Admiral Beez
Major
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Better German naval strategy 1930-1945? (1 Viewer)
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Glider
Captain
At the end of the day, Germany didn't have a Navy worthy of the name. A handful of cruisers and about a dozen destroyers plus some torpedo boats, wouldn't have stood a chance.
Or as this is still a wiff thread, think about what the KM (or rather the Reichsmarine) would have been like if the British and Americans had convinced the French to raise the Versailles conditions somewhere at the end of 1928. Namely, as soon as the details about the Panzerschiffe appeared, the British became inclined to talk about the German fleet (not to mention that AGNA is the result of the British desire to stop building the other 3 (Versailles) Panzerschiffe). At that time (1928) the Germans wanted to join the WNT agreement with a capital ship quota of 125 kt. We know the history, but is this a wiff?
On the other hand, if the Panzerships were a thorn in the side of the British, somehow the most logical thing is to either get what you can (cancellation of the Treaty of Versailles - and that only happened in 1936, so it's late for building big navy) or continue in a direction that does not suit the (future) opponent. KM with 6x Deutschland class and all other diesel-powered cruisers & destroyers (I mean long radius).. a big problem for the RN.
And one more thing, warships have been the subject of international agreements since WWI, so ... everyone knew the exact years when something could be built (that is, when an old capital ship or crusier can be replaced with a new one - for example, even the ancient ones pre-dreadnought of KM (RM) had to wait for the replacement time, and theirs cruisers were limited to 6 kt). Only some classes of coastal and auxiliary ships were not limited in number (but they were in tonnage and armament). So Germany didn't have much room for changes in tonnage (or main calibre off guns) and that's why Deutschland class caused a storm as an unconventional design. Those contracts were valid for everyone, including RN, so one of the concerns of RN was the comparison of new and old BBs (because speed, type of armour, construction design, optics, guns ... are not same in 20 years difference). Most reconstructions of capital ships were precisely caused by the impossibility of building new ships.
Bismarck was the notion of a new and dangerous adversary (for the RN) as if we didn't count KGV (which sailed to hunt him with fitting crews still a board) the latest BBs were Nelson & Rodney of '27.
Somehow I think that KM with 6x Deutschland, and 2 to 3 Scharnhorst (but diesel and with 3x3x380, so the proper treaty 35kt) and some accompanying cruisers / large ocean destroyers would be a significant problem for the RN '39-'41.And perhaps the tonnage of an individual BB would be raised, for even more formidable battleships because with Bismarck the tonnage was not cheated, but an increase in weight was escalator clause in accordance with the WNT/LNT. In addition, I would add a larger number (slightly larger due to the range and load capacity of mines) schnellbot, and necessarily (in addition to the usual collection of seaplanes / floatplanes) a dedicated rikko anti-ship geschwader or two, and at least one long-range reconnaissance / anti-ship (say based on the Do 19 but with 4x Bramo 323 or Jumo 211). They would probably be significantly more usable than the Condor.
And, perhaps, it would not be bad to supplement the fleet that can go to the Atlantic with two smaller (say 18kt) carriers?
On the other hand, if the Panzerships were a thorn in the side of the British, somehow the most logical thing is to either get what you can (cancellation of the Treaty of Versailles - and that only happened in 1936, so it's late for building big navy) or continue in a direction that does not suit the (future) opponent. KM with 6x Deutschland class and all other diesel-powered cruisers & destroyers (I mean long radius).. a big problem for the RN.
And one more thing, warships have been the subject of international agreements since WWI, so ... everyone knew the exact years when something could be built (that is, when an old capital ship or crusier can be replaced with a new one - for example, even the ancient ones pre-dreadnought of KM (RM) had to wait for the replacement time, and theirs cruisers were limited to 6 kt). Only some classes of coastal and auxiliary ships were not limited in number (but they were in tonnage and armament). So Germany didn't have much room for changes in tonnage (or main calibre off guns) and that's why Deutschland class caused a storm as an unconventional design. Those contracts were valid for everyone, including RN, so one of the concerns of RN was the comparison of new and old BBs (because speed, type of armour, construction design, optics, guns ... are not same in 20 years difference). Most reconstructions of capital ships were precisely caused by the impossibility of building new ships.
Bismarck was the notion of a new and dangerous adversary (for the RN) as if we didn't count KGV (which sailed to hunt him with fitting crews still a board) the latest BBs were Nelson & Rodney of '27.
