Better German naval strategy 1930-1945? (2 Viewers)

[z42]

For example, as successful as the Merchant raiders were, they came too late and were too few when the time was right (as well as the Fw 200 Condor).

As for the KM merchant raiders, I don't follow why you say they came too late. The first, Atlantis, completed her conversion in Dec 1939 and sailed, after being delayed by ice in the Baltic, at the end of March 1940. She was followed by Orion in April & Widder in May. So I don't really see how their operations could have begun much earlier, unless conversions had been undertaken pre-war. Numbers were limited by lack of suitable shipping, both for conversions, and for the supply ships needed to support them.

A major problem for the Germans was simply that technology had overtaken some of the old historic ways of using sea power. Things like Hudsons and Catalinias (Much like Fw 200s) could pinpoint raiders faster and/or search much wider areas of the sea than surface ships even if they could not safely attack raiders. The aircraft were advancing much faster than the ships. The 3-4 years it took to build a large surface ship in the mid 30s saw large increases in the capabilities of maritime recon aircraft.

I think the argument about merchant raiders being too late is that the window of opportunity for using them successfully was cut short when the Allies built up their maritime recon capability. So to have a big impact on the war they would have needed lots of them out at sea already early in the war.

 

[EwenS]

I think the argument about merchant raiders being too late is that the window of opportunity for using them successfully was cut short when the Allies built up their maritime recon capability. So to have a big impact on the war they would have needed lots of them out at sea already early in the war.

The other factor to cut short their period of viability was the entry of Japan into WW2. That eliminated much of their Indian Ocean and Pacific hunting grounds due to
1. The withdrawal of merchant shipping from the eastern part of the IO after the Fall of Singapore and
2. Much more naval activity in the Pacific region.

But Michel finished her last and not very successful operation, in Oct 1943 when sunk returning to Japan.

It was however March 1944 before the last of the supply ships in the IO, by then supporting U-boat operations, was sunk by a surface group using Ultra intelligence to track it down.

Auxiliary Cruiser

The German Kriegsmarine, Auxiliary Cruiser, Kriegsmarine Ships, Auxiliary Cruiser

www.german-navy.de

 

[Admiral Beez]

How about the German surface fleet is optimized to support an amphibious invasion of Britain. Other than taking Norway, lb for lb and $ for $ invested, the surface fleet can't do anything for the war effort the U-Boats can't do better. But breaking through the RN to land and support 100,000 German troops across the Channel, now that's a navy making a contribution worthy of the expense. So, how does Germany's combined surface and u-boat force do this, and what sorts of vessels do they need? You can't win a gunfight in a confined space against a dozen RN battleships, so you need to be innovative.

 

[z42]

How about the German surface fleet is optimized to support an amphibious invasion of Britain. Other than taking Norway, lb for lb and $ for $ invested, the surface fleet can't do anything for the war effort the U-Boats can't do better. But breaking through the RN to land and support 100,000 German troops across the Channel, now that's a navy making a contribution worthy of the expense. So, how does Germany's combined surface and u-boat force do this, and what sorts of vessels do they need? You can't win a gunfight in a confined space against a dozen RN battleships, so you need to be innovative.

Interesting scenario. Maybe something like

• As you say, cannot win a gunfight against the RN battleships, so need to figure out an asymmetrical way to deny them access to the area where they could disturb the landings.
• LW achieves air superiority over the channel, and over the coastal areas of Germany and the low countries so that the invasion fleet isn't sunk en route to the marshalling areas.
• Close off the English channel with massive minefields, patrols by the LW, as well as S-boats, torpedo boats (like, say, the Elbing class), destroyers. Also including ASW assets to prevent to RN from penetrating into the channel with subs.
• If RN surface forces try to enter the channel, in addition to a decent chance they are gonna hit mines, they are attacked by LW dive bomber and torpedo strikes, and torpedo attacks by submarines, S-boats, torpedo boats, destroyers, and shore batteries.
• With "ownership" of the channel, the invasion fleet can move across the channel and launch the invasion.

Now, is all this feasible for Germany with the resources they had? I'm quite sure the answer to that is no.

