Better German naval strategy 1930-1945? (1 Viewer)

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One of these things is not like the others. The Higgins boat bow ramp is a copy of the MLC not the Daihatshu.
But did the US even know about the handful of MLC the RN was operating when they got the Japanese info?

USN was paying attention to what Japan was doing in China. Were they paying any attention to what the Brits were doing with small craft in the Mediterranean?
 
MLC No.1 for the RN had been completed in 1926.

MLC10 was an improved design first trialled in 1929, and after modifications, again in 1930 through 1934 both at home and in the Med and proved entirely satisfactory. As a result 2 more were bought in 1935 (MLC11 & 12). An improved batch of 6, with 2 engines, were completed early in 1939. Some had waterjet propulsion & some screws. These were used at Narvik in 1940.

Next up was the Assault Landing Craft (ALC renamed the Landing Craft Assault - LCA in early 1942). Prototype ordered Sept 1939, trialled April 1940 with first batch of 17 more ordered Oct 1940. By early 1941 over 200 had been ordered. This craft had a bow ramp to allow the exit of the troops it carried.

Britain placed its first order for the LCP(L) in Oct 1940 - initial batch of 50.

The LCP(L) was followed by the LCP(R) with a "light personnel ramp". The naval architect and author DK Brown, who worked at the Admiralty for many years, credits that as happening after the US entered the war "this idea being borrowed from the LCA".

Info taken from his book The Design and Construction of British Warships 1939-1945. The Official Record Vol. III: Landing Craft & Auxiliary vessels. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1557501629.

In the introduction he notes that this was the publication of an official Admiralty history of ship design drawn up post WW2. He writes

"...This book is published as it was written and no attempt has been made to correct any errors there may be (except obvious spelling mistakes), though manuscript notes suggest that it was very carefully checked."

Now that doesn't quite coincide with the usual timescale of the ramp being tested in May 1941 by Higgins. On the other hand there were a number of USN liaison officers working with the RAF and RN in early 1941 (for example it was an Ensign Smith that was part of the crew of an RAF Catalina and who spotted Bismarck in May and an US Assistant Naval Attache was on Illustrious when she was bombed in Jan 1941, while Britain was training USAAF/USN/USMC officers fighter direction techniques). So it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that information about British landing craft found its way back to the USA in 1941, even if not known about pre-war.

From the LCP(R) was developed the LCVP, with a wider and stronger bow ramp able to accommodate light vehicles.
 
But did the US even know about the handful of MLC the RN was operating when they got the Japanese info?

USN was paying attention to what Japan was doing in China. Were they paying any attention to what the Brits were doing with small craft in the Mediterranean?
The prototype MLC was 15 years old in 1941. If the US didn't know about it by then that is a spectacular lack of intelligence. I'll bet every schoolboy in the UK knew what a TLC was.
 
As a 'strategy" goes for most of the 1930s the "build a crap load of landing craft" is a pretty poor one.

What else are you giving up to build 1000-2000 landing craft?
Where do you "plan" to launch the landing craft from (harbors/piers)?
What is it going to take for the Army to get those loading sites?
Are you short changing the Armies need to handle France?
The French collapse was not a guarantee for most of the 1930s or even in 1940.
And just having 1000-2000 more powered landing craft does not address the issue of the Royal Navy. Especially if Destroyer and other surface combat ship construction is cut back to pay for the Landing Craft.
And if "word" gets out????
There is no other country that the Germans need mass amounts of landing craft to deal with other than Britain.
 
If the Kreigsmarine were to attempt an operation in the Caribbean, then they'd have to deal with the USN, USCG and USAAF - who covered the Carribean extensively.
In just 1942 alone, the Germans lost six U-boats in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico.
And the RCN and RN. Of the 6 U boats lost U-94 was sunk by HMCS Oakville and U-162 was sunk by HMS Vimy, HMS Pathfinder and HMS Quentin. The RCN and RN provided escort groups in the Caribbean.
 
By the way, the US was aware of various landing craft, but their focus was on the Imperial Japanese Navy's use in China in the 1930's.

Add to that, the British using the Higgins boat (referred to as the "R-Boat) starting in 1940.
Hi
The first 'Higgins boats' that were delivered to the UK in October 1940 (50 in number) were the LCP(L)s, they did not have a ramp:
Scan_20241007.jpg

The British were already using the LCA (Landing Craft, Assault), the first action being at Narvik in May 1940, these had a ramp:
Scan_20241007 (2).jpg

Info from 'Assault From The Sea 1939-45, The craft, The Landings, The Men' by J D Ladd.

Mike
 
Hi
The first 'Higgins boats' that were delivered to the UK in October 1940 (50 in number) were the LCP(L)s, they did not have a ramp:
View attachment 800117


Mike
The boat in the foreground is the type of LCP(L) that my Sea Scout boat was. Imagine that cabin a bit wider and extended to the three crew members are. It was civialianized.
 
