, but not then, the P36's and extra Wildcats would have been delivered with no interference from the Japanese. In fact, one of their major mistakes was they did not recon the island.
As far as pilot experience, we all must remember that the same 0 combat US Navy pilots I am tossing into this hypothetical are the same guys that fought the Zero to a 1 to 1 kill ratio at Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal. The 0 combat AAF guys in my P36's, well if you can't bring experience, bring as many as you can! (Some of these guys might be high time pilots, just haven't been in combat)
Greg Boeser, please understand, i am playing with history with what was actually there and available. There were no P38, P47,P51, Hellcats, Corsairs, Bearcats, Spitfires etc available. If you play the alternative history game, more Wildcats and P36's were all we had that MIGHT get released.
Hope I covered everything. Give me your opinion after you read my thinking/explanations. I love a good natured debate.
P36's at Pearl Harbor had 1 30 caliber machine gun, the 50 had been removed because they were short of 50's on the island. P36's with1 30 were only being used for gunnery training. Any P36 kills at Pearl were accomplished with 1 synchronized 30
Top speed of P36 is somewhat debated with anything from 290-317 mph being quoted. I would definitely want (if I was a P36 pilot) to drag the fight down to 12,000 feet or so, but at least it retain its high speed handling, the high speed dive and roll being top notch, controls remaining light even at 400+. One USAAF report from early 1943 does state, from a test, that the P36 is faster and outclimbs a Zero below 10,000 (I'm not sure if I believe it's faster, but the report says it is) and almost matches it in turn (allied pilots state it could turn with a KI43 above 180-200 mph, Sgt Stuart Garnett)
A full fresh Wildcat squadron and 38 aircraft arrived at Pearl a day or 2 before Yorktown sailed, in fact, the 6 Avengers flown to Midway came from this ship. Agreed that pilots were tired, some still fought at Midway, some did not and were sent home for rest and to train more pilots.
AAF would not have released P39 or P40 from Hawaii because of defense (wise precaution) that's why I choose P36, it was historically there and they might have let them go because they were 'obsolete'. (Some here debate that P40 was step backward from P36 but that's whole new discussion)
P36 pilots would not have flown directly into combat from carrier (not sure you caught that) but would have followed 46 wildcats from carrier 1 or 2 days before attack with navy pilots navigating the short distance to Midway. (How ever close or far they decided to drop them) We know now, but not then, the P36's and extra Wildcats would have been delivered with no interference from the Japanese. In fact, one of their major mistakes was they did not recon the island.
As far as pilot experience, we all must remember that the same 0 combat US Navy pilots I am tossing into this hypothetical are the same guys that fought the Zero to a 1 to 1 kill ratio at Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal. The 0 combat AAF guys in my P36's, well if you can't bring experience, bring as many as you can! (Some of these guys might be high time pilots, just haven't been in combat)
Greg Boeser, please understand, i am playing with history with what was actually there and available. There were no P38, P47,P51, Hellcats, Corsairs, Bearcats, Spitfires etc available. If you play the alternative history game, more Wildcats and P36's were all we had that MIGHT get released.
Hope I covered everything. Give me your opinion after you read my thinking/explanations. I love a good natured debate.
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- #108
All of that sounds reasonable and better than my original 20,000 feet. I would tell the CAP to orbit at the highest altitude they felt comfortable at with reguard to fuel, oxygen and tactical position/situation.
GregP
Major
Reality plays hell with "what ifs," doesn't it?
Pinsog is right. All we had were F4Fs and P-36s that might have been reasonably available at the time. We DID have some biplanes and some P-26 Peashooters, but they would not have been a lot of help except to draw fire away from the more modern aircraft. The sum total of all P-38s in service at the time was very low, and they weren't combat ready anyway. 65 P-38s had been completed by September 1941, along with the 12 YP-38s the service retained minus one lost in a dive test, but I don't know how many P-38s had been delivered to actual combat units when Pearl Harbor happened. It wasn't many.
Boeser is right when he says the P-36 flown by inexperienced pilots is not really a match for a veteran in a Zero, especially when armed with only one 30-cal MG!
Somehow, it looks as if WWII is gonna' start all over again! Or unless the movie "Final Countdown" had played out ...
It might have been better if all the ships had been steamed up and ready to sortie, but that also might well have simply resulted in a blocked harbor entrance. Tough to think what you could have changed at the time unless the people in charge at the time also changed. They were pretty bound by their thinking and probably would have ignored or deferred action on any alarms. I mean, who attacks at 8:00 on a Sunday morning? Don't those heathens respect anything?
Incredibly, the band playing the National Anthem on the fantail of a ship FINISHED the song before breaking for cover (at least, that is the story)! Can you say, "Stuipd!" Sorry sir, they were all killed just as the flute players finished the last refrain ... at least they died in rhythm and on key!
Pinsog is right. All we had were F4Fs and P-36s that might have been reasonably available at the time. We DID have some biplanes and some P-26 Peashooters, but they would not have been a lot of help except to draw fire away from the more modern aircraft. The sum total of all P-38s in service at the time was very low, and they weren't combat ready anyway. 65 P-38s had been completed by September 1941, along with the 12 YP-38s the service retained minus one lost in a dive test, but I don't know how many P-38s had been delivered to actual combat units when Pearl Harbor happened. It wasn't many.
Boeser is right when he says the P-36 flown by inexperienced pilots is not really a match for a veteran in a Zero, especially when armed with only one 30-cal MG!
Somehow, it looks as if WWII is gonna' start all over again! Or unless the movie "Final Countdown" had played out ...
It might have been better if all the ships had been steamed up and ready to sortie, but that also might well have simply resulted in a blocked harbor entrance. Tough to think what you could have changed at the time unless the people in charge at the time also changed. They were pretty bound by their thinking and probably would have ignored or deferred action on any alarms. I mean, who attacks at 8:00 on a Sunday morning? Don't those heathens respect anything?
Incredibly, the band playing the National Anthem on the fantail of a ship FINISHED the song before breaking for cover (at least, that is the story)! Can you say, "Stuipd!" Sorry sir, they were all killed just as the flute players finished the last refrain ... at least they died in rhythm and on key!
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- Thread starter
- #110
Greg, I can assure you that if I had brought the P36's to Midway they would have carried a pair of synchronized 50's!! Got to give those Pearl Harbor P36 pilots credit for scrambling under attack and bringing down 3 or 4 planes with only 1 30 caliber machine gun
Peter Gunn
Master Sergeant
Interesting thought, used to hang out on a naval warfare board (now defunct) where several of the old salts answered this very question when I posed it, what if the battleships had sortied? Their considered opinion was that they'd need at least four hours warning and maybe more to get steam up and moving (and that's just to clear the harbor). And if they did, consensus was that the dreadnoughts would still have been attacked but this time in deep water, although it was still even money since the fleet would be able to maneuver and would have had AAA ready, but any loss would have been permanent.
