Best pilots

[drgondog]

The deck of a carrier does add to the excitement however the North Sea is a lot less hospitable then the balmy Pacific if one has to ditch

The ETO (RAF/US/LW) had probably far more losses due to weather as the USN including carrier accidents but there were a lot more sorties in ETO.

I don't think the USN had very many missions when they took off, formed up, performed the R/V escorted to target and back and never once saw the ground until they were 200 feet off the deck on final approach!

One hell of a lot of missions were flown in snowstorms, fog, rain, cloud cover, icing, T-storms (not as bad as PTO) and just generally nasty, foul, weather.

England has two seasons - winter and 4th of July

 

[renrich]

No question Bill that the ETO had worse weather than the PTO(unless you are talking about the North Pacific) but most of the time if a pilot let down he would have land below him, not water and the carrier pilot was looking for a moving airfield. Having said that, weather in Europe had to be a major factor in AC losses.

 

[drgondog]

No question Bill that the ETO had worse weather than the PTO(unless you are talking about the North Pacific) but most of the time if a pilot let down he would have land below him, not water and the carrier pilot was looking for a moving airfield. Having said that, weather in Europe had to be a major factor in AC losses.

Good point on North Pacific.. however now that you mention that who was doing most of the flying in the Aleutians..

I am nowhere going to say that a anything is consistently worse than a night carrier landing in bad weather. Hat's off to the Gold Wings.

 

[Glider]

Glider, Actually, the question was which of the US services had the most competent pilots but if everyone wants to debate all countrie's pilots it is fine with me.

Whoops

 

[machine shop tom]

Robert S. Johnson trained for and was prepared to be piloting an A-20. He was totally surprised to be assigned to flying a fighter. Good thing as it turned out.

tom

 

[renrich]

AAF did most flying, I believe in North Pacific. I don't remember any carriers being deployed there(unless you count Doolittle raid) Navy would be primarily patrol plane and some medium bombers(Venturas)

 

[Crumpp]

Woods references include the OKL award number and in many cases a film reference. However, I have done a lot of cross checking and the awards are in many case twice (or more) the actual losses experienced by the 8th AF.

Hi Bill!


The OKL did not confirm any victories after November 1944 and there is no guarantee those before that date are confirmed.

It frequently took more than a year to confirm a victory under the OKL system and the Master List of Confirmed victories was destroyed or hidden after the war.

As such there is not "official" list of what was confirmed and what was not.

I haven't read the thread, but Caldwell does a great job, IMHO, of putting claims to losses in his books on JG26.

Do you know the status report criteria for the USAAF, btw?

All the best,

Crumpp

 

[drgondog]

Hi Bill!


The OKL did not confirm any victories after November 1944 and there is no guarantee those before that date are confirmed.

It frequently took more than a year to confirm a victory under the OKL system and the Master List of Confirmed victories was destroyed or hidden after the war.

As such there is not "official" list of what was confirmed and what was not.

That has been my understanding

I haven't read the thread, but Caldwell does a great job, IMHO, of putting claims to losses in his books on JG26.

I agree. He has helped me also in putting some JG26 losses to 355th as my research helped him do the same. I sent him my Encounter log som time ago as well as my updatd Lost/Cause lists- many of which will spculate on pilot (LW) that might have been the cause. I've got some updates to make - as soon as I complete them I will send to you.

Do you know the status report criteria for the USAAF, btw?

All the best,

Crumpp

G- I'm not sure what you mean by 'status report criteria' but I'll take a stab at 8th and 9th VCB review for you.

1. The claimant wrote an Encounter Report describing the claim.
2. A witness required to attest to the circumstances or the combat film is last hope of confirmation.
3. The Encounter Report went to Victory Credits Board. What you see on Mike Williams website for example are samples that went through the VCB and often have notes re: the credit.
4. Once through the VCB process, the pilot (often several) are notified via an 'Official' 8th airforce Credit citation containing pilot, location, type of aircraft in credit and date.

All those rolled up to 8th AF VCB compiled in toto pst war. There were many errors, duplicates and double scores.

USAF 85 reviewed all of them, re-matched to Encounter Reports and stripped the duplicates plus removed some questionable awards and either disallowed or reduced a confirm to a probable or a probable to a Damaged. I found several on my own.

