Battle of Midway, a better plan
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Right. Not anything else going on in the hanger. Have you been underway?
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- #63
Export Hawk had heavier armament and weighed more than US P36. It had 6 guns and armor plate, and some on here claim it had self sealing tanks (flyboyJ thinks they had self sealing tanks) The point of that comparison was that the P36 still had lighter wing loading than a Spitfire and had been flown off a carrier before, in fact, same P36's off same carrier.
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- #64
I think they were very intelligent back then.
I think that they might have been able to find a place to let a few pilots sleep on an 800 foot aircraft carrier. They found a place for the Dolittle guys to sleep. This was 48 hours, maybe rotate bunks? sleeping bag on floor?
I realize that P36's are complicated. What do you think they did for the B26's and Avengers that were flown out at the last minute for parts and mechanics?
I think that they might have been able to find a place to let a few pilots sleep on an 800 foot aircraft carrier. They found a place for the Dolittle guys to sleep. This was 48 hours, maybe rotate bunks? sleeping bag on floor?
I realize that P36's are complicated. What do you think they did for the B26's and Avengers that were flown out at the last minute for parts and mechanics?
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- #65
Where did pilots sleep when they sent overloaded aircraft carriers with planes parked on deck to Guadalcanal? They did almost exactly what I am suggesting 2 months later at Guadalcanal. They overloaded carriers headed that way with extra fighters. They had AAF P39's and Wildcats doing intercepts together. They were short of spares so they cannibalized damaged planes. Where did the parts come from when the first fighters landed on Guadalcanal? Did they grab all the tools and spare parts from the Hornet and Wasp as they were sinking when they sent what they could of their airgroups to Guadalcanal? How many extra parts do you need for the first 1 or 2 missions when the planes should be in good shape when they leave the carrier? After the first combat some of the damaged planes could be salvaged for parts
parsifal
Colonel
The Japanese most certainly were not ahead of the game in terms of their doctrine for carrier operations. In many respects they were behind, particularly in technology and particularly compared to british ops, where night ops were the norm, ASV radar fitted as standard and the british all weather capabilities years ahead of the Japanese (the Japanese would not have been able to carry out the operations the british were doing like the strikes on the Bismarck) . Between the US and the IJN there was a slight advantage to the latter. For the Japanese Pearl harbor was very much contrary to their established battle plans and intended strategy to fight the Americans. The intention was that as the americans began to fight their way across the pacific, the IJN would use its light forces and its carriers to inflict attrition on the US battlefleet as it ploughed its way toward the Japanese defences somewhere in the central pacific. Most admirals, including the majority of IJN admirals did not believe their carrier assets had the capacity to sink heavy units at sea. They could, however inflict damage, forcing some to either turn back, or reduce speed, thereby increasing the advantages to the other side.
The Japanese were ahead of the game, simply because they had the numbers to concentrate their carriers. Two or three carriers operating as a cohesive unit are exponentially more dangerous than a single carrier or a few carriers operating against many flat tops. In 1941, the Americans had enough carriers to concentrate, but were on the defensive, had lost the initiative were fighting on multiple fronts (including the Atlantic) and even in the Pacific were forced to operate on widely separated fronts whilst the Japanese had the priceless advantage of operating on interior lines with really just one front to worry about. Moreover, the Americans had to withhold significant parts of their force structure back for training purposes. This would deliver great dividends later, but in June 1942 the Americans were forced to fight with dispersed forces as they struggled to contain the rampaging Japanese.
The RN was facing an even more acute crisis as they struggled to meet their world wide commitments. The RN was easily ahead of both the other navies in recognizing the benefits of concentration of effort in carrier operations, but seldom possessed the resources to exploit that knowledge.
Your sources for reinforcement are very unrealistic and unconvincing. If nothing else, it would allow the IJN a free hand in those other TOs. The IJN in addition to their MI strategy had developed their so-called "FS" strategy, which western accounts sometimes refer to as the "second operational phase". Basically the Japanese concluded that they lacked the shipping to carry out a direct assault on either the HI or Australia, but also recognized the vital importance of putting pressure on both objectives. In March and April 1942, with their "1st operational phase" completed with amazingly light losses, but as yet no strategic victory to force the Americans to the peace table, the Japanese adopted an essentially opportunistic war strategy, in which they would pursue the lines of least resistance. There were four main MLAs considered and a fourth subsidiary one also thrown in rather late in the planning. The four main options considered were
1) A continued advance through India to establish a link with the European Axis. The continued USN activities culminating with the Doolittle raids made the IJN realise that they could not afford to be distracted away from the pacific. This option was quickly dropped from an early stage
2) Plan FO was the plan to invade Australia, and was touted as a viable option by Yamamoto to lure the Americans into a climactic battle of destruction. Coral Sea was fought as a precursor to that plan, but the victory at coral sea did not fully cancel the Japanese desire to carry out the operation. Indeed, there were more than a few in the American commands that expected the Japanese to pour more resources in a second round of Coral Sea, pouriong more carriers into that TO so as to achieve the objectives of the operation.
3) Plan RY. This operation was the IJNs plan to invade and occupy Nauru and Ocean in the south Pacific. The operation was originally set to be executed in May 1942 immediately following op MO and before Operation MI, which resulted in Midway. The primary reason for the operation was to exploit the islands' supplies of phosphate. After a postponement due to interference by enemy forces, the operation was completed in August 1942. The USN cryptanalysts were aware of this plan but lacked the resources to counter it. It had been expected by the IJN that the USN might react, but such reaction neve eventuated
4) Operation FS, already mentioned above had the intention of isolating Australia, It intended to achieve that by the capture of strategic islands including noumea fiji and beyond that American Samoa. If the japanese had been given the latitude to carry out that operation it would have significantly disrupted the allied containment strategy. ,
The Japanese were considering all of these options at the time that the midway operation was also being planned.
In February 1942, Japanese Admiral Yamamoto, proposed an immediate invasion of Australia. He had just implemented his bombing raids on Darwin in the Northern Territory. He pleaded with the Japanese General Staff, to land two Japanese Army Divisions on the northern coastline of Australia which was very poorly defended. They were to follow the north-south railway line to Adelaide, thus dividing Australia into two fronts. Once Adelaide had been taken, a second force would land on the south east coast of Australia and drive northwards to Sydney and southwards to Melbourne.
Yamamoto's plan appeared to be a diversionary invasion plan rather than a plan to occupy Australia. He wanted to draw large American forces away from launching attacks on the Japanese Island chain far to the north of Australia.
