Howard Gibson
Senior Airman
I don't know if it was specifically designed for that mission, but it had a high rate of climb, it was fast, and it had heavy firepower. It was not a good aircraft to strategically bomb.
Better German Aircraft in 1943 Inflict Crucial Losses of Allied Air Power in Britain?
- Thread starter Romantic Technofreak
- Start date
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Jabberwocky
Staff Sergeant
Ehhhh, sort of.
What really pushed the Typhoon into service was the appearance of the FW 190 in mid to late 1941. The Spitfire Mk V was clearly outclassed across the altitude range. The Typhoon had similar performance below 15,000 ft and it was felt that closing the qualitative gap was worth the trade off of putting a not fully sorted design into operation.
Given 1940-1941 Air Service and Ministry of Aircraft Production orders and production plans, the Typhoon (in some form) was always going to be brought into service in some numbers. By mid 1940, the Air Ministry had ordered close to 2000 Typhoons (and another 500 Tornadoes) and was expecting Hawker to be churning them out at the rate of 200 per month by mid 1942.
This didn't happen - for a variety of reasons. Actual deliveries were about 275 aircraft to the middle of 1942, against expected production of about 1700.
The tip and run raids probably saved the Typhoon from becoming a limited production type with the RAF, cementing it as worth the time and effort despite the difficulties.
The RAF did continue to fly Typhoons ... they just switched from fighter to fighter bomber roles over the course of 1943.
I feel there's a *little" more to it than just that...
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GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
The P-38 was a response to the USAAC's proposal X-608, issued in 1937, that requested a high-altitude, twin engined interceptor.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
It was designed originally as an interceptor.
Shortround6
Major General
The original specification called for an interceptor with two hours of endurance at high speed.
The X-609 proposal (which lead to the groundhog) was supposed to have similar/same? speed/altitude/weapons but with only one hour of endurance.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
I wasn't trying to address endurance at all, just the fact that it was originally intended to be an interceptor.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Going from memory, X-608 was along the USAAC's thinking that enemy bombers were going to appear on the horizon at some point and they wanted an interceptor for that role (shades of YFM-1?)
I beleive X-609 was aimed more toward a point defence single seat/single engine type.
I beleive X-609 was aimed more toward a point defence single seat/single engine type.
Admiral Beez
Major
Just keep hitting the British aircraft factories in 1940 with the existing bomber fleet and you'll do the trick.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
And leave population centers alone (as much as possible).
A bomb dropped on a house is a bomb not dropped on a factory, which results in an angry citizenry and a factory that will continue to build products to kill you with.
Admiral Beez
Major
Apparently British Admiral Somerville got along very well with King. King's parents were Irish-born so probably carried some resentment towards the British occupation of Ireland. Even today when I travel to Ireland for work I don't mention being born in England and instead keep to my friendly, Canadian personna.
- Thread starter
- #111
Romantic Technofreak
Airman
- 37
- Jul 12, 2008
Hi all,
please cling to the basic question and tell me: how many British and American fighters would/could you send to Scotland if there is a dangerous German threat to the North?
About forcing German fighters to prematurely drop their additional tanks, I expect my friends to answer the following: "This may work for the beginning. Luftwaffe leadership will anticipate that and only send a small number of bombers as decoy, escorted by a mulitiude of fighters. When this force is intercepted by Allied fighters, the bombers on the spot return home and leave the theater to a bigger fighter duel. This will always lead to a German advantage, because they have much more of them. And soon the Allied fighter force is worked down - because they have only 200!" After this he thinks, attacks with a real bomber force will compredly easy push through.
So, I hope you understand my plea above. I need something to tell him what I hope even he understands.
nuuumannn
: Please give the source you quote from. My friend and I also used a book from Griehl to argue about the He 177.
T Tkdog : Requirent for the scenario is peace/armistice on the Eastern frontier, even Stalin cooperating with Germany again.