The truly difficult one to assess was the famous "I saw him in a spin pouring smoke and claim Destroyed" when we now know that many Fw 190 pilots in trouble would put their Fw 190 into a spin... so we can be reasonably certain that a signigicant number of the destroyed and Probable claims for this manuever were probably Damaged.

For my own research I used both USAF 85 and Frank Olynyk's works as my final determinant for air scores - thereby reducing the 355th FG 'final WWII air to air tally' after some double records for Henry Brown and Cullerton were stripped out.

I DID use 8th AF VCB for ground scores as there is no other source available (after stripping duplicates) and cross referencing with 355th Histories to double check 'type'

Is that what you wanted?

Regards,

Bill

 

[Crumpp]

Thanks Bill!

Maybe this will make it help to clear up my confusing question.

The status report criterion is the guidelines for placing an aircraft on a column on a status reported to higher.

For example, the Luftwaffe reported all aircraft with any damage whatsoever as damaged on their daily reports.

Even if a pilot scrubbed a tire and it needed to be changed, it went down as damaged. The majority of these "damaged" aircraft would have their minor repairs completed in time for the next day's mission.

This caused confusion in ultra intercepts for example, when the Allies would intercept the status reporting 85% of the SE day fighter forces was in repair. These intercepts combined with pilot claims, caused the RAF to declare Dieppe a huge victory for their "air superiority umbrella" theory. We now know it was not a good day for the RAF.

It also as you point out earlier, causes confusion when matching claims.

My question is about the 8th USAAF accounting procedures and how they affect claims matching in your experience?

I have had some fairly good success in lining up air battles myself. This research is problematic at best however.

It also highlights the importance of good controllers setting up their units for success too. It has been my experience that whoever had positional advantage comes out on top. If the engagement is neutral, then generally there are very few casualties combined with an even spread.

All the best,

Crumpp

 

[drgondog]

Thanks Bill!

Maybe this will make it help to clear up my confusing question.

The status report criterion is the guidelines for placing an aircraft on a column on a status reported to higher.

Makes sense now. The Operations Board at the Group level for each Fighter/Bomber Group was kept at Group level in context of 'Available' and reported at end of day to 8th HQ plus 'Tentative' based on a/c coming out of repair. The latter was important when a Maximum Effort was being planned.

I do not know if any daily status of 'damaged/repairable' was posted on daily basis but all Class E were reported.

For example, the Luftwaffe reported all aircraft with any damage whatsoever as damaged on their daily reports.

Even if a pilot scrubbed a tire and it needed to be changed, it went down as damaged. The majority of these "damaged" aircraft would have their minor repairs completed in time for the next day's mission.

This caused confusion in ultra intercepts for example, when the Allies would intercept the status reporting 85% of the SE day fighter forces was in repair. These intercepts combined with pilot claims, caused the RAF to declare Dieppe a huge victory for their "air superiority umbrella" theory. We now know it was not a good day for the RAF.

It also as you point out earlier, causes confusion when matching claims.

My question is about the 8th USAAF accounting procedures and how they affect claims matching in your experience?

I have had some fairly good success in lining up air battles myself. This research is problematic at best however.

It also highlights the importance of good controllers setting up their units for success too. It has been my experience that whoever had positional advantage comes out on top. If the engagement is neutral, then generally there are very few casualties combined with an even spread.

All the best,

Crumpp

Roger on the matching - When I update my Encounter Log I will send it

 

[drgondog]

Thanks Bill!


I have had some fairly good success in lining up air battles myself. This research is problematic at best however.

Gene - I have two examples for you to ponder.

First - here is a little narrative of a pretty big air battle in the NE Augsburg to E and SE of Munich and back over Oberphaffenhofen in which Caldwell/Muller reference Prien's documented losses as "39 KIA/12 WIA and Sixty fighters.

The Battle Over Munich – April 24, 1944

Three 109s and two pilots of that number fell to the bombers according to Prien. The remaining 57 fighters lost to fighters agree very well with 8th FC' total of 60-5-21 - fourteen of which occured probably and primarily with JG11 and possibly JG1 near Worms/Mannheim during Penetration. The 355th and 357th did the heavy lifting around Munich.

Erich did a great job researching Prien and other to name names and picked up 20+ Me 109 losses in that area.