Somehow I think that KM with 6x Deutschland, and 2 to 3 Scharnhorst (but diesel and with 3x3x380, so the proper treaty 35kt) and some accompanying cruisers / large ocean destroyers would be a significant problem for the RN '39-'41.And perhaps the tonnage of an individual BB would be raised, for even more formidable battleships because with Bismarck the tonnage was not cheated, but an increase in weight was escalator clause in accordance with the WNT/LNT. In addition, I would add a larger number (slightly larger due to the range and load capacity of mines) schnellbot, and necessarily (in addition to the usual collection of seaplanes / floatplanes) a dedicated rikko anti-ship geschwader or two, and at least one long-range reconnaissance / anti-ship (say based on the Do 19 but with 4x Bramo 323 or Jumo 211). They would probably be significantly more usable than the Condor.
And, perhaps, it would not be bad to supplement the fleet that can go to the Atlantic with two smaller (say 18kt) carriers?
Reluctant Poster
Tech Sergeant
- 1,630
- Dec 6, 2006
Going French sounds risqué
Reluctant Poster
Tech Sergeant
- 1,630
- Dec 6, 2006
H-class battleship proposals - Wikipedia
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
The eureka moment came from Mr. Higgins. Granted I saw the "whole story" on a YT vid but it sure jives from what I've read and experienced. Higgins had been building boats in the South, Florida or Louisiana, methinks. Higgins built wooden boats that could maneuver in shallows and on and off sand bars for fish and game. The 'Gummint and Higgins hooked up. They noodled around and came up with a 36 foot wooden landing with a honking big skeg. I know. I personally scraped and painted the one on my Sea Explorer Ship (Post)'s LCP(L?) for years. Built in Manitowac, Wisconsin. The same hull can be seen in pictures of the Guadalcanal campaign. The one without the ramp. Just imagine it with a small cabin about 10 ft aft of the bow up to the engine box.
The "A Ha!" moment came when The 'Gummint showed Higgins the Daihatsu model and its ramp. The result was a sea worthy landing craft, not a motorized landing barge.
Admiral Beez
Major
It's impressive that post-WW1 Germany could produce sufficient armour for its warships and vehicles. When Britain was rearming in the late 1930s they had to import armour plates from Czechoslovakia due to lack of British steelmaking capacity. For example, "Britain was obliged to procure 12,500 tons of armour plate from Czechoslovakia in 1938-39 to complete the cruisers Kenya and Trinidad, and the aircraft carriers Illustrious, Victorious and Formidable." Brown, 1998, Armor from Czechoslovakia, Warship International, 35 (1), pp9-10.H-class battleship proposals - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
The Navy actually dismissed the photos taken by a Marine, who photographed the Daihatsus in action during the battle of Shanghai.
It was the Marine who approached Higgins with a balsa wood model he made himself.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
It's been awhile since I saw it.
Reluctant Poster
Tech Sergeant
- 1,630
- Dec 6, 2006
I am curious as to why the US Marines didn't study Gallipoli. The X lighters used by the British had bow ramps.
X Lighters - Plans of X127
X Lighter.org is dedicated to the X Lighter ships of the Royal Navy, designed for the Gallipoli campaign in 1915.
xlighter.org
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Hi
Or even the ramped craft being used in 1904 by the British, as in the the Exercise Landing on the beach at Clacton during the 1904 Manoeuvres, which were very public:
(Source: 'Futile Exercise? The British Army's Preparations for War 1902-1914' by Simon Batten.)
Mike
Shortround6
Major General
Problem for the Germans is that there were several different classes of landing craft.
The Allies did NOT try sail Higgins boats from British ports to French coast for example.
British divided landing craft into two categories,
Ship to shore (like the Higgins boat) (carried on ships to the invasion site)
Shore to shore. Could make the passage on it's own over short distances.
Germans have few, if any, troop transports to carry the small craft. And they needed specialized davits or cranes for boat handling.
Germans in operation Sea Lion were planning on shore to shore. With mostly unsuitable vessels.
Now in 1935-36-37 the Germans can change their strategy and build a few (or more than a few) transports with large scale boat handling equipment.
They can also build a number of smaller Shore to Shore craft/vessels that can make the "voyage".
Here is where strategy/planning start to impact things.
IF the Germans do NOT invade/take over Holland it is about 245-250 miles from Emden to the British coast a bit north of Great Yarmouth.