A good what if thread, too bad the site is long gone.
Greg Boeser
1st Sergeant
At Pearl, the 46th PS had time to fully arm four P-36As between the first and second waves. They had to brave a burning building to get the .50s. These four bounced the Japanese over Kaneohe, claiming 3, but in reality only damaging a few. Lt Sterling was shot down and the other a/c suffered damage to some extent. Lt. Harry Brown of the 46th PS claimed two kills, both B5N's from Soryu. He had only one functioning gun. Look up David Aiken's excellent reconstruction of the dogfight over Koneohe NAS, published in Flight Journal magazine, Oct 2002?
parsifal
Colonel
I don't see how a last minute reinforcement of Midway will make any difference. There are too many logistic issues to resolve for me to see this as an optimal tactic. Ive already given my view on the strategic lunacy of this scheme, now we need to look at the tactical situation to see if there is any hope in the detail of an alternative outcome
The IJN historically launched its attacks on the atoll at 0430 hours, with 108 a/c forming the strike, including 36 escorting A6Ms. This strike was first detected at 0530 by a PBY piloted by Lt William Chase who transmitted his sighting at 0545. Confirmation followed with radar fixes at 0553, whereupon the order was given to scramble. The US forces did manage to get nearly all their fighters into the air, 21xF2as and 6xF4Fs, however the initial intercepts could only be undertaken by 9 of the 27 fighters, and then only with some of these aircraft operating at an altitude disadvantage. This suggests the defenders were still getting into position, suggesting further that it was difficult to get all the 27 defenders airborne in time and in position to make a difference. However, disregarding the 24 search planes already in the air before the fighters,, the atoll was able to launch most of its remaining strike aircraft, roughly 60 a/c (some of which failed to locate the main target, and others shot to pieces).
The second wave of the defending CAP was able to intercept at the very last minute, just outside the flak zone, suggesting they were still climbing at the time of the attack. This is important because it suggests the CAP was struggling to get everything airborne in time.
As to the effectiveness of this Cap, it just wasn't, to put it in its simplest terms.
Turning first to the initial intercepts, , Parks led six Buffaloes and three Wildcats to intercept the 108 oncoming Japanese planes. Captain John Carey, leading the three Wildcats in Parks' flight, was first to sight the Japanese. Carey immediately transmitted a sighting report. He then moved to engage the attackers. The Japanese bombers flew in a large V formation, trailed by escorting Zeros. Carey reportedly rolled his Wildcat and powered into the V, claiming a Kate. After this initial pass he then climbed to get into position for another. However Japanese rear gunners raked his Wildcat, riddling Carey's legs and forcing him to abort. Second Lieutenant Clayton M. Canfield followed Carey into his attack, it is fairly certain he destroyed a Kate. Canfield saw Zeros diving on him. A 20mm cannon shell damaged his Wildcat, and he pulled up into the clouds and lost his pursuers. Coming out of the clouds, Canfield joined Carey and with two damaged birds, they both limped back to Midway. Captain Marion E. Carl,flying the third Wildcat, was jumped by several Zeros after attacking the Kates and was forced to break off his attack as well, with no observable results.
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While the Wildcats fought for their lives, Parks led his six Buffaloes in an attack on the Kates. The Marines managed one pass before they were jumped by by the Zeros. Parks and four other Marines were killed. Only Lieutenant Daniel J. Irwin survived. He managed to fly his damaged Buffalo back to Midway with Zeros after him all the way. He later said, "Their gunnery was very good, and I doubt if on any run they missed hitting my plane."
VMF-221's 12 reserve fighters, led by Captains Daniel J.Hennessy and Kirk Armstead, also attacked the Japanese planes. Hennessy's six Buffaloes smashed into the bombers and were jumped by the escorting Zeros, which destroyed four of them within seconds of the opening contact with this group.
Only two of Hennessy's men survived this initial engagement. Armstead's Buffaloes intercepted the Japanese a few miles from Midway and downed three Kates before the rampaging Zeros destroyed three of them as well. These aircraft really had no chance against the zeroes. It mattered not if the aircraft was an f4f or F2-A. American success at midway was not due to the superiority of its aircraft or aircrew, and its fighters were just not competitive at this time against the zero.
Observing the dogfight from the ground, Lieutenant Charles Hughes said that the defending fighters were clearly completely outclassed by the Zekes, He said the allied CAP "looked like they were tied to a string while the Zeros made free passes at them."
The Japanese pushed relentlessly toward Midway. To Marine Pfc Phillip Clark at D Battery on Sand Island, the Japanese formations looked like "three wisps of clouds far out on the horizon." On Sand and Eastern, the Marines and sailors waited for the attack. An observer marveled at the "very calm…lackadaisical air" with which the defenders waited for the strike, "as though they had been living through this sort of thing all their lives."
Midway's AA defences appear to have been substantially more effective than the fighters, firing with every available weapon, defenders fought back with everything they had. Major Dorn E. Arnold of the 6th Defense Battalion fired a Browning Automatic Rifle at the enemy; a sailor on Sand Island used a Colt.45. Second Lieutenant Elmer Thompson and another Marine fired a .30-caliber machine gun from a crippled SB2U.
The Japanese attack ended at 6:48 a.m. The all-clear sounded on Midway at 7:15, and the process of picking up the pieces began. Kimes ordered VMF-221's fighters to land. Six Buffaloes staggered in. Including four aircraft that landed during the raid, 20 U.S. fighters had survived, however nearly all these aircraft were so badly damaged they would not be ready to fly for days, if ever. Of those, only one Wildcat and a single Buffalo were fit to fly immediately. Fifteen Buffaloes and two Wildcats were shot down, and 13 pilots were killed. A combined loss of Eleven Japanese aircraft were recorded, to both fighters and AA. It is difficult to separate these numbers, but it seems maybe 4 or 5 bombers were lost to the airborne defences, the remainder to the AA. 53 were damaged, 15 seriously, the remainder would be ready for operations within a few hours on return, had they survived the surprise attack by the US Carriers.
What can be expected if a whole lot of fighters were committed to the battle. Not much I think. The numbers suggested have become spongy, to say the least. But it is possible to say that the 29 airborne fighters managed to shoot down 4 of the 11 enemy fightes, with 2 of those losses being to the advance guard. I think the advance guard represents all that could be put aloft an in position early in the battle and that the remainder, some 18 or so fighters, being at some level of disadvantage due to position or altitude or both. These additional 18 fighters might have managed to bring down two fighters, whilst losing most of their own. If the fighter defences had been hurriedly added to the defences at the last minute, without an increase in the handling or logistic capabilities of the atoll, it is reasonable to believe the additional aircraft would form part of this second, less effective and badly positioned second group
The IJN historically launched its attacks on the atoll at 0430 hours, with 108 a/c forming the strike, including 36 escorting A6Ms. This strike was first detected at 0530 by a PBY piloted by Lt William Chase who transmitted his sighting at 0545. Confirmation followed with radar fixes at 0553, whereupon the order was given to scramble. The US forces did manage to get nearly all their fighters into the air, 21xF2as and 6xF4Fs, however the initial intercepts could only be undertaken by 9 of the 27 fighters, and then only with some of these aircraft operating at an altitude disadvantage. This suggests the defenders were still getting into position, suggesting further that it was difficult to get all the 27 defenders airborne in time and in position to make a difference. However, disregarding the 24 search planes already in the air before the fighters,, the atoll was able to launch most of its remaining strike aircraft, roughly 60 a/c (some of which failed to locate the main target, and others shot to pieces).
