Better luck for the RN carrier force 1939-1941

EwenS said:

Not sure it is.

The night CAGs had two roles. Firstly CAP for the Task Force at night and in bad weather when day fighters couldn't fly. And in that Saratoga's CVG(N)-53 was unusual in that it contained both a day fighter, VF-53, and a night fighter, VF(N)-53, squadron. And secondly a nighttime offensive role which used the night fighters in the intruder role along with a torpedo bomber squadron with radar equipped TBF/TBM Avengers for a heavier nighttime punch. Sometimes these squadrons teamed up for joint attacks.

You will find details here about the operations of CVG(N)-90 aboard Enterprise here.

VF(N)-90 Squadron History

The history of Night Fighting Squadron 90: a pioneering US Navy night and all-weather squadron, 1944-1945.

www.cv6.org

VT(N)-90 Squadron History

The history of Night Torpedo Squadron 90: one the first US Navy squadrons engaged in night and all-weather carrier operations, 1944-1945.

www.cv6.org

These night groups are in addition to the small numbers, usually 4-6, of night fighters that would be added to each CV fighter squadron before deployment to the combat zone from 1944 through to the end of the war even when there was a night carrier available.

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So they had a dedicated CAP role, but that isn't similar to having dedicated CAP carriers in KdB because they did a little intruder work as well?

I think that conceptually the idea rhymes.

Back to the interwar RN I think 3 critical mistakes were made just after WW1 that adversely affected them 1st mistake when selecting hulls to convert as experimental carriers Beatty who had recently been made 1st Sea Lord chose Fishers Folleys and what became Eagle as well as a temporary conversion of HMS Vindictive a ship that was converted from a Hawking's class cruiser and was a Carrier for 6 years from 1918-24 with moderate success while understandable especially as they had no other use for the ships this was a mistake and several other officers argued against it. However, with 20-20 hindsight I would have not converted the Chilean Battleship into Eagle and thus Chilie would have had both of the ships they ordered and the UK would have had the extra funds from the payment for both ships as Chillie was unwilling to either accept Eagle as a Carrier and the UK was unwilling to pay to convert her back. I would then convert the 3 cancelled Admiral Class carriers as they had already been cancelled there hulls were partially built and it was better than scrapping them. Alongside Fishers Follies and the commission of Hermes (and multiple sister ships) as the RN was actively very aviation minded at the time and was actively experimenting with a wide range of carrier concepts (Argus, Hermes, Vindictive, Eagle and the Courageous Class in multiple forms) so experimenting with small carriers (Hermes/Argos) Medium Carriers (Fishers Follies) and Large Carriers (3 Cancelled Admiral Class) is quite sensible. Several UK Admirals advocated for this at the time but Beatty overruled them. This could all have been achieved before the Washington treaty. The second big mistake was with Hermes and only building one of them when under the original interpretation of the treaty Hermes could easily have been classed as a Cruiser as she was 10,500 tons by dropping half a knot or improved construction techniques the RN could have had a whole class of "trade protection cruisers" by dropping 500 tons (something they did ask for on many occasions) these ships would have been somewhat comparable to a WW2 CVE in both form and function freeing up the bigger ships for other roles and like the 1942 light carrier program and the cruiser programs of the day, several minor powers probably would have been quite keen on purchasing one (most likely customers Australia, Argentina, Netherlands, Brazil, Canada, and Chile as all of these countries bought various ships from the UK during the interwar period and also bought Carriers from the 1942 program and had large coastlines either for themselves or colonial possessions and a need to protect shipping and interwar Hermes had a very successful carrier hunting down pirates and protecting trade along with several others like New Zeeland and Malaya). This program also has the benefit of helping the shipbuilding industry and acting as a job creation exercise as well as securing further contracts for maintenance and plane sales and thus being significantly cheaper than unemployment benefits for the out-of-work shipbuilders etc. As for cost yes there would have been an initial cost and the UK's finances were not great in the interwar period however they were nowhere near as bad as many people claim as between 1919 and 1939 the UK ran a budget surplus for 19 of those 20 years (they had a deficit of 1% in 1929). So the UK could afford this program even more so if they brought the scrapping of the older 12-inch armed ships forward from the mid-1920s to the early 1920s. The third big mistake was not pushing hard enough for the retention of control over aircraft on the carriers by all means the RAF could have had the land-based RNAS units but the RN needed to have complete control of carrier-based assets as they have significant differences from their land-based cousins and it would have also massively simplified procurement and operational control. This was eventually seen as the correct way to do things with the Inneskip award but that case needed to be made earlier especially in the 1920s when former 1st lord of the Admiralty and Navy fan Winston Churchill was the Chancellor of the Exchequer and in charge of the budget.

