Better German Aircraft in 1943 Inflict Crucial Losses of Allied Air Power in Britain?

[nuuumannn]

The Germans never stopped attacking Britain, but never did they achieve anywhere near the effectiveness nor intensity as they did in 1940/41. An interesting insight into their intent following the cessation of the intensive campaign known as the Blitz following the Battle of Britain, was the overall campaign nicknamed the Baedekker Blitz, which wasn't just attacks limited to cultural centres of interest in 1942, but stretched well into 1944 when the attacks were ceased owing to their ineffectiveness at achieving the aims set out, attacking culturally significant targets. The Wiki page covers a lot of this and it is a surprisingly interesting read.

Baedeker Blitz - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Combine this with Steinbock and the Germans themselves came to the realisation that they have to change tactics when attacking the UK and focus use on its wunderwaffen. Air raids by bombers are sooooo 1940...

 

[Jabberwocky]

To a degree, but it depends on the nature and composition of the threat. The likelihood of such a thing would be He 111s, Ju 88s and Do 217s (you can immediately discount the He 177 as there were simply not enough available aircraft, and with the serviceability and engine issues, the type wasn't ready for intensive operations) with Bf 109s and Fw 190s as escort against Spitfire IXs and Typhoons, with P-47s, P-38s and the first P-51s,

I was thinking more of aircraft pulled away from other commitments (the Mediterranean in particular), rather than the actual types of aircraft. I believe there were more than 550 RAF single engine fighters in the MTO by the middle of 1943 - but it's a mottley mix of Spitfires, Hurricanes, Tomahawks/Kittyhawks and some Mustang I/IIs.

I do think USAAF reactions to a 'BoB 2' would be very interesting to speculate on - could you get the P-38 and P-47C to work as defensive interceptors, or does it look to other roles entirely? What does the USAAF do with its Allison powered P-51As? Does it pull back from coastal airfields and let the RAF handle incoming raids, while it focuses on airfield attack and other missions?

(As an aside, does anyone know why the RAF's Mustang Is don't appear on strength lists until the formation of the 2TAF? AIR 22 has nothing on strength until September 1943, when all of a sudden 16 squadrons of Mustang Is show up as in service. As I understand it, the RAF put 11 Mustang squadrons into operation in 1942 and then 8 more in the first half of 1943, with some other squadrons transitioning to Spitfires/Typhoons).

depending on when this attack takes place, contributing from the US 8th AF - and I'm pretty certain the Americans wouldn't sit on their hands if Britain was attacked BoB style in 1943 because of potential danger to its interests...

Agreed. I do wonder though if the Americans would be willing to put off their offensive plans and play defense.

I can't see Germany doing any better than what they did in 1940, to be frank. Britain's air defence wasn't stagnant in that time between.

Even with a qualitative leap in German aircraft performance, I don't think that controlling UK airspace/shutting down the RAF and USAAF is possible for the Luftwaffe in 1943. Causing plenty of damage, yes. But not to the point of crippling the RAF or USAAF.

1940 was their big chance - when they probably had the greatest advantage and still didn't manage to defeat the RAF.

 

[tomo pauk]

I do think USAAF reactions to a 'BoB 2' would be very interesting to speculate on - could you get the P-38 and P-47C to work as defensive interceptors, or does it look to other roles entirely? What does the USAAF do with its Allison powered P-51As? Does it pull back from coastal airfields and let the RAF handle incoming raids, while it focuses on airfield attack and other missions?

P-38 and P-47C and early D will certainly work as defensive fighters.
USAAF does not have any P-51A (a.k.a. Mustang II per RAF parlance) operative abroad before September of 1943, ditto for the RAF. They have the cannon-armed photo-recon P-51, a.k.a. the F-6A; not sure how well the cannons work (on the equivalent Mustang Ia, the British eventually replaced US cannons with British ones). All said, Allies received 770 of Mustang I (4 HMGs, 4 LMGs) and Mustang Ia (4 cannons) fighters.

(As an aside, does anyone know why the RAF's Mustang Is don't appear on strength lists until the formation of the 2TAF? AIR 22 has nothing on strength until September 1943, when all of a sudden 16 squadrons of Mustang Is show up as in service. As I understand it, the RAF put 11 Mustang squadrons into operation in 1942 and then 8 more in the first half of 1943, with some other squadrons transitioning to Spitfires/Typhoons).