Thumpalumpacus
: See above to Tkdog: Fighting Rommel's troops, the British never had to encouter a number of Axis soldiers more than a army corps. Freeing one or two German armies from the Eastern frontier and sending them to Egypt (combined with satisfying air power), the British would not hold on. The Red Sea and the Persian Gulf are narrow waterways and far from GB or US territory. The British were just very lucky that no sincere Axis threat to their positions happened. Otherways fate had shown that sending supplies to harbours like Suez and Basrah were a very risky enterprise.
A Admiral Beez : No, Sir. We expect American fighters to reach Scottish ground via Greenland and Iceland. Even if British aircraft production were knocked out, the American were not.
So only if the fuel supply to Britain is cut, the German side will win. About the correct way to achieve this, my friend and I disagree.
Once more a big Thank You for your answers!
Regards, RT
please cling to the basic question and tell me: how many British and American fighters would/could you send to Scotland if there is a dangerous German threat to the North?
About forcing German fighters to prematurely drop their additional tanks, I expect my friends to answer the following: "This may work for the beginning. Luftwaffe leadership will anticipate that and only send a small number of bombers as decoy, escorted by a mulitiude of fighters. When this force is intercepted by Allied fighters, the bombers on the spot return home and leave the theater to a bigger fighter duel. This will always lead to a German advantage, because they have much more of them. And soon the Allied fighter force is worked down - because they have only 200!" After this he thinks, attacks with a real bomber force will compredly easy push through.
So, I hope you understand my plea above. I need something to tell him what I hope even he understands.
nuuumannn
: Please give the source you quote from. My friend and I also used a book from Griehl to argue about the He 177.T Tkdog : Requirent for the scenario is peace/armistice on the Eastern frontier, even Stalin cooperating with Germany again.
Thumpalumpacus
: See above to Tkdog: Fighting Rommel's troops, the British never had to encouter a number of Axis soldiers more than a army corps. Freeing one or two German armies from the Eastern frontier and sending them to Egypt (combined with satisfying air power), the British would not hold on. The Red Sea and the Persian Gulf are narrow waterways and far from GB or US territory. The British were just very lucky that no sincere Axis threat to their positions happened. Otherways fate had shown that sending supplies to harbours like Suez and Basrah were a very risky enterprise.A Admiral Beez : No, Sir. We expect American fighters to reach Scottish ground via Greenland and Iceland. Even if British aircraft production were knocked out, the American were not.
So only if the fuel supply to Britain is cut, the German side will win. About the correct way to achieve this, my friend and I disagree.
Once more a big Thank You for your answers!
Regards, RT
buffnut453
Captain
Hi all,
please cling to the basic question and tell me: how many British and American fighters would/could you send to Scotland if there is a dangerous German threat to the North?
About forcing German fighters to prematurely drop their additional tanks, I expect my friends to answer the following: "This may work for the beginning. Luftwaffe leadership will anticipate that and only send a small number of bombers as decoy, escorted by a mulitiude of fighters. When this force is intercepted by Allied fighters, the bombers on the spot return home and leave the theater to a bigger fighter duel. This will always lead to a German advantage, because they have much more of them. And soon the Allied fighter force is worked down - because they have only 200!" After this he thinks, attacks with a real bomber force will compredly easy push through.
So, I hope you understand my plea above. I need something to tell him what I hope even he understands.
T Tkdog : Requirent for the scenario is peace/armistice on the Eastern frontier, even Stalin cooperating with Germany again.
A Admiral Beez : No, Sir. We expect American fighters to reach Scottish ground via Greenland and Iceland. Even if British aircraft production were knocked out, the American were not.
So only if the fuel supply to Britain is cut, the German side will win. About the correct way to achieve this, my friend and I disagree.
Once more a big Thank You for your answers!
Regards, RT
The answer is....they'll send as many as are needed to meet the threat. In 1943, Fighter Command is stronger than it was in 1940 and there are USAAF fighters in addition that could be used for critical defence operations.