Here is the huge question.

The 355th were awarded 18 Me 109s and two Fw 190s while the 357th got 13 Me 109s and 9 Me 110's and one Ju -88. Total 43 German fighters.

An Me 410 MIGHT be mistaken for a Ju 88 but nobody misses the twin tail t/e Me 110 very often. Neither Erich or Leo Etgen or Muller or Caldwell can find a reference to any Me 110 losses that day?

On the other hand the LW claimed/Awarded (in Woods lists) claimed 11 Mustangs shot down by 109s and 1 by ZG26 in Munich area. These claims fit closely with actual times starting around Augsburg when 355th first engaged at 1315, to last one near Oberphaffenhofen at 1420.

What really happened is the 355th lost 3 to Me 109s and the 357th lost 1 to 109s. The 357th also lost two to mid air collisions with the Me 110 debris they had destroyed. Total four to Me 109s and two to MAC

A second mystery(of many) for available LW records is regarding July 28, 1944.
The 355th had two air to air clashes on an escort mission to Merseburg. One in which McElroy shot down Ltn Ernst Hirschfeld of JG300 in a 190 then got a 109 south of the target near Erfurt.

Dad took a flight down to chase a six Me 109 formation that dove through the B-17s they were escorting. One of the 109s was seen to blow up, shot down by the bombers, and dad caught the leader near the deck, where he went in out of control under a thin cloud cover near Mulhausen. Gun camera film was taken of wreckage before heading home.

The first two (above) including Hirschfeld's demise can be found in LW records, but neither of the 109s near Mulhausen can be retrieved so far by Leo Etgen or Goyat or several others.

I did find an obscure reference to two JG3 Me 109s from 7./JG3 but no time or location was associated with these 'lost in aircombat' record and this unit was supposed to be in France some hundred plus miles away.

The last of the true mysteries for me is the tangle that 12 Mustangs of 354FS had west and SW of Dummer lake and in Munster area on 14 January. They were awarded 6 Fw 190s (including four 190D-9's) out of 13 in the second engagement plus 5 Me 109s out of 12 in the first engagement.

It is probable that the tangle down near Coblenz was between 78th FG and JG26 (with similar results of 13 destroyed for no losses) in which Vogt was KIA in his Dora 9.

Do your sources point to anything useful?

Regards,

Bill

 

[Crumpp]

I will see what I can dig up, Bill.

 

[renrich]

Back to the subject of best pilots in US armed forces in WW2, Korea and Viet Nam. This story is from memory from (I think) the foreword of the book "Feet Wet." the author was a fellow named Gilchrist? who was a retired Navy pilot. This happened in the late sixties, early seventies when the author was the CAG on a carrier in the Med. They were conducting a "blue water" practise mission and when the AC were scheduled to return, it was night, there was a storm with high winds and rain. The author was(Ithink) first back aboard in an F4 and went below to watch the rest of the strike come aboard on closed circuit TV. There was a Soviet spy ship close aboard. The author watched as the rest of the F4s, A6s and A7s all got aboard without a single wave off, bolter or problem. A very difficult evolution. With great relief the CAG went up to the bridge expecting a possible attaboy form the CO of the boat. Suddenly the OD came up with a message in plain English from the Soviet ship. The message read," From Soviet ship to American carrier, your pilots fly good." I got a thrill out of that. I lent that book to my brother and it disappeared. Wish I could find a copy.

 

[renrich]

Was reading on Mike Williams' site a USAAF report on the P47 and it stated that the view over the nose was not suitable for deflection shooting. This post refers back to an earlier discussion about the USN emphasis on the art of deflection shooting.

 

[Nikademus]

Since there are many people on this forum with experience, how would you grade the fighter pilots of the USN, US Marines, AAF and later the US Air Force as far as their capabilities during WW2, Korea and Viet Nam."