General Yamashita agreed with Yamamoto's Invasion Plan and even volunteered to lead the invasion. However, the plan was opposed by Japanese Prime Minister, General Tojo, as he believed that there were no contingency plans considered for Yamamoto's Invasion Plan. IGHQ was receiving fairly accurate intelligence on the steady stream of US air and ground reinforcements streaming into Australia at that time and argued that American airpower, including the fighters being rushed to the TO at that time were a serious risk to the operation. Take away some or all of those reinforcements, and the main opposition to FO evaporates.
3) plan FI was an alternative to FO and called for the invasion of Noumea, the south west pacific, culminating in the capture of Fiji. It was essentially a cut down version of FS. For a while, even after the crushing defeats at midway, the Japanese considered a continuation of that strategy, but the presence of significant land based assets and then carriers deterred the Japanese to the point they cancelled the operation in September.
The point about all this is the fighters you are relying on to achieve your questionable numerical superiority on midway (we wont even go to the extremely limited spot capacity on the atoll that would have made the management of such ac numbers all but impossible) is that you are robbing Peter to half pay for Paul. Denuding the defences in the South pacific at a time when the Japanese were known to be preparing major offensive into those for the purposes of knocking out the major power left standing to resist the Japanese (ANZAC's contribution to the defence of the pacific at least on land and in the air was not overtaken by the US until the latter part of 1943) would have been a massive loss of faith and trust in the US promises to help defend australia at a time we were struggling. It probably or likely would have brought about the capitulation of the Australians, at least, in much the same way as the Portuguese had done. This was something the US greatly feared and worked very hard to avoid. Part of that response was the deployment of the very assets you are now proposing to plunder.
You might want to consider expanding your reading list before spouting the blessings of shattered Sword. Whilst an excellent reference work, it is not the last word on the pacific by a long shot. as an example, you might want to consider some of the translations slowly becoming available from a truly Japanese perspective, of which the following is an example
http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/ajrp/ajrp2.nsf/WebI/JpnOperations/$file/JpnOpsText.pdf?OpenElement
The Japanese were ahead of the game, simply because they had the numbers to concentrate their carriers. Two or three carriers operating as a cohesive unit are exponentially more dangerous than a single carrier or a few carriers operating against many flat tops. In 1941, the Americans had enough carriers to concentrate, but were on the defensive, had lost the initiative were fighting on multiple fronts (including the Atlantic) and even in the Pacific were forced to operate on widely separated fronts whilst the Japanese had the priceless advantage of operating on interior lines with really just one front to worry about. Moreover, the Americans had to withhold significant parts of their force structure back for training purposes. This would deliver great dividends later, but in June 1942 the Americans were forced to fight with dispersed forces as they struggled to contain the rampaging Japanese.
The RN was facing an even more acute crisis as they struggled to meet their world wide commitments. The RN was easily ahead of both the other navies in recognizing the benefits of concentration of effort in carrier operations, but seldom possessed the resources to exploit that knowledge.
Your sources for reinforcement are very unrealistic and unconvincing. If nothing else, it would allow the IJN a free hand in those other TOs. The IJN in addition to their MI strategy had developed their so-called "FS" strategy, which western accounts sometimes refer to as the "second operational phase". Basically the Japanese concluded that they lacked the shipping to carry out a direct assault on either the HI or Australia, but also recognized the vital importance of putting pressure on both objectives. In March and April 1942, with their "1st operational phase" completed with amazingly light losses, but as yet no strategic victory to force the Americans to the peace table, the Japanese adopted an essentially opportunistic war strategy, in which they would pursue the lines of least resistance. There were four main MLAs considered and a fourth subsidiary one also thrown in rather late in the planning. The four main options considered were
1) A continued advance through India to establish a link with the European Axis. The continued USN activities culminating with the Doolittle raids made the IJN realise that they could not afford to be distracted away from the pacific. This option was quickly dropped from an early stage
2) Plan FO was the plan to invade Australia, and was touted as a viable option by Yamamoto to lure the Americans into a climactic battle of destruction. Coral Sea was fought as a precursor to that plan, but the victory at coral sea did not fully cancel the Japanese desire to carry out the operation. Indeed, there were more than a few in the American commands that expected the Japanese to pour more resources in a second round of Coral Sea, pouriong more carriers into that TO so as to achieve the objectives of the operation.
3) Plan RY. This operation was the IJNs plan to invade and occupy Nauru and Ocean in the south Pacific. The operation was originally set to be executed in May 1942 immediately following op MO and before Operation MI, which resulted in Midway. The primary reason for the operation was to exploit the islands' supplies of phosphate. After a postponement due to interference by enemy forces, the operation was completed in August 1942. The USN cryptanalysts were aware of this plan but lacked the resources to counter it. It had been expected by the IJN that the USN might react, but such reaction neve eventuated
4) Operation FS, already mentioned above had the intention of isolating Australia, It intended to achieve that by the capture of strategic islands including noumea fiji and beyond that American Samoa. If the japanese had been given the latitude to carry out that operation it would have significantly disrupted the allied containment strategy. ,
The Japanese were considering all of these options at the time that the midway operation was also being planned.
In February 1942, Japanese Admiral Yamamoto, proposed an immediate invasion of Australia. He had just implemented his bombing raids on Darwin in the Northern Territory. He pleaded with the Japanese General Staff, to land two Japanese Army Divisions on the northern coastline of Australia which was very poorly defended. They were to follow the north-south railway line to Adelaide, thus dividing Australia into two fronts. Once Adelaide had been taken, a second force would land on the south east coast of Australia and drive northwards to Sydney and southwards to Melbourne.
Yamamoto's plan appeared to be a diversionary invasion plan rather than a plan to occupy Australia. He wanted to draw large American forces away from launching attacks on the Japanese Island chain far to the north of Australia.
General Yamashita agreed with Yamamoto's Invasion Plan and even volunteered to lead the invasion. However, the plan was opposed by Japanese Prime Minister, General Tojo, as he believed that there were no contingency plans considered for Yamamoto's Invasion Plan. IGHQ was receiving fairly accurate intelligence on the steady stream of US air and ground reinforcements streaming into Australia at that time and argued that American airpower, including the fighters being rushed to the TO at that time were a serious risk to the operation. Take away some or all of those reinforcements, and the main opposition to FO evaporates.
3) plan FI was an alternative to FO and called for the invasion of Noumea, the south west pacific, culminating in the capture of Fiji. It was essentially a cut down version of FS. For a while, even after the crushing defeats at midway, the Japanese considered a continuation of that strategy, but the presence of significant land based assets and then carriers deterred the Japanese to the point they cancelled the operation in September.
