Better German naval strategy 1930-1945?

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Winning the MTO would have been a major accomplishment for the Axis. They might have been able to access petroleum in the middle east, and prevent the Allies from using the Suez. And with Malta falling, their fleet & air power could concentrate on blocking Allied forces from breaking into the Med from Gibraltar.
This is the problem looking at the"MTO" as a single theatre. The distances involved are huge. Winning the war in Libya / Egypt (North Africa) still leaves a huge task before getting your hands on significant quantities of oil.

Once you get to the Suez Canal you are still 750-1000+ miles as the crow flies (longer by road) away from the oilfields around Kirkuk in Iraq and at the head of the Persian Gulf with its big oil refinery at Abadan.

There was a small, even by WW2 standards, oil field in Egypt on the Red Sea coast IIRC, but no refining capacity. There were refineries at Haifa in Palestine (British mandate territory) and at Tripoli in Lebanon (Vichy French controlled until mid-1941), but they drew their crude oil supply by pipeline across the desert from the Kirkuk oilfields.

Britain maintained a lot of troops in the ME outwith N.A. during WW2 under various commands at different times. Check out 9th & 10th armies. Immediately prior to war with Japan the region was being reinforced against the possibility of Soviet collapse or Turkey entering the war on the Axis side.

The Med was shut to through shipping traffic from mid-1940 to mid-1943. A lot of the resupply was unloaded at ports like Suez at the southern end of the Canal. In mid-1942 A part of the Med Fleet, including the subs, was withdrawn to Beirut & Haifa. Losing the Canal would not have ended the fight in the ME.

From mid-1940 there was really 2 naval campaigns in the Med. The Med Fleet based on Alexandria (about 150 miles west of the Canal) and Force H based on Gibraltar. Both about 1,000 miles from Malta. Once Malta falls those forces are free for other purposes. Force H also had responsibilities covering the Atlantic, as during the Bismarck chase.
 
The Weimar light cruisers and other light stuff (steam torpedo boats and destroyers) are still going to be very useful. They did a lot of mine laying for one thing. The 3 armored ships also gave the British a lot of heartburn during the 30s and into 1940. Something like 19 ships to chase down the Graf Spee alone. It is in the 30s that they seem to have come off the rails. How many times did they have to refuel the Prinz Eugen during the Operation Rheinübung? Twice after leaving the Bismarck? An ocean raider it was not. And the early bow on the Hipper and Blucher? Again, where were they going to operate it? In the Baltic? And the Machinery was crap. It may have had the most powerful 8in guns of any WW II cruiser (or 2nd) and it may have had the most armor but it couldn't operate in bad weather and need a fleet of tankers to even run around in the North Atlantic? Long range light cruisers with 6-9 15cm guns might have been a better bet. The ugly twins were a better deal. They force the French to reply and they need a lot more attention than simply adding an extra couple of cruisers to the hunters. Is a Hipper worth 2 or 3 Countys if you don't have BC handy? Scharnhorst forced deployment of capital ships. B & T maybe more questionable. Anything past the Tirpitz is a waste. The British can out build the Germans, Forcing them into certain path is one thing. Making the path a little wider or thicker may not give good return on investment.

Mines and torpedo boats are arguably the core of a coastal defense fleet, so even if you forgo a blue water surface fleet you want those.

Per wiki the Hippers had a range of 6800 nm at 20kn, compared to 8000 nm at 10kn for the Counties and 10000 nm at 15 kn for the Baltimores (later dropping to 7000 nm with later heavier variants). Or 10000 nm at 20 kn for the Deutschlands. So the Hippers do seem short-legged, but not dramatically so (particularly once one takes into account the speed at which those wiki numbers are quoted at). Maybe they were running at high speed to evade Allied warships, which would obviously have eaten up the fuel a lot faster? But yes, something like a light cruiser in the 10000 ton range with long range, reliable machinery, and decent seakeeping would have been better.