How many of Mustangs belonged to the 'Army cooperation' branch? The AIR 22 lists these until 31st December of 1941, and not after that, at least not in the copies that I have handy.

Agreed. I do wonder though if the Americans would be willing to put off their offensive plans and play defense.

If they can muster enough of strength, they still carry on? Or, fighters go defensive, bombers go during the night?

1940 was their big chance - when they probably had the greatest advantage and still didn't manage to defeat the RAF.

Greatest numerical advantage certainly. But yes, it was either win or go home in 1940.

 

[Vincenzo]

RAF Mustang I&II squadrons
2: 4/42-1/45
4: 4/42-1/44
14: 5/43-6/43
16: 4/42-10/43
26: 1/42-3/44, 11/44-1/45
63: 6/42-5/44
168: 11/42-10/44
169: 6/42-9/43
170: 6/42-1/44
171: 9/42-12/42
225: 5/42-10/42, 4/43-7/43
231: 3/43-1/44
239: 5/42-9/43
241: 3/42-11/42
268: 4/42-8/45
303: 4/45-5/45
309: 8/42-2/44, 9/44-10/44
400: 6/42-2/44
414: 6/42-8/44
430: 1/43-12/44
613: 4/42-10/43

 

[Jabberwocky]

Super interesting. Thank you.

Graphing it out, it looks like June 1942 through to January 1944 was the heyday of the Mustang I with the RAF, with an average of just over 15 squadrons operating the type through that period. For this time period, that means the Mustang is nearly as important numerically as the Typhoon to the RAF.

 

[nuuumannn]

Even with a qualitative leap in German aircraft performance, I don't think that controlling UK airspace/shutting down the RAF and USAAF is possible for the Luftwaffe in 1943. Causing plenty of damage, yes. But not to the point of crippling the RAF or USAAF.

Completely agree Jabberwocky. The LW certainly lost their chance and despite the odd daylight incursion into British airspace the majority of their continued manned bomber attacks were made by night, against which they were faced with Mosquitoes and Beaufighters.

Despite the qualitative advantage the Germans had compared to their 1940 bomber fleet, the RAF has improved in quality too, so match for match, given that in this possible scenario the Germans do try another daylight offensive, there is not likely to be a qualitative advantage over the British, and with the USAAF protecting its airfields and other assets from direct attack, that really changes things for the Germans.

 

[Jabberwocky]

Completely agree Jabberwocky. The LW certainly lost their chance and despite the odd daylight incursion into British airspace the majority of their continued manned bomber attacks were made by night, against which they were faced with Mosquitoes and Beaufighters.

I'm lucky enough to have Luftwaffe Fighter-Bombers Over Britain (Chris Goss, with Peter Cornwell and Bernd Raubach) sitting on my (much reduced) shelves. It details the extent of the Luftwaffe's low level daylight Jabo attacks on the UK from March 1942 to June 1943.

According to their research, there were 230 separate 'tip and run' attacks against the UK by the Luftwaffe over those 16 months. These ranged from something as small as two Bf 109s bombing coastal towns with another pair covering, all the way up to multi JG, multi attack efforts with 60 plus Jabos and more than 100 other fighter aircraft operating escort, diversionary attacks, withdrawal support and landing site cover.

The RAF were extremely frustrated about their inability to stop these attacks. In August 1942, just eight of 44 Luftwaffe raids - and none of the 26 Jabo attacks - were precceded by radar warnings. The British were also peeved that they generally only caught the Jabos after they'd dropped their bombs and that ground fire wasn't very effective. Luftwaffe combat losses were about 120 to 130 aircraft - mostly by fighters (the Typhoon proved quite successful in early 1943, but Luftwaffe pilots persistently mis-identified the aircraft as a "Tomahawk" or "Curtis").

I wonder how that intensity of operations and losses compares to night bombers?

 

[nuuumannn]

I'm lucky enough to have Luftwaffe Fighter-Bombers Over Britain (Chris Goss, with Peter Cornwell and Bernd Raubach) sitting on my (much reduced) shelves. It details the extent of the Luftwaffe's low level daylight Jabo attacks on the UK from March 1942 to June 1943.

