and then they had to wait until June 1944I think the near-impossibility of invading the UK was amply demonstrated in 1940.
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and then they had to wait until June 1944I think the near-impossibility of invading the UK was amply demonstrated in 1940.
and then they had to wait until June 1944
Depends on who you listened to.I'm simply pointing out that the UK wasn't in nearly such dire straits as was painted.
Depends on who you listened to.
Just the very threat of a German invasion tied up precious resources that Britain could have used elsewhere.
This is a wiki page, and I apologize, however, it does give a fairly straight foreward over view of the effort and resources dedicated to the potential of a German invasion:Yeah, that's rather my point.
Even before Barbarossa, the OKW had decided that Seeloew wasn't doable. The Brits didn't know of that decision, to be sure, but they knew that the Heer lacked the barges for troop transport, the Kriegsmarine lacked the ships for escort, and the Luftwaffe couldn't seize control of the air. They judged right.
The Brits actually did send troops from the UK to North Africa in 1941, both around the Cape route and iirc a convoy of tanks through the Med when the situation was still in doubt. What was it, Operation Tiger? The UK was sending troops, arms, and materiel to the Med almost as soon as Italy jumped in.
So while they kept forces on Britain and trained up, and gathered in American troops later for the European invasion, they still sent out large units even before Barbarossa kicked off, which kinda tells you what they really thought.
This is a wiki page, and I apologize, however, it does give a fairly straight foreward over view of the effort and resources dedicated to the potential of a German invasion:
British anti-invasion preparations of the Second World War - Wikipedia
en.m.wikipedia.org
(solid references provided, btw)
Shore bombardmentThe dates clearly show that the marine mammal operation is seasonal - any armored formations are not needed in the winter and can go where the situation is problematic.
And let's get back to the topic - I think that for KM it is less important how many and what kind of ships it has and that the real omission is how they used them.
KM could not oppose RN directly, but they failed to create direct pressure. Namely, as the Fleet in Being, they have already blocked considerable resources of the RN (and the RAF), let's imagine what would have happened if Bismarck, instead of (repeated) trip to the Atlantic, for example, made a night bombardment of some coastal target in Scotland, repeated by schnellboot raids, then a provocative commando attack on, say, Cyprus, then a concentrated pre-Drumbeet u-boot to Jamaica or Cape of Good Hope .... The mosquito sting tactic would have blocked and stretched significantly more UK power. And with that, KM would contribute more.
Operations in those areas would have been in the declared Neutrality Zone in 1941. Inevitably it would have brought the KM into conflict with the USN just as happened when the USN, later in 1941, began escorting convoys to the Mid Ocean Meeting Point south of Iceland. It undoubtedly would have brought forward US entry into WW2, which was something Hitler tried to avoid until Dec 1941.If the Kreigsmarine were to attempt an operation in the Caribbean, then they'd have to deal with the USN, USCG and USAAF - who covered the Carribean extensively.
In just 1942 alone, the Germans lost six U-boats in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico.
The dates clearly show that the marine mammal operation is seasonal - any armored formations are not needed in the winter and can go where the situation is problematic.
And let's get back to the topic - I think that for KM it is less important how many and what kind of ships it has and that the real omission is how they used them.
KM could not oppose RN directly, but they failed to create direct pressure. Namely, as the Fleet in Being, they have already blocked considerable resources of the RN (and the RAF), let's imagine what would have happened if Bismarck, instead of (repeated) trip to the Atlantic, for example, made a night bombardment of some coastal target in Scotland, repeated by schnellboot raids, then a provocative commando attack on, say, Cyprus, then a concentrated pre-Drumbeet u-boot to Jamaica or Cape of Good Hope .... The mosquito sting tactic would have blocked and stretched significantly more UK power. And with that, KM would contribute more.
Quite agree. It could take 2 months or more just to load up the ships, get them around Africa and unload them. Then 2 months or more to load ships, get them back and unload them.Can they, realistically? I'm not an expert on WWII military logistics, but is it really worth the effort, and is there time, to ship an armored division to Egypt in the autumn, integrate them into whatever forces are there, do something useful, then ship them back to the UK, refit, and be prepared to repel an invasion come spring?
Agree again. For instance they laid down the Hipper on 6 July 1935 and that is after drawing up the plans, issuing the contracts and collected the first few hundred tons (or thousand) of materials next to the slipway. They commissioned the ship 29 April 1939 but it took a number of months to complete trials/training. Other large German (and just about everybody else's) ships had somewhat similar build times. Without very good spies many times navies were responding to published accounts as to guns/armor/speed etc. which were often incorrect.These issues go hand in hand, I think. First, you need to think of what the mission the navy is supposed to fulfill, then you build the navy that suits those requirements. Of course, given the volatile political situation in interwar Europe, you cannot be sure how the world is going to look in a decade or so, so you should design a navy that has some kind of flexibility to perform different kinds of missions rather than being hyper-optimized for any one particular mission (that might no longer exist by the time war breaks out).
This actually worked out rather well for the Germans in the short term. They managed to convince a lot of people that their Army, Air Force and Navy were more powerful/capable than they really were, which stopped the other countries from spanking Hitler during the mid 30s.But what you shouldn't do is build a navy with big guns BOOM BOOM just to satisfy the chest-thumping ego of the great leader.
Corsica was under Vichy French control from June 1940 until Nov 1942. Then it was occupied by the Italians until Sept 1943. Then the Germans arrived for a short period before being withdrawn in Oct 1943.Well, I didn't say anywhere that I would recall the British armored divisions back, but I guess there's enough time from September to April - May to train people and produce new vehicles - after all, I only emphasized what happened in RT. And.. ok, I forgot about the Neutrality zone, but didn't the UK have a couple of isles in the Atlantic that are interesting to visit and shoot a couple of shells - from merchant/u-boot/panzershife ? And yes - we are talking about the period from 1939 to the winter of 1942. For example, as successful as the Merchant raiders were, they came too late and were too few when the time was right (as well as the Fw 200 Condor). And as an example of unpreparedness - KM practically exhausted its stock of magnetic mines by 1940, and the number of torpedoes fell to a dangerous low level (not to mention that the UK might have been without a Churchill if they were checking to see if they were working when fired from submarines).
The fleet in being strategy did work, I just wanted to say that it would have been even more successful if they had prepared purposeful plans for poking at various places. And admittedly, I was more expecting neat ideas on how to do something like that ?
For example, is it possible to transfer the Staffel of Condors to Corsica and visit Gibraltar in 1940. Because one squadron of NF Blenheims / Beaufighters in Gibraltar is one less in the UK?
Namely, as the Fleet in Being, they have already blocked considerable resources of the RN (and the RAF), let's imagine what would have happened if Bismarck, instead of (repeated) trip to the Atlantic, for example, made a night bombardment of some coastal target in Scotland, repeated by schnellboot raids, then a provocative commando attack on, say, Cyprus, then a concentrated pre-Drumbeet u-boot to Jamaica or Cape of Good Hope
A lot of these ideas are rather fanciful. It is almost 4000 miles one way from 1/2 between Iceland and Scotland the gap between Cuba and Haiti before you get to Jamaica, or about 800 miles further than Cape Hatteras, one way.The fleet in being strategy did work, I just wanted to say that it would have been even more successful if they had prepared purposeful plans for poking at various places. And admittedly, I was more expecting neat ideas on how to do something like that ?