Best Tank of WW2

Best Tank of WW2

  • King Tiger

    Votes: 16 15.0%

  • Panther

    Votes: 48 44.9%

  • Sherman

    Votes: 11 10.3%

  • T-34

    Votes: 32 29.9%
  • Total voters
    107

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules


Who said that it took 2 million hours versus 5 hours for Tiger and T-34 production?

A pretty good discussion of the manhours needed to produce each tank is availble on the Axis history Forums. here is a link if you are interested

Axis History Forum • View topic - Manhour required to produce armament

None of the figures given for production times are reliable, which explains why there are wildly fluctuating differences in th manhours per unit produced. I myself have seen figures ranging from 7 times the hours, down to about 2.2 times when comparing Panther to T-34.

There are numerous factors that go to explaining this fluctuation. For a start it depends on the point of reference. If you look at the first Tiger produced, a figure of around 300000 man hours is going to surface. You can then compare that to a T-34 during its peak production runs and arrive at a figure of 11000 man hours per (T-34) tank. On the face of it, the production times per Tiger tank are about 30 times that of a T-34. but this would be a gross misuse of the stats. I believe that it may well have cost 300000 man hours for Tiger production, at the beginning of its production run, and that it may well have cost just 11000 man hours for a t-34 during the height of its production. But the figures are just not comparable. Once the tiger got into stride the time taken to produce each unit came down dramatically.

But I still firmly am of the opinion that the production costs for the advanced German tank designs were prohibitive. Some of this arose from the poor management of the lines themselves, where the germans allowed constant detail changes to the designs to occur, with resultant disruptions to the production programs occurring almost continually. Some of the problems arose from materials shortages, and transport bottlenecks. Some delays occurred as a result of bombing. Some of the delays occurred because the germans were about a year behind the Russians in setting up the lines for their new designs. Ths meant that the production of these types was occurring behind a backdrop of setting up the line in the first place and that the new types were essentially prototypes whilst the Russians wre producing a tried and proven design. Some of the problems arose from the relatively small size of the factories themselves. Some problems arose becaise of the inherent innefficiencies in the Nazi system, which deeply corrupt and basically innefficient. And some of the problems arose because the designs themselves were over complex and difficult to build

Panther tank production is an intersting case study. Production began in 1943, and a target production figure of 600 vehicles per month was set. This was never attained. In 1943, the average production rate was 148 vpm. With basically the same factory space and workforce, this steadily ramped up in 1944, to a peak of 380 in September. Then the Allies bombed the MAN Diesel plant, halting engine production for nearly 5 months....production continued but at a reduced rate. . It demosntrates the difficulties the germans were labouring under....
 
ctrian said:
Guys how many tanks you produce depends on the facilities available.On the one hand SU had Chelyabinsk and Nizhny Tagil while on the same scale Germany only had Nibelungenwerk in Austria .
Click to expand...

With regard to this extract, it is simply not true. There were many firms in Germany associated with AFV production, not least of which was the giant Krupp works based at Magdeburg. The factory at Nibelungen was not involved greatly with AFV production until the second half of the war, and was never associated with Panther production. At wars end it was the only factory used to turn out turretted versions of the MkIV and was engaged in the production of a number of other heavy types including the Maus and the Jagdtiger types. It was responsible for a little under 50% of tank production for Germany from 1943 on. But ther were other factories involved with AFV production...not al of them with final assembly but some were like the MAN diesel engine factory were resonsible for significant component manufacture.

To try and argue that the germans put less resources, or had access to less factory space compared to the Russians is simply ingoring some basic dacts. truth is they had considerably greater factory floor space, and a considerably greater amount of factory space devoted to AFV production. Admittedly some of these factories were not all that effieicient, due mainly to their small size, but in total there was a large number of firms involved in AFV manufacture, or associated components. Russian industry should have been heavily outgunned in this respect, but never was.....and I believe some of that reason was because of the emionent produceability of their equipment. The Russians always designed their equipment with one eye oon production. The germans hardly ever considered this aspect of the equation.
 
The stats i have are from ''Kursk 1943 a statistical analysis'' : PzIV - 103.462 RM ,Panther - 117.100 RM. I don't see anything prohibitive .You seem to be under the impression that the PzV cost as much as the Tiger.
Regarding tank facilities there can be no comparison with the huge Russian plants in the Urals and the German plants in terms of size.Like i said only one was built up to specs during the war.There is a detailed discussion on this in AHF but i simply don't have the energy to look it up.Check RichTO90's if you want to find it.
 