And that is around 110-120 miles overland from the center of London and about 200 miles from any possible air fields in Germany.
An Invade Britain First strategy does not look good.
If the Germans invade Holland and Belgium first they can shorten the sea voyage to around 120-130 miles from the major Dutch/Belgian ports.
With Northern France in hand landings south of Ipswich are a lot more feasible. At least from point of view of distance and easy of Air support
which this scheme really needs because we are reducing the German to lower than it was historically.
Basically the Invade Britain First strategy has got zero chance even if they start planning and buying "stuff" for it in 1935. And if not Britain First then it becomes Britain 4th or 5th (depends on where Poland fits in). Germans have to take the jump off points for the Invasion of Britain, even if they are using Do 23s for support.
The Allies did NOT try sail Higgins boats from British ports to French coast for example.
British divided landing craft into two categories,
Ship to shore (like the Higgins boat) (carried on ships to the invasion site)
Shore to shore. Could make the passage on it's own over short distances.
Germans have few, if any, troop transports to carry the small craft. And they needed specialized davits or cranes for boat handling.
Germans in operation Sea Lion were planning on shore to shore. With mostly unsuitable vessels.
Now in 1935-36-37 the Germans can change their strategy and build a few (or more than a few) transports with large scale boat handling equipment.
They can also build a number of smaller Shore to Shore craft/vessels that can make the "voyage".
Here is where strategy/planning start to impact things.
IF the Germans do NOT invade/take over Holland it is about 245-250 miles from Emden to the British coast a bit north of Great Yarmouth.
And that is around 110-120 miles overland from the center of London and about 200 miles from any possible air fields in Germany.
An Invade Britain First strategy does not look good.
If the Germans invade Holland and Belgium first they can shorten the sea voyage to around 120-130 miles from the major Dutch/Belgian ports.
With Northern France in hand landings south of Ipswich are a lot more feasible. At least from point of view of distance and easy of Air support
which this scheme really needs because we are reducing the German to lower than it was historically.
Basically the Invade Britain First strategy has got zero chance even if they start planning and buying "stuff" for it in 1935. And if not Britain First then it becomes Britain 4th or 5th (depends on where Poland fits in). Germans have to take the jump off points for the Invasion of Britain, even if they are using Do 23s for support.
The so called "escalator clause" in the 1936 London Treaty applied only to the size of guns that could be fitted to new battleships.
Article IV
(1) No capital ship shall exceed 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) standard displacement.
(1) No capital ship shall exceed 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) standard displacement.
(2) No capital ship shall carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 14 in. (356 mm.); provided however that if any of the Parties to the Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament signed at Washington on 6 February 1922, should fail to enter into an agreement to conform to this provision prior to the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty, but in any case not later than 1 April 1937, the maximum calibre of gun carried by capital ships shall be 16 in. (406 mm.).
(3) No capital ship of sub-category (a), the standard displacement of which is less than 17,500 tons (17,780 metric tons), shall be laid down or acquired prior to 1 January 1943.
(4) No capital ship, the main armament of which consists of guns of less than 10 in. (254 mm.) calibre, shall be laid down or acquired prior to 1 January 1943.
What then happened was that Japan didn't give the required notification by 1 April 1937. So the limits on capital ships became 35,000 tons standard displacement armed with 16" guns (see North Carolina and South Dakota classes).
In early 1937 thoughts turned to what the Japanese would build if they didn't sign up. Britain & the USA believed it would exceed 35,000 tons. Best guess was that would be around 45,000 tons (nothing like the 65,000 ton Yamato monsters they did in fact build, whose size remained a secret until well into WW2).That would outclass anything then being built. So the signatories to the 1936 Treaty got together to agree a new tonnage limit. Britain argued for 40,000 tons (cost and infrastructure reasons) but the US insisted on 45,000 tons and Britain acquiesced. The new tonnage limit was set in July 1937. The USN went to 45,000 tons with the Iowas but Britain chose to restrict itself to 40,000 tons with the Lions.
So the version of the story on the Wiki Bismarck page is incorrect
Bismarck & Tirpitz were laid down in July and Nov 1936, with the design having its origins as far back as 1932. By spring 1937 the early design was already being modified, with a limit of 42,000 tons for Germany's own infrastructure problems.
So the size of the Bismarck class was not related to "escalator clause" (effective 1 April 1937) and the tonnage agreement (effective 31 July 1937).