If the Kreigsmarine were to attempt an operation in the Caribbean, then they'd have to deal with the USN, USCG and USAAF - who covered the Caribbean extensively.
Prewar it's trickier. The Germans need to land forces onto Vichy French territories in the Caribbean before the DoW on the USA.

But those French colonies are close to US territory and the US mainland. Washington isn't going to sit idly by as German forces move towards the French West Indies.

French-Caribbean-Map-Shadow3.jpg
 
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Prewar it's trickier. The Germans need to land forces onto Vichy French territories in the Caribbean before the the DoW on the USA.
And the USA is going to sit back and let that happen?

They kept a close eye on what was going on in the Vichy Caribbean colonies, which increased as time went on. Ultimately in May 1942 (yes I know after PH) they insisted that 2 French cruisers there be immobilised. Machinery parts were removed and sent to Casablanca.
 
The better question is how do you know high pressure steam is NOT going to have issues. Foresight is all that is necessary. A proper testing and development program would have shown that 1,000 psi steam pressure was not going to work. At the time the Germans were introducing their ultra high pressure steam plants in their 1934 destroyers, the Americans, who had the experience of high pressure land based plants to draw upon, were much more conservative settling for an increase from 465 psi to 565 psi for their Gridley class destroyers. A further increase to 665 psi in the Sims class was where they finally settled for their WWII destroyers. 2/3s the pressure of the German plants and approached in a more methodical manner.
Actually the US steam plants did not work as advertised. I recently viewed this video discussing the problems.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0MIRyN-pLuQ#ddg-play
I bought the book the discussed in the video .
Highly recommended.
Thsi book gives an in depth discussion of the problems actually faced by the USN in operating their new ships.
The much greater range promised for the new ships turned out to be a bit of an illusion and in fact new range tables were issued at the end of the war which were more in line with practical experience.
 
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Actually the US steam plants did not work as advertised. I recently viewed this video discussing the problems.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0MIRyN-pLuQ#ddg-play


Yes, it was an interesting discussion; I actually stumbled upon it earlier and posted the link in another thread at WWII Destroyers?

I bought the book the discussed in the video .
Highly recommended.
Thsi book gives an in depth discussion of the problems actually faced by the USN in operating their new ships.
The much greater range promised for the new ships turned out to be a bit of an illusion and in fact new range tables were issued at the end of the war which were more in line with practical experience.

Interesting. I never bought that book although I was intrigued. Perhaps I should reconsider!
 
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The Fletchers still looked great.

I'm sure they would still be great looking even if they had been equipped with somewhat more conservative lower pressure steam plants! Lengthen it a little bit in order to make room for the bulkier machinery, or just lop off that middle 5" turret and magazine?
 
Speaking of German naval strategy, a few days ago was the 85th anniversary of the Battle of River Plate. Someone posted a link to an article arguing that far from being a heroic battle the British fought against the odds, they had the upper hand and should have succeeded in sinking the Graf Spee outright, and it was only Harwood's mistakes that allowed the Graf Spee to sneak away into Montevideo.


I think it's somewhat harsh on Harwood, seems quite an ask to expect him to quickly abandon the pre-war doctrine and wargamed plans when it turned out they weren't working as well as hoped. Or what do you think?

(Though the article does point out what has been mentioned earlier in this thread, that the Deutschlands were glass cannons. Vulnerable to 8" fire from practically any distance.)
 
I'm sure they would still be great looking even if they had been equipped with somewhat more conservative lower pressure steam plants! Lengthen it a little bit in order to make room for the bulkier machinery, or just lop off that middle 5" turret and magazine?
Agree with most of it. I love turret farms. Why should the IJN cruisers have all the cool turret layouts?
 
Speaking of German naval strategy, a few days ago was the 85th anniversary of the Battle of River Plate. Someone posted a link to an article arguing that far from being a heroic battle the British fought against the odds, they had the upper hand and should have succeeded in sinking the Graf Spee outright, and it was only Harwood's mistakes that allowed the Graf Spee to sneak away into Montevideo.
....
Hi,
Thanks for posting the link. I don't want to hijack this thread, but just real quickly, in reading the article I'm not sure that I agree with too much of what the author has written. He talks a fair bit of what was expected to happen, but kind of seems to imply that since that didn't happen it was due to faults by the RN Commander, when in reality I think that in pretty much any battle that I can think of nothing really ever goes according to what may have been expected, and luck can play a big part in any outcome (for instance, one lucky hit can have a big impact, etc).

Regards

Pat
 
Having Exeter's bridge crew and communications taken out early in the battle, along with A & B turrets, kind of stopped the hoped for plan of action. The follow up by the 6" cruisers, however, was classic and quite well carried out. Plus, even though the Exeter only had one turret operational, it was her shot that hit the Graf Spee's engineering spaces and left her without usable fuel.
 

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