Easiest thing is to can the carrier before it is laid down. It was more a case of "keeping up the the Jones's " than a real operational need.

Fair enough, however this doesn't save that much resources. Though in addition to the GZ & Seydlitz themselves, you have the all the effort that went into developing naval aircraft etc that could have been spent more usefully.

That being said, the 1000-year Reich evidently planned to be around after the war (the name kind of gives it away), so developing naval aviation for the eventuality that it eclipses battleships as the king of the seas would have been prudent. Of course, once the war starts (or in particular, after the war becomes an existential crisis) it would have made sense to put any naval aviation projects on ice.

forget the idea of blasting your way into a protected convoy. The Hippers were both too expensive and yet not armed and armored well enough to duke it out with even British 8in Cruisers.

So what are the surface raiders supposed to do then? Pick off lone merchants, for which something like a fast light cruiser or even an auxiliary cruiser is good enough? Or just function as a force in being?

British can afford to loose cruisers. The existing Germans cannot.

Yes, and further, a mission killed British warships can likely limp into port and be repaired whereas a mission killed German warship would likely be hunted down and sunk.

Germans operated in the early part of the war like submersible torpedo boats. At night they fought on the surface and used their speed to attack the convoys and evade many of the early British escorts (11-12knt trawlers).

This of course changed with faster escorts and radar, but at the time it wasn't a bad strategy, was it?
 
The other possibility is that another assault is being prepared to cut access to Crimea through Ukraine once forces are drawn
off to the Kursk area. This would leave a well known bridge as the only way in for Russia.

Wrong thread!?
 
Mines and torpedo boats are arguably the core of a coastal defense fleet, so even if you forgo a blue water surface fleet you want those.
Germans were building these, some dispute as to actual effectiveness.
0px-German_Torpedo_Boat_T_21_at_sea_on_2_July_1946.jpg

But not blue water, they would barely make the North Sea on a bad day. But you want some ships that can escort the Narvik ore convoys.
Fair enough, however this doesn't save that much resources. Though in addition to the GZ & Seydlitz themselves, you have the all the effort that went into developing naval aircraft etc that could have been spent more usefully.
Problem for the Germans (and any other late comers) is while they were working on the Graf Zeppelin the British were working on the Ark Royal, 4 Illustrious and had laid down the Implacable in March of 1939. This was a building race the Germans had no hope of winning. And building and trying to run one carrier depended on a crap load of luck. Out of the first 4 British carriers lost, 3 were by submarine and one was by surface ship guns. Depending on a single carrier (or even two) for your whole fleet depends on very good luck.
So what are the surface raiders supposed to do then? Pick off lone merchants, for which something like a fast light cruiser or even an auxiliary cruiser is good enough? Or just function as a force in being?
It kind of depends on the escorts, The Rawalpindi wasn't escorting anything. It was patrolling the area around Iceland. A decent cruiser (or pair) could fight such a ship and break into a convoy. But fighting actual modern British Cruisers even with a Hipper was too dangerous. The Hipper would win a one on one dual but the danger of crippling damage was too great. Graf Spee proved that. The Exeter was one of the two weakest 8in cruisers the British had and the two other cruisers had eight 6 in guns apiece.
This of course changed with faster escorts and radar, but at the time it wasn't a bad strategy, was it?
It was a very good tactic at the time. It also called for slightly different boats than the British were building. The British boats were usually 2-3 kts slower than the German boats on the surface. British boats were 1-2 kts faster underwater.

The Germans also needed high surface speed to bring the boats together form the wolf packs.

As far as German Maritime patrol aircraft go. The main problem was just building them, The Fw 200 wasn't bad, they just didn't order enough because they were waiting for the He 177, and waiting, and waiting and.............................
If the thing could leave France, fly around Ireland, head towards Iceland and then turn and fly to Norway and then come back a few days later why are you fooling around with in flight refueling? How many hours do you expect the crew to stay in the plane? Order enough planes so you can fly 2 missions a day or more. Not one mission every two-three days.
 