The point about all this is the fighters you are relying on to achieve your questionable numerical superiority on midway (we wont even go to the extremely limited spot capacity on the atoll that would have made the management of such ac numbers all but impossible) is that you are robbing Peter to half pay for Paul. Denuding the defences in the South pacific at a time when the Japanese were known to be preparing major offensive into those for the purposes of knocking out the major power left standing to resist the Japanese (ANZAC's contribution to the defence of the pacific at least on land and in the air was not overtaken by the US until the latter part of 1943) would have been a massive loss of faith and trust in the US promises to help defend australia at a time we were struggling. It probably or likely would have brought about the capitulation of the Australians, at least, in much the same way as the Portuguese had done. This was something the US greatly feared and worked very hard to avoid. Part of that response was the deployment of the very assets you are now proposing to plunder.
You might want to consider expanding your reading list before spouting the blessings of shattered Sword. Whilst an excellent reference work, it is not the last word on the pacific by a long shot. as an example, you might want to consider some of the translations slowly becoming available from a truly Japanese perspective, of which the following is an example
http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/ajrp/ajrp2.nsf/WebI/JpnOperations/$file/JpnOpsText.pdf?OpenElement
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- #67
Parsifal" Every one of these planes except the 21 Marine fighters deposited at Noumea were left behind at Pearl. 15 Yorktown fighters traded in, 10 replacements not used, and the 22 P36's which never did go anywhere else during the war. Only Noumea would be shorted and 21 Wildcats wouldn't have helped much anyway as proved by both Midway and Wake. 20 fighters spread at remote fields here and there will accomplish little in the event of a large carrier strike. A large group of 95 or so would represent a formidable force.
I think they would fit, as I said earlier, I would remove 4 B26's. 6 Avengers, 16 dauntless's and 11 Vindicators. That is 37 planes, some of them are quite large. The 10 folding wing F4F-4's could have their wings folded, at least 2 fighters could be parked for each B26
No Wildcats or P36's were ever deployed to Australia so this has no bearing on them.
I think they would fit, as I said earlier, I would remove 4 B26's. 6 Avengers, 16 dauntless's and 11 Vindicators. That is 37 planes, some of them are quite large. The 10 folding wing F4F-4's could have their wings folded, at least 2 fighters could be parked for each B26
No Wildcats or P36's were ever deployed to Australia so this has no bearing on them.
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- #68
Quite honestly this is the strangest thread I have ever done. I'm not time warping Corsairs or Bearcats in time for battle, I'm not miraculously fixing the US torpedo problem and training B26 pilots to deliver them, I'm not miracle'ing 2 squadrons of Spitfires from England to Midway. I am loading planes at Hawaii onto existing carriers in the existing time frame and picking up the 21 Wildcats that were just delivered to Noumea before Halsey was recalled.
I could have suggested Iron Man and Thor intervene with more support and less argument.
I have been told adding more fighters is a bad idea because:
1. Who will control them? Because telling trained Navy, Marine and AAF fighter pilots that "108 enemy planes at 15,000 feet, jump them right here (pointing to map) and shoot them down" isn't enough
2. Can't fly mixed missions with Navy, Marine and AAF pilots because they had never done it and the planes aren't the same, they have different performance levels. Even though they flew P39's and Wildcats together at Guadalcanal
3. outnumbering the enemy fighters almost 3 to 1 is bad because the same pilots that can't find the enemy (the original 27 flew right to them just fine, not sure how 27 flew right to them but 95 can't find them) are going to shoot down all their own planes because they don't know what a Zero looks like
4. We can work on B17's, B26's and Avengers but a P36 is just too darn complicated
5. Leaving the carriers 50-75 miles south of the island in a safe place while the beefed up island defenses thin down the enemy air groups absolutely cannot be done because we haven't trained for that and never tried it before
6. Pilots that haven't shot down Zeros can't shoot down Zeros, even though the only fighter pilots that had seen them were the few Yorktown pilots that were retained from the Coral Sea battle and the rest of the first timers held about a 1 to 1 kill ratio
7. P36's can't fly from a carrier, even though these exact P36's were flown from the Enterprise to Pearl in February 1941
8. Cant fly cap over Midway because they might get caught out of fuel, even though flying CAP over a carrier was standard procedure
9. the attack might not happen even though we were sure enough that it would happen when it actually did happen that we sent 3 carriers and their battle groups out to the middle of nowhere, flew 4 B26's, 6 Avengers and several B17's straight to Midway from Pearl. We did all that, but sending fighters to Midway instead of 4 B26's, 6 Avengers, 16 Dauntless and 11 Vindicators is just crazy over the top.
10. the 1st wave of Japanese might do something different and sneaky (never found out what that might be)
11. a battle fleet containing 3 aircraft carriers has no room for 68 extra pilots
This is starting to sound like a Monty Python skit:
"Outpost 4 to Base, we are being over run!!!!"
"Base to outpost 4, hang on we are sending men and weapons to help"
"Outpost 4 to base, did you hear me? I said we are being over run, the last thing I need is more men and weapons!!!!!"
I could have suggested Iron Man and Thor intervene with more support and less argument.
I have been told adding more fighters is a bad idea because:
1. Who will control them? Because telling trained Navy, Marine and AAF fighter pilots that "108 enemy planes at 15,000 feet, jump them right here (pointing to map) and shoot them down" isn't enough
2. Can't fly mixed missions with Navy, Marine and AAF pilots because they had never done it and the planes aren't the same, they have different performance levels. Even though they flew P39's and Wildcats together at Guadalcanal
3. outnumbering the enemy fighters almost 3 to 1 is bad because the same pilots that can't find the enemy (the original 27 flew right to them just fine, not sure how 27 flew right to them but 95 can't find them) are going to shoot down all their own planes because they don't know what a Zero looks like
4. We can work on B17's, B26's and Avengers but a P36 is just too darn complicated
5. Leaving the carriers 50-75 miles south of the island in a safe place while the beefed up island defenses thin down the enemy air groups absolutely cannot be done because we haven't trained for that and never tried it before
6. Pilots that haven't shot down Zeros can't shoot down Zeros, even though the only fighter pilots that had seen them were the few Yorktown pilots that were retained from the Coral Sea battle and the rest of the first timers held about a 1 to 1 kill ratio
7. P36's can't fly from a carrier, even though these exact P36's were flown from the Enterprise to Pearl in February 1941
8. Cant fly cap over Midway because they might get caught out of fuel, even though flying CAP over a carrier was standard procedure
9. the attack might not happen even though we were sure enough that it would happen when it actually did happen that we sent 3 carriers and their battle groups out to the middle of nowhere, flew 4 B26's, 6 Avengers and several B17's straight to Midway from Pearl. We did all that, but sending fighters to Midway instead of 4 B26's, 6 Avengers, 16 Dauntless and 11 Vindicators is just crazy over the top.
10. the 1st wave of Japanese might do something different and sneaky (never found out what that might be)
11. a battle fleet containing 3 aircraft carriers has no room for 68 extra pilots
This is starting to sound like a Monty Python skit:
"Outpost 4 to Base, we are being over run!!!!"