 

[Shortround6]

Close off the English channel with massive minefields, patrols by the LW, as well as S-boats, torpedo boats (like, say, the Elbing classin), destroyers. Also including ASW assets to prevent to RN from penetrating into the channel with subs.

To pick on one part of the plan or most of the aspects of one part of the plan.

Close off the English channel with massive minefields,
British have got a lot more minesweepers and minelayers than the Germans, many hundreds more due to mobilizing the much larger fishing fleet. They can afford to loose more mine warfare ships.
Patrols by the LW.
Germans need air supremacy, not just air superiority.
as well as S-boats.
Germans had about 18 S boats in service in Sept 1939 (the first 6 boats had been sold out of service or sold to Spain) the big influx came later. If the Germans had 70-100 in service in late 1939 or early 1940 somebody would have noticed and British/French/Dutch orders adjusted accordingly.
The Elbing class.
Built when and in place of what? 44 Elbings in place of 22 Z class or in addition to the Z's or in place of the 21 type 35 and type 37 torpedo boats?
British had around 60+ of the old WW I V & W destroyers, They had about 52 Launched between 1926 and the end of 1934. they had the already mentioned 50+ launched 1935 through 1938 and they had 7 more launched in 1939 (+ 6 ex -Brazilian) and 13 (?) launched in 1940. The DDs launched in 1937-40 (and later) were the big boys with 6-8 4.7in guns and while deficient in AA guns they would have been deadly in night actions against German Invasion shipping (and small escorts).
ASW assets
From where? The minelayer/mine sweeper fleet? The anti-British destroyer/cruiser escorts?

This started with a different strategy for the German Navy, a lot of times it veered into fewer surface ships to allow more to be spent on the Army (tanks) or the Luftwaffe (more aircraft) but if they need to build a crap more destroyers and small ships that savings disappears and the Germans engage in a building race of small ships and light (6in and under) cannon. Can they complete it in 1940-41? do they need to swipe diesels from the U-boats for landing craft?

British shipyards are going unleash the start of an avalanche of small ships in 1941.

And again, the goal of the RN is to stop any invasion fleet. Save guarding supplies is secondary. Does not matter if the supplies reach an Occupied Britain.
The German navy is going to have to inflict massive losses on the RN because the RN will accept very large losses to destroy an invasion fleet.

Germans not only have to lay large mine fields. They have to sweep large British minefields to get to the invasion sites.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The Germans need both air and naval superiority to manage a successful invasion. They also need dedicated landing craft because unpowered barges ain't cutting it. And they also need to include at least one and probably two armored divisions, with extra landing support for them.

Now, the problem becomes how to stop the RAF, get through the minefields, and then fight through the Dover force and the Home Fleet while delivering enough troops to gain a decision on English ground. I'd argue that the LW won't be able to win the necessary air superiority, due to short-range German fighter escort being unable to escort the bombers attacking the Home Fleet's sally until the latter is already upon the invasion force -- too late by half -- as well as Chain Home providing some intel.

And how to build the KM to push it home? Even before Norway, sinking KM heavy units and then unleashing destroyers and MTBs/MGBs against vulnerable and mostly unpowered barges seems obvious. RN has a ton of light cruisers too. Can the LW sink them all? Can the KM defend enough barges to make the invasion successful?

I'm skeptical of the idea that Germany could patch together any prewar build-strategy that would make Sealion viable.

Remember, in any counterfactual, you need to assume that the opponent will take steps too. Germany builds more U-boats? UK builds more ASW craft. Germany builds more bombers? UK prioritizes fighters. And so on.

 

[Admiral Beez]

And how to build the KM to push it home? Even before Norway, sinking KM heavy units and then unleashing destroyers and MTBs/MGBs against vulnerable and mostly unpowered barges seems obvious.

While successful in Germany taking the country, the Norway campaign was a disaster for the Kriegsmarine's surface fleet, with three cruisers (Blücher, Karlsruhe and Königsberg) and at least ten destroyers sunk, and Scharnhorst and Lutzow badly damaged by British torpedoes. It was a costly victory for Germany for a small gain against a nation with little naval opposition. To repeat this success against the UK the KM will need to be much larger and luckier.