southjn1982 said:

I would then convert the 3 cancelled Admiral Class carriers as they had already been cancelled there hulls were partially built and it was better than scrapping them. Alongside Fishers Follies and the commission of Hermes (and multiple sister ships) as the RN was actively very aviation minded at the time and was actively experimenting with a wide range of carrier concepts (Argus, Hermes, Vindictive, Eagle and the Courageous Class in multiple forms) so experimenting with small carriers (Hermes/Argos) Medium Carriers (Fishers Follies) and Large Carriers (3 Cancelled Admiral Class) is quite sensible.

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The three Admiral hulls were a lost opportunity. But we need to be quick about it, as the three of them were only laid down in autumn 1916 and thus not much more than keels and lower hulls before they were suspended in March 1917. We need the Admirals to be converted to carriers and construction well underway by war's end in order to avoid their cancellation under the WNT or postwar austerity measures. Chile won't be paying for her now two battleships until after the war, and we need the money for the Admirals in 1917-18. So, what do we cancel in 1916 to free up the funds?

Admiral Beez said:

The three Admiral hulls were a lost opportunity. But we need to be quick about it, as the three of them were only laid down in autumn 1916 and thus not much more than keels and lower hulls before they were suspended in March 1917. We need the Admirals to be converted to carriers and construction well underway by war's end in order to avoid their cancellation under the WNT or postwar austerity measures. Chile won't be paying for her now two battleships until after the war, and we need the money for the Admirals in 1917-18. So, what do we cancel in 1916 to free up the funds?

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cut back on the C and D class cruisers or one of the Emergency destroyer programs also cancel the conversation of Vindictive that started in 1916 as well as the conversion of Eagle should free up funds or even sell/divert funds from the and slow the construction of Ramellies for a couple of months as she wasn't finished until September 1917 are all options although being mid-war finance is not so much an issue as during peacetime as you could have done many things like appealing to the Dominions as Canada was interested in acquiring a Battleship maybe the South Africans or the Raj could be tapped up for some cash as for the Candians they tried to get Battleships but couldn't get the funding past parliament they could even try a public subscription like the Japanese did with some of the Kongos or they did for the Tanks (Tank Bonds were very sucessful at raising money)

in less than a month, Tank Bonds around the UK rose

Glasgow £14,563,714
Birmingham £6,703,439
Edinburgh £4,764,639
Manchester £4,430,000
Bradford £4,060,000
London (2 weeks) £3,423,261
Newcastle £3,068,768
Swansea £2,180,939
Hull £2,186,820
Leicester £2,063,250
Liverpool £2,061,012
West Hartlepool £2,367,333

Glasgow is still very proud of how much it rose

As for the hulls were more advanced than you think at least two of them Howe and Rodney were within a month of having the hull launched when construction stopped as they were laid down only 3-6 weeks after Hood and although the construction was suspended in March 1917 it wasn't canceled until 27th Feb 1919 so they could have been under construction but incomplete during Washington

southjn1982 said:

cut back on the C and D class cruisers or one of the Emergency destroyer programs also cancel the conversation of Vindictive that started in 1916 as well as the conversion of Eagle should free up funds or even sell/divert funds from the and slow the construction of Ramellies for a couple of months as she wasn't finished until September 1917 are all options although being mid-war finance is not so much an issue as during peacetime as you could have done many things like appealing to the Dominions as Canada was interested in acquiring a Battleship maybe the South Africans or the Raj could be tapped up for some cash as for the Candians they tried to get Battleships but couldn't get the funding past parliament they could even try a public subscription like the Japanese did with some of the Kongos or they did for the Tanks (Tank Bonds were very sucessful at raising money)

in less than a month, Tank Bonds around the UK rose

Glasgow £14,563,714
Birmingham £6,703,439
Edinburgh £4,764,639
Manchester £4,430,000
Bradford £4,060,000
London (2 weeks) £3,423,261
Newcastle £3,068,768
Swansea £2,180,939
Hull £2,186,820
Leicester £2,063,250
Liverpool £2,061,012
West Hartlepool £2,367,333