"Base to outpost 4, hang on we are sending men and weapons to help"
"Outpost 4 to base, did you hear me? I said we are being over run, the last thing I need is more men and weapons!!!!!"
buffnut453
Captain
I know...I said I'd bow out but some of the points being made need to be rebutted. Regarding maintenance crew, type qualification and the simple fact of maintaining an unusual aircraft for a limited number of sorties is not the problem. The problem is how to turn your quantity of aircraft rapidly at the end of their sortie. You have to have the personnel to replenish them (fuel, oil, ammo, oxygen, check hydraulics etc) which takes time. You also have to have the capabilities to produce stuff like oxygen so you can refill the tanks. Then there's dealing with battle damage to get aircraft patched up and back into the fray. Simply saying "The same guys will do all the planes" is box of rocks dumb because the groundcrew will get exhausted...and FAST. Either that or your sortie generation rate will tank, which means you can't put the force in the air that you need to achieve your objectives. And all the while, Nagumo still has 50% of his aircraft that are not committed to the battle.
Pinsog, you seem to think that it's an easy task to just throw a bunch of aircraft onto an airfield, tell them "Fly north, young men, and kill lots of the enemy" and it will all happen like magic. It WON'T. Situations change and it takes a LOT of planning, logistics and C3 to make it work. Military history is filled of "well it was SUPPOSED to work" events where things just didn't go to plan. Reinforcements of the kind you indicate would probably have been detected by the Japanese, leading to potentially a change of plans by Nagumo....and you're betting the farm on things panning out the way they did in reality. Any time travel show will tell you that a change to one aspect of history will have unexpected, and unforeseen, consequences. They thought they were going in against a single USMC fighter squadron on Midway. If they had ANY inkling of the size of force you're proposing, that plan would have changed...drastically! The Japanese weren't stupid...and bear in mind their primary objective was a major engagement with the USN carriers. If that happens, most of your available fighter defences are sitting on an island while your carriers are being heavily engaged. While there are precedents for AF aircraft taking off from a carrier, it typically wasn't as part of a major combat formation that was expected to carry on with ongoing major operations.
If you want to convince us that this will work, please take on the challenge of doing the maths for a squadron of aircraft in terms of turnaround times, parking space requirements, POL, ammunition, maintenance crews to turn the squadron in, say, 30 mins or less, oxygen production needs, time taken to launch and then climb to height...and then multiple that by the number of squadrons you want to squeeze onto Midway. Then take a look at what was truly available in terms of fuel stores, parking space, food production capacity, accommodation etc. Also bear in mind that you must maintain a reasonable CAP over Midway otherwise all those aircraft you've brought in will just get schwacked whle they're being refueled/rearmed (and the longer that takes, the greater the risk...which gets us back to the number of maintenance crew you need). And all of this hasn't even considered dealing with damaged aircraft, unjamming malfunctioning guns etc etc etc.
Please...stop just repeating that "it should be simple" and show us, mathematically and with schematics HOW it would work. There are plenty of people here who HAVE worked air combat operations, who've turned aircraft without sufficient groundcrew...and several have commented on the complexity of the problem you're laying out but you don't seem to be listening. If you're going to press the issue, then please provide the evidence.
Pinsog, you seem to think that it's an easy task to just throw a bunch of aircraft onto an airfield, tell them "Fly north, young men, and kill lots of the enemy" and it will all happen like magic. It WON'T. Situations change and it takes a LOT of planning, logistics and C3 to make it work. Military history is filled of "well it was SUPPOSED to work" events where things just didn't go to plan. Reinforcements of the kind you indicate would probably have been detected by the Japanese, leading to potentially a change of plans by Nagumo....and you're betting the farm on things panning out the way they did in reality. Any time travel show will tell you that a change to one aspect of history will have unexpected, and unforeseen, consequences. They thought they were going in against a single USMC fighter squadron on Midway. If they had ANY inkling of the size of force you're proposing, that plan would have changed...drastically! The Japanese weren't stupid...and bear in mind their primary objective was a major engagement with the USN carriers. If that happens, most of your available fighter defences are sitting on an island while your carriers are being heavily engaged. While there are precedents for AF aircraft taking off from a carrier, it typically wasn't as part of a major combat formation that was expected to carry on with ongoing major operations.
If you want to convince us that this will work, please take on the challenge of doing the maths for a squadron of aircraft in terms of turnaround times, parking space requirements, POL, ammunition, maintenance crews to turn the squadron in, say, 30 mins or less, oxygen production needs, time taken to launch and then climb to height...and then multiple that by the number of squadrons you want to squeeze onto Midway. Then take a look at what was truly available in terms of fuel stores, parking space, food production capacity, accommodation etc. Also bear in mind that you must maintain a reasonable CAP over Midway otherwise all those aircraft you've brought in will just get schwacked whle they're being refueled/rearmed (and the longer that takes, the greater the risk...which gets us back to the number of maintenance crew you need). And all of this hasn't even considered dealing with damaged aircraft, unjamming malfunctioning guns etc etc etc.
Please...stop just repeating that "it should be simple" and show us, mathematically and with schematics HOW it would work. There are plenty of people here who HAVE worked air combat operations, who've turned aircraft without sufficient groundcrew...and several have commented on the complexity of the problem you're laying out but you don't seem to be listening. If you're going to press the issue, then please provide the evidence.
parsifal
Colonel
Parsifal" Every one of these planes except the 21 Marine fighters deposited at Noumea were left behind at Pearl.
21 fighters was a significant number in June 1942, not enough to win, but enough to make it difficult. Over rabaul, for example, the air defence component at that time was a mere 12 wiraway trainers. Over Port Moresby the numbers were about 16 p-40s, there were just 6 buffaloes defending Fremantle..
15 Yorktown fighters traded in, 10 replacements not used, and the 22 P36's which never did go anywhere else during the war.
The most vital part of the equation are these aircraft. They are part of the strategic reserves for the pacific Command and AAF, and at a guess I would say a vital component to the training elements of the US at that time. Even if they were being held as part of the depot reserves, their release would be very difficult to agree to as a good idea or optimal. You don't wear down your reserves unless you absolutely need to, and reinforcing midway to this extent was definitely not a case of 'absolutely need to".
Only Noumea would be shorted and 21 Wildcats wouldn't have helped much anyway as proved by both Midway and Wake.
No, and no. Robbing your vital strategic reserves is the issue, not robbing the front line commands. Denuding your reserves does a lot of bad things to your ability to flexibly react, and curtails your capacity building efforts.