The USN, being a far smaller group pre-war tended to have the best overall training compared to the USMC or AAF. This was in large part due to the emphasis on aerial gunnery by the squadron leaders like Thatch and Flatley after the pilots had completed basic training and had been posted to a VF. I have an ex-navy friend who had a copy of a 1942 USN training manual and according to it, gunnery was not much if any more emphasised than in the USAAC/USAAF or USMC. (it was officially made so later in the war after campaigning by people like Thatch) One can actually find support in this in the pages of Lundstrom's vol I on the First Team. (the veterans also didn't think too highly of Hornet's green VF at the time of Midway either which lends further support)

The AAF was on the opposite spectrum, being much larger and after the war started it was assembly line time. Still, I have read comments in books like Chris Shores' "Fighters over the Desert" from UK pilots that felt that basic US training was better than theirs though still green until actual combat worked out the kinks.

 

[SoD Stitch]

The USN, being a far smaller group pre-war tended to have the best overall training compared to the USMC or AAF. This was in large part due to the emphasis on aerial gunnery by the squadron leaders like Thatch and Flatley after the pilots had completed basic training and had been posted to a VF. I have an ex-navy friend who had a copy of a 1942 USN training manual and according to it, gunnery was not much if any more emphasised than in the USAAC/USAAF or USMC. (it was officially made so later in the war after campaigning by people like Thatch) One can actually find support in this in the pages of Lundstrom's vol I on the First Team. (the veterans also didn't think too highly of Hornet's green VF at the time of Midway either which lends further support).

I'm guessing this has something to do with "quality over quantity" in the USN vs. the USAAF; the Navy only had so many a/c and so many carriers, whereas the US military-industrial complex was cranking out thousands of land-based a/c for the USAAF. It would make sense that, if you could only have 50 pilots on an aircraft carrier at any given time (I'm guessing on the number), that you would want the 50 best pilots you could get. Whereas the USAAF had no such restrictions; you could always park another 10 or 20 a/c on any given airfield, and station another 10 or 20 pilots there to fly them.

 

[renrich]

Apparently though, according to Lundstrom, the prewar training of USN pilots was very thorough including much gunnery. Having said that, it was not as thorough as that of the IJN pre WW2. The emphasis according to Lundstrom on deflection shooting which paid huge dividends in 1942 and 43 and his statement about European and USAAF fighter design not being conducive to deflection shooting makes me wonder if the Corsair's and to a lesser extent the Hellcat's view over the nose was conducive to good deflection shooting. Perhaps improved gun sights made up for the poor view over the engine cowling.

 

[Nikademus]

Apparently though, according to Lundstrom, the prewar training of USN pilots was very thorough including much gunnery. Having said that, it was not as thorough as that of the IJN pre WW2. The emphasis according to Lundstrom on deflection shooting which paid huge dividends in 1942 and 43 and his statement about European and USAAF fighter design not being conducive to deflection shooting makes me wonder if the Corsair's and to a lesser extent the Hellcat's view over the nose was conducive to good deflection shooting. Perhaps improved gun sights made up for the poor view over the engine cowling.

Yes, he does. However I suspect that Lundstrom may have confused the good deflection shooting with initial base USN training vs. where it may really have rested, that is with the established Squadron leaders like Thach and his disciple Flatley. They'd take the graduated recruits and put em through their own program of IBP's (Indiv battle practices) and mock dogfight them to increase their gunnery.

After being informed about the early USN training manual and it's revelation that gunnery was not particularily emphasised vs. other orgs, I went back through Lundstrom's appendex on USN training and found some indicators of support apart from the comments about Thach's initiation of new fighter pilots in the beginning of his vol 1. on the First Team.

This from Appendix 1:

The original ACTG syllabus called for 75 flying hours in such areas as tactics, navigation, gunnery and bombing, field carrier land practice, the actual carrier qualifcation, night flying and instruments. Organization of the groups proceeded very slowly as qualified instructors and modern aircraft were in short supply. For example, the fighter pilots did not see any Brewster F2A Buffalos until late 1941. By that time they had racked up from 70 to 150 flight hours in ACTF's, the long wait before the war broke out due to the few vacencies in the combat squadrons. Because of a lack of suitible aircraft, instructors, and flight decks, time spent in ACTG was not necessarily very useful.

Here's the real interesting part:

Because of these deficiencies, the squadrons still bore most of the burden of operational training. Once in his duty squadron, the rookie had to measure up swiftly to the standards set by his commanding officer. This meant hard work refinning gunnery skills and learning practical (as opposed to textbook) tactics. Their greatest failing, according to Lt Cdr. John S. Thach of Fighting Three, was that the ACTG graduates usually had very little fixed gunnery training.