According to their research, there were 230 separate 'tip and run' attacks against the UK by the Luftwaffe over those 16 months. These ranged from something as small as two Bf 109s bombing coastal towns with another pair covering, all the way up to multi JG, multi attack efforts with 60 plus Jabos and more than 100 other fighter aircraft operating escort, diversionary attacks, withdrawal support and landing site cover.

The RAF were extremely frustrated about their inability to stop these attacks. In August 1942, just eight of 44 Luftwaffe raids - and none of the 26 Jabo attacks - were precceded by radar warnings. The British were also peeved that they generally only caught the Jabos after they'd dropped their bombs and that ground fire wasn't very effective. Luftwaffe combat losses were about 120 to 130 aircraft - mostly by fighters (the Typhoon proved quite successful in early 1943, but Luftwaffe pilots persistently mis-identified the aircraft as a "Tomahawk" or "Curtis").

I wonder how that intensity of operations and losses compares to night bombers?

It's funny you should state that info, which is good and details a very smart means of producing damage to the UK simply because they were so difficult to defend against. During the Battle of Britain, Erpobungsgruppe 210 carried out low level jabo raids against various targets and they were generally successful and caused a lot of damage, inadvertently punching a hole in the CH system which remained undetected by the Germans and was repaired afterwards. The problem was, in the thick of the combat, the '210 unit was wiped out in number during the battle, only to reform and carry on. The unit suffered heavy losses during that period, but its attacks were virtually unstoppable, the aircraft being intercepted afterwards. The Germans missed a trick by not making more such attacks during the battle, despite efforts to keep up the pressure by fitting Bf 109s with bombs and flying them over at high altitude.

 

[Macandy]

It's also conveniently forgotten that while the BoB was going on, and afterwards, the RAF was going across the channel every day and night attacking German airfields and targets further afield.
All the light AA guns and 88's you see dotted around airfields etc in Germans photographs from Summer 1940 weren't just set dressing!

 

[Romantic Technofreak]

tomo pauk : "Is there a problem for your friend to register here and make his points in person?"
My friend's command of English language is good, but not as much as mine. On the one hand he lacks stamina, on the other hand, sometimes he thinks he is the one-and-only WWII German aircraft expert. So he sees no point in joining a forum.

S Shortround6 : "Trying to continue on over Scotland is an complete fantasy."
As I told, my friend sees a superiority in numbers for the German side. I say the Allies could have opened more airfields in Scotland if necessery. But he denies.

nuuumannn : "The problem is the British rotated home based fighter squadrons," asf.
Same as to Shortround6 above.

M Macandy : "Where does Germany invent all the extra petrol from?"
1) Stalin could be asked for giving some. He always wanted capitalist states to fight each other, so he may agree.
2) Starting Mediterranean action in October 1942, my friend and I unanimously calculate that French Northwest Africa would fall within two weeks (making "Torch" impossible) and the British defended Middle East within months, thus the Axis receiving control over the Abadan oilfields and the pipelines leading to Mediterranean harbors.

D Denniss : "Germans had no 600l drop tank, just 300 and 900. 900 was impossible to install under Fw 190 wing - insufficient clearance."
If I forward this to my friend, he would surely reply it were no big problem to create a 600 l fuel tank.

D Denniss : "Fw 190 required special modifications to carry 2 drop tanks (fuel + air lines to wing hard points, coax MGs replaced by oil tank). Even with larger drop tanks (or a 3rd 300l belly tank) I doubt they had enough space for an even larger oil tank."
Could be forwarded to my friend, I wonder what he will answer.

tomo pauk : about switching the Fw 190 to a DB engine
Same answer as to Denniss above. But my friend may say, the Fw 190 does it with the BMW 801 too.

J Jabberwocky : (#79)
Given the total numbers you told, and if there is a threat from the north, how many would you transfer to Scotland? The Allied leadership would not forget the threat from the south, especially if harassament attacks still continue.

nuuumannn : "you can immediately discount the He 177 as there were simply not enough available aircraft in 1943, and with the serviceability and engine issues, the type wasn't ready for intensive operations"
Depending on one (not completely sure, we admit) my friend and I say the He 177 A-3 was service-ready at the end of 1942, though minor problems remained and rookie pilots did not correctly perform the climbing process, which was a bit tricky. I agree with my friend that a reliable He 177 A-3 was possible in 1943. I think the production number of He 177 A-3 until September 1943 could be 500 copies.

nuuumannn : "During the Battle of Britain, Erpobungsgruppe 210 carried out low level jabo raids against various targets and they were generally successful and caused a lot of damage, inadvertently punching a hole in the CH system which remained undetected by the Germans and was repaired afterwards."
As much as I know my friend, he will claim similar attacks like these, but mainly against airfields in Scotland as preparation for anti-shipping attacks.