The efforts of the far flung air garrisons, strung out like penny packets does appear futile, but in reality was the glue that held the pacific command together. They fulfilled a vital role in fact. Your thinking is failing to understand the situation being faced at this time. The Japanese held the initiative, were not blind to allied defensive preparations (contrary to most American based sources that claim otherwise) were rampaging everywhere and anywhere across the pacific, The Allies had to disperse their forces to react, they had to withhold significant forces as reserves, they had to expend vast reserves for capacity building. The only mobile reserves were the fast carriers, and whilst these carriers did have the ability to pack more fighters onto their decks, and act as aircraft ferries, that would be about the last thing you waould want in a disputed sea area like the midway approaches. The US command had to contingency plan, they had to assume that the Japanese might cotton on to what was happening and might react in ways not foreseen. The last thing you want is your casrrier decks to be caught cluttered and operating inefficiently because of some hair brained scheme as yet incomplete trying to send in your fighters suicidally to defend a pointless speck of dirt in the middle of the pacific. Midway as a piece of real estate was totally unimportant, it was the fight surrounding that real estate and the implications for its loss that made it significant.
20 fighters spread at remote fields here and there will accomplish little in the event of a large carrier strike. A large group of 95 or so would represent a formidable force.
Wrong. For the reasons ive previously pointed out to you
I think they would fit, as I said earlier, I would remove 4 B26's. 6 Avengers, 16 dauntless's and 11 Vindicators. That is 37 planes, some of them are quite large. The 10 folding wing F4F-4's could have their wings folded, at least 2 fighters could be parked for each B26
Look at the air garrisons stationed on the atoll at later stages. Numbers never came close to the numbers you are suggesting. It needs more research, that I would accept, but its just not sitting right at this minute.
No Wildcats or P36's were ever deployed to Australia so this has no bearing on them
Some Wildcates were deployed for reapirs that I know of. I would have to check properly, but I suspect that 1 or 2 p-36s wound up in Aus. Irrelevant however, as these aircraft at that time were needed to defend Pearl and more importantly act as strategic reserves.
21 fighters was a significant number in June 1942, not enough to win, but enough to make it difficult. Over rabaul, for example, the air defence component at that time was a mere 12 wiraway trainers. Over Port Moresby the numbers were about 16 p-40s, there were just 6 buffaloes defending Fremantle..
15 Yorktown fighters traded in, 10 replacements not used, and the 22 P36's which never did go anywhere else during the war.
The most vital part of the equation are these aircraft. They are part of the strategic reserves for the pacific Command and AAF, and at a guess I would say a vital component to the training elements of the US at that time. Even if they were being held as part of the depot reserves, their release would be very difficult to agree to as a good idea or optimal. You don't wear down your reserves unless you absolutely need to, and reinforcing midway to this extent was definitely not a case of 'absolutely need to".
Only Noumea would be shorted and 21 Wildcats wouldn't have helped much anyway as proved by both Midway and Wake.
No, and no. Robbing your vital strategic reserves is the issue, not robbing the front line commands. Denuding your reserves does a lot of bad things to your ability to flexibly react, and curtails your capacity building efforts.
The efforts of the far flung air garrisons, strung out like penny packets does appear futile, but in reality was the glue that held the pacific command together. They fulfilled a vital role in fact. Your thinking is failing to understand the situation being faced at this time. The Japanese held the initiative, were not blind to allied defensive preparations (contrary to most American based sources that claim otherwise) were rampaging everywhere and anywhere across the pacific, The Allies had to disperse their forces to react, they had to withhold significant forces as reserves, they had to expend vast reserves for capacity building. The only mobile reserves were the fast carriers, and whilst these carriers did have the ability to pack more fighters onto their decks, and act as aircraft ferries, that would be about the last thing you waould want in a disputed sea area like the midway approaches. The US command had to contingency plan, they had to assume that the Japanese might cotton on to what was happening and might react in ways not foreseen. The last thing you want is your casrrier decks to be caught cluttered and operating inefficiently because of some hair brained scheme as yet incomplete trying to send in your fighters suicidally to defend a pointless speck of dirt in the middle of the pacific. Midway as a piece of real estate was totally unimportant, it was the fight surrounding that real estate and the implications for its loss that made it significant.
20 fighters spread at remote fields here and there will accomplish little in the event of a large carrier strike. A large group of 95 or so would represent a formidable force.
Wrong. For the reasons ive previously pointed out to you
I think they would fit, as I said earlier, I would remove 4 B26's. 6 Avengers, 16 dauntless's and 11 Vindicators. That is 37 planes, some of them are quite large. The 10 folding wing F4F-4's could have their wings folded, at least 2 fighters could be parked for each B26
Look at the air garrisons stationed on the atoll at later stages. Numbers never came close to the numbers you are suggesting. It needs more research, that I would accept, but its just not sitting right at this minute.
No Wildcats or P36's were ever deployed to Australia so this has no bearing on them
Some Wildcates were deployed for reapirs that I know of. I would have to check properly, but I suspect that 1 or 2 p-36s wound up in Aus. Irrelevant however, as these aircraft at that time were needed to defend Pearl and more importantly act as strategic reserves.
buffnut453
Captain
Pinsog, you are grossly misrepresenting the objections. Nobody is saying more fighters is a bad idea. We're just not buying your oversimplication, and outright ignoring, of the challenges.
Fighter formations must be commanded. When you have multiple units involved, there must be communication between the units to ensure attacks are correctly coordinated. It's not WHO will command but HOW command will be executed in the air. For example, let's say that, en route to the intended intercept point, the P-36 squadron lags behind the others or, because of unfamiliarity with navigation over water, they drift off. How does the commander call them back if they're not on the same radio frequency (indeed, they may not be using the same radios)? Simply saying, "well they'd just stay within visual formation" isn't going to work...and how does one unit warn all other units of the location of the enemy once sighted? You MUST have air-to-air communication and you have steadfastly ignored this issue.
P-39s and F4Fs did NOT fly interceptions together at Guadalcanal. The relative performance differences of the 2 types were such that the P-400s and P-39s couldn't get to height fast enough and so seldom ever made an interception, hence they were re-roled for ground attack. If you want a formation to stick together, it must fly at the pace of the worst performing airframe...which takes us back to the C3 issue because, if the overall air commander isn't flying the slowest aircraft, how does he know he's not running away from half his formation?
The original 27 didn't engage as a single formation. They engaged as separate divisions and were defeated in detail. The problem is not finding the enemy or identifying him. The problem is getting all your fighters into the engagement at the same time. That is a MASSIVE problem. If they don't all go in together, they will be defeated piecemeal.
Per my previous post, it's not about the complexity of the aircraft. It's how many maintenance staff you need to replenish, repair and launch them. You can't just keep using the same groundcrew because your sortie generation rate will tank...and then you won't have a 3-to-1 numerical advantage because most of your aircraft will be stuck on the ground. Remember, Nagumo still has 50% of his aircraft not committed. Unless you can turn your fighters and get them back in the air, they are simply targets.