Problem was of course further exaserbated by the war's outbreak which required assembly line pilot training much the same as with other larger organizations reducing total flight hours before graduation. This would seem to link my associates comments lifted from the training manual he had with information documented from Lundstrom. Advanced/proficient gunnery was largely the result of indiv squadron commanders pre-war and during the war....their methods were eventually better incorporated into late war USN training.

Still the overall result would be a green pilot but a well trained one. On a related subject I think this is one of the great hidden facets of the F6F which goes unappreciated by people transfixed by the paper stats of the far more tempormental F4U. The Hellcat was an easy, forgiving plane to fly plus it was Ironworks tough, allowing green pilots to make mistakes and live to learn from them as well as providing a plane docile and forgiving allowing them to do their jobs better. I've read some posters on different websites try to paint the Hellcat as a 2nd class aircraft in order to paint the Japanese in even worse light vs. 2nd generation aircraft and pilots...but I never agreed with it. The Hellcat was one of the most perfect planes for a war of attrition and mass deployment.

 

[mkloby]

The USN, being a far smaller group pre-war tended to have the best overall training compared to the USMC or AAF. This was in large part due to the emphasis on aerial gunnery by the squadron leaders like Thatch and Flatley after the pilots had completed basic training and had been posted to a VF.

Just a couple of questions and comments - if you are discussing aviation training, USMC pilots have always trained with the USN, even back to the first Marine aviator (naval aviator No. 5), 1stLt Alfred A. Cunningham to naval aviator no. 29213 1stLt Matthew F. Kloby. Did USMC and USN pilots go through a different syllabus?

In regards to USN aviation being a smaller pre-war group, I can't imagine that to be true. I'm having trouble finding exact numbers of USN aviation strength. However, in 1936 the USMC had only 145 aviators active. By mid 1940 there were 245, and the end of 1940 saw 425.

Due to the passage of the Naval Cadet Act in 1935, by 1938 614 newly commissioned butterbars were on active duty as naval aviators. The vast majority of these were comissioned in the USN, not the USMC.

Also to note - the majority of training is ALWAYS done in the fleet, not in flight school. Flight school provides the basics of aviation which are built upon in the operational forces.

 

[Nikademus]

Just a couple of questions and comments - if you are discussing aviation training, USMC pilots have always trained with the USN, even back to the first Marine aviator (naval aviator No. 5), 1stLt Alfred A. Cunningham to naval aviator no. 29213 1stLt Matthew F. Kloby. Did USMC and USN pilots go through a different syllabus?

I believe the Marine pilots had a similar basic syllabus but didn't always include carrier qualifications. I recall a comment from Joe Foss that he and the men he trained with were given little more than 'basic' and then thrown into the frey. (fortunately Foss was natural talent). A similar story is given in regards to the VMSB and VMF's that fought at Midway.

In regards to USN aviation being a smaller pre-war group, I can't imagine that to be true. I'm having trouble finding exact numbers of USN aviation strength. However, in 1936 the USMC had only 145 aviators active. By mid 1940 there were 245, and the end of 1940 saw 425.

My comment referred primarily to the limited number of VF squadrons active in the Fleet. With such smaller numbers, the Squadron commanders were at greater liberty to train up their broods of fighter pilots to higher standards such as the deflection gunnery emphasised in Lundstroms book as opposed to say the mass expansion of the RAF prewar in turning out large numbers of fighter pilots.

as far as total numbers of pilots are concerned; I have some info.....in 1934 Congress authorized an expansion over a five year period for 2,000 more naval aircraft which required an expansion of the existing pilot pool. The 1939 Naval Aviation reserve act called for 6,000 reservist pilots to be trained.

In 1940 Congress authorized an increase of naval aircraft to 4500, then to 10,000 and finally to 15,000. (at this point it started to become the larger assembly line type similar to the expanding USAAC/USAAF)

Also to note - the majority of training is ALWAYS done in the fleet, not in flight school. Flight school provides the basics of aviation which are built upon in the operational forces.

Yes...i agree. The problem was that on other boards, some posters were dropping Lundstrom's name and saying things like "basic USN (and USMC) training was the best in the world because it taught deflection shooting and other advanced tactics and noone else did"