Oh yes, I agree. But our air boss has to do his best. My plan would be to throw everything at the task force, including stressing the carrier's engines and catapults to get those 4x500lb armed Skyhawks into the air.
If they can cripple one of the two RN carriers things will change, and if Argentina loses their carrier in the process, it makes little difference to Argentina's position.
It is clear that the Argentinians tried to do just what you are suggesting on 2nd May 1982. Problem was that they just couldn't get the numbers to add up.
The air group on the 25 de Mayo at the end of April 1982 consisted of
4x S2E Tracker
2x S-61D Sea King (until 1 May)
8x A-4Q Skyhawk
The Skyhawks required 40knots of wind over the deck to be catapulted off with 4x500lb Mk.82 bombs. On 2nd May when they went to launch there was a 10knot wind blowing (unusually light for the season in the South Atlantic). The ship was only capable of steaming at about 20 knot max and 18 knots sustained. (Even brand new in 1945 these ships were only capable of 25 knots, since when she had grown heavier and aircraft needed more WOD even with the steam catapult. While new machinery had been fitted in 1968 it came from a sister ship, Leviathan, that had never been completed).
6 aircraft were prepared for the attack (4 attackers, a deck spare in case one of the attackers should go u/s, and `one with a Buddy refuelling pack in case anyone ran short of fuel on the way home). The probability was that they might achieve 4 hits (25%) against the British carriers that were their main targets and would lose 2 aircraft (50%) in the process. Losing all 4 would have been acceptable if both carriers could be damaged.
The low winds saw the bomb load reduced to 3 and then only 2 bombs per aircraft. So that would have reduced the expected hits to just 2 for the loss of 2-4 aircraft. At that stage the risk/reward calculation for the Argentinians didn't stack up so the mission was scrubbed and, with the loss of the Belgrano that day the Argentinian Navy went onto the defensive on the concern that the same might happen to the 25 de Mayo. In fact the SSN Splendid had been detailed to search for and find her ASAP, but that is another story.
There was another hope in the Argentinian plan. If the A-4Q raid could put the British Task Force on the back foot, the 3 Exocet equipped corvettes of their TG 79.4 (Drummond, Guerrico & Granville) might be able to sneak in close enough to launch their 12 Exocet missiles.
In practice things were more complicated. While both sides had some idea of where the other was neither side knew exactly where. One of the Argentinian Trackers sent out to search was detected on British radars and illuminated by a Sea Dart guidance radar. Knowing that it likely came from the carrier, the RN sent out a Sea Harrier initially at high level for 200 miles which then dropped down to 200ft for the last 40 miles. It then switched on its radar and found the Argentinian TF 79.1 (the carrier, 2 Type 42 destroyers and a tanker) 25 miles away. It was immediately illuminated by all sorts of radars including Sea Dart guidance radars. On his return the pilot was asked what he did. His reply? "I switched off the radar and f--ked off, Boss!"