Please bear in mind that one of the key traits of air power is ubiquity: the ability to operate wherever needed within the range of the aircraft. Thus squadrons can move around as needed to confront the threat.
Finally, exactly what critical targets will be hit in Scotland? The RN anchorages would be a good target, as would the industrial towns of Aberdeen and Glasgow (and to a lesser extent Edinburgh). However, the vast majority of UK military production and strategic targets were in England. The Luftwaffe is NEVER going to eradicate the RAF in 1943 by attacking Scotland. Aside from anything else, the only way the Luftwaffe could generate any sizeable force would be by removing units from the Eastern Front....and that's simply impractical.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
Problems:
1) Transporting those troops and then supplying them through a Mediterranean Sea heavily contested by the Royal Navy (including submarines, not particularly vulnerable to Fliegerkorps X) and RAF assets, so that they can even take the North African coast in the first place.
2) Producing the fuel used to mount the drive to Abadan, which is about 1500 miles by road from Cairo -- all the time securing that supply-line against enemy attack. How many tanks are you bringing, and how thirsty are they? Does Germany have that fuel on hand? Remember, at one point DAK was using three liters of fuel in transport to get one liter of fuel to the front -- in eastern Libya. Don't forget feeding the troops.
3) Getting the oil or refined products back will require tankers to either cross the same Med, or exit the natural chokepoint of the Straits of Hormuz. With British bases in South Africa basing ships to interdict the Cape route (they also have basing at Aden and could probably use Diego Garcia for this purpose), and British ships and subs based from Gibraltar contesting the Med, how much of that fuel will get to Germany? Do the Axis even have the tankers in numbers to do the job?
The Brits weren't "lucky". They controlled both ends of the Med, and Suez was going to be a tough a nut to crack, as their troops in NA would be falling back on their supply lines and they could call upon units in Palestine and the Levant for reinforcement.
Then, too, you must convince Hitler to not invade Russia. Given that this was a basic premise of his Lebensraum aim, that seems like a pretty big hurdle.
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Shortround6
Major General
Yes, we all know how well that tactic worked for the British with the whole "lean into France" thing.
And the British usually only had to cross around 100 miles of water each way.
Crossing 300 miles of water each way makes things a lot more difficult (read higher losses from damaged aircraft not making it back)
Heinkel He 177, 277, 274 by Manfred Griehl and Joachim Dressel Airlife, England, 1998 is the main source from where I got the info.
Annotations as follows:
"in mid 1942 E-Stelle 177 reported that the aircraft had a range of 1,305 miles, with a maximum speed of just 244 mph while carrying a 2,000 kg (4,400 lb) load, lower than expected, which led to conclusions that maritime attacks could not be made before March 1943."
This comes from p.59, the quote about maritime attacks being made by Oberstleutnant Petersen of the E-Stelle 177 in mid 1942.
"The He 177A-3 was also a maintenance hog; after every sortie each aircraft required extensive maintenance checks, a 25 hour servicing owing to the sophistication of some of the equipment on board, which suffered consistent failures operationally. It was recognised as being far more maintenance intensive than the Fw 200."
This comes from P.61.
"By early 1943, it was recorded that 26 faulty DB 610 engines had to be replaced within the Staffeln. By August 1943, only 20 He 177A-3s were built and there was a shortfall of around 800 (!) replacement serviceable engines required for completed aircraft and airframes on the production line. Bearing in mind that production and delivery was slow and intermittent to the Staffeln, this was a serious blow to the type's availability."
This comes from p.69/70, although there is an error of grammar on my part, "By August 1943" should read "In August 1943".
"In operational service the aircraft experienced constant mechanical faults, which reduced available numbers, let alone the continuing engine issues, which, by April 1944 only four replacement units had been delivered for 60 He 177s in service."