Glasgow is still very proud of how much it rose

As for the hulls were more advanced than you think at least two of them Howe and Rodney were within a month of having the hull launched when construction stopped as they were laid down only 3-6 weeks after Hood and although the construction was suspended in March 1917 it wasn't canceled until 27th Feb 1919 so they could have been under construction but incomplete during Washington

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I think you are overstating the state of completion of these Admiral hulls.

Ian Johnston, author of "The Battleship Builders", wrote an article in Warship 2015 based on a visit to the former Fairfield yard, now BAe Govan. In that he noted that the various post Jutland design changes meant that

"...Rodney could not rise much above her double bottom while this redesign was underway, although the erection of engine and boiler room bulkheads gave some indication of the ship she could have been." He then continued after noting that shipbuilding was fully stretched in 1917 "...At Fairfield, several thousand tons of Rodney was sterilised on the berth in the hope that she would eventually be restarted.....The situation was largely unchanged during the following year, mainly because of insufficient labour...".

Hood's hull alone weighed over 14,000 tons. So it would seem there was a lot of steelwork still to erect let alone armour and machinery to be fitted. The QE class took some 12-18 months from laying down to launch for a hull that weighed 60% as much. Rodney was laid down in Oct 1916. I am exceedingly sceptical that she could have been launched within one month of being suspended in March 1917, ie 6 months after being laid down.

Both Fairfield and Cammell Laird were keen to get these slips cleared. Both had invested heavily in their yards to be able to lay these large ships down. The final cancellation in Feb 1919 came as a relief to Fairfield as it allowed them to clear the slip and begin work on the merchant ship orders they held.

Edit Even the smaller Renown class took 12-14 months on the slips.

Vindictive was only used as a carrier for a very brief period.

Commissioned in Oct 1918 she was used for trials that year (only one landing on her aft deck ever made). July 1919 she ferried aircraft to Russia, unloaded them, after which they operated from shore. After grounding, she then remained in Russia to provide support to them and to act as a depot ship to a flotilla of MTBs. On return to the U.K. in Dec 1919 she was placed in reserve. Hobbs describes her at that point as "of little value as either a carrier or a cruiser".

From 1920 to March 1923 she was used as a troopship.

Whilst it would have been taken time there was no shortage of money or potential money to pay for the work and the issue with the shipyard being grateful to go onto new work was they weren't being paid for having the dock being used and thus they were keen to build new ships to generate income if the Admirals are restarted that is not the case. When it comes to money in 1917-18 as the tank bonds show especially in places like Glasgow more than enough capital could have been raised to pay for the work if the political will had been there. HMS Hood Cost 6 million to build while Glasgow alone raised 14 Million to pay for tanks in January 1918 and as a naval city it is likely that a public subscription for a Warship instead of the tank one (or before it say for example in December 1917) would have got even more. It is perfectly reasonable if construction had restarted in 1918-19 for it to be completed or very close to being completed by 1922. The money was there and by late 1918 so was the workforce what was really lacking was the political will.

Edit for some reason I had it in my head that the tank bank in Glasgow lasted a month it was only 1 week thus Glasgow raised 14 million in one week in January 1918 (Jan 11th-18th) and during Warship Week in 1942 £955,611,589 was raised throughout the country

The three Admirals, had they been built as CVs would have been impressive aircraft carriers. without displacement treaty limitations they might have been completed with double deck hangars, capable of operating a hundred aircraft or more. Essentially double decker Lexingtons.

And with >850 ft carriers the FAA will have to be a focus at both Whitehall and the Air Ministry.