M Macandy : "the RAF was going across the channel every day and night attacking German airfields and targets further afield."
I am sure RAF and USAAF would retalliate by attacking German airfields in Norway. I expect my friend to encounter tht they would already done before they even tried. Sometimes he is really difficult to handle...

Many thanks, and best regards,
RT

 

[SaparotRob]

There are none so blind as he who would not see.

 

[Shortround6]

S Shortround6 : "Trying to continue on over Scotland is an complete fantasy."
As I told, my friend sees a superiority in numbers for the German side. I say the Allies could have opened more airfields in Scotland if necessery. But he denies.

You can fantasize about bigger drop tanks and some other details but........

When you need just under 1/3 of the available fuel just to reach British airspace (20-30 miles off the coast) and you still need 15% or more fuel to reach the target area things are not looking good. If the Germans drop tanks over the target area (the cargo ships) they need around 45% of the total fuel to get home with. However with the drop tanks gone the 190s only have about 33% (?) of fuel at that point.

The defenders don't actually have to shoot down very many German fighters.
A lot of the German fighters are on one way trips on there first mission.
OR.......................The Germans are carrying very, very large drop tanks in combat and trying to fight the British fighters that way. Which is also a one way mission.

His plan is unsustainable and it is not a few quick raids and everything gets resolved.

 

[nuuumannn]

Hi Romantic technofreak, whilst we appreciate the queries, it does seem your friend is refusing to see the facts so he can construct his own reality, which was far from the reality as it actually existed. The Germans were in no position to launch a daylight offensive against Britain in 1943 and it would have taken a complete sea-change in management i.e. remove the Nazi party from power before anything like that could be achieved, and then there is the British response, which your friend is ignoring.

I have mentioned Steinbock and the Baedekker raids, both of which were predominantly carried out at night, which both did little more for the Germans than whittle down existing numbers of combat aircraft. As Jabberwocky pointed out, high speed low-level jabo raids proved effective and difficult to counter, but again attrition rate took its toll. A campaign is about sustained pressure. None of the German campaigns post 1941 against Britain were able to be sustained to the same degree as those launched by both the RAF and USAAF against Germany, or even to the same degree as the Germans had done so in 1940/41. The Germans simply didn't have the resources to do so while fighting a war on multiple fronts and chewing through resources and it could not match the production abilities of Britain and the Commonwealth, let alone the USA.

"you can immediately discount the He 177 as there were simply not enough available aircraft in 1943, and with the serviceability and engine issues, the type wasn't ready for intensive operations"
Depending on one (not completely sure, we admit) my friend and I say the He 177 A-3 was service-ready at the end of 1942, though minor problems remained and rookie pilots did not correctly perform the climbing process, which was a bit tricky. I agree with my friend that a reliable He 177 A-3 was possible in 1943. I think the production number of He 177 A-3 until September 1943 could be 500 copies.

Your friend's assessment of the He 177 is far from reality. Yes, around 500 had been built, but a paltry few were ready for service - this is one thing soooo many people ignore. The aircraft was extremely troublesome and by 1944, only a handful could be declared ready for action. To save repeating myself, here's a bit I wrote the other day for another thread:

It had promise, but it was poorly executed, and was beset by manufacturing and development issues ranging over quite a period of time, it also did not meet performance targets; in mid 1942 E-Stelle 177 reported that the aircraft had a range of 1,305 miles, with a maximum speed of just 244 mph while carrying a 2,000 kg (4,400 lb) load, lower than expected, which led to conclusions that maritime attacks could not be made before March 1943. The He 177A-3 was also a maintenance hog; after every sortie each aircraft required extensive maintenance checks, a 25 hour servicing owing to the sophistication of some of the equipment on board, which suffered consistent failures operationally. It was recognised as being far more maintenance intensive than the Fw 200.