Parsifal did you check your own link? It says 2.000 manhours for a Panther.Thats would make it ''cheaper'' than a T-34 even though the Russian tank was in production for a number of years.That seems reasonable to you?
 

I think you will find the figures given in your reference are exclusive of turrets, comms, optics, delivery and armament. The more often quoted figure figure for the cost of a Panther is RM192000, which includes the delivery charges. A Sherman is about $30000 USD from memory, but it is difficult to make direct correlations. A T-34 had a variable cost depending on point of manufacture, but ranged from about R136000 through to about R198000. There has never been a satisfactory conversion rate determined for Roubles to Dollars, but it may have been as little as 5% as valuable. If so that makes a T-34 dirt cheap....about $6-12000 USD per copy. I am doubtful of that....a more reasonable estimate I read somewhere is about $25000 per copy.

Breaking my own rule, if I wanted to attempt a conversion of the wartime currencies (which I think is innaccurate, and therefore not a lot of help) the conversion of the RM to Dollars is about 3.5 to 1. Thats based on rough estimates of what commodities were worth, and how much your RM could purchase of that commodity. There is no relaible exchange rate, and the whole thing is upset by artificial pegging, devalauations and a lack of crfedible exchange rates at the time. So for what I about to do, I know I am going to be truly sorry, but what the hell......

On the basis of the above exchange estimate, a Panther in USD terms is worth about $55000USD, a Tiger I is about $90000 and a Tiger II about $180000. A T-34 might be $12-25000

In terms of floor space per individual factory, many German plants did labour under trhe disadvantage of being not designed for the purpose, and not sufficiently large. But in terms of overall factory space the germans enjoyed a considerable advantage. They also enjoyed a big advantage in the pool of skilled labour, but this was wasted in their mindless use of precious skilled labour as general Infantry

Regarding the Tank facilities, the Russians had larger individual factories builot for the purpose, whilst the Germans had more factory space overall but in smaller packets. The factory in Austria accounted for nearly 50% of tank production after 1942, but virtually none before then. The Germans had a better ntrained workforce...more skilled workers that is, but tended to rely on slave labour as the war progressed which badly affected build quality, particularly heat treatment of the armour plate.

Truth is, you cannot be as precise as all this suggests. The figures are too rubbery, the comparisons too artificail, the assumptions too great. All one can say really is that German tanks were expensive and took a lot of man hours to build. Russian tanks were cheap and took a lot less time to build. And given that numbers are a quality all their own, and wars were won by numbers, the Russian approach was the superior one
 
Last edited:
ctrian said:
Parsifal did you check your own link? It says 2.000 manhours for a Panther.Thats would make it ''cheaper'' than a T-34 even though the Russian tank was in production for a number of years.That seems reasonable to you?
Click to expand...

Its a forum...you have to sort through the chaff. These were not the only, or even the most significant sources to rely on, but they provide a good spectrum of the different opinions. You have to take a statement, run with it, try and verify it from other tertiary sources and work your way through the minefield very carefully
 

It is the cost given without gun and radio.Since the Panther gun and radio were not made of gold or diamonds i don't think they would change the comparison .This price makes the Pz V seem like a very good deal.
I will agree that all the data have their own problems and cannot be used for an apple to apples comparison.But i don't think it's reasonable to assume that the T-34 was 10 times cheaper 55.000 manhours vs 4.000 per your previous post.Tank production was not a major part of the German war economy and had to start in the 30's from point zero.You should keep that in mind when trying to compare countries .Then things that you attribute to mistakes etc come off as the natural evolution of events.
 

For all practical purposes everybody but the Russians started their tank production (not design) in mid 30s and the Russians had only a few years head start. It is true that the Russians built more tanks than the rest of the world put together (and then some) during the 30s but a factory that was constructed to build T-27 tankettes or even T-26 light tanks may not be capable of building T-34s without some major rework. the overhead gantry cranes might be incapable of handling the heavier components or completed tanks and other machinery may be too small. There is a reason that both the US and Britain contracted with railroad locomotive builders for their first large batches of tanks.
As far as the Panthers "golden gun" it may not have been gold but 5.25 meter long barrel needs a good sized lathe to work on it. It may have required a much larger initial forging and more machine time to complete, Not 5 times a shorter 75mm gun but perhaps double.
 
The Russians were building T-26 and BT tanks while the Germans struggled to produce tankettes that's quite an advantage.As for the gun i doubt it was that more expensive than the kwk40 and even if it was the difference in overall price would still be small.Bottom line the Panther was a good deal financially.
 