Problem for the Germans (and any other late comers) is while they were working on the Graf Zeppelin the British were working on the Ark Royal, 4 Illustrious and had laid down the Implacable in March of 1939. This was a building race the Germans had no hope of winning. And building and trying to run one carrier depended on a crap load of luck. Out of the first 4 British carriers lost, 3 were by submarine and one was by surface ship guns. Depending on a single carrier (or even two) for your whole fleet depends on very good luck.

Well, this applies to battleships as well. Or cruisers. Or destroyers. The British could outbuild the Germans, and given the importance of sea power to the existence of UK as a nation, would make sure to do it as well. And of course Britain had a head start, not having to scrap her navy due to the Versailles treaty.

Only in u-boats did the Germans manage to outbuild the British, and that's probably largely due to the UK not needing such a huge number of submarines for her needs.

But yes, if you do go for carriers you need to build a bunch of them so as not to have all your sea power disappear in one stroke if you lose one of them. Though arguably the same applies to gun-based ships as well.

It kind of depends on the escorts, The Rawalpindi wasn't escorting anything. It was patrolling the area around Iceland. A decent cruiser (or pair) could fight such a ship and break into a convoy. But fighting actual modern British Cruisers even with a Hipper was too dangerous. The Hipper would win a one on one dual but the danger of crippling damage was too great. Graf Spee proved that. The Exeter was one of the two weakest 8in cruisers the British had and the two other cruisers had eight 6 in guns apiece.

Yes. I think that it seems gun matches between roughly equally matched ships usually tended to go to the one who first managed to land serious hits on the opponent, as such hits would reduce the "fighting power" of the ship and thus spiral into an increasingly lopsided match.

So in order to beat a treaty cruiser without unduly risking serious damage to yourself, you probably need something akin to the "PBB2" envisioned somewhere on page 1 or 2 of this thread. Keep the 28 cm guns of the Deutschlands, but add armor against 8" fire and sufficient speed to run away from superior forces. Probably means something around 20-25000 tons. Or even a full-blown battlecruiser, the class of ships which was originally designed to hunt cruisers. Problem here is of course that such ships become expensive enough that Germany cannot afford many of them, and this makes it easier for the Allies to gang up on such a ship with superior forces.

Maybe a better option indeed is the fast light cruiser mentioned previously in the thread? Enough armament and armor to fight destroyers, ASW escorts, and merchant cruisers, run away from anything else including enemy light cruisers.

It was a very good tactic at the time. It also called for slightly different boats than the British were building. The British boats were usually 2-3 kts slower than the German boats on the surface. British boats were 1-2 kts faster underwater.

The Germans also needed high surface speed to bring the boats together form the wolf packs.

While the Type XXI was evidently a bridge too far, it seems they could have made a significantly simpler and cheaper boat than XXI that was still better than the VII. Something inbetween the VII and XXI? Take the streamlined hull and conning tower approach of the XXI with the turreted 30mm AA guns, lose the deck gun, and even without the massive battery pack and huge electric motors of the XXI it should be possible to get a significant submerged speed boost?

Make a variant with an extra hull section with more fuel and stores, and this can replace the Type IX for long range patrols as well?

As far as German Maritime patrol aircraft go. The main problem was just building them, The Fw 200 wasn't bad, they just didn't order enough because they were waiting for the He 177, and waiting, and waiting and.............................
If the thing could leave France, fly around Ireland, head towards Iceland and then turn and fly to Norway and then come back a few days later why are you fooling around with in flight refueling? How many hours do you expect the crew to stay in the plane? Order enough planes so you can fly 2 missions a day or more. Not one mission every two-three days.

Chris from MAH seems to think the FW 200 did have several quite major flaws:

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=831kbAyx3I4

That being said, having more planes, albeit flawed, beats waiting for the successor that never arrives..
 