The second wave of the defending CAP was able to intercept at the very last minute, just outside the flak zone, suggesting they were still climbing at the time of the attack. This is important because it suggests the CAP was struggling to get everything airborne in time.
As to the effectiveness of this Cap, it just wasn't, to put it in its simplest terms.
Turning first to the initial intercepts, , Parks led six Buffaloes and three Wildcats to intercept the 108 oncoming Japanese planes. Captain John Carey, leading the three Wildcats in Parks' flight, was first to sight the Japanese. Carey immediately transmitted a sighting report. He then moved to engage the attackers. The Japanese bombers flew in a large V formation, trailed by escorting Zeros. Carey reportedly rolled his Wildcat and powered into the V, claiming a Kate. After this initial pass he then climbed to get into position for another. However Japanese rear gunners raked his Wildcat, riddling Carey's legs and forcing him to abort. Second Lieutenant Clayton M. Canfield followed Carey into his attack, it is fairly certain he destroyed a Kate. Canfield saw Zeros diving on him. A 20mm cannon shell damaged his Wildcat, and he pulled up into the clouds and lost his pursuers. Coming out of the clouds, Canfield joined Carey and with two damaged birds, they both limped back to Midway. Captain Marion E. Carl,flying the third Wildcat, was jumped by several Zeros after attacking the Kates and was forced to break off his attack as well, with no observable results.
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While the Wildcats fought for their lives, Parks led his six Buffaloes in an attack on the Kates. The Marines managed one pass before they were jumped by by the Zeros. Parks and four other Marines were killed. Only Lieutenant Daniel J. Irwin survived. He managed to fly his damaged Buffalo back to Midway with Zeros after him all the way. He later said, "Their gunnery was very good, and I doubt if on any run they missed hitting my plane."
VMF-221's 12 reserve fighters, led by Captains Daniel J.Hennessy and Kirk Armstead, also attacked the Japanese planes. Hennessy's six Buffaloes smashed into the bombers and were jumped by the escorting Zeros, which destroyed four of them within seconds of the opening contact with this group.
Only two of Hennessy's men survived this initial engagement. Armstead's Buffaloes intercepted the Japanese a few miles from Midway and downed three Kates before the rampaging Zeros destroyed three of them as well. These aircraft really had no chance against the zeroes. It mattered not if the aircraft was an f4f or F2-A. American success at midway was not due to the superiority of its aircraft or aircrew, and its fighters were just not competitive at this time against the zero.
Observing the dogfight from the ground, Lieutenant Charles Hughes said that the defending fighters were clearly completely outclassed by the Zekes, He said the allied CAP "looked like they were tied to a string while the Zeros made free passes at them."
The Japanese pushed relentlessly toward Midway. To Marine Pfc Phillip Clark at D Battery on Sand Island, the Japanese formations looked like "three wisps of clouds far out on the horizon." On Sand and Eastern, the Marines and sailors waited for the attack. An observer marveled at the "very calm…lackadaisical air" with which the defenders waited for the strike, "as though they had been living through this sort of thing all their lives."
Midway's AA defences appear to have been substantially more effective than the fighters, firing with every available weapon, defenders fought back with everything they had. Major Dorn E. Arnold of the 6th Defense Battalion fired a Browning Automatic Rifle at the enemy; a sailor on Sand Island used a Colt.45. Second Lieutenant Elmer Thompson and another Marine fired a .30-caliber machine gun from a crippled SB2U.
The Japanese attack ended at 6:48 a.m. The all-clear sounded on Midway at 7:15, and the process of picking up the pieces began. Kimes ordered VMF-221's fighters to land. Six Buffaloes staggered in. Including four aircraft that landed during the raid, 20 U.S. fighters had survived, however nearly all these aircraft were so badly damaged they would not be ready to fly for days, if ever. Of those, only one Wildcat and a single Buffalo were fit to fly immediately. Fifteen Buffaloes and two Wildcats were shot down, and 13 pilots were killed. A combined loss of Eleven Japanese aircraft were recorded, to both fighters and AA. It is difficult to separate these numbers, but it seems maybe 4 or 5 bombers were lost to the airborne defences, the remainder to the AA. 53 were damaged, 15 seriously, the remainder would be ready for operations within a few hours on return, had they survived the surprise attack by the US Carriers.
What can be expected if a whole lot of fighters were committed to the battle. Not much I think. The numbers suggested have become spongy, to say the least. But it is possible to say that the 29 airborne fighters managed to shoot down 4 of the 11 enemy fightes, with 2 of those losses being to the advance guard. I think the advance guard represents all that could be put aloft an in position early in the battle and that the remainder, some 18 or so fighters, being at some level of disadvantage due to position or altitude or both. These additional 18 fighters might have managed to bring down two fighters, whilst losing most of their own. If the fighter defences had been hurriedly added to the defences at the last minute, without an increase in the handling or logistic capabilities of the atoll, it is reasonable to believe the additional aircraft would form part of this second, less effective and badly positioned second group
GregP
Major
More defense is always better, if it is available. If not needed, it can turn into offense. Simple.
Since we aren't in command, and it has already been fought, there is no counter position that can be checked and verified in real life. It is almost impossible to logically argue that less defense or the same is better than more. I can't buy it. Of course, I am also not really familiar with the possible reinforcement equipment that could logically be sent, except for the post here since I've never considered fighting it a different way. To me, history is played out and has spoken. But it COULD have been changed if action were to be taken, before the battle, to attack or defend differently. I've never been into that myself. but it certainly a possibility that did not occur in real life.
I'm not sure if they had the pilots for the extra aircraft, but I assume each plane came with a pilot. If not, why was it sent? Unless to replace losses or re-equip with new planes ... and I've never seen any suggestion that Midway should have been re-equipped. Or with what, if so. I'm, thinking a nuclear carrier would have been nice, but wasn't available at the time. Lacking same, and lacking space-based surveillance, they did pretty well, given the resources and technology of the time. I'll take it, anyway.