"The development and construction of the Bismarck-class battleships were marked by significant challenges, particularly concerning their tonnage. Initially, the designs called for a standard displacement that adhered to the limitations set by the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. However, as the design process progressed, it became clear that the desired capabilities and armament of the ships would result in a much higher displacement. This led to revisions in the design to accommodate the increased tonnage while attempting to maintain the ships' speed and maneuverability."
What then happened was that Japan didn't give the required notification by 1 April 1937. So the limits on capital ships became 35,000 tons standard displacement armed with 16" guns (see North Carolina and South Dakota classes).
In early 1937 thoughts turned to what the Japanese would build if they didn't sign up. Britain & the USA believed it would exceed 35,000 tons. Best guess was that would be around 45,000 tons (nothing like the 65,000 ton Yamato monsters they did in fact build, whose size remained a secret until well into WW2).That would outclass anything then being built. So the signatories to the 1936 Treaty got together to agree a new tonnage limit. Britain argued for 40,000 tons (cost and infrastructure reasons) but the US insisted on 45,000 tons and Britain acquiesced. The new tonnage limit was set in July 1937. The USN went to 45,000 tons with the Iowas but Britain chose to restrict itself to 40,000 tons with the Lions.
So the version of the story on the Wiki Bismarck page is incorrect
Bismarck & Tirpitz were laid down in July and Nov 1936, with the design having its origins as far back as 1932. By spring 1937 the early design was already being modified, with a limit of 42,000 tons for Germany's own infrastructure problems.
So the size of the Bismarck class was not related to "escalator clause" (effective 1 April 1937) and the tonnage agreement (effective 31 July 1937).
"The development and construction of the Bismarck-class battleships were marked by significant challenges, particularly concerning their tonnage. Initially, the designs called for a standard displacement that adhered to the limitations set by the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. However, as the design process progressed, it became clear that the desired capabilities and armament of the ships would result in a much higher displacement. This led to revisions in the design to accommodate the increased tonnage while attempting to maintain the ships' speed and maneuverability."
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Here is a map of the proposed Sea lion landing areas.
Now here is an interactive map of the ocean floor around the southern North Sea and English Channel. Drop down menu in top left corner allows you to play with water depth.
Note the amount of shallow water in that region that severely limits the amount water that large warships could exploit and the area in which U-boats could operate effectively. The shipping channels exist for a reason.
As an aside it helps explain why S,G & PE turned towards the north and away from the French coast after passing Dover in Feb 1942. Note all those shallow waters.
In 1940 the RN had forces deployed at Scapa Flow (Home Fleet), Rosyth (on River Forth), Humber, Harwich, Chatham / Sheerness, before you ever get to the Channel from the north. Then all the Channel ports.
Now here is an interactive map of the ocean floor around the southern North Sea and English Channel. Drop down menu in top left corner allows you to play with water depth.
Note the amount of shallow water in that region that severely limits the amount water that large warships could exploit and the area in which U-boats could operate effectively. The shipping channels exist for a reason.
As an aside it helps explain why S,G & PE turned towards the north and away from the French coast after passing Dover in Feb 1942. Note all those shallow waters.
In 1940 the RN had forces deployed at Scapa Flow (Home Fleet), Rosyth (on River Forth), Humber, Harwich, Chatham / Sheerness, before you ever get to the Channel from the north. Then all the Channel ports.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
Perhaps I was a bit hyperbolic. I did mean the part about seaworthiness, but from ship to shore. They weren't Cigarette racing boats or a Grand Banks trawler, but I know they can stand a bit of tossing about and get you home.
1st IJN attempt at Wake onto a defended Beach resulting in not even an attempted landing, and lost two destroyers to WWI era 5" guns
With the 2nd attempt, the Japanese had 600 casualties to the 101 US from that understrength and underarmed garrison
UK? Plenty of leftover 18 pounders from WWI, and the Gas shells for them.
British were not going to screw around.
I stand corrected, but the bottom line is that they stayed within the scope of the contract (or they were lucky so it coincided). It was only after the Munich Agreement that the policy towards the UK began to change and they began to think about plan Z.
In fact, the story is similar to that of the Graf Zeppelin, the appetites were constantly growing, as was the tonnage.
And the gas shells ... considering there were plans to bomb the beaches (if I'm not mistaken there is a story about Sqd of Blenheims) I'm sure the UK would let the genie out of the bottle .... and then I don't even want to imagine what ww2 would look like further...
Plenty ? Everything is relative.