Germany going all-in on u-boats means the UK home fleet can be mostly deployed to the MTO, and the US capital ships can all be deployed to the Pacific. Still, there would be a great demand for escort carriers and corvettes/DEs/frigates/whatever. So sacrifice, say, the Iowas and Alaskas, some Liberty ships, and instead churn out an extra 100 CVE's, 500 corvettes, and deploy B-24's for patrol duties rather than to bombing Europe. Germany might succeed in delaying D-day until 1945, though is the invasion needed by then or are the Soviets already in Paris? And of course with the home fleet supporting the MTO, North Africa collapses and Italy probably drops out of the war sooner.
Don't know about skipping the Iowas but not wasting resources on the Alaskas would've been a good idea.
 
Don't know about skipping the Iowas

The greatest fast battleships still afloat! But, they never contributed much to WWII, did they?

Of course, they didn't know that when they were ordered. But if a much greater u-boat threat would have prioritized building a million ton of ASW focused hardware before laying them down, by that time they might have seen that the future belongs to aircraft, and subsequently converted the Iowa order to Essexes, or even Midways?
 
The greatest fast battleships still afloat! But, they never contributed much to WWII, did they?

Of course, they didn't know that when they were ordered. But if a much greater u-boat threat would have prioritized building a million ton of ASW focused hardware before laying them down, by that time they might have seen that the future belongs to aircraft, and subsequently converted the Iowa order to Essexes, or even Midways?

They better have the new and improved Ball, Crystal, MkII for that sort of planning.
 
Per wiki the Hippers had a range of 6800 nm at 20kn, compared to 8000 nm at 10kn for the Counties and 10000 nm at 15 kn for the Baltimores (later dropping to 7000 nm with later heavier variants). Or 10000 nm at 20 kn for the Deutschlands. So the Hippers do seem short-legged, but not dramatically so (particularly once one takes into account the speed at which those wiki numbers are quoted at). Maybe they were running at high speed to evade Allied warships, which would obviously have eaten up the fuel a lot faster? But yes, something like a light cruiser in the 10000 ton range with long range, reliable machinery, and decent seakeeping would have been better.
Just quickly (I'm supposed to be working for the man), while the Hippers had range of 6,800 nm @ 20 kn in peace situations (aka running on cruising turbines); that drops to just 3,080 nm @ 21 kn when they're running on main turbines (i.e. prepared to run when you accidentally bump into equal/superior RN forces).

RN ships may always cruise on the cruising turbines - if they bump into a CA/BC/BB, they just need to maintain contact long enough to call for help.

Diesels in Deutschlands don't compromise range.
 
They better have the new and improved Ball, Crystal, MkII for that sort of planning.

Perhaps I didn't explain myself clearly. My argument was that churning out a million tons worth of CVE's and DE's would take some time, even with the immense industrial resources of the USA. By the time that is done and the Iowas are next in line to be laid down, sufficient time might have passed for the USN to have second thoughts whether they really need them or would it be more useful to build, say, 4 Midways instead.

Then again, CVE's and DE's were built mostly in civilian yards, so they might not be competing with the Iowas for slipway space? In which case the above argument is invalid?
 
The greatest fast battleships still afloat! But, they never contributed much to WWII, did they?

Of course, they didn't know that when they were ordered. But if a much greater u-boat threat would have prioritized building a million ton of ASW focused hardware before laying them down, by that time they might have seen that the future belongs to aircraft, and subsequently converted the Iowa order to Essexes, or even Midways?
Everyone remembers the 4 Iowas completed (2 ordered July 1939 & 2 ordered June 1940 that completed Feb 1943 to June 1944)

Everyone forgets the additional pair ordered in Sept 1940, Illinois & Kentucky. Illinois laid down Dec 1942, or Jan 1944 or Jan 1945 depending on the source. Whatever, the build was delayed by higher priorities. Kentucky laid down March 1942, suspended in June and her bottom structure launched to clear the slip for LST production. Work began agin on her in a dry dock in Dec 1944.
 