In the end the best German naval plan is to focus on building a much more powerful u-boat fleet to be in service in Sept 1939. Focus on this while skipping the Scharnhorsts, Bismarcks, Huttens and Graf Zeppelins. Post Deutschland class, any surface warship should be CAs or smaller.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

While successful in Germany taking the country, the Norway campaign was a disaster for the Kriegsmarine's surface fleet, with three cruisers (Blücher, Karlsruhe and Königsberg) and at least ten destroyers sunk, and Scharnhorst and Lutzow badly damaged by British torpedoes. It was a costly victory for Germany for a small gain against a nation with little naval opposition. To repeat this success against the UK the KM will need to be much larger and luckier.

Right, that's why I wrote even before. Those three cruisers and ten destroyers wouldn't have meant much at all against the RN.

In the end the best German naval plan is to focus on building a much more powerful u-boat fleet to be in service in Sept 1939. Focus on this while skipping the Scharnhorsts, Bismarcks and Huttens and Graf Zeppelins.

Probably, but if the Germans had taken this course, no doubt the British would have cut a couple or three KGVs off the shopping list and added a hundred or so Flowers. It's not like the Brits are stupid. They see a submarine buildup, of course they're going to react.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Probably, but if the Germans had taken this course, no doubt the British would have cut a couple or three KGVs off the shopping list and added a hundred or so Flowers.

Italian and Japanese fleet planners will be pleased when Britain's decides to cut 3/5 of their fast battleships. With four Littorios, three Yamatos plus four Richelieus and a fleet of North Carolinas and SoDaks on order or building, can Britain really make such a cut?

 

[Shortround6]

The Pre 1939 build up of the Germans for a British Invasion is a non-starter. It Assumes the Germany will take-not only Holland and all of Belgium, unlike WW I, but at least a good chunk of northern France. It Assumes that the French navy is mostly out of play and it Assumes that the Germans will capture a fair amount of coastal shipping from the captured territories.
Germans rounded up hundreds of Rhine and other river barges which crippled their own transport network for a number of months. Pre-war planning would have tried to take that into account and at least significantly increased tug/tow boat production

And we are back to the build more U-boats plan, Which in the absence of heavy ship construction would have triggered some sort of response from the British and a pretty major one.
People are forgetting what happened in WW I.
1917 3726 ships hit.
1918 1649 ships hit.

In 1935-36 Germany stops building large war ships and starts building lots more submarines?
British had plans more escort ship production, they thought they had more time. Germans have 100 subs at the beginning of 1939 instead of the 56 in Sept 1939 with another hundred on the slip ways in Jan 1939?
What would the British do? Wring their hands and cry in their gin?

With no German surface navy to speak of, British (and French?) operations to lay mines much closer to German ports/harbors would be much easier.
Germans ability to lay mines from surface ships would be more restricted and U-boats would have to do more of mine laying work.

Somebody kicks the RAF in the bum and diverts more resources to CC?
Doesn't need a lot of hindsight, it needs remembering the results of WW I.

 

[GrauGeist]

The Germans needed to make an arrangement with Japan for their Daihatsu landing craft (the same type that Higgins copied) and having the IJN Special Landing Force give them training before even considering an invasion.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Italian and Japanese fleet planners will be pleased when Britain's decides to cut 3/5 of their fast battleships. With four Littorios, three Yamatos plus four Richelieus and a fleet of North Carolinas and SoDaks on order or building, can Britain really make such a cut?

They could also cut a couple of carriers, if it came to that.

I don't think the American or French BBs factor into it, as they are Allied or at least sympathetic navies.

The Yamatos matter only as much as the Far East does, and as historical the Brits gave that short shrift anyway.

That leaves the Littorios, which is a fair objection, but without German capital ships to guard against, you've got 2 KGVs, 3 battlecruisers, 5 QEs of various modernity, and four R-class BBs.

I think skipping a couple of battleships to answer the submarine buildup you posit is pretty doable. Skipping 3 KGVs is about 110,000 tons, and allowing for 1000 tons per corvette and understanding it's not a 1:1 thing, you're still getting 80 or 90 ASW bottoms.