Since we aren't in command, and it has already been fought, there is no counter position that can be checked and verified in real life. It is almost impossible to logically argue that less defense or the same is better than more. I can't buy it. Of course, I am also not really familiar with the possible reinforcement equipment that could logically be sent, except for the post here since I've never considered fighting it a different way. To me, history is played out and has spoken. But it COULD have been changed if action were to be taken, before the battle, to attack or defend differently. I've never been into that myself. but it certainly a possibility that did not occur in real life.
I'm not sure if they had the pilots for the extra aircraft, but I assume each plane came with a pilot. If not, why was it sent? Unless to replace losses or re-equip with new planes ... and I've never seen any suggestion that Midway should have been re-equipped. Or with what, if so. I'm, thinking a nuclear carrier would have been nice, but wasn't available at the time. Lacking same, and lacking space-based surveillance, they did pretty well, given the resources and technology of the time. I'll take it, anyway.
parsifal
Colonel
The single most important aspect of the pacific war was logistics. If you had it you could do stuff, if you didnt, you couldnt. moreover that lesson had already been fought and learnt in spades in places like Corregidor and Singapore.
The second most important factor was having sufficient reserves. You needed reserves to fill gaps train others, react to exigencies. in the pacific, you had reserves, or you lost.
It is not always the case that simply pouring more into a situation of a given resource was going to fix or improve a situation. In fact I would say it was almost never the case that numbers decided the issue in the pacific. this happened on guadacanal, at Moresby and for the Japanese, at Rabaul. Defended by more than 100000 men, Rabaul was bypassed and left to become a liability for the Japanese. In the SoPac region, the allies could call on nearly 12 divs, and yet could barely afford to bring a battalion into battle on the Kokoda track. Impatient at these realities, Macarthur tried what you are advocating, he poured vast numbers into a the battle. The formations were poorly trained and even more poorly supplied. they all fell over at the first gate.
in the vast pacific, numbers do NOT improve your chances of victory. They increase your logistic burdens, They make the place in question a target rich environment. Filling a place up like midway with half trained, tired, unsupported air assets that you cant afford anyway, with badly trained pilots is about as dumb as it gets. You just don't do that where every bullet, every can of bully beef is a massive cost and a massive risk. Every man (or plane) sent to the PTO was the equivalent of 8 in the ETO. Having another 100 a/c in the PTO is the equivalent of robbing 800-1000 a/c in Britain. Its just madness what is being suggested.
As far as having sufficient trained aircrew on hand in June 1942, the US simply did not have that sort of resource luxury (in June 1942 at least) to throw around in the fashion suggested . aircrew deployed to Australia for example had to be immediately placed in training for a long period and their aircraft either grounded, or seconded to the RAAF temporarily . Similar to the Japanese there were some hard core experienced crews, particularly on the carriers, but not as good as the Japanese at the start and not as numerous either. It took time to train a bigger air force and even longer to make it superior to the enemy, but the US had the fuel the planes and the depth to undertake such an expansion. It was still, for a time , a heavy business, the first fighters of the USAAC did not deploy to England until August 1942. Despite having expanded the army to more than 60 divs by the end of 1942, the US was hard pressed to deploy just 3 divs for TORCH, and even then, the formations committed came up very short in terms of capability and training
For the first year of the war the US fought at a distinct disadvantage. against both of the axis.
The idea of overwhelming the Japanese with large numbers of half trained, or untrained, or completely absent aircrews is a bad idea. the suggestion to pour vast proportions of limited air assets poorly supported , poorly serviced assets of overtired aircrews that will be abysmally organised and unco-ordinated formations up against one of the best trained and cohesive military units takes a bad idea and turns it into lunacy
The second most important factor was having sufficient reserves. You needed reserves to fill gaps train others, react to exigencies. in the pacific, you had reserves, or you lost.
It is not always the case that simply pouring more into a situation of a given resource was going to fix or improve a situation. In fact I would say it was almost never the case that numbers decided the issue in the pacific. this happened on guadacanal, at Moresby and for the Japanese, at Rabaul. Defended by more than 100000 men, Rabaul was bypassed and left to become a liability for the Japanese. In the SoPac region, the allies could call on nearly 12 divs, and yet could barely afford to bring a battalion into battle on the Kokoda track. Impatient at these realities, Macarthur tried what you are advocating, he poured vast numbers into a the battle. The formations were poorly trained and even more poorly supplied. they all fell over at the first gate.
in the vast pacific, numbers do NOT improve your chances of victory. They increase your logistic burdens, They make the place in question a target rich environment. Filling a place up like midway with half trained, tired, unsupported air assets that you cant afford anyway, with badly trained pilots is about as dumb as it gets. You just don't do that where every bullet, every can of bully beef is a massive cost and a massive risk. Every man (or plane) sent to the PTO was the equivalent of 8 in the ETO. Having another 100 a/c in the PTO is the equivalent of robbing 800-1000 a/c in Britain. Its just madness what is being suggested.
As far as having sufficient trained aircrew on hand in June 1942, the US simply did not have that sort of resource luxury (in June 1942 at least) to throw around in the fashion suggested . aircrew deployed to Australia for example had to be immediately placed in training for a long period and their aircraft either grounded, or seconded to the RAAF temporarily . Similar to the Japanese there were some hard core experienced crews, particularly on the carriers, but not as good as the Japanese at the start and not as numerous either. It took time to train a bigger air force and even longer to make it superior to the enemy, but the US had the fuel the planes and the depth to undertake such an expansion. It was still, for a time , a heavy business, the first fighters of the USAAC did not deploy to England until August 1942. Despite having expanded the army to more than 60 divs by the end of 1942, the US was hard pressed to deploy just 3 divs for TORCH, and even then, the formations committed came up very short in terms of capability and training
For the first year of the war the US fought at a distinct disadvantage. against both of the axis.
The idea of overwhelming the Japanese with large numbers of half trained, or untrained, or completely absent aircrews is a bad idea. the suggestion to pour vast proportions of limited air assets poorly supported , poorly serviced assets of overtired aircrews that will be abysmally organised and unco-ordinated formations up against one of the best trained and cohesive military units takes a bad idea and turns it into lunacy
Glider
Captain
Probable outcome (to me anyway) 1) Land based aircraft get chopped down by the Japanese. Why? because the Japanese aircraft are a lot better, the pilots are more experienced and they are concentrated
2) US Carriers suffer serious losses. Why? because the US carriers will not have their war compliment of crews and aircraft, plus their aircraft are not as good, pilots not as well trained and the AA fire from the US ships is almost neglgable at this stage of the war.
Peter Gunn
Master Sergeant
Just a few points, while I disagree with pinsog on his scenario I will say that I think point number two isn't correct. The US carriers (if I understand pinsog's idea) is that they are waiting to the South with their full complement of dive/torpedo bombers to strike after the Japanese attack. Also I think USN AA fire was relatively decent even at Midway, to say it was negligible I believe is a far cry from what it was.