Cost without armament for a turreted tank nearly always means cost without turret, and that represents roughly 1/3 the total cost of the vehicle. Thats why the figure you are quoting is a gross understatement of the total unit cost for a Panther and just one of the pitfalls when looking at the cost of the item. I know that the quoted cost for the Sherman is fully equipped, but exclusive of delivery. I am not sure about some of the quoted costs for the T-34, or even if some of the quoted costs are uniform for each factory that made the delivery. There is so much difference in the quoted costs and manhours per unit, for the T-34 for each of the major factories that I am doubtful about uniformity.

All this statistical uncertainty doesnt alter the basic trend evident in those statistics. In terms of cost, or man hours or any other production cost measure, the T-34 consistently and markedly is substantially less than the MkV. No amount of massaging of the uncertainties can hide that really. Its the elephant in the room that just wont go away.
 
Like i said before the book states that it is the price without radio and gun.Obviously the T-34 would be cheaper since it was a smaller vehicle and in production for years before the Panther.However was the price justified by performance ? That's whats important in any comparison.Yes the T-34 was built in record numbers.It was also destroyed in record numbers.And after ww2 in Korea and the Middle East it had a similar bad performance.You have to look at cost AND performance.
 

length of KwK 40 L/43 138.6 in weight 1,041lb both include muzzle brake.
length of KwK 40 L/48 153.6 in weight 1,094lb both include muzzle brake.
length of KwK 42 L/70 218 in, weight 2,390lb both include muzzle brake.

length of 76.2 F-34 .. 124.6 in weight 1003lb no muzzle brake.
length of 75mm M3 ....118.4 in weight 893lb no muzzle brake.

If you have to rebuild/retool either factory to make 20-30 ton tanks compared to what you were building where is the head start?

The Russians may have had more design experience and even more experience riveting tanks together but if you need a 5 ton over head crane to move the turret in the factory and the factory only has a 3 ton crane you are out of luck no matter how many 8-15 ton tanks you may have designed/produced.
 
Because you already have factories , transport channels ,design bureaus , engine plants , gun plants , trained workers etc ,the whole system.Meanwhile the other guys start from scratch .Even if that lead is 5 years you're still one generation ahead.Compare the main tanks in German and Soviet arsenal for example in 1941.On the Soviet side you have 45mm as the main armament (T-26 and BT ) with 75mm for the new tanks.On the German side only the new PzIII with 50mm gun and PzIV with 75mm are better ,meaning only 36% of total force for Berbarosa was superior to standard old Soviet tanks.
 

I agree that T-34 losses were heavy, but in the context of WWII this does not hold true that just because T-34 losses were heavy, that this makes German Tanks autometically superior. Case in point are the much quoted losses for 1944, the year that the German super tanks really began to have their alleged effect. Total Russian losses were about 23000 AFVs, of which the T-34 had to form a big proportion. Against this the Germans on the Eastern Front lost 9000 AFVs (not including Halftracks). However, about 13000 of these 23000 were destroyed by ATGs, and the vast majority of these were of the towed variety. Small wonder then that Rommel in 1943 advocated a near total abandonment of tank production in favour of ATG production. Using that flawed cost analysis raised earlier, an 75mm ATG costs around RM 12000 to a Panthers RM192000. Do the math. Which was more a threat to Soviet Armoured breakthroughs, 100 Panthers or 1600 ATGs? In tank on tank engagements, overall the Germans were not nearly so superior as their counterparts, it was the Infantry ATGs that did most of the killing of tanks, including Panzerfausts and the like.

When the Germans were on the attack, the same was true for them as well. During Kursk the majority of German Tank losses were not suffered at the hands of Soviet armour, they were lost to dug in Soviet ATGs. And the socalled superiority of the German Heavies was certainly not evident there. Of the the 250 or so Panthers committed to the battel, about 192 actually got into combat (the balance broke down enroute), and of that 190 or so, only 40 were still operational three days later. Similar dismal performancxes were experoienced by equipment such as the Elefant and Tigers. They did some good work, to be sure, but their overall performance was a failure for any number of reasons. So unless these Panthers were blessed with super powers, it certainly wasnt them that was killing the Soviet armour in that battle. In fact the majority of the tank victories for the germans were achieved by their MkIVs and their MkIIIs.