My point is not only that UK cannot afford to ignore this u-boat buildup, it can actually afford to counter it if that's where the Kriegsmarine wants to go. I doubt they would ignore it, and cuts could reasonably be made elsewhere to afford a counter to it.

It's not like Germany has that many slips.

 

[Glider]

The Germans needed to make an arrangement with Japan for their Daihatsu landing craft (the same type that Higgins copied) and having the IJN Special Landing Force give them training before even considering an invasion.

The Japanese were able to review the German preparations for the German invasion and they quickly recognised that it had no chance of success. I doubt that the Daihatsu landing craft would have made any difference.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The Japanese were able to review the German preparations for the German invasion and they quickly recognised that it had no chance of success. I doubt that the Daihatsu landing craft wouldn't have made any difference.

Even without Norway losses, the KM couldn't protect Sealion sufficiently. And while the ranges were shorter than BoB, I doubt the LW could protect those barges or beachheads either.

 

[GrauGeist]

Even without Norway losses, the KM couldn't protect Sealion sufficiently. And while the ranges were shorter than BoB, I doubt the LW could protect those barges or beachheads either.

Been a while since I read about Sea Lion, but the Luftwaffe was planned to aerial drop mines in predetermined corridors to protect that invasion fleet with Uboats and Torpedo boats creating an extended buffer.

The Luftwaffe was also tasked with creating a clear operating zone and while all this looked good on paper, the actual execution would have most likely fallen short of the mark.

At that point in time, only the Japanese could have pulled off such a plan since they had experience in beach assaults.

 

[GrauGeist]

The Japanese were able to review the German preparations for the German invasion and they quickly recognised that it had no chance of success. I doubt that the Daihatsu landing craft would have made any difference.

The Landing Craft would have been a far better option than what the Germans had on hand.
Plus, Sea Lion was hastily put together - had the Germans actually consulted the IJN earlier and worked with them, then a more realistic (and possibly successful plan) may have been put together.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Been a while since I read about Sea Lion, but the Luftwaffe was planned to aerial drop mines in predetermined corridors to protect that invasion fleet with Uboats and Torpedo boats creating an extended buffer.

The Luftwaffe was also tasked with creating a clear operating zone and while all this looked good on paper, the actual execution would have most likely fallen short of the mark.

At that point in time, only the Japanese could have pulled off such a plan since they had experience in beach assaults.

I'm not sure the Japanese would do any better. When you look at their amphib ops, you'll see that most were away from the objective, launched at night, or both. I don't think they could be much more successful than the Germans against defended beaches.

Granted, they had those useful amphib ships with well-decks and/or flight decks, definite plus over German equipment, but they didn't tend to assault stuff directly. They landed farther away and then attacked, if the objective was defended. That's not going to help them get past the RN or RAF, unless we've also brought over the IJN, and now we're off into whatifland.

 

[z42]

The Germans needed to make an arrangement with Japan for their Daihatsu landing craft (the same type that Higgins copied) and having the IJN Special Landing Force give them training before even considering an invasion.

They could dig up the plans for the French landing craft used when France tried to invade England in the year of the Lord 1199, complete with bow ramps and all. And since they're oar powered, no worries about having to reallocate diesel engines from submarines or S-boats.


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8zAV2JMq_6w&t=27s

Hey, I saw it on TV so it must be true, right?

 

[Reluctant Poster]

They don't have to consult the Japanese for a landing craft design. The can simply cruise over to the Isle of White and have a look at the MLC which the British have had since 1926. As far as I can tell this is the first landing craft with a bow ramp.

https://wikimili.com/en/Motor_landing_craft.

I have never understood the story of the Americans having a eureka moment when they first saw a daihatsu. Somewhere I have a Boys Own annual or similar from the 30s with a picture of a MLC

 

[Denniss]

Germany should have scrapped all their big plans for capital ships after Tirpitz and especially scrap the carrier program. They need more U-/S-boats. S-boats for coastal stuff like in the channel and U-Boats in the Atlantic. Instead they replicated the errors of WW1 where big fleets were supposed to engage each other while the small number of subs proved to be effective vs enemy shipping lanes. I'm not even talking about the way too complicated engines installed in Destroyers and cruisers (prone to failures)