Admiral Beez said:

The three Admirals, had they been built as CVs would have been impressive aircraft carriers. without displacement treaty limitations they might have been completed with double deck hangars, capable of operating a hundred aircraft or more. Essentially double decker Lexingtons.

And with >850 ft carriers the FAA will have to be a focus at both Whitehall and the Air Ministry.

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In theory yes but I think with the technology of the day when it comes to aircraft handling they would lower the number. I think they would have hit the same barrier other carriers hit when it comes to operating a large air group regarding command and control and cycling the planes so I would expect an operational air group of 85-90 similar to the Nimitz class today. The interesting question would be how tall the Hangers are, as this would have a major impact on what planes they had. I the 1930s due to the tall Hanger for her size as well as large lifts (even if they were so crazy slow it took an hour to cycle an entire air group) Bearn operated twin-engine torpedo planes. WIth a large Hanger If she had survived maybe Sea-Mosquito or Sea Hornet style planes may have seen action earlier.

southjn1982 said:

The interesting question would be how tall the Hangers are, as this would have a major impact on what planes they had.

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I assume the Admirals would have a hangar height equal to the 16ft on Hermes, Argus and the Courageous class (15ft on Furious) and 20ft on Eagle. Split the difference and we're about 16-18ft on one or two hangars.

As for the number of hangars, one max sized hangar may be better than two, even with the need to keep the CAG below deck in harsh weather. One hangar will free up displacement for oil fuel and avgas.

SaparotRob said:

Would PM Curtain insist that that Force Z head to Australia?

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He might, and with two divisions of Australians holding the line in North Africa he has a strong point. But neither HMS Courageous or Glorious have the range to make the 6,500-6,700 nmi from CFB Esquimalt to Brisbane or Sydney, or for that matter the 7,000 nmi to Singapore (not that you want to go there, now). And, without hindsight, the route to Australia (or Singapore) would potentially send Force Z right into the path of the Kido Butai. My guess is Force Z is ordered to Pearl Harbour to support the USN, as part of Churchill's hope for more tanks and destroyers for North Africa and the Atlantic.

But yes, I'd say the eventual destination for Force Z is Australia, as part of countering Japan's Coral Sea ops, the Solomons being British territory after all. If Force Z is operating non-folding Martlets, Chesapeakes and whatever Dauntless the USN will spare, along with four months of training alongside the USN CAGs, the two RN carriers have a good chance.



If they survive, after Coral Sea I'd see Courageous and Glorious sent to the US Pacific Coast (via Pearl Harbour for refuel) or South Africa for significant machinery maintenance and deep refit. Both ships will be too clapped out for Midway. If sent Stateside the two carriers may emerge four months later with significant updates to their aircraft handing capabilities (outriggers, heavier arrestor gear, faster lifts, flattened aft flight deck, etc.), perhaps radar (likely not, as would want a British set), and most definitely AA. Just in time to load up with Hellcats and Tarpons to serve alongside USS Saratoga instead of HMS Victorious (USS Robin).

So you think, if Glorious, Courageous, and Ark Royal had survived, the Allies might have won WWII? Intriguing idea...

But seriously, I think you disregard the enormous luck the Royal Navy had that the German torpedoes were performing subpar throughout 1939 and most of 1940. Ark Royal might have been sunk on September 6th 1939 by U39, had the torpedoes not prematured due to a weakness in the firing circuit of the magnetic detonator. This was almost two weeks before the attack on Courageous. So, yes, Courageous might have survived 1939, being recalled from submarine hunting after Ark Royal was sunk. During the Norway campaign in 1940, numerous British ships escaped damage or worse because of malfunctioning German torpedoes, Warspite at least twice. Had those losses been incurred, that would have had serious consequences for the RN*s future operations. Would Courageous instead of Ark Royal have been able to launch the strike that crippled Bismarck under the prevailing weather conditions?