The other problem I have (with this scenario) is the carriers being south of Midway, thought the idea was to flank the IJN and come at them from a rather unexpected locale.
- Thread starter
- #118
Hello Glider: Just to make sure you understand the plan, the US carriers would have all of the 81 Wildcats, 101 dive bombers and 43 (41, 42, 43?) Torpedo planes
46 extra Wildcats, 21 that Halsey delivered to island of Noumea (can't remember spelling) 15 turned in from Yorktown after Coral Sea, and 10 unused replacements, plus 22 P36's that were being used for gunnery training at Pearl.
Most of these would be deck loaded onto Enterprise and then Hornet would escort her to south of Midway and then flown a shore on June 2 or June 3. If they all wouldn't fit, a few could be squeezed onto Yorktown.
1. US was so sure of Japanese attack on morning of June 4, that all fighters not on CAP had engines running and pilots in the cockpits. That is pretty confident of an attack at a certain time. Therefor, I would have a CAP of say 20 Wildcats at 12,000 feet, the first planes on the runway are 22 P36's due to fast climb. Word comes in of attack, P36's go up first, CAP starts climbing to 20,000, P36's join them and they head to historical 1st intercept say 30-40 miles out with orders to jump the escort. 42 Wildcats and P36's vs 36 Zeros. I have no idea how this would turn out, but 20 Wildcats diving into a Zero formation with guns blazing should scatter formation, P36's behind them fall onto Zeros for WW1 style turning dogfight because that is what they had trained for and P36 was near equal to Zero in turn at slow speeds a superior above 180-200 mph. What happens CANNOT BE DETERMINED, but radio less Zero's should be tied up because they would assume this was whole of Midway CAP. Once bombers move away RADIOLESS ZEROS CANNOT BE CALLED TO HELP BOMBERS.
2. This leaves 21 Buffalos and 32 Wildcats to engage 72 Japanese bombers with 0 escort. Remaining Wildcats and Buffalos have been scrambling the whole time, ordered to proceed in groups of 2-4 as they lift off. They would probably be strung out from 15,000 down to relatively low level, but they would be free to pursue Japanese bombers at will, free from Zero escort.
3. Mean while, 3 US carriers are somewhere south-southeast of Midway, historically there were 0 Japanese subs or recon planes in that area. What ever damage is done to 1st raid, US carriers and their aircraft are unmolested and still hidden as Midway fighters cause attrition to Japanese aircraft (hopefully massive attrition) in the first wave.
(you may have already understood plan before, if not, there it is)
Lack of US pilot experience keeps getting brought up. I would like to remind everyone here that these same, inexperienced Navy and Marine pilots are the same guys that fought the Zero to a 1 to 1 kill ratio at Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal in an inferior F4F Wildcat. There is no reason to think these same pilots would do any worse here than they did in real life.
Peter Gunn: Thank you, you are correct that carriers remain in hiding with full historical compliment of fighters, dive bombers and torpedo planes waiting for Midway group to thin out Japanese carrier planes
46 extra Wildcats, 21 that Halsey delivered to island of Noumea (can't remember spelling) 15 turned in from Yorktown after Coral Sea, and 10 unused replacements, plus 22 P36's that were being used for gunnery training at Pearl.
Most of these would be deck loaded onto Enterprise and then Hornet would escort her to south of Midway and then flown a shore on June 2 or June 3. If they all wouldn't fit, a few could be squeezed onto Yorktown.
1. US was so sure of Japanese attack on morning of June 4, that all fighters not on CAP had engines running and pilots in the cockpits. That is pretty confident of an attack at a certain time. Therefor, I would have a CAP of say 20 Wildcats at 12,000 feet, the first planes on the runway are 22 P36's due to fast climb. Word comes in of attack, P36's go up first, CAP starts climbing to 20,000, P36's join them and they head to historical 1st intercept say 30-40 miles out with orders to jump the escort. 42 Wildcats and P36's vs 36 Zeros. I have no idea how this would turn out, but 20 Wildcats diving into a Zero formation with guns blazing should scatter formation, P36's behind them fall onto Zeros for WW1 style turning dogfight because that is what they had trained for and P36 was near equal to Zero in turn at slow speeds a superior above 180-200 mph. What happens CANNOT BE DETERMINED, but radio less Zero's should be tied up because they would assume this was whole of Midway CAP. Once bombers move away RADIOLESS ZEROS CANNOT BE CALLED TO HELP BOMBERS.
2. This leaves 21 Buffalos and 32 Wildcats to engage 72 Japanese bombers with 0 escort. Remaining Wildcats and Buffalos have been scrambling the whole time, ordered to proceed in groups of 2-4 as they lift off. They would probably be strung out from 15,000 down to relatively low level, but they would be free to pursue Japanese bombers at will, free from Zero escort.
3. Mean while, 3 US carriers are somewhere south-southeast of Midway, historically there were 0 Japanese subs or recon planes in that area. What ever damage is done to 1st raid, US carriers and their aircraft are unmolested and still hidden as Midway fighters cause attrition to Japanese aircraft (hopefully massive attrition) in the first wave.
(you may have already understood plan before, if not, there it is)
Lack of US pilot experience keeps getting brought up. I would like to remind everyone here that these same, inexperienced Navy and Marine pilots are the same guys that fought the Zero to a 1 to 1 kill ratio at Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal in an inferior F4F Wildcat. There is no reason to think these same pilots would do any worse here than they did in real life.
Peter Gunn: Thank you, you are correct that carriers remain in hiding with full historical compliment of fighters, dive bombers and torpedo planes waiting for Midway group to thin out Japanese carrier planes
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- Thread starter
- #119
Parsifal: as usual you have presented wonderful facts and a well laid out perspective. If you could send me a link where it shows the P36's at Pearl Harbor getting more guns installed before intercept, I haven't seen that before and I would enjoy reading that account.
I agree with your assessment of logistics in the Pacific (and actually in europe and north africa also. Our logistics is what allowed us success in all theaters. Most, if not all the time we simply out supplied the guys we beat)
One thing I believe you may be missing is, my alternate battle doesn't depend on logistics like a long campaign does. All extra 46 Wildcats and 22 P36's arrive at Midway on lets say June 3 in the afternoon. All new fighters land with full ammo and nearly full fuel tanks (they take off with full fuel and only use enough for a short flight, depending on how far away you want US carriers from Midway. Or carriers run up very close, fly off fighters and then retire to 50, 75, 100 miles, south of Midway) The 1st Japanese raid was expected on morning of June 4th. So expected was the attack that morning that all of the fighters not already in the air were on the runway, pilots in cockpits, engines running! That is pretty confident that an attack is on the way soon! If I was in charge, I am not concerned about a logistics issue, this combat is going to be a shotgun duel at 10 feet, short and violent. I want enough CAP to engage the Zero escorts and tie them up long enough for the rest of the fighters to get at the single engine Japanese carrier bombers unmolested. We all know what happens to unescorted Japanese Carrier bombers at the hands of a Wildcat, they die and they die quickly.