And then there were production difficulties, which constantly delayed the type's operational debut. By early 1943, it was recorded that 26 faulty DB 610 engines had to be replaced within the Staffeln. By August 1943, only 20 He 177A-3s were built and there was a shortfall of around 800 (!) replacement serviceable engines required for completed aircraft and airframes on the production line. Bearing in mind that production and delivery was slow and intermittent to the Staffeln, this was a serious blow to the type's availability.

In operational service the aircraft experienced constant mechanical faults, which reduced available numbers, let alone the continuing engine issues, which, by April 1944 only four replacement units had been delivered for 60 He 177s in service. Attrition was high as well, with crashes suffered by inexperienced crews; II/KG 1 lost seven aircraft alone in training accidents during the type conversion in May 1944.

Once operational KG 1's aircraft suffered losses against Soviet positions during low-level ground attack runs, surely not a sensible attack strategy for such a large aircraft, and several were shot down during raids in July 1944 against advancing Soviet armour. Following these, I and II KG 1 aircraft were withdrawn back to Germany, and some had their equipment stripped and were scrapped rather than undergoing repair.

By this time, even during trials of newer versions, problems were being encountered, in March 1944 during trials of the V15 prototype it suffered severe oscillation, but it did achieve speeds of 710 km/h (441 mph) in diving trials. By mid 1944, production of the He 177A-5 was being wound down following Albert Speer's decree that fighter production was to be emphasised and that further production of heavy bombers was to be halted...

This info comes from Griehl and his book on the type, the information coming from data collected from German archives, so it has credibility. The simple fact was the He 177 was not ready for sustained combat operations in 1943. "Minor problems" does not describe the litany of issues with the aircraft and I feel your friend is refusing to acknowledge the reality behind the aircraft as it was at that time.

 

[tomo pauk]

His plan is unsustainable and it is not a few quick raids and everything gets resolved.

'His plan'? The friend's plan?
I'd pay money to see that friend.

 

[Jabberwocky]

Given the total numbers you told, and if there is a threat from the north, how many would you transfer to Scotland? The Allied leadership would not forget the threat from the south, especially if harassament attacks still continue.

13 Group had, from memory, eight or 10 single engine fighter squadrons attached to it in 1942 and 1943. Mostly around Newcastle and Edinburgh. 14 Group had a couple as well (at Inverness?) but it was absorbed into 13 Group some time in 1943.

Does it need more than that? If Fighter Command has around 80 to 85 single engine dayfighter squadrons in 1943, then does it need to put more than about 15% of its strength in Scotland and Northeast England?

If the fighting is heaviest in the North, then the RAF will do what it did in 1940 - send fresh squadrons where they're needed and put war weary squadrons in quiet sectors for R&R.

 

[Tkdog]

If the Germans had tried this Churchill might have been willing to arrange sending tankers of aviation fuel to Norway to support their efforts. (I jest, of course,).

But if Germany wanted to throw away men and material on a futile campaign to "bomb ports" then the allies would have been more than willing to decimate the Nazi Air Force over Scotland rather than over Germany. Home field advantage and all. Any allied pilots who bail out or make an emergency landing are at home rather than a POW camp.

At the same time this pulls irreplaceable assets from the defense of Germany making the allied bombing campaign easier. Churchill would not want bombs falling anyplace in the UK. But if the Germans want to throw away resources to little gain that's better than some alternatives. Allie's have comparably limitless assets available to them by 1943. They can shift things around and still apply pressure on multiple fronts. The Germans can't.

Meanwhile the clock is of course ticking. Anything that delays D Day has two looming issues for Germany. The Russians get further into Germany proper at the end (no West Germany at all?) and the A bomb comes closer to be being ready to use. By 1943 the best course for Germany is to lose as quickly as possible.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

2) Starting Mediterranean action in October 1942, my friend and I unanimously calculate that French Northwest Africa would fall within two weeks (making "Torch" impossible) and the British defended Middle East within months, thus the Axis receiving control over the Abadan oilfields and the pipelines leading to Mediterranean harbors.

Just to address this one point, there's no way the Germans had the strength on the ground to 1) capture Abadan and 2) get that oil back to Germany safely. They'd have to sail it back to Germany at some point, and didn't have the tankers to do so; nor did they have the troops to defend a pipeline to the Levant trying the short route to Italy. There's no way it can get around Capetown safely.

The Germans couldn't conquer N. Africa once Hitler decided to invade the USSR (in the summer of 1940, carrying that out a year later). Had they decided to try in 1940 they're still going to have to fight for the Mediterranean against a Royal Navy that can cut off supply.

