I did not mention the I-153, which also was used relatively successfully as an attack aircraft, only because it was not particularly effective. Its maximum bomb load was about 150 kg, and its design did not allow the installation of cannon armament. However, practice demonstrated that the I-153, when used as a ground attack aircraft, suffered significantly fewer losses than the Il-2 despite the lack of armor. And the I-207 could not only carry 500 kg of bomb load, but also could dive steadily with it at an angle of 70°. In addition, its design allowed the installation of two suspended 23-mm cannons instead of bombs. In general, this "little guy" had outstanding performance for 1940-1941 - but not as a fighter aircraft, as it was originally designed to be! In addition, its engine allowed the use of low-octane gasoline, the plane was sufficiently stable and very maneuverable, it did not make high demands on the level of pilot's training, takeoff and landing were not difficult. With the same engine, this biplane had the same maximum speed as the I-16, surpassing the latter in all other characteristics.
This is one of the problems of the Soviet Air Force - serious underestimation of many concepts due to tactical stereotypes. In particular, this relates to the concept of the fighter-bomber or generally unarmored light bomber-attack aircraft. The Soviets relied on armor, but it turned out that by 1941 the Germans had 20-mm antiaircraft guns whose shells easily penetrated any aircraft armor. A much more effective defense was maneuverability and speed - especially with an air-cooled engine. The Soviets did not immediately, but gradually realized that the P-40 was much more useful as a bomber than as a fighter, but at the same time the P-40 retained the ability to engage enemy fighters (albeit defensively), i.e. it could operate independently without additional escort. The Soviets did not recognize the combat potential of the P-47 at all - there is a rather arrogant characteristic from the famous test pilot Mark Gallai, saying that it was a very comfortable aircraft to fly it in a straight line, but it was not a fighter. The P-47 would hardly have been as successful as a fighter on the Eastern Front as it was on the Western Front - primarily due to lower altitudes of the major air combats where the P-47 had no advantage. But as a fighter-bomber it had excellent performance.
The Soviets had their own "evil genius" in the field of air force tactics in the late 1930s and early 1940s - the head of the Red Army's main aviation supply directorate, P.A.Alekseyev [ah-lehk-say-ehv], whose efforts prevented the I-207 from being adopted for service, despite the pilots' high estimates. This is not the only "merit" of Alekseyev - he was the only one who insisted on a single-seat version of the Il-2, in addition, due to his unjustifiably excessive requirements to the range of fighters, Soviet designers were forced to increase the capacity of fuel tanks, which greatly deteriorated maneuvering characteristics. The list can be continued.