Perhaps I didn't explain myself clearly. My argument was that churning out a million tons worth of CVE's and DE's would take some time, even with the immense industrial resources of the USA. By the time that is done and the Iowas are next in line to be laid down, sufficient time might have passed for the USN to have second thoughts whether they really need them or would it be more useful to build, say, 4 Midways instead.

Then again, CVE's and DE's were built mostly in civilian yards, so they might not be competing with the Iowas for slipway space? In which case the above argument is invalid?

I don't think we'd need another hundred CVEs in addition to the 75 we built. Put 50 in the Atlantic, keep 25 in the Pacific to service the 3rd/5th Fleet and support landing ops, that still leaves you with 16 CVEs on station in the Atlantic leading hunter-killer groups, 16 in resupply/refit, 16 in transit to or from patrol stations.

That's roughly 1 CVE for every 6 U-boats on patrol (based on the same 1/3 rotation of forces). That's 24-30 aircraft per U-boat, and you don't have to sink them -- you only need to keep them underwater while the convoy passes.

Thus, I don't think the construction of BBs will be affected.
 
The problems of time would have been the main obstacle to the 300+ u-boat fleet concept (I think).

As mentioned already by others, the intel that would probably have been available to the UK as to what the Germans were building has to be taken into account.

When does the German high command adopt Donitz' plan (or some approximation thereof)?

How long would it take for the Kriegsmarine to reach the 300+ number? Hence, how long does the UK have to adapt its shipbuilding program?

How much/quickly would the UK modify its shipbuilding plans to adapt to the 300+ u-boat navy even if it was the main problem, and would they even decide it was the main problem? (We are operating from hindsight for the most part, but are we correct in our estimates of the effect such a departure from the original timeline would have?)

The RN battle fleet might be freed up if there were no B/T/S/G/GZ, etc, but does that mean there would be any effective use for the RN big boys elsewhere in the ETO/MTO? Battlehips and cruisers are somehat worthless for ASW. If I were Donitz, with 300+ u-boats at my disposal, I would go hunting the RN surface fleet in a big way. I do not know enough about the historical deployments of the u-boats for purposes other than commerce raiding, but the general feeling I get from what I have read is that most of the sinkings of RN surface combatants happened simply because they showed up at the scene - ie Courageous, Eagle, Ark Royal, Barham, to name the capital ships (I am not counting Royal Oak because I think that can be said to be an intentional S&D mission by the u-boats at Scapa Flow). How much effect would the ability to seriously go after the RN major surface fleet combatants have?

As far as a 'successful' 300+ u-boat plan goes, I think we kind of have to assume that France still falls - either in the same way as it did originally, or shortly (6 months or so?) thereafter. Without the FoF the deployment of the u-boats probably becomes significantly less effective - particularly in the MTO as there would be no bases outside of Italy(?).
 
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Perhaps I didn't explain myself clearly. My argument was that churning out a million tons worth of CVE's and DE's would take some time, even with the immense industrial resources of the USA. By the time that is done and the Iowas are next in line to be laid down, sufficient time might have passed for the USN to have second thoughts whether they really need them or would it be more useful to build, say, 4 Midways instead.

Then again, CVE's and DE's were built mostly in civilian yards, so they might not be competing with the Iowas for slipway space? In which case the above argument is invalid?
The Midways were controversial ships even within the USN. The design was approved by SecNav in March 1942, with 4 included in the Max War Programme of Aug 1942. They were the only item in that Programme that FDR refused to authorise as he thought that they would take to long to build - ships for the next war as he saw them. By allocating ships 2 & 4 to the New York Navy Yard it was then thought possible to complete them quicker. They had capacity because the Montana class battleships had been suspended but that still required the new dry docks intended for that purpose to be completed. FDR finally approved construction of the first pair at Newport News and the NY Navy Yard on 29 Dec 1942 and a third at Newport News in May 1943. Ship 4 had been cancelled in Jan 1943. It was late 1943 however before the first pair could be laid down.