50-75 miles is VERY close for carriers. You run a real risk of their being detected...and Nagumo has the spare resources to attack them. Again, you're misrepresenting the objections. Nobody...I repeat NOBODY, anywhere had put 90+ fighters up into a single engagement. USAAF and USN fighters had NOT operated together. You can't just ignore these issues. I'll bet even the R/T vernacular was different between the services...even assuming they could communicate. Joint operations are HARD. Again, there are many of us who have done them and it's hard in an age where Joint is an understood term. That definitely was NOT the case in mid-1942.
Again, this isn't the issue. It's how your manage your tactics. A divisional formation behaves very differently from a battle pair...and you'd be throwing all this together into the same fight. It's a recipe for confusion and misidentification.
Flying P-36s off a carrier is easy. Doing that while conducting high-intensity operations against the biggest naval force ever seen in the Pacific is a totally different proposition. It's an incredibly risky proposition to essentially lose a flat top because it's being used as a ferry when you know you're going up against Kido Butai. It would fly against all combat doctrine that the Navy had to deliberately go into a major naval engagement knowing that you can't launch aircraft from one of your carriers. PH in Feb 41 is not the same as confronting the main IJN force off Midway. You'd want EVERY flat top available for the highest number of sorties.
Again, you're misrepresenting the argument. It's not that a CAP can't be flown over Midway, it's simply the expense of doing so. It takes a LOT of resources to maintain a CAP (typically three/four times the number of aircraft airborne). If you want CAPS, you have to resource them, turn the aircraft etc etc. All that will take away from your fighter force that can go out and intercept the incoming IJNAF attack. Also, the CAPs must be coordinated - more units/aircraft means more complexity and more risk of blue-on-blue.
Putting the best part of 100 fighers on Midway is a major change to the tactical situation. You cannot assume that the Japanese attack would continue as per history when there's such a dramatic change to the local ORBAT. Sorry but commanders don't just blindly charge in regardless of the threat.
It's not the pilots. It's the loss of operational capability because you're giving up a flight deck. I don't see any sensible commander agreeing to this when he knows he's going up against the most formidable naval air force in the world.
- Thread starter
- #72
Why would fighter reinforcements be detected but the dive bombers, B26's, Avengers and extra B17's flown in were not?
As I have said, I would fly the Vindicators and Dauntless's out and not deploy the B26's and Avengers that were flown in near the end just to make room for the fighters. Without a pic of the runways with Vindicators, Dauntlesses, B26's and Avengers all parked it would be difficult to say just how exactly the fighters could or would be parked. The 10 folding wing F4F-4's could fold their wings, more than 1 fighter per B26.
Food, accommodation? I just got rid of more people with the bombers I disposed of than fighter pilots I'm bringing in. Bringing in 68 single place fighters to replace, 27 2 place bombers, 6 3 place bombers and 4 B26's (not sure on crew number, 6?)
Fuel, ammo, oxygen. Fuel for 27 2 place bombers, 6 Avengers and 4 B26's should spread out ok for the fighters for at least a mission or 2. Wildcats could go back to carriers in a dire emergency. All planes bring in full load of ammo and O2 and as much fuel as possible for 1st mission. (it is why I would drop them say 50 to 75 miles out)
We knew, or thought we knew, and we were right, about what day the attack was coming and even guessed about what time the attack would start. So there was no need to fly all these fighters all day every day up until the day of the 1st attack. Recon missions have to go on and they did.
The 27 fighter pilots on Midway took off and flew directly to the 1st wave. So would 30 be different? 50? 70? 90? Not sure why the 'control' needed to be different just because there were more fighters? Who would control however many fighters were crammed on the island? I assume the same guy that controlled the 27
As I have said, I would fly the Vindicators and Dauntless's out and not deploy the B26's and Avengers that were flown in near the end just to make room for the fighters. Without a pic of the runways with Vindicators, Dauntlesses, B26's and Avengers all parked it would be difficult to say just how exactly the fighters could or would be parked. The 10 folding wing F4F-4's could fold their wings, more than 1 fighter per B26.
Food, accommodation? I just got rid of more people with the bombers I disposed of than fighter pilots I'm bringing in. Bringing in 68 single place fighters to replace, 27 2 place bombers, 6 3 place bombers and 4 B26's (not sure on crew number, 6?)
Fuel, ammo, oxygen. Fuel for 27 2 place bombers, 6 Avengers and 4 B26's should spread out ok for the fighters for at least a mission or 2. Wildcats could go back to carriers in a dire emergency. All planes bring in full load of ammo and O2 and as much fuel as possible for 1st mission. (it is why I would drop them say 50 to 75 miles out)
We knew, or thought we knew, and we were right, about what day the attack was coming and even guessed about what time the attack would start. So there was no need to fly all these fighters all day every day up until the day of the 1st attack. Recon missions have to go on and they did.
The 27 fighter pilots on Midway took off and flew directly to the 1st wave. So would 30 be different? 50? 70? 90? Not sure why the 'control' needed to be different just because there were more fighters? Who would control however many fighters were crammed on the island? I assume the same guy that controlled the 27
buffnut453
Captain
I can't go on with this. You clearly have never served in an air combat environment and refuse to listen to those who have. When you're expecting combat. you don't just sit on your backside and wait for the appointed time...if you do that, you'll find you get surprised. Just because the guesstimate proved to be correct doesn't mean the commander could relax and ignore the threat until the appointed time. Your using massive hindsight with that assessment. I'm tired of repeating myself because, clearly, you have no understanding of the problems of controlling a formation of aircraft, The RAF with a full ground control capability never went above 60 aircraft in a single formation, and they were all the same service...and it was after months of practice to make it work Throwing 90 aircraft together without prior training will NOT work. Period.
- Thread starter
- #74
Again, we suspected knew the day of the attack and we were right. This plan probably wouldn't work if we weren't for certain that Midway was the target.
1. Control. Again, a radar operator guides them to the 1st attack. Correct on the 27 attacking piecemeal. I would say climb rate had an effect on that. Radar operator gives constant updates. Heck, if your worried about that tell everyone to get to 20,000 directly over the island. When they visually spot the attack they go in. Simple, not the best but simple.
2. P39's and F4F did fly interception together, F4F's went up top, P39's well they got as high as they could. Sometimes they stayed low and picked off stragglers. I never meant they flew wing to wing, but they took off in together in groups and attacked as best they could, many times one peeling a Zero off the other
3. A large formation or maybe 2 smaller formations would be best for attack, but maybe they don't all need to get there at the same time. If a reasonable number of fighters, say all P36's and hopefully a few Wildcats to even up the odds, could dive into the Zero formation and break it up, then other fighters could carve up the bombers as they arrived on scene. F4F's that are left would be especially good at it, followed by Buffalos.