About 60% of the British Army's total artillery equipment was lost in France in 1940 and 50% of its tanks. For an Army expanding from a small peacetime regular force to a much larger wartime conscript force in a short period of time, there was not enough to go around. This article sets out losses and what remained as well as giving an indication of just how many divisions could be fully equipped with what was left. In reality most were short of something.
Firstly, steel plate does not equal armour plate. It will have different elements added to it to make it harder to begin with (Chromium, Nickel & Molybdenum for example|). It will then be subjected to other processes to harden its faces to varying depths. Different types of armour were subjected to different processes. Post WW1 with the battleship holiday, there was much less demand for armour plate from the Royal Navy as the principal customer (not much demand from Army for tanks or the RAF for aircraft inter-war) and the Admiralty, in a time of financial stringency, refused to subsidise the manufacturers to maintain the plant so they turned the plant to other uses or closed it.
Around 1936 the 3 main armour suppliers had a capacity of around 18,000 tons per year. Demand in 1938-39 for the Admiralty was expected to be 44,000 tons. So with the expanded rearmament programme from 1936 demand increased again and the Admiralty persuaded the Treasury to invest at least £2.25m into expanding the armour production capacity of a number of companies. But those facilities took time to come on line and that did not match the demand of the shipbuilding programmes. In 1936 alone the Admiralty ordered 34,361 tons of armour plate. Problems were then encountered in 1937 with too many armour plates failing quality control tests. So in Jan 1938 it was decided imports would be required and the Admiralty went shopping. After approaching the USA, France, Sweden & Germany (yes the future enemy!) only Czechoslovakia was willing to assist, which was fortunate as the Skoda Works at Vitkovice (owned by the Rothschilds) had produced some of the best armour in the world pre-WW1. Of the 12,500 tons ordered from Czechoslovakia only 10,000 tons had been delivered by the end of Aug 1939. The shortage caused delays to the completion of Victorious. Another odd thing is that although Germany had completed its occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, deliveries via the German rail system continued until the end of August 1939.
Secondly the scale of production required by each nation was completely different.
Steel and armour plate was generally taken to weigh 40lbs for a 1ft x 1ft x 1in plate (length / width / thickness). The thicker the plate generally the greater the difficulty in making armour plate.
As built a King George V class battleship had 12,460 tons devoted to its protection. Plates up to 14-15" for the side armour and 5-6in for the deck armour. 5 built = 62,300 tons.
An Illustrious class carrier had 4,941 tons devoted to its protection (only half the weight of the flight deck armour is in that figure due to their design using it as structural steel as well as armour protection - Friedman). Plates up to 3" thick on the flight deck and 4.5" thick for the side armour. 3 built 14,823+tons.
Indomitable 4,299 tons for protection (as above)
Implacable 3,645 tons for protection (as above). 2 built. 7,290 tons
Fiji class cruisers 1,310 tons plates up to 3.5" thick. 11 built. 14,410 tons
So that lot adds up to 103,122 tons and only covers that part of the 1936-39 programmes that I can quickly put my hands on.
In comparison how many big ships did Germany produce from the beginning of 1937?
2 Bismarcks - plates up to 14.2in thick; total armour weight 18,780 tons = 37,560 tons,
Graf Zeppelin,
5 Hipper class cruisers.
The vast majority of the tanks Germany produced prior to WW2 were small
Panzer I weight 5.3 tons; armour thickness 7-13mm (0.25-0.5") 2,435 produced mostly 1934-38
Panzer II weight 8.8 tons; armour thickness 5-15mm (0.2-0.6") 1,856 produced 1935-44.
Panzer III weight 14.8-19.2 tons; armour thickness 15-30mm (0.6-1.2") on the pre-WW2 variants of which c250 produced
Panzer IV weight 18.1-19.7 tons; armour thickness 15-30mm (0.6-1.2") on pre-WW2 variants of which c260 produced.
And those weight are the fully loaded weight including all the non-armour items like engnes, guns etc.
In the run up to WW2 one problem the KM faced was that it was in competition with the Wehrmacht for steel generally and armour in particular. So it was constrained as to just how many ships it could build.
Admiral Beez
Major
How about this for a 1930s onward German naval strategy.... Jan 1930, Weimer Republic rejects the notion of naval power and cancels the three Deutschlands. Instead Germany double downs on gaining an economic and industrial lead, including a large expansion in the German merchant and liner fleet.