This info comes from P.85 and includes the following: "Numerous major and minor faults regularly reduced the number of serviceable aircraft available.", followed by a description outlining lack of servicing equipment, with my last statement coming from the last paragraph on that page.
"Following these, I and II KG 1 aircraft were withdrawn back to Germany, and some had their equipment stripped and were scrapped rather than undergoing repair."
P.91, following the statement "1 and 2 KG I were withdrawn from operations by 28 July 1944", with the previous two pages detailing the low-level attacks.
In support of the general statement the type was not ready for combat, on pg.77: "Major Schede had to report to the KdE, Oberstleutnant Petersen, that the "He 177 is not suitable for operations in its present form." This was in the summer of 1942.
Erhard Milch in January 1943 recounted on p.83: "Considering the six bad accidents involving the He 177s of I/KG 50 within 14 days, I request the withdrawal of this formation from operations and transfer back to homeland." The previous three pages detail the aircraft's use and highlights the accidents the type suffered, to do with faulty engines.
Need I continue. There are numerous quotes from the book I could have included regarding poor serviceability, poor availability, bad engines and delivery of replacements to the units and crashes as a result of engine failures and other technical issues to fill an entire book. The final chapter outlines some of the bad decision making that went on regarding introducing the aircraft into service, but begins by stating what we already know, that the engines were notoriously bad and were the source of much delay, unserviceability and unavailability, not to mention structural failure owing to weak construction, for example.
In short, the He 177 was a disaster and it was by no means ready for combat in 1943. Any other conclusion is a simple refusal to accept the reality behind this aircraft.
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buffnut453
Captain
Jabberwocky
Staff Sergeant
.
Those are two very different questions. But the answer for both is the same: it depends.
How many fighters the RAF and USAAF would deploy would be based very much on the perception of how 'dangerous' the threat is compared to other sectors. How frequent the raids are, what the targets are, what the raid size is, what the composition is, what sort of warning time are they getting, what kind of damage is being done, what sort of targets are being hit, how accurate or not are the raids. Those sort of things.
As for how many they could send - that would be based on the requirements in other sectors, along with the ability of RAF/Coastal Command/Fleet Air Arm/Bomber Command airfields in the area to operate fighters from.
If there's no major danger in the Southeast, it's pretty easy to pivot North. If there's equal threats to strategic targets, then why shouldn't the RAF/USAAF meet them with equal levels of strength?
Raids in the North bring up the question of what the Royal Navy is going to be doing (Scappa Flow being rather important). My Fleet Air Arm knowledge is limited, but does anyone else know how many squadrons the FAA had in/around Scotland over 1943? Also, when did the FAA's first Hellcats arrive in Europe?
Those are two very different questions. But the answer for both is the same: it depends.
How many fighters the RAF and USAAF would deploy would be based very much on the perception of how 'dangerous' the threat is compared to other sectors. How frequent the raids are, what the targets are, what the raid size is, what the composition is, what sort of warning time are they getting, what kind of damage is being done, what sort of targets are being hit, how accurate or not are the raids. Those sort of things.
As for how many they could send - that would be based on the requirements in other sectors, along with the ability of RAF/Coastal Command/Fleet Air Arm/Bomber Command airfields in the area to operate fighters from.
If there's no major danger in the Southeast, it's pretty easy to pivot North. If there's equal threats to strategic targets, then why shouldn't the RAF/USAAF meet them with equal levels of strength?
Raids in the North bring up the question of what the Royal Navy is going to be doing (Scappa Flow being rather important). My Fleet Air Arm knowledge is limited, but does anyone else know how many squadrons the FAA had in/around Scotland over 1943? Also, when did the FAA's first Hellcats arrive in Europe?
Tell him you posted his questions on a WW2 aviation forum and everyone agreed the Germans would have won. It will save you A LOT of time arguing a false argument.Hi all,
please cling to the basic question and tell me: how many British and American fighters would/could you send to Scotland if there is a dangerous German threat to the North?