4. True that Nagumo has 50% of his force on his ships. The US has 100% of its force waiting on its carriers, untouched by battle as the Midway pilots whittle down the enemy. As far as fuel, oil and ammo, the pilots and Marine grunts on Guadalcanal pitched in and helped get them back in the air. The B17 and Catalina guys can help to since all their planes are gone. Battle damage is obviously a more specialized problem. Badly damaged will probably be pushed out into the sand and not play any more part in the battle. I imagine many planes would climb into a second strike, if there was one, with unprepared damage much as the Wildcats that fought over Yorktown did in the historical battle of Midway
5. I doubt that they would work together like a well oiled machine, but once contact is made the best laid plan would probably go out the window anyway. Maybe a bar room brawl at 15,000 is all we could hope for. Zeros fought individually and didn't even have radios so if one decent sized group of Wildcats made a firing pass through the middle of them, then they would be unlikely to ever regroup to protect the bombers. If a decent sized group of fighters got into the unprotected bombers it would be a slaughter
6. Tactics. I would dived group in 2. P36 and some wildcats go after Zeros, everyone else after bombers. Buffaloes should concentrate on bombers. Wildcats fighting Zeros do hit and runs, its the only way they can fight. P36's with 2 machine guns should probably just drop into the Zeros and tail chase dogfight after the Wildcats make a firing pass and break it up. P36 was very close to Zero in turn and climb, depending on altitude, and could always out roll it. They would have a couple of days to discuss it among themselves. hard to say what they would work out.
7. Flying P36's of a carrier 1 or 2 days before the attack is easier than hauling 16 B25's to Japan or 48 Spitfires to Malta, twice. There was no one in that part of the ocean. Escorting carrier still runs CAP because they don't know this at the time. Again, i was told P36's can't fly off a carrier earlier in thread
8. I suggested half the fighters should be at altitude for CAP the morning of the attack that we knew was coming that morning. I was told they might run out of gas. Well who ever was running Midway guessed nearly perfect on when they would get there.
9 and 10. According to Shattered Sword the Japanese actually did charge in blind, its part of why they lost. We are trading nearly 40 bombers for 68 fighters, half the time trained pilots can't tell the difference, how would the Japanese? When did they do recon of Midway? How could they tell what a unit was unless they take pictures from relatively close? Why should what the Japanese did historically change at all? Nothing is changing except I am loading fighters onto an empty carrier deck. Enterprise or Hornet carries them, other one provides air cover. Back them up 100 miles from Midway. Look at the Japanese search grid. Both sides of Midway, even with it, nothing past it. No subs, they were late in getting in position.
11. Were to put the pilots was actually a problem, look back in the thread.
1. Control. Again, a radar operator guides them to the 1st attack. Correct on the 27 attacking piecemeal. I would say climb rate had an effect on that. Radar operator gives constant updates. Heck, if your worried about that tell everyone to get to 20,000 directly over the island. When they visually spot the attack they go in. Simple, not the best but simple.
2. P39's and F4F did fly interception together, F4F's went up top, P39's well they got as high as they could. Sometimes they stayed low and picked off stragglers. I never meant they flew wing to wing, but they took off in together in groups and attacked as best they could, many times one peeling a Zero off the other
3. A large formation or maybe 2 smaller formations would be best for attack, but maybe they don't all need to get there at the same time. If a reasonable number of fighters, say all P36's and hopefully a few Wildcats to even up the odds, could dive into the Zero formation and break it up, then other fighters could carve up the bombers as they arrived on scene. F4F's that are left would be especially good at it, followed by Buffalos.
4. True that Nagumo has 50% of his force on his ships. The US has 100% of its force waiting on its carriers, untouched by battle as the Midway pilots whittle down the enemy. As far as fuel, oil and ammo, the pilots and Marine grunts on Guadalcanal pitched in and helped get them back in the air. The B17 and Catalina guys can help to since all their planes are gone. Battle damage is obviously a more specialized problem. Badly damaged will probably be pushed out into the sand and not play any more part in the battle. I imagine many planes would climb into a second strike, if there was one, with unprepared damage much as the Wildcats that fought over Yorktown did in the historical battle of Midway
5. I doubt that they would work together like a well oiled machine, but once contact is made the best laid plan would probably go out the window anyway. Maybe a bar room brawl at 15,000 is all we could hope for. Zeros fought individually and didn't even have radios so if one decent sized group of Wildcats made a firing pass through the middle of them, then they would be unlikely to ever regroup to protect the bombers. If a decent sized group of fighters got into the unprotected bombers it would be a slaughter
6. Tactics. I would dived group in 2. P36 and some wildcats go after Zeros, everyone else after bombers. Buffaloes should concentrate on bombers. Wildcats fighting Zeros do hit and runs, its the only way they can fight. P36's with 2 machine guns should probably just drop into the Zeros and tail chase dogfight after the Wildcats make a firing pass and break it up. P36 was very close to Zero in turn and climb, depending on altitude, and could always out roll it. They would have a couple of days to discuss it among themselves. hard to say what they would work out.
7. Flying P36's of a carrier 1 or 2 days before the attack is easier than hauling 16 B25's to Japan or 48 Spitfires to Malta, twice. There was no one in that part of the ocean. Escorting carrier still runs CAP because they don't know this at the time. Again, i was told P36's can't fly off a carrier earlier in thread
8. I suggested half the fighters should be at altitude for CAP the morning of the attack that we knew was coming that morning. I was told they might run out of gas. Well who ever was running Midway guessed nearly perfect on when they would get there.
9 and 10. According to Shattered Sword the Japanese actually did charge in blind, its part of why they lost. We are trading nearly 40 bombers for 68 fighters, half the time trained pilots can't tell the difference, how would the Japanese? When did they do recon of Midway? How could they tell what a unit was unless they take pictures from relatively close? Why should what the Japanese did historically change at all? Nothing is changing except I am loading fighters onto an empty carrier deck. Enterprise or Hornet carries them, other one provides air cover. Back them up 100 miles from Midway. Look at the Japanese search grid. Both sides of Midway, even with it, nothing past it. No subs, they were late in getting in position.
11. Were to put the pilots was actually a problem, look back in the thread.
- Thread starter
- #75
They weren't just sitting on their backside. They had B17's and Catalina's patrolling out every day. Are you saying that because we had 95 fighters sitting on the runway that we need to fly all of them every day? Why not keep all of them fueled and armed and send up CAP patrols with a few of them. I never suggested all the fighter pilots sleep up until the moment of the attack. Engines need started and warmed every day, but again, we thought we knew when the attack was and we nailed it. AND the Japanese got complacent about winning so they didn't follow through with their recon like they should, their subs got into position late and they're carriers were not at full strength on pilots and planes
- Thread starter
- #76
You are correct that I have "never served in an air combat environment". I assume you are retired US air force. (Thank you, I respect that) But lets be honest, unless you are close to 90 years old I'm going to guess that you have never been in an "air combat environment" either IF we are talking about repulsing an actual enemy air attack. When was the last time US forces were attacked from the air? Early Korea?