Of course, that'd save them from the blunder of invading the USSR, but still, they didn't have the navy or the bottoms to see enough divisions to both drive to Abadan and take it, and then safeguard the lines of communication both on land and sea.

They simply could not project power that far in those days.

 

[Howard Gibson]

I'm lucky enough to have Luftwaffe Fighter-Bombers Over Britain (Chris Goss, with Peter Cornwell and Bernd Raubach) sitting on my (much reduced) shelves. It details the extent of the Luftwaffe's low level daylight Jabo attacks on the UK from March 1942 to June 1943.

According to their research, there were 230 separate 'tip and run' attacks against the UK by the Luftwaffe over those 16 months. These ranged from something as small as two Bf 109s bombing coastal towns with another pair covering, all the way up to multi JG, multi attack efforts with 60 plus Jabos and more than 100 other fighter aircraft operating escort, diversionary attacks, withdrawal support and landing site cover.

The RAF were extremely frustrated about their inability to stop these attacks. In August 1942, just eight of 44 Luftwaffe raids - and none of the 26 Jabo attacks - were precceded by radar warnings. The British were also peeved that they generally only caught the Jabos after they'd dropped their bombs and that ground fire wasn't very effective. Luftwaffe combat losses were about 120 to 130 aircraft - mostly by fighters (the Typhoon proved quite successful in early 1943, but Luftwaffe pilots persistently mis-identified the aircraft as a "Tomahawk" or "Curtis").

I wonder how that intensity of operations and losses compares to night bombers?

This is why the RAF brought the Typhoon in to service in spite of problems with the Napier Sabres and the structural failures. If the Luftwaffe had increased their fighter bomber campaign, the RAF would have continued to fly Typhoons, and they would have built more Spitfire_XIIs. By 1943, they had increasing numbers of Spitfire_IXs.

The RAF carried out operations over German occupied Europe to maintain their pilot's and squadron's combat readiness. The Germans got the better of these combats because there was no desperate need to fight unless the odds were good. The Fw-190s helped. Launching nuisance raids over England just gives the RAF the opportunity to engage when the conditions suited them.

 

[Howard Gibson]

I was thinking more of aircraft pulled away from other commitments (the Mediterranean in particular), rather than the actual types of aircraft. I believe there were more than 550 RAF single engine fighters in the MTO by the middle of 1943 - but it's a mottley mix of Spitfires, Hurricanes, Tomahawks/Kittyhawks and some Mustang I/IIs.

I do think USAAF reactions to a 'BoB 2' would be very interesting to speculate on - could you get the P-38 and P-47C to work as defensive interceptors, or does it look to other roles entirely? What does the USAAF do with its Allison powered P-51As? Does it pull back from coastal airfields and let the RAF handle incoming raids, while it focuses on airfield attack and other missions?

Even with a qualitative leap in German aircraft performance, I don't think that controlling UK airspace/shutting down the RAF and USAAF is possible for the Luftwaffe in 1943. Causing plenty of damage, yes. But not to the point of crippling the RAF or USAAF.

1940 was their big chance - when they probably had the greatest advantage and still didn't manage to defeat the RAF.

By 1943, the Spitfire_IXs had better high altitude performance than the Luftwaffe. A re-staging of the Battle of Britain would have perfectly suited them. The short ranged Spitfires were not much use for strategic bombing. Conventional level bombing raids over England would have provided them stuff to shoot at, under conditions that suited their two-speed superchargers.

Let the Spits and Typhoons intercept German raiders, even at low altitude. The Americans can continue their bombing over Germany, and face fewer Luftwaffe fighters.

Launching air raids over England to force the RAF to pull resources from the Mediterranean requires the Luftwaffe to pull resources from the Mediterranean, or from the Russian Front. Perhaps Luftwaffe pilots would prefer to be shot down over Great Britain.

 

[swampyankee]

I do think USAAF reactions to a 'BoB 2' would be very interesting to speculate on - could you get the P-38 and P-47C to work as defensive interceptors, or does it look to other roles entirely? What does the USAAF do with its Allison powered P-51As? Does it pull back from coastal airfields and let the RAF handle incoming raids, while it focuses on airfield attack and other missions?
.

Wasn't the P-38 originally designed as a defensive interceptor?