You say numbers don't help?
What would happen to 29 Hurricanes trying to intercept 72 Stuka's if 36 ME109's were 5,000 feet above them?
I would guess the same thing that happened at Midway
What would happen if 42 Hurricanes jumped 36 ME109's from above and then 53 Hurricanes attacked 72 Stukas in groups of 2-4?
I would say the ME109's would get tied up and the Stuka's would not do well. (and at least the ME109's had radios so the Stuka's could beg for help)
Also, Midway scrambled not only the rest of her fighters, I don't know how many were in the air, but also 4 B26's, 6 Avengers, and around 27 Dauntless and Vindicator dive bombers, all between the sighting of the Japanese 1st attack and 0600. Either Shattered Sword or The First Team says that every airplane was off Midway by 0600, I can't remember which.
I agree with your assessment of logistics in the Pacific (and actually in europe and north africa also. Our logistics is what allowed us success in all theaters. Most, if not all the time we simply out supplied the guys we beat)
One thing I believe you may be missing is, my alternate battle doesn't depend on logistics like a long campaign does. All extra 46 Wildcats and 22 P36's arrive at Midway on lets say June 3 in the afternoon. All new fighters land with full ammo and nearly full fuel tanks (they take off with full fuel and only use enough for a short flight, depending on how far away you want US carriers from Midway. Or carriers run up very close, fly off fighters and then retire to 50, 75, 100 miles, south of Midway) The 1st Japanese raid was expected on morning of June 4th. So expected was the attack that morning that all of the fighters not already in the air were on the runway, pilots in cockpits, engines running! That is pretty confident that an attack is on the way soon! If I was in charge, I am not concerned about a logistics issue, this combat is going to be a shotgun duel at 10 feet, short and violent. I want enough CAP to engage the Zero escorts and tie them up long enough for the rest of the fighters to get at the single engine Japanese carrier bombers unmolested. We all know what happens to unescorted Japanese Carrier bombers at the hands of a Wildcat, they die and they die quickly.
You say numbers don't help?
What would happen to 29 Hurricanes trying to intercept 72 Stuka's if 36 ME109's were 5,000 feet above them?
I would guess the same thing that happened at Midway
What would happen if 42 Hurricanes jumped 36 ME109's from above and then 53 Hurricanes attacked 72 Stukas in groups of 2-4?
I would say the ME109's would get tied up and the Stuka's would not do well. (and at least the ME109's had radios so the Stuka's could beg for help)
Also, Midway scrambled not only the rest of her fighters, I don't know how many were in the air, but also 4 B26's, 6 Avengers, and around 27 Dauntless and Vindicator dive bombers, all between the sighting of the Japanese 1st attack and 0600. Either Shattered Sword or The First Team says that every airplane was off Midway by 0600, I can't remember which.
parsifal
Colonel
Parsifal: as usual you have presented wonderful facts and a well laid out perspective. If you could send me a link where it shows the P36's at Pearl Harbor getting more guns installed before intercept, I haven't seen that before and I would enjoy reading that account.
I didn't post that.
I agree with your assessment of logistics in the Pacific (and actually in europe and north africa also. Our logistics is what allowed us success in all theaters. Most, if not all the time we simply out supplied the guys we beat)
Okay, so why post a scenario variant where logistics is basically ignored?
One thing I believe you may be missing is, my alternate battle doesn't depend on logistics like a long campaign does.
The length of the campaign is relevant only in that the nature of the logisitic challenges will change for a short sharp campaign like this, as opposed to a long drawn out one like say guadacanal. A/c need armourers, controllers, fitters, ammunition, refuellers, vehicles to move them around, hangar spaces, you name it. Take those elements away and you have amassive aircraft handling and servicing issue. What took an hour, say, to refuel, rearm, and scramble a strike or defensive CAP effort historically 9which is roughly what it did take), with the same amount of logiustic support, will take a lot longer. It might easily take 5 or 6 hours to organize your CAP, your runways might be clogged to the point of being unable to function.
I served on a carrier with a crew of 1300, and an air group of 21. The carrier had deck space to accommodate 37 a/c as designed. We still could have crammed 30 something a/c on that carrier, but the logisitic demands of modern aircraft made it inefficient to do so. It was more efficient to operate a lesser number of a/c on a day to day to day basis. Airbases are the same. They have a maximum capacity. As the Japanese found on several occasions, shuttling a/c in and out on a whim like this ruins your logistics both on a lon and short term basis.
You might argue that you could make room by removing your strike and search a/c. very bad idea. Your strike aircraft are your eyes mostly, plus there was no way before the battle of knowing that the land based strikes would not be effective. Unless we are relying on the tea leaves and crystal balls, we need those strike a/c to balance up the numbers for the carriers.
All extra 46 Wildcats and 22 P36's arrive at Midway on lets say June 3 in the afternoon. All new fighters land with full ammo and nearly full fuel tanks (they take off with full fuel and only use enough for a short flight, depending on how far away you want US carriers from Midway.
So what? They have been airborne, and at least half of them will require servicing. Because you have sucked out your pool of aircraft from allover, including the reserves, these guys arrive with no integration, no battle tactics, no experience, tired, and aircraft in need of service. Malta provides the best parallel to draw from. In the situations where spits (or hurricanes) were flown off the carrier, for the purposes of reinforcing the island defences and immediate turn around, the support crews for the squadron(s) were already on the island, more importantly the squadrons were fully trained and fully integrated so they could fight as a team, as it was losses of these hurried reinforcement efforts were always heavy. It takes time to learn the ropes, learn who goes high and who goes low, who banks left and who goes right. Your gaggle of untrained, half trained zonked out drones basically will have no chance
Moreover getting those guys onto the island, refueled and rearmed required extraordinary efforts by the existing garrison. A/C were sent out to guide the newcomers in, facilities were built in advance to house service and protect the new arrivals. Major increases in the air garrison would take months of planning in advance, you have hours.
Or carriers run up very close, fly off fighters and then retire to 50, 75, 100 miles, south of Midway) The 1st Japanese raid was expected on morning of June 4th.
Expected, but not certain, and with so many changes on your plan, compared to the historical situation, you cannot be sure of this.
NO admiral, worth his salt is going to risk his carriers by taking the carriers to within 100 miles of a disputed island. You have got to be kidding. If a transfer of this kind was attempted, you can bet your last dollar, it will be be from the maximum possible distance from the atoll. Moreover, short or long, there will be attritional losses in your relief force. This is a bunch of untrained, un-integrated wallies flying clapped out reserve aircraft without over water navigation skills. Ever been over the ocean, in the middle of nowhere and not know where your target is. Its scary. For good reason. It would not be out of the question to expect attritional losses of 30-50% in this scenario. When the Japanese tried something similar in 1944, it decimated the transferring formations before even a shot was fired. At the Marianas, where the Japanese tried a similar stunt, non combat losses from emergency transfers from the assets further south and to the west, amounted in total to over 305 of the force commitment. You can probably expect a higher attrition rate from your untrained, un-integrated forces attempting the same thing.