Moreover, after Kursk, the Germans lost the initiative and were on the strategic defensive. Contrary to popular belief, so long as your equipment is reliable and doesnt break down on the battlefield (something these flat footed behemoths had a lot of trouble doing), it is actually far less costly to operate on the defensive with tanks than in the attack. Thats because the defending armour has to contend far less with the threat of Infantry AT weaponary. So whereas more than 50% of Soviet armour was lost to the German Infantry formations as they executed their various offensive breakthroughs, the German Panzerwaffe was exposed to thjis kind of shenanigan far less. Therefore, it seems very likley that the majority of German AFV losses were lost either to breakdown, or direct attacks by Soviet armour. Not such an imporessive advantage after all despite all the lavish resources spent on it....

Dont get me wrong, German tanks were a marvel of engineering, a thing of impressive military pzazz and flash. But because of their expense they could not be deployed in sufficient numbers to make a difference, and so, whilst individually fantastic weapons, collectively they were basically a liability to Germany.
 
I'm sorry but i don't see how the Tiger was a failure in any possible way ,in fact it was a force multiplier in all fronts.The figure i have for the Panther is 117.100 RM without a gun and radio.I also fail to see how you could tell which T-34 was destroyed by tank gun and which by anti tank gun.Didn't they have the same caliber? I also don't understand how a stationary gun will follow a tank during a breakthrough.What you say about the Kursk battle is true but the kill record of the Panther units also tells a different story .If you look at the T-34 it also had serious maintenance problems in the first years.Finally i have to agree with you that a lot of German AFV's were destroyed in retreats ,this is another proof they were so survivable that they managed to avoid being destroyed in direct combat like the super duper T-34.Their crews of course were free to find a new vehicle and return to battle unlike their enemies.
 

You are only comparing guns. Most T-26 maxed out at 15mm of armor which means that they are vulnerable to the German 20mm armed vehicles. Most have no radios. Ergonomics are terrible, is the commander the loader for the turret MG? and at about 6 secs per drum of ammo he is going to be doing a lot of loading.

Just because you have an engine plant that can make an air cooled flat four of 90 hp does not mean you have an engine plant that can make a water cooled V-12, at least in quantity. Maybe it can and maybe it can't. Where the aircooled cylinders cast separately or in paired blocks. Are the v-12 cylinders separate with a sheet metal jacket or 6 cylinder engine blocks. same with the cylinder heads, One piece castings? Are the lathes for turning the crankshafts long enough. The V-12 crankshaft being much longer. Are the V-12 cranks cast or forged? and so on.
maybe the engine plant can make V-12 diesels without a major upgrading but it is not automatic.
Changing transport channels? is this a joke? How far were most places in Europe (Germany) from a rail line if they had enough people to staff factory to begin with. If you have a rail line with in a few miles and close in elevation you have a "transport channel". Nobody was moving either masses of steel or competed tanks by truck if they had any choice what so ever.

and to repeat, just because you have the infrastructure to manufacture 8-10 ton vehicles does not mean you have the infrastructure to manufacture/handle 20-30 ton vehicles. without some serious upgrading/modification.
 


I'm sorry but i don't see how the Tiger was a failure in any possible way ,in fact it was a force multiplier in all fronts.


Viewed as an individual piece of hardware, you are correct, the tiger was a force multiplier. Viewed as a set, however, its great cost and difficulty of construction meant that it was only ever possible to deploy the type in very limited numbers. Moreover, because of that, as an overall element of the German panzer arm, it was a liability. For example, if we base our examination on what we do know, that the tiger I at some point in its career cost RM 312000 per unit, and a towed 75mm gun cost just RM 12000 to produce, or a Stug III cost just RM 52000 to produce, then the alternatives are 1xTiger I, 6xStugs or 26 75 mm Paks. Viewed in those terms the tiger is not a force multiplier, its an unnecessary and expensive flamboyance that sucks out resources better suited to German capabilities and requirements


The figure i have for the Panther is 117.100 RM without a gun and radio?

And, as Ive pointed out to you, your figures less armament means that they are being delivered at that price without turrets. This was a product of the Nazi system of AFV production. The Germans more than anybody, tended to contract out components manufacture, so it is very easy to either miss something, or deliberately underquote to make the product look more price attractive. The figures for Panther fully constructed are not RM 117000, its RM 192000 although this might have changed as the war progressed. In 1943, which is what your reference is concerned with, the cost of those 250 panthers was many times the accepted figures, because they were delivered at the beginning of the production run. I am also reasonably certain it also would lack a full electrical fitout communications and most of the optics if the turret is not fitted, which I am 100% sure it is not at RM 117000.

I also fail to see how you could tell which T-34 was destroyed by tank gun and which by anti tank gun.Didn't they have the same caliber?