These ships were so large that there were few places that could build them. A proposal to build one in the new dry dock at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, intended for a Montana was not workable because it was used to build 2 Baltimore class heavy cruisers simultaneously. As it was some juggling of Essex class carrier orders was necessary to build Midway.
 
Chris from MAH seems to think the FW 200 did have several quite major flaws:

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=831kbAyx3I4

That being said, having more planes, albeit flawed, beats waiting for the successor that never arrives.
Germany had several maritime types besides the Fw200, such as the Do217, Ju290, BV222, etc.
The main problem was that they did not have enough.

As for the Fw200, it was a good aircraft and contributed greatly against Allied shipping.
 
Well, this applies to battleships as well. Or cruisers. Or destroyers. The British could outbuild the Germans, and given the importance of sea power to the existence of UK as a nation, would make sure to do it as well. And of course Britain had a head start, not having to scrap her navy due to the Versailles treaty.
British could and did out build the Germans and the Germans (some of them) seemed to forget that.
Germany may have done OK with the scrapping/scuttling of the High Seas fleet. British in 1918 had 13 capital ships (or 12 if you count each Repulse as 1/2) that were oil fired. That is 100% oil fired. Germany had.......count them.............0. They had some ships that could spray oil fuel on coal in the boilers to help out with sprint speed. Bayern carried 3350tons of coal and 610 tons of oil. British had the same 12-13 ships with 15in guns, German had 2 ships with 15 in guns.
Germany was well behind the British construction during WW I and anything they would have been allowed to keep over and above the Versailles treaty was obsolete and/or needed extensive reconstruction.
The Mackensen class was better protected than the Tiger but were not really better armed. The most complete one was still 12 months from being finished when work stopped.
Only in u-boats did the Germans manage to outbuild the British, and that's probably largely due to the UK not needing such a huge number of submarines for her needs.
Well, there are only so many subs you can put into the Baltic sea ;)
Build what you need, not what the other guy built.
But yes, if you do go for carriers you need to build a bunch of them so as not to have all your sea power disappear in one stroke if you lose one of them. Though arguably the same applies to gun-based ships as well.
Well, the Germans did have 4 baskets (or 4 + 3 half baskets) instead of 1. Even before radar skewing your navy to operate best in good weather in the NA doesn't seem to be a good plan. The Guns ships could (before radar) take advantage of poor weather/visibility to elude pursuit. Maybe not a great plan but sending out 1 (2?) carriers to face 5-6 Modern (newer than the Furious and sisters) carriers in good weather does not seem like a good plan.
Maybe a better option indeed is the fast light cruiser mentioned previously in the thread? Enough armament and armor to fight destroyers, ASW escorts, and merchant cruisers, run away from anything else including enemy light cruisers.
This is probably a better plan. It forces the British to spread out their Cruisers even more. British had a crap load of old WW I cruisers which had problems in the NA. Short range, wet, slow and the main battery was light and short ranged. They may have been better than the armed merchant cruisers but they were a large step below even the Leanders. (fire control, exposed gun crews, slow rate of fire in long gun action, etc)
While the Type XXI was evidently a bridge too far, it seems they could have made a significantly simpler and cheaper boat than XXI that was still better than the VII. Something inbetween the VII and XXI? Take the streamlined hull and conning tower approach of the XXI with the turreted 30mm AA guns, lose the deck gun, and even without the massive battery pack and huge electric motors of the XXI it should be possible to get a significant submerged speed boost?
A streamlined conning tower only bought so much. Both the British and Americans did several refit/rebuild programs on their WW II subs. Extending to new motors and new battery packs and sometimes cutting the hull in two and adding in extra length to fit in much higher Battery capacity.
See Greater Underwater Propulsion Power Program - Wikipedia.
Chris from MAH seems to think the FW 200 did have several quite major flaws:
It did have some major flaws, they also did minimal changes because the He 177 was just around the corner, or the next corner, we can't to improve the Fw 200 now as the He 177 is surely on the next block and then...............................................

B-17Gs were NOT B-17Ds with extra gun turrets.
 

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