So expected was the attack that morning that all of the fighters not already in the air were on the runway, pilots in cockpits, engines running!
It still took a while for them to intercept, and the defending CAP could not fight as a single integrated group. Scramble was ordered shortly after the second confirmation at around 0555 hours. First interceptions were 25 minutes later by just 9 a/c, followed by a further 12 a/c with insufficient altitude to be fully effective. Your reaction times are going to be worse, much worse, no way to know for sure, but could arguably add 15 minutes to the scramble times, maybe more. During the BoB, untrained formations could usually take more than 3 times as long to scramble as fully trained formations. It led to several disaster in that battle. This would be the same.
That is pretty confident that an attack is on the way soon! If I was in charge, I am not concerned about a logistics issue, this combat is going to be a shotgun duel at 10 feet, short and violent. I want enough CAP to engage the Zero escorts and tie them up long enough for the rest of the fighters to get at the single engine Japanese carrier bombers unmolested.
You are dreaming. Logisitics 9albeit of a different nature0 is as important, or probably more important in your short shapr fight as it is in a long drawn out fight. I can see large numbers of fighters lost in the over water transfer, large numbers unserviceable after the flight, insufficient ground crews on hand to service them properly, and insufficient air traffic control to get them up in a sufficient time.
In the air, I see a disaster as well. Totally unintegrated formations, with no battle plan, no opportunity to train as a team, many of the pilots lacking the flying skills to be competitive. It would be a turkey shoot alright, a clay pidgeon shoot…of American fighters.
We all know what happens to unescorted Japanese Carrier bombers at the hands of a Wildcat, they die and they die quickly
Really? In the hands of a trained air group, flying to an agreed plan with adequate fighter control, yes. In situations where this was absent, which was the case facing VMG-221, and even moreso with the gaggle you are proposing the results would be very disappointing. Historically the the 22 defending fighters that were lost ofr written off, with the loss of 13 pilots, managed to bring down maybe, but not certain, just 4 a/c. moreover on two occasions in the historical battles they got the drop on the escorts and achieved a clear firing pass on the defending bomber formations.
No, you kid yourself yet again. It is not a given that the Japanese bombers would be hacked out of the sky. Highly unlikely actually
You say numbers don't help?
I should qualify this by saying that they don't help unless properly supported.
What would happen to 29 Hurricanes trying to intercept 72 Stuka's if 36 ME109's were 5,000 feet above them?
It was often the case in the BoB that formations of 50+ bombers escorted by 20-30 Me 109s, stacked high and above the bombers in loose escort formation would be attacked by 2 or 3 hurricanes. It was important for the hurricanes to be high and carry out a diving pass before scarpering gain height and do it allover again. 29 hurricanes would amount to a "big wing" which was found to be unworkable and inefficient in that battle.
I would guess the same thing that happened at Midway
It would be a very rare event, for a Cap to be 70+ a/c. With your 50 something defenders, you might get 20 in the first wave. They will be late, and low, fighting uncoordinated and at an altitude disadvantage
What would happen if 42 Hurricanes jumped 36 ME109's from above and then 53 Hurricanes attacked 72 Stukas in groups of 2-4?
The stukas would have bombed their target and be home for tea by the time a formation of that size had formed up. It's a ridiculous supposition, never happened, never could happen. I suggest you read a little, and study the effects of mallory's so called "big wings". They were useless and totally ineffective. As your plan would be. .
I would say the ME109's would get tied up and the Stuka's would not do well. (and at least the ME109's had radios so the Stuka's could beg for help)
If it was possible, the numbers would help, but there are so many difficulties in achieving this as to make it possible to rule out as ever happening
Also, Midway scrambled not only the rest of her fighters, I don't know how many were in the air, but also 4 B26's, 6 Avengers, and around 27 Dauntless and Vindicator dive bombers, all between the sighting of the Japanese 1st attack and 0600. Either Shattered Sword or The First Team says that every airplane was off Midway by 0600, I can't remember which.
Its true, but the first interceptions by a formed up fighter group were some minutes later. Only 9 of the 27 defenders were in position, and even then the form up of this group was incomplete. The second group could only intercept with difficulty just outside the flak zone, and almost all were poorly positioned for their attacked. The second group claimed to shoot down 4 bombers but more likely managed to shoot down just two before being monstered by the A6Ms.
With another 50+ aircraft to get off the ground, response times will suffer. I think the CAP would be far too late to react if it tried to form a defence gp of more than about 15 to 20 a/c. Later with improved radar this response was increased, but not in 1942. The defenders only received 30 minutes warning of the attack from their radar. They were already alerted to the attack by the airborne PBY patrols some minutes earlier than that
I didn't post that.
I agree with your assessment of logistics in the Pacific (and actually in europe and north africa also. Our logistics is what allowed us success in all theaters. Most, if not all the time we simply out supplied the guys we beat)
Okay, so why post a scenario variant where logistics is basically ignored?
One thing I believe you may be missing is, my alternate battle doesn't depend on logistics like a long campaign does.
The length of the campaign is relevant only in that the nature of the logisitic challenges will change for a short sharp campaign like this, as opposed to a long drawn out one like say guadacanal. A/c need armourers, controllers, fitters, ammunition, refuellers, vehicles to move them around, hangar spaces, you name it. Take those elements away and you have amassive aircraft handling and servicing issue. What took an hour, say, to refuel, rearm, and scramble a strike or defensive CAP effort historically 9which is roughly what it did take), with the same amount of logiustic support, will take a lot longer. It might easily take 5 or 6 hours to organize your CAP, your runways might be clogged to the point of being unable to function.
I served on a carrier with a crew of 1300, and an air group of 21. The carrier had deck space to accommodate 37 a/c as designed. We still could have crammed 30 something a/c on that carrier, but the logisitic demands of modern aircraft made it inefficient to do so. It was more efficient to operate a lesser number of a/c on a day to day to day basis. Airbases are the same. They have a maximum capacity. As the Japanese found on several occasions, shuttling a/c in and out on a whim like this ruins your logistics both on a lon and short term basis.
You might argue that you could make room by removing your strike and search a/c. very bad idea. Your strike aircraft are your eyes mostly, plus there was no way before the battle of knowing that the land based strikes would not be effective. Unless we are relying on the tea leaves and crystal balls, we need those strike a/c to balance up the numbers for the carriers.
All extra 46 Wildcats and 22 P36's arrive at Midway on lets say June 3 in the afternoon. All new fighters land with full ammo and nearly full fuel tanks (they take off with full fuel and only use enough for a short flight, depending on how far away you want US carriers from Midway.