Yes they did, and the research behind that comes from Russian sources. What the Russians are able to dduce are the points and when losses were sustained. Since the majority of Soviet armoured operations were directed against German Infantry formations, with the German armour nowhere to be seen, it makes sense that the majority of losses came from Infantry crewed weapons. I don't have the details about the particular breakdowns of particular engagements. But the methodology makes sense to me, so I accept the findings. If you don't accept them, that's fine, but I would suggest you would need to find a source to back that up.


I also don't understand how a stationary gun will follow a tank during a breakthrough. What you say about the Kursk battle is true but the kill record of the Panther units also tells a different story. If you look at the T-34 it also had serious maintenance problems in the first years. Finally i have to agree with you that a lot of German AFV's were destroyed in retreats ,this is another proof they were so survivable that they managed to avoid being destroyed in direct combat like the super duper T-34.Their crews of course were free to find a new vehicle and return to battle unlike their enemies.


German heavy tanks were in fact no more mobile, or able to keep up with Soviet Breakthroughs than a towed ATG could. That was their great weakness. Soviets would punch a hole and pour through, pushing as hard and as fast as they could. Calling it a hole is a misnomer, it was more like a section of the front, since soviet doctrine called for broad front penetrations rather than schwerepunkt style incisions in the German method. German Panzers were no more able to intercept or keep up with these fast moving breakthroughs than a truck towed ATG

In fact German losses in their Panzer crews was heavy and crippling during their retreats, but it would, and was, be a much higher loss rate whilst on the offensive. Their losses during Kursk attest to that. As to survivability, well, one just has to look at the experience level of the crews during Ardennes and the Colmar offensives to get an idea there. Crew training for the 1945 Colmar offensive consisted of a static run through of the tank systems, and then they were off to the front. The average crew experience level on the western front (and most of the tank formations had come from the east) in late 1944, was just three weeks. The panzerwaffe was anything but a bunch of country clubbers swanning around brewing up Allied and Soviet tanks. Moreover in the east, they had failed in their mission of stopping the Soviet breakthroughs. Whilst there is no denying their heroism, and their individual effectiveness; as a force viewed in the whole they were a failure, and a good measure of that failure came from the equipment choices they made.
 
SR

I agree completely with your comments (a welcome change?). Part of the problem in the german production system was their failure to invest in setting up proper factories in th lead up to war. hitler was a gambler, and he gambled on ashort war. He believed he could win his war with a minimum of investment in long term infrastructure. This explains at least in part, that whilst the british, Americans, Russians and just about everyboidy else was investing in long term production infrastructure, the germans were expending the bulk of their military spending on completed equipment, rathr than spending it on infrastructure. There was a long term penalty to be paid for that....eventually the plant being used would become obsolete, and for the germans this may well have been the case.
 

I may be stretching things here but that may be why the Germans kept t-38 chassis in production so long. Not that the factory didn't have "space" (square footage)to make MK IVs or something like that but that the physical plant couldn't handle the larger vehicles. And if you did have the cranes and lifts and machine tools needed to build MK IVs or Panthers why not stick them in a new building and build both?

I could be wrong but the idea that Germany started from "nothing" and some how built this "almost" world beating Machine seems a little out of touch with reality. While it is true that they were banned from building new war equipment for the 20s and the early 30s most other countries didn't build all that much either in the 20s. They got by on WW I left overs and in many cases relied on these left overs a little too long. In many cases the western nations didn't "tool up" for newer, more modern designs until after the Germans did. Germany was also one of the most heavily industrialized nations in Europe. It's steel production and heavy industry was bigger than than most anybody else except the United States. Czechoslovakia actually had quite a steel and heavy industry section itself, in the old Skoda works. Heavy industry being railway locomotives, railway wagons or carriages, bridges, structural steel, ship building, heavy machine tools, stationary power plants etc.
I think you are right, Germany tried to "coast" on this head start in capability, and either didn't realize how much the opposition was improving it's capability, or gambled (and lost) that the war would be over before the factories could make a difference.
 


Are you joking ? One country has a several year lead in building tanks and you're actually suggesting that they also started from scratch? Do you have any idea of industrial economics?
 
You must log in or register to reply here.

Users who are viewing this thread

Total: 1 (members: 0, guests: 1)

Similar threads

Z
Best tank engines of WWII
15 16 17
Replies
335
Views
22K
Reluctant Poster
R
A
Rolls Royce Tank Engines
Replies
2
Views
607
Reluctant Poster
R
P
Which tank is this ?
Replies
2
Views
736
programa
P
N
US Navy WW2 squadron patch
Replies
1
Views
523
Wurger
D
Help with RAF WW2 service record
Replies
10
Views
727
Sabrejet
Menu
Log in
Register