About forcing German fighters to prematurely drop their additional tanks, I expect my friends to answer the following: "This may work for the beginning. Luftwaffe leadership will anticipate that and only send a small number of bombers as decoy, escorted by a mulitiude of fighters. When this force is intercepted by Allied fighters, the bombers on the spot return home and leave the theater to a bigger fighter duel. This will always lead to a German advantage, because they have much more of them. And soon the Allied fighter force is worked down - because they have only 200!" After this he thinks, attacks with a real bomber force will compredly easy push through.
So, I hope you understand my plea above. I need something to tell him what I hope even he understands.
T Tkdog : Requirent for the scenario is peace/armistice on the Eastern frontier, even Stalin cooperating with Germany again.
A Admiral Beez : No, Sir. We expect American fighters to reach Scottish ground via Greenland and Iceland. Even if British aircraft production were knocked out, the American were not.
So only if the fuel supply to Britain is cut, the German side will win. About the correct way to achieve this, my friend and I disagree.
Once more a big Thank You for your answers!
Regards, RT
800 and 804 squadrons were the first operational FAA squadrons to receive Hellcats in July and Aug 1943 while based in Northern Ireland. They first deployed aboard the escort carrier Emperor at the beginning of Dec. The next didn't form until March 1944.
Most FAA fighter squadrons in late 1943 were deployed in the Med. Those at home were generally based at Macrahanish on the west coast, Northern Ireland or in England as they worked up or undertook deck landing practice. The only units at FAA bases in the Orkneys would be fleet requirements units (target towing etc) or from Home Fleet carriers between sorties. In the second half of 1943 that mostly meant 801 with Seafires on Furious and VF-4 F4F-4 from USS Ranger (deployed to the Home Fleet between Aug & Nov to release Illustrious for the Med).
There were a number of RAF fighter stations in 14 Group (HQ Inverness) of Fighter Command. Places like Castletown (near Wick), Peterhead (north of Aberdeen) and Skeabrae in the Orkney Islands. Squadrons would be rotated through these bases to give them a rest from operations in the south. In April 1943 for example 131 squadron was at Castletown and 66 and 234 at Skeabrae all on Spitfires with 245 on Typhoons at Peterhead.
Squadrons moving north would generally leave their aircraft down south, inheriting airframes already at these northern stations. So they would generally be Mk.V Spitfires. However a number of high altitude Spitfire Mk.VI and later Mk.VII were maintained at Skeabrae to intercept high altitude Luftwaffe recce aircraft attempting to photograph Scapa Flow.
Most FAA fighter squadrons in late 1943 were deployed in the Med. Those at home were generally based at Macrahanish on the west coast, Northern Ireland or in England as they worked up or undertook deck landing practice. The only units at FAA bases in the Orkneys would be fleet requirements units (target towing etc) or from Home Fleet carriers between sorties. In the second half of 1943 that mostly meant 801 with Seafires on Furious and VF-4 F4F-4 from USS Ranger (deployed to the Home Fleet between Aug & Nov to release Illustrious for the Med).
There were a number of RAF fighter stations in 14 Group (HQ Inverness) of Fighter Command. Places like Castletown (near Wick), Peterhead (north of Aberdeen) and Skeabrae in the Orkney Islands. Squadrons would be rotated through these bases to give them a rest from operations in the south. In April 1943 for example 131 squadron was at Castletown and 66 and 234 at Skeabrae all on Spitfires with 245 on Typhoons at Peterhead.
Squadrons moving north would generally leave their aircraft down south, inheriting airframes already at these northern stations. So they would generally be Mk.V Spitfires. However a number of high altitude Spitfire Mk.VI and later Mk.VII were maintained at Skeabrae to intercept high altitude Luftwaffe recce aircraft attempting to photograph Scapa Flow.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
I just had the same thought about an hour ago!