So what? They have been airborne, and at least half of them will require servicing. Because you have sucked out your pool of aircraft from allover, including the reserves, these guys arrive with no integration, no battle tactics, no experience, tired, and aircraft in need of service. Malta provides the best parallel to draw from. In the situations where spits (or hurricanes) were flown off the carrier, for the purposes of reinforcing the island defences and immediate turn around, the support crews for the squadron(s) were already on the island, more importantly the squadrons were fully trained and fully integrated so they could fight as a team, as it was losses of these hurried reinforcement efforts were always heavy. It takes time to learn the ropes, learn who goes high and who goes low, who banks left and who goes right. Your gaggle of untrained, half trained zonked out drones basically will have no chance
Moreover getting those guys onto the island, refueled and rearmed required extraordinary efforts by the existing garrison. A/C were sent out to guide the newcomers in, facilities were built in advance to house service and protect the new arrivals. Major increases in the air garrison would take months of planning in advance, you have hours.
Or carriers run up very close, fly off fighters and then retire to 50, 75, 100 miles, south of Midway) The 1st Japanese raid was expected on morning of June 4th.
Expected, but not certain, and with so many changes on your plan, compared to the historical situation, you cannot be sure of this.
NO admiral, worth his salt is going to risk his carriers by taking the carriers to within 100 miles of a disputed island. You have got to be kidding. If a transfer of this kind was attempted, you can bet your last dollar, it will be be from the maximum possible distance from the atoll. Moreover, short or long, there will be attritional losses in your relief force. This is a bunch of untrained, un-integrated wallies flying clapped out reserve aircraft without over water navigation skills. Ever been over the ocean, in the middle of nowhere and not know where your target is. Its scary. For good reason. It would not be out of the question to expect attritional losses of 30-50% in this scenario. When the Japanese tried something similar in 1944, it decimated the transferring formations before even a shot was fired. At the Marianas, where the Japanese tried a similar stunt, non combat losses from emergency transfers from the assets further south and to the west, amounted in total to over 305 of the force commitment. You can probably expect a higher attrition rate from your untrained, un-integrated forces attempting the same thing.
So expected was the attack that morning that all of the fighters not already in the air were on the runway, pilots in cockpits, engines running!
It still took a while for them to intercept, and the defending CAP could not fight as a single integrated group. Scramble was ordered shortly after the second confirmation at around 0555 hours. First interceptions were 25 minutes later by just 9 a/c, followed by a further 12 a/c with insufficient altitude to be fully effective. Your reaction times are going to be worse, much worse, no way to know for sure, but could arguably add 15 minutes to the scramble times, maybe more. During the BoB, untrained formations could usually take more than 3 times as long to scramble as fully trained formations. It led to several disaster in that battle. This would be the same.
That is pretty confident that an attack is on the way soon! If I was in charge, I am not concerned about a logistics issue, this combat is going to be a shotgun duel at 10 feet, short and violent. I want enough CAP to engage the Zero escorts and tie them up long enough for the rest of the fighters to get at the single engine Japanese carrier bombers unmolested.
You are dreaming. Logisitics 9albeit of a different nature0 is as important, or probably more important in your short shapr fight as it is in a long drawn out fight. I can see large numbers of fighters lost in the over water transfer, large numbers unserviceable after the flight, insufficient ground crews on hand to service them properly, and insufficient air traffic control to get them up in a sufficient time.
In the air, I see a disaster as well. Totally unintegrated formations, with no battle plan, no opportunity to train as a team, many of the pilots lacking the flying skills to be competitive. It would be a turkey shoot alright, a clay pidgeon shoot…of American fighters.
We all know what happens to unescorted Japanese Carrier bombers at the hands of a Wildcat, they die and they die quickly
Really? In the hands of a trained air group, flying to an agreed plan with adequate fighter control, yes. In situations where this was absent, which was the case facing VMG-221, and even moreso with the gaggle you are proposing the results would be very disappointing. Historically the the 22 defending fighters that were lost ofr written off, with the loss of 13 pilots, managed to bring down maybe, but not certain, just 4 a/c. moreover on two occasions in the historical battles they got the drop on the escorts and achieved a clear firing pass on the defending bomber formations.
No, you kid yourself yet again. It is not a given that the Japanese bombers would be hacked out of the sky. Highly unlikely actually
You say numbers don't help?
I should qualify this by saying that they don't help unless properly supported.
What would happen to 29 Hurricanes trying to intercept 72 Stuka's if 36 ME109's were 5,000 feet above them?
It was often the case in the BoB that formations of 50+ bombers escorted by 20-30 Me 109s, stacked high and above the bombers in loose escort formation would be attacked by 2 or 3 hurricanes. It was important for the hurricanes to be high and carry out a diving pass before scarpering gain height and do it allover again. 29 hurricanes would amount to a "big wing" which was found to be unworkable and inefficient in that battle.
I would guess the same thing that happened at Midway
It would be a very rare event, for a Cap to be 70+ a/c. With your 50 something defenders, you might get 20 in the first wave. They will be late, and low, fighting uncoordinated and at an altitude disadvantage
What would happen if 42 Hurricanes jumped 36 ME109's from above and then 53 Hurricanes attacked 72 Stukas in groups of 2-4?
The stukas would have bombed their target and be home for tea by the time a formation of that size had formed up. It's a ridiculous supposition, never happened, never could happen. I suggest you read a little, and study the effects of mallory's so called "big wings". They were useless and totally ineffective. As your plan would be. .
I would say the ME109's would get tied up and the Stuka's would not do well. (and at least the ME109's had radios so the Stuka's could beg for help)
If it was possible, the numbers would help, but there are so many difficulties in achieving this as to make it possible to rule out as ever happening
Also, Midway scrambled not only the rest of her fighters, I don't know how many were in the air, but also 4 B26's, 6 Avengers, and around 27 Dauntless and Vindicator dive bombers, all between the sighting of the Japanese 1st attack and 0600. Either Shattered Sword or The First Team says that every airplane was off Midway by 0600, I can't remember which.
Its true, but the first interceptions by a formed up fighter group were some minutes later. Only 9 of the 27 defenders were in position, and even then the form up of this group was incomplete. The second group could only intercept with difficulty just outside the flak zone, and almost all were poorly positioned for their attacked. The second group claimed to shoot down 4 bombers but more likely managed to shoot down just two before being monstered by the A6Ms.
With another 50+ aircraft to get off the ground, response times will suffer. I think the CAP would be far too late to react if it tried to form a defence gp of more than about 15 to 20 a/c. Later with improved radar this response was increased, but not in 1942. The defenders only received 30 minutes warning of the attack from their radar. They were already alerted to the attack by the airborne PBY patrols some minutes earlier than that
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