All these are fine counterfactual speculations. Just remember that, as far as US and British authorities were concerned in December of 1941, Japanese aircraft were biplanes fashioned out of bamboo and canvas, piloted by shortsighted men with buckteeth. Had your three Brits run into Kido Butai in 1941, the result would have been one-sided indeed. It took the US navy almost half a year to get the measure of the Zero. How do you think Fulmars would have fared?

mikemike said:

All these are fine counterfactual speculations. Just remember that, as far as US and British authorities were concerned in December of 1941, Japanese aircraft were biplanes fashioned out of bamboo and canvas, piloted by shortsighted men with buckteeth. Had your three Brits run into Kido Butai in 1941, the result would have been one-sided indeed. It took the US navy almost half a year to get the measure of the Zero. How do you think Fulmars would have fared?

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And there we have another of the WW2 myths.

British intelligence had circulated fairly accurate details of Japanese aircraft types, including the Zero fighter, in mid-1941. They reissued that intelligence about a week after Pearl Harbor.

Doesn't seem to have percolated down to the people at the front - hence Force Z. Or maybe they just didn't believe the intelligence (everybody knows the Japs can't build real planes). James Bond may not have had the standing then that he has now.

If those details didn't comprise the maneuverability or the range of the Zero, there is still scope to be surprised when meeting the plane in combat.

mikemike said:

Doesn't seem to have percolated down to the people at the front - hence Force Z. Or maybe they just didn't believe the intelligence (everybody knows the Japs can't build real planes). James Bond may not have had the standing then that he has now.

If those details didn't comprise the maneuverability or the range of the Zero, there is still scope to be surprised when meeting the plane in combat.

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There were no Zeros above Force Zed.

mikemike said:

Doesn't seem to have percolated down to the people at the front - hence Force Z. Or maybe they just didn't believe the intelligence (everybody knows the Japs can't build real planes). James Bond may not have had the standing then that he has now.

If those details didn't comprise the maneuverability or the range of the Zero, there is still scope to be surprised when meeting the plane in combat.

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And there were no carriers to send with a fighter complement that would have made a difference.

I recommend reading Boyd "The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters. Linchpin of Victory 1935-1942" to fully understand British Far Eastern Naval Policy in the period.

As for Force Z, it didn't become such until PoW & Repulse arrived in Singapore on 2 Dec 1941. Prior to that it was Force G but those ships didn't link up until arriving at Ceylon. Repulse sailed for the IO on 31 Aug 1941 as part of an Admiralty plan to reinforce the IO theatre. She sailed as escort to convoy WS11 and eventually reached Ceylon on 27 Nov to link up with PoW. PoW sailed from Britain as the main part of Force G on 24 Oct 1941 and arrived in Colombo on 28 Nov 1941 to join Repulse and the onward journey to Singapore.

In Aug 1941 the Admiralty had taken a decision not to deploy a carrier to the IO until about April 1942. The reasons were that the Med theatre had priority and no carriers were available in the interim. The RN carriers and their employment on or around 24 Oct 1941 were as follows:-

Argus - ferrying aircraft from Britain to Gibraltar for onward delivery to Malta
Eagle - Docked for much needed refit on 1 Nov 1941. Extent of this was cut back following loss of Ark Royal. Completed 9 Jan 1942
Hermes - refit at Simonstown SA from mid-Nov until 31 Jan 1942. Air group 9 Swordfish. No fighters.
Furious - at Philadelphia Navy Yard for a badly needed refit
Ark Royal - By late Oct 1941 she was badly in need of a refit especially to her machinery, which the Admiralty were planning to run from late 1941 to April 1942.
Illustrious - US repairs only completed in Oct followed by work up. Air group 12 Swordfish.
Formidable - US repairs only completed early Dec.
Victorious - with the Home Fleet. Required in case the Kriegsmarine came out to play.
Indomitable - completed 10 Oct 1941 and working up in the Carribean. Due at Gibraltar by 30 Nov probably to release Ark for refit. Proved many times that even if she had not run aground there she couldn't have joined Force Z in time to save it.

Illustrious & Formidable both needed to return to Britain for additional works, not helped by colliding en route, and to pick up their new air groups, for which the were transporting the first folding wing Martlet II. As a result they weren't ready to sail for the IO until March & Feb 1942 respectively.