parsifal
Colonel
For those who are interested this is the actual wording from the memorandum issued by the Joint Chiefs that authorised the bombing campaign (for both the US and CW forces committed to that task). You can find it in Memorandum C.C.S. 166/1/D by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, dated 21 January 1943:
Directive to the appropriate British and U.S. Air Force Commanders to govern the operation of the British and U.S. Bomber Commands in the United Kingdom (Approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 65th meeting on January 21, 1943)
1. Your Primary object will be the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.
2. Within that General concept, your primary objectives, subject to the exigencies of weather and tactical feasibility, will for the present be in the following order of priority:
(a) German submarine construction yards.
(b) The German aircraft industry.
(c) Transportation.
(d) Oil plants.
(e) Other targets in enemy war industry.
The above order of priority may be varied from time to time according to developments in the strategical situation. Moreover, other objectives of great importance either from the political or military point of view must be attacked. Examples of these are:
(1) Submarine operating bases on the Biscay coast. If these can be put out of action, a great step forward will have been taken in the U-boat war which the C.C.S have agreed to be a first charge on our resources. Day and night attacks on these bases have been inaugurated and should be continued so that an assessment of their effects can be made as soon as possible. If it is found that successful results can be achieved, these attacks should continue whenever conditions are favorable for as long and as often as is necessary. These objectives have not been included in the order of priority, which coves the long term operations, particularly as the bases are not situated in Germany.
(2) Berlin, which should be attacked when the conditions are suitable for the attainment of the specially valuable results unfavorable to the moral of the enemy or favorable to that of the Russians.
3. You may also be required, at the appropriate time, to attack objectives in Northern Italy on connection with amphibious operations in the Mediterranean theater.
4. There may be certain other objectives of great but fleeting importance for the attack of which all necessary planes and preparations should be made. Of these, an example would be the important units of the German Fleet in harbor or at sea.
5. You should take every opportunity to attack Germany by day, to destroy objectives that are unsuitable for night attack, to sustain continuous pressure on German morale, to impose heavy losses on the German day fighter force, and to contain German fighter strength away from the Russian and Mediterranean theaters of war.
6. When the Allied armies reeneter the Continent, you will afford them all possible support in the manner most effective.
7. In attacking objectives in occupied territories, you will conform to such instructions as may be issued from time to time for political reasons by His Majesty's Government through the British Chiefs of Staff.
This directive known as the Casablanca directive or POINTBLANK, replaced the general directive No. 5 above, S46368 D.C.A.S, 14th February 1942 and was issued to the appropriate British and United States Air Force Commanders to govern the operations of British and U.S. Bomber Commands in the United Kingdom.
In his post war book Bomber offensive Harris mentions the Casablanca directive at the start of chapter seven "The offensive underway". In it he emphasises the "Object" paragraph of the directive issued to the RAF and mentions the "Primary" paragraph in passing. He explains that the subject of morale had been dropped (it had been emphasised in the previous general directive No. 5 (the Area Bombing Directive)) and that he was to proceed with the "general 'disorganisation' of German industry" but that some parts of that industry, such as U-Boat building, had a higher priority than others, from which he drew the conclusion that it "allowed [him] to attack any German industrial city of 100,000 inhabitants and above" and that the Ruhr remained the principal target for the RAF.]
However it is clear that even the so-called "area bombing" directive was never intended to try and achieve a total national collapse of morale. It was intended to achieve dislocation of production on a city by city basis, with the emphasis on lost morale, but failing that, by the sheer destruction of the cities themselves, and to maximise civilian casualties.
Directive to the appropriate British and U.S. Air Force Commanders to govern the operation of the British and U.S. Bomber Commands in the United Kingdom (Approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 65th meeting on January 21, 1943)
1. Your Primary object will be the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.
2. Within that General concept, your primary objectives, subject to the exigencies of weather and tactical feasibility, will for the present be in the following order of priority:
(a) German submarine construction yards.
(b) The German aircraft industry.
(c) Transportation.
(d) Oil plants.
(e) Other targets in enemy war industry.
The above order of priority may be varied from time to time according to developments in the strategical situation. Moreover, other objectives of great importance either from the political or military point of view must be attacked. Examples of these are:
(1) Submarine operating bases on the Biscay coast. If these can be put out of action, a great step forward will have been taken in the U-boat war which the C.C.S have agreed to be a first charge on our resources. Day and night attacks on these bases have been inaugurated and should be continued so that an assessment of their effects can be made as soon as possible. If it is found that successful results can be achieved, these attacks should continue whenever conditions are favorable for as long and as often as is necessary. These objectives have not been included in the order of priority, which coves the long term operations, particularly as the bases are not situated in Germany.
(2) Berlin, which should be attacked when the conditions are suitable for the attainment of the specially valuable results unfavorable to the moral of the enemy or favorable to that of the Russians.
3. You may also be required, at the appropriate time, to attack objectives in Northern Italy on connection with amphibious operations in the Mediterranean theater.
4. There may be certain other objectives of great but fleeting importance for the attack of which all necessary planes and preparations should be made. Of these, an example would be the important units of the German Fleet in harbor or at sea.
5. You should take every opportunity to attack Germany by day, to destroy objectives that are unsuitable for night attack, to sustain continuous pressure on German morale, to impose heavy losses on the German day fighter force, and to contain German fighter strength away from the Russian and Mediterranean theaters of war.
6. When the Allied armies reeneter the Continent, you will afford them all possible support in the manner most effective.
7. In attacking objectives in occupied territories, you will conform to such instructions as may be issued from time to time for political reasons by His Majesty's Government through the British Chiefs of Staff.
This directive known as the Casablanca directive or POINTBLANK, replaced the general directive No. 5 above, S46368 D.C.A.S, 14th February 1942 and was issued to the appropriate British and United States Air Force Commanders to govern the operations of British and U.S. Bomber Commands in the United Kingdom.
In his post war book Bomber offensive Harris mentions the Casablanca directive at the start of chapter seven "The offensive underway". In it he emphasises the "Object" paragraph of the directive issued to the RAF and mentions the "Primary" paragraph in passing. He explains that the subject of morale had been dropped (it had been emphasised in the previous general directive No. 5 (the Area Bombing Directive)) and that he was to proceed with the "general 'disorganisation' of German industry" but that some parts of that industry, such as U-Boat building, had a higher priority than others, from which he drew the conclusion that it "allowed [him] to attack any German industrial city of 100,000 inhabitants and above" and that the Ruhr remained the principal target for the RAF.]
However it is clear that even the so-called "area bombing" directive was never intended to try and achieve a total national collapse of morale. It was intended to achieve dislocation of production on a city by city basis, with the emphasis on lost morale, but failing that, by the sheer destruction of the cities themselves, and to maximise civilian casualties.
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