You have some valid points. It is never as easy as it seems on paper. But some of the points made by you and others don't hold water either. Where do we put extra pilots on the carrier? Food, fuel, oxygen, sleeping quarters, all were needed by the bombers that I would have either evacuated or never sent at all. A P36 can't take off from a carrier? Cant fly CAP because they might be caught when they run out of fuel? Cant run an intercept with multiple type of planes?
None of those arguments make sense.
Many of the jobs you talk about getting done on these fighters were done by pilots and Marine grunts at Guadalcanal. Repair is one thing, but The First Team talks about Marines gladly helping rearm and refuel aircraft. Mechanics would be left to do skilled jobs such as repairing battle damage.
Why does it have to be all 90 in one formation? How about 3 30 plane formations? If a group can plunge into the Zeros and keep them occupied, then the rest of the defending fighters can pick off the bombers as they arrive on scene. How about 1 30 plane formation and the rest attack the bombers completely piecemeal? Does that scenario make sense?
I'm not using massive hindsight, notice I didn't leave the worthless carrier torpedo bombers at home. I looked at Coral Sea and the Pearl Harbor attack and said, what if we had a large number of fighters waiting to jump them? Thin out the carrier planes as much as possible before our carriers ever get involved and it will be safer and easier for our carriers to do their job.
How are you giving up a flight deck if you fly the fighters to the island 2 days before the attack when your in completely safe waters 100, 200, 300, 400 miles south of Midway? The very operation that your telling me now was dumb and they would never do is PRECISELY what the USS WASP was doing and why she missed the battle. She went into the Mediterranean twice in a row to deliver Spitfires. The germans even knew she was there because they timed the arrival and destroyed the first group as it arrived.
How would the Japanese know we beefed up the fighters on Midway? They weren't flying recon, Shattered Sword covered that, again, it is one of the reasons they lost.
Would you like to explain the last 2 paragraphs of questions I have?
- Thread starter
- #78
Aren't you the one that claimed aP36 couldn't take off from a carrier?
The P-36s had been delivered to Hawaii in February 1941 by being loaded on the carrier the USS Enterprise in California, then in a first for the USAAC, flown off the carrier's deck by the P-36's U.S. Army Air Corps pilots when the Enterprise neared the coast of Hawaii. This saved considerable time over the traditional shipping method of having the fighters first disassembled, crated and then loaded by crane in the hold of a freighter, then unloaded and reassembled in Hawaii.[19]
Aren't you the guy that said:
1. If I was a carrier skipper, there's no way you're going to get me to sail my ship into harm's way with a deck stacked full of stiff-wing land-lubber airplanes! No way in hell! Sure, P-36s had been delivered from carrier decks, but that was a delivery in a low-threat zone, not a combat launch, and with only a few planes on deck at a time, as they needed most of the deck for takeoff. Army pilots need considerable special training before being launched off a carrier, and the preparations for Midway were something of a mad scramble, IIRC.
I replied:
XBe02Drvr: If you were skipper of the USS Wasp you would have delivered a load of fixed wing Spitfires to Malta, in a combat situation, as you were ordered to do.
If you were skipper of the USS Wasp, after all the Spitfires you just delivered were destroyed as they arrived/landed, you would have delivered a second load of Spitfires to Malta, in a combat situation, as you were ordered to do.
(Spitfire pilots had 0 carrier training. All of them took off just fine and 1 even landed back aboard the Wasp without a tail hook because his drop tank wouldn't feed)
If you were skipper of the Hornet, you would have delivered 16 B25's off the coast of Japan, in a combat situation, as you were ordered to do
You didn't respond to either of those points.
The Akutan Zero didn't do much except confirm everything that US Navy pilots had been saying.
You also said this:
So you've got 15 pilots who've seen the Zero and are telling these fantastic stories of what it can do. Given the timeframe available I can't see them refashioning the training of the large mass of fighter pilots who've been taught to fight the turning dogfight. I find the 1 to 1 F4F vs Zero in the first six months hard to believe
. As for P-36s, their record against IJA Ki43s
should not b taken as predictive against Zeros. The A6M was a far more formidable machine and IJN pilots better trained. In the Netherlands Indies Kido Butai Zeros slaughtered Dutch P-36s.
Cheers,
Wes
KI43 was superior to Zero in turn and high speed handling and I think climb also. The zero was faster and had cannon. You may find the 1 to 1 kill ratio b between a Zero and F4F have to believe, but what you believe is irrelevant. That was the ratio. You need to read the First Team volumes 1 and 2 then get back to me.
Pilots returning fro Coral Sea weren't terrified of the Zero. In fact, please refer to page 300 of The First Team Pearl Harbor to Midway "The VF-2 and VF42 pilots respected the enemy fighter, particularly its tremendous maneuverability, but the Mitsubishis did not intimidate them. On the basis of their first combat experiences, the pilots felt their Grumman F4F-3 Wildcats were equal to the Zeros in speed and climbing ability and superior in firepower and protection, being inferior only in maneuverability"
Sounds like you need to do a bit more reading. Let me know your thoughts on what you already got wrong above
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- Thread starter
- #80
Parsifal:
thats well laid out plan of what the Japanese intended to do. I understand everything your saying but, none of these aircraft were ever used for the defense of Australia. I might be wrong, but I don't think Wildcats were ever deployed to Australia. Let me know if you can find a reference. To my knowledge, P39 and P40's were what was used to defend Australia early on, the lack of altitude capability really hampering their effectiveness until Spitfires and Lightnings finally showed up.
The training aspect of the fighters I would plan to steal is a very valid point your brought up, the P36's before Pearl Harbor were used for gunnery training and in fact had only 1 30 caliber machine gun mounted when the attack happened. So any victories scored by the P36 was done with only a single 30.
thats well laid out plan of what the Japanese intended to do. I understand everything your saying but, none of these aircraft were ever used for the defense of Australia. I might be wrong, but I don't think Wildcats were ever deployed to Australia. Let me know if you can find a reference. To my knowledge, P39 and P40's were what was used to defend Australia early on, the lack of altitude capability really hampering their effectiveness until Spitfires and Lightnings finally showed up.
The training aspect of the fighters I would plan to steal is a very valid point your brought up, the P36's before Pearl Harbor were used for gunnery training and in fact had only 1 30 caliber machine gun mounted when the attack happened. So any victories scored by the P36 was done